area handbook series 

Poland 

a country study 



Poland 

a country study 



Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 




On the cover: Arched entrance to the monastery of Jasna 
Gora at Czestochowa 



Third Edition, First Printing, 1994. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Poland : a country study / Federal Research Division, Library of Con- 
gress ; edited by Glenn E. Curtis. — 3rd ed. 

p. cm. — (Area handbook series, ISSN 1057-5294) 
(DA Pam ; 550-162) 

"Research completed October 1992." 

"Supersedes the 1984 edition of Poland : a country study, edit- 
ed by Harold D. Nelson" : T.p. verso. 

Includes bibliographical references (pp. 307-327) and index. 
ISBN 0-8444-0827-1 

1. Poland. I. Curtis, Glenn E. (Glenn Eldon), 1946- 
II. Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. III. Series. 
IV. Series: DA Pam ; 550-162. 
DK4040.P57 1994 93-46235 
943.8— dc20 CIP 



Headquarters, Department of the Army 
DA Pam 550-162 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 



Foreword 



This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepared by 
the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress under 
the Country Studies/Area Handbook Program sponsored by the 
Department of the Army. The last page of this book lists the other 
published studies. 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, 
describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national 
security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelation- 
ships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural 
factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social 
scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of 
the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static 
portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make 
up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com- 
mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature 
and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their 
attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and 
political order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not 
be construed as an expression of an official United States govern- 
ment position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to 
adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections, 
additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be wel- 
comed for use in future editions. 

Louis R. Mortimer 
Chief 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, D.C. 20540 



111 



Acknowledgments 



The authors are indebted to numerous individuals and organi- 
zations who provided materials, time, advice, and expertise on Po- 
lish affairs for this volume. 

Thanks go to Ralph K. Benesch, who oversees the Country 
Studies/ Area Handbook Program for the Department of the Army. 
The authors also appreciate the advice and guidance of Sandra W. 
Meditz, Federal Research Division coordinator of the handbook 
series. Special thanks also go to Marilyn L. Majeska, who managed 
the editing and production process, assisted by Andrea T. Mer- 
rill; to Teresa E. Kemp, who designed the book cover and the title 
page illustration for Chapter 2; to Marty Ittner, who designed the 
other chapter title page illustrations; to David P. Cabitto, who 
provided graphics support and, together with the firm of Green- 
horne and O'Mara, prepared maps; and to Tim Merrill, who com- 
piled geographic data. LTC Peter J. Podbielski, United States 
Army, provided invaluable personal insights into the current status 
of the Polish military; Marcin Wiesiolek of the Foreign Military 
Studies Office, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, and Michal Bichniewicz 
of the Center for International Studies and Defense Analyses in 
Warsaw updated the national security section; and Karl W. Soper 
assembled basic source materials for preparation of Chapter 5. 

The Polish Information Agency (Polska Agencja Informacyjna) 
provided the editor with a wide selection of current photographs 
of economic and military activities. Ronald D. Bachman and Sam 
and Sarah Stulberg also contributed numerous timely photographs. 

The contributions of the following individuals are gratefully ac- 
knowledged as well: Sharon Costello, who edited the chapters; Bar- 
bara Edgerton and Izella Watson, who did the word processing; 
Catherine Schwartzstein, who performed the final prepublication 
editorial review; Joan C. Cook, who compiled the index; and Linda 
Peterson of the Printing and Processing Section, Library of Con- 
gress, who prepared the camera-ready copy under the supervision 
of Peggy Pixley. 



v 



Contents 



Page 

Foreword iii 

Acknowledgments v 

Preface xiii 

Chronology of Important Events xv 

Country Profile xxi 

Introduction XXIX 

Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 

Neal Pease 

EARLY HISTORY UNTIL 1385 3 

The Origins of Poland 3 

The Medieval Era 5 

Integration into European Civilization 7 

THE JAGIELLON ERA, 1385-1572 7 

The Polish-Lithuanian Union 7 

The "Golden Age" of the Sixteenth Century 10 

THE NOBLE REPUBLIC, 1572-1795 15 

The Elective Monarchy 15 

The Deluge, 1648-67 15 

Decay of the Commonwealth 16 

The Three Partitions, 1764-95 17 

PARTITIONED POLAND 22 

The Napoleonic Period 22 

The Impact of Nationalism and Romanticism 23 

The Era of National Insurrections 25 

The Time of "Organic Work" 26 

Social and Political Transformation 27 

INDEPENDENCE WON AND LOST, 1914-45 28 

World War I 28 

Interwar Poland 30 

World War II 34 

THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC 39 

Consolidation of Communist Power 39 

From Stalinism to the Polish October . 41 

The Gathering Crisis of People's Poland, 1956-80 ... 43 

The Birth of Solidarity 45 



vii 



The Jaruzelski Interlude 47 

The 1989 Elections and Their Aftermath 50 

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 53 

Glenn E. Curtis 

PHYSICAL SETTING 56 

Topography 57 

Drainage 60 

Climate 61 

ENVIRONMENT AND POLLUTION , 61 

Environmental Conditions and Crises 62 

Environmental Groups 63 

Government Environmental Policy 64 

DEMOGRAPHY 65 

Languages 65 

Population Growth and Structure 66 

Population Density and Distribution 68 

THE SOCIAL ORDER 68 

Ethnic Groups 71 

The Intelligentsia 75 

The Working Classes 77 

Social Relationships 82 

The Role of Women 83 

HOUSING 86 

Communist Housing Policy 86 

Polish Housing in Practice 87 

Housing after 1989 88 

RELIGION 89 

The Polish Catholic Church and the State 92 

The Polish Catholic Church and the People 97 

Other Churches 98 

EDUCATION 100 

The Education Tradition 101 

Eras of Repression 101 

The Drive for Education Reform 103 

Structure of the Education System 104 

HEALTH AND WELFARE 107 

Health Conditions 107 

The Health Care System 107 

Health Issues 109 

The Welfare System Ill 



vin 



Chapter 3. The Economy 115 

Zbigniew M. Fallenbuchl 

NATURAL RESOURCES 118 

Minerals and Fuels 118 

Agricultural Resources 120 

Labor Force 120 

THE ECONOMY UNDER THE COMMUNIST 

SYSTEM 121 

System Structure 121 

Development Strategy 123 

DEVELOPMENT OF THE CENTRALLY PLANNED 

ECONOMY 124 

Establishing the Planning Formula 124 

Retrenchment and Adjustment in the 1960s 126 

Reliance on Technology in the 1970s 127 

Reform Failure in the 1980s 128 

AFTER THE FALL OF THE COMMUNIST SYSTEM 129 

Marketization and Stabilization 130 

Macroeconomic Indicators for 1990-91 133 

The External Balance of the Economy 137 

The Privatization Process 138 

Economic Policy Making in the 1990s 139 

STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY 140 

Fuels and Energy 141 

Extractive and Manufacturing Industries 147 

Agriculture 151 

Fishing and Forestry 154 

Transportation and Communications 156 

Banking and Finance 159 

FOREIGN TRADE 162 

The Foreign Trade Mechanism 163 

Postcommunist Policy Adjustments 164 

Foreign Investment 168 

ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 169 

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 171 

Ronald D. Bachman 

POLITICAL SETTING 174 

The Round Table Agreement 175 

The Mazowiecki Government 176 

Popular Election of a President 177 

The Bielecki Government 179 

The Parliamentary Elections of October 1991 180 



ix 



The Olszewski Government 181 

The Pawlak Interlude 183 

The Suchocka Government 183 

THE CONSTITUTION 184 

The Constitution of 1952 184 

Constitutional Revisions after April 1989 187 

GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE 188 

Presidency 189 

Sejm 191 

Senate 192 

Supreme Control Chamber 192 

Council of Ministers 193 

Regional and Local Government 194 

Judicial System 194 

POLITICAL PARTIES 198 

Solidarity 199 

Center Alliance 200 

Democratic Union 201 

Liberal-Democratic Congress 202 

Beer-Lovers' Party 202 

Peasant Alliance 202 

Christian National Union 203 

Party of Christian Democrats 204 

Confederation for an Independent Poland 204 

PZPR and Successor Parties 205 

Polish Peasant Party 206 

POLITICS AND THE MEDIA 206 

The Early Opposition Press 207 

Liberalization in the 1980s 207 

The End of Press Censorship 208 

Book Publishing 209 

Radio and Television 209 

FOREIGN RELATIONS 210 

Soviet Union and Russia 212 

Other Former Soviet Republics 215 

Southern Neighbors and the Visegrad Triangle 218 

Germany 220 

The United States 222 

Other Western Countries 224 

International Organizations 225 

Chapter 5. National Security 229 

Glenn E. Curtis 

DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES 232 

From Medieval Times to World War I 232 



x 



The Interwar Years 234 

World War II 236 

The Communist Era 237 

NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 244 

Threat Perception 244 

Military Doctrine 247 

Strategy and Tactics 250 

Military Cooperation and Exchanges 251 

DEFENSE ORGANIZATION 253 

The Communist Tradition 253 

Evolution and Restructuring 254 

National Security Agencies 258 

Armed Services 259 

MILITARY MANPOWER . 267 

The Military and Society 268 

Recruitment and Service Obligations 270 

Military Training and Education 274 

DEFENSE AND THE NATIONAL ECONOMY 278 

Military Budget 278 

Arms Procurement 279 

LAW AND ORDER 284 

Internal Security 284 

Crime 287 

Penal System 289 

Under Communism 290 

Appendix. Tables 293 

Bibliography 307 

Glossary 329 

Index 335 

Contributors 353 

List of Figures 

1 Administrative Division of Poland, 1992 xxviii 

2 Piast Poland, 966 to 1370 8 

3 Jagiellon Poland-Lithuania, Fifteenth Century 12 

4 Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth from the Union of 

Lublin, 1569, to 1667 14 

5 The First Partition of Poland, 1772 18 

6 The Second Partition of Poland, 1793 20 

7 The Third Partition of Poland, 1795 21 

8 Duchy of Warsaw, 1807-13, and Congress 

Poland, 1815 24 



xi 



9 Independent Poland, 1921-39 32 

10 Occupied Poland in World War II 38 

11 Postwar Territorial Adjustments, 1945 40 

12 Topography and Drainage 58 

13 Population Density by District, 1992 70 

14 Distribution of Heavy Industry and Mineral 

Resources, 1992 146 

15 Transportation System, 1992 158 

16 Enlisted Ranks and Insignia, 1992 272 

17 Officer Ranks and Insignia, 1992 273 

18 Warrant Officer Ranks and Insignia, 1992 276 



xii 



Preface 



At the end of the 1980s, Poland, like the other countries of Eastern 
Europe, underwent a rather sudden shift away from communist 
rule and into an uncertain new world of democracy and economic 
reform. The events spurred by the repudiation of Poland's last com- 
munist regime in 1989 demanded a new and updated version of 
Poland: A Country Study. Because the emergence of the opposition 
Solidarity movement in 1 980 increased the flow of information from 
communist Poland, reliable coverage of the 1980s has been possi- 
ble. Thus, this new treatment of Poland is based on a number of 
authoritative monographs and a host of scholarly articles. The most 
useful of those sources are cited in a bibliographic summary at the 
end of each chapter. 

The authors of this edition have described changes in the past 
ten years against the historical, political, and social background 
of Poland. Particular emphasis falls on the transition period that 
began in 1989 with the rejection of the last communist government. 
This period, a historic watershed not yet concluded in 1993, prom- 
ises to have permanent impact on all aspects of Polish life. The 
authors have attempted to present a compact, accessible, and un- 
biased treatment of five main topics: historical setting, society and 
its environment, the economy, government and politics, and na- 
tional security. 

Polish personal names are rendered with full diacritics. The spell- 
ing of geographical names conforms to that approved by the United 
States Board on Geographic Names, including the use of diacritics, 
with the exception of commonly used international spellings such 
as Warsaw (Warszawa) and Oder (Odra). On maps English- 
language generic designations such as river, plain, and mountain 
are used. In the text, organizations commonly known by their acro- 
nyms (such as PZPR, the Polish United Workers' Party) are in- 
troduced first by their full English and Polish names. 

Measurements are given in metric units; a conversion table is 
provided in the Appendix. To amplify points in the text, tables 
in the Appendix provide information on various aspects of Polish 
society, economic performance indicators, Polish political parties, 
and military strength. A glossary and a bibliography are also in- 
cluded at the end of the book. 

The body of the text reflects information available as of Octo- 
ber 1992. Certain other portions of the text, however, have been 
updated. The Introduction discusses significant events that have 



Xlll 



occurred since the completion of research; the Chronology, Country 
Profile, and Glossary include updated information as available; and 
the Bibliography includes recently published sources thought to be 
particularly helpful to the reader. 



xiv 



Table A. Chronology of Important Events 



Period 



Description 



MEDIEVAL PERIOD 
966 

1025 
1079 
1226 
1241 
1320 

1333-70 

1364 
1385 

1410 

SIXTEENTH CENTURY 
1500-1600 

1526 



1543 



Prince Mieszko adopts Christianity; traditional date of 
origin of Polish state. 

Bolesiaw I (the Brave) recognized as first king of Poland. 

Bishop Stanisiaw of Krakow martyred. 

Teutonic Knights introduced into Polish regions. 

Asiatic Tatars invade Poland and Central Europe. 

Following a period of disunity, Wladyslaw Lokietek (the 
Short) recognized in Europe as king of Poland. 

Kazimierz III (the Great), reigns as one of Poland's 
most noted rulers. 

University of Krakow founded. 

Union of Krewo begins Polish-Lithuanian Common- 
wealth under Jagiellon Dynasty. 

Forces of Poland-Lithuania defeat Teutonic Knights at 
Battle of Grunwald (Tannenberg). 



Traditional "Golden Age" of Poland-Lithuania; peri- 
od when political stability, prosperity, and cultural 
achievement reach their peak. 

Defeat by Ottoman Turks at Batde of Mohacs leads to 
collapse of Jagiellon rule over Bohemia and Hungary. 

Copernicus publishes treatise defining heliocentric 
universe. 



1569 



Union of Lublin strengthens Polish-Lithuanian Com- 
monwealth. 



1572 

SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 
1648-67 



Jagiellon Dynasty ends, and era of truly elective monar- 
chy begins. 



"Deluge" period includes internal rebellion and for- 
eign invasion. 



1683 



King Jan Sobieski breaks siege of Vienna. 



XV 



Table A. — Continued 



Period 



Description 



EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
ca. 1700-25 

1764 

1768-72 
1772-73 

1791 

1792-93 

1794 
1795 

NINETEENTH CENTURY 
1807-15 



ca. 1820-55 



1830-31 



1846 
1863-64 



ca. 1864-1900 



TWENTIETH CENTURY 
1914-18 

ca. 1919-21 



Poland becomes virtual puppet of Russia during reign 
of Tsar Peter the Great. 

Stanislaw August Poniatowski elected as last king of 
Poland-Lithuania. 

Confederation of Bar rebels. 

Austria, Prussia, and Russia impose first partition of 
Poland. 

Constitution of May 3 restores hereditary monarchy and 
reforms political system. 

Confederation of Targowica invites foreign interven- 
tion; Prussia and Russia carry out second partition 
of Poland. 

Tadeusz Kosciuszko leads rebellion against foreign rule. 

Austria, Prussia, and Russia impose third partition of 
Poland, ending Polish independence for more than 
a centurv. 



Semi-independent Duchy of Warsaw established by 
Napoleon; abolished by Russian occupation, 1813; 
repartitioned by Congress of Vienna after Napoleon's 
final defeat. 

Era of Romanticism in Polish culture produces such 
figures as Mickiewicz and Chopin. 

"November Revolt" against Russian rule in Congress 
Kingdom of Poland proves unsuccessful. 

Polish uprising fails in Austrian zone of partition. 

"January Insurrection" in Russian sector culminates 
in failure, ending phase of nineteenth-century insur- 
rections against foreign domination. 

Period of "Organic Work" marks important transition 
in Polish politics and society. 



World War I results in collapse of all partition powers 
and rise of independent Second Polish Republic at 
war's end. 

War with Soviet Russia; Poland avoids Soviet conquest 
and gains narrow victory. 



XVI 



Table A. — Continued 



Period Description 

1926 Jozef Pilsudski gains power by coup and establishes 

sanacja government that rules until 1939. 

1939 World War II begins with September invasions of 

Poland by Nazi Germany and Soviet Union; Polish 
forces defeated. After defeat, Polish government-in- 
exile forms in London under General Sikorski. 

1940- 41 Soviet Union incarcerates 1.5 million Poles in labor 

camps and executes thousands of prisoners of war be- 
fore ceding Polish lands to Germans. 

1941- 44 All Polish territory comes under Nazi occupation, tak- 

ing savage toll of Polish lives; Poland becomes main 
killing ground of the Holocaust; Polish resistance 
movements active at home and abroad. 

1943 Discovery of Katyh Massacre causes breach between 

Soviet Union and Polish government-in-exile. 

1944 Warsaw uprising by resistance Polish Home Army 

receives no Soviet assistance, is crushed by Nazis. 

1945 Red Army occupies Polish territories and establishes 

communist-dominated coalition government. 

1947 Communists consolidate political monopoly after rigged 

elections. 

1947- 49 Sovietization occurs, including nationalization of indus- 

try and business, attacks on organized religion, and 
imprisonment of opposition leaders. 

1948- 56 Stalinist period brings most severe communist rule; 

adoption of Soviet-style constitution; attempted col- 
lectivization of agriculture. 

1956 Worker riots in Poznah result in numerous deaths; in 

defiance of Soviet Union, Wladystaw Gomulka chosen 
as Polish Communist Party leader; he announces 
commitment to reform and liberalization of system. 

1968 Popular disenchantment with Gomulka begins to crys- 

tallize opposition that will mature in next two decades. 

1970 Government price increase policy brings strikes and 

demonstrations on Baltic coast; met by lethal force, 
hundreds die; Gomulka deposed. 

1970-80 Edward Gierek heads communist party; his policies 

result in severe economic crisis and intensified op- 
position sentiment; strikes and riots result from price 
rises, 1976. 



XVII 



Table A. — Continued 



Period Description 

1978 Cardinal Karol Wojtyla, elected pope, takes name John 

Paul II. 

1980 Nationwide worker strikes culminate in occupation of 

Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk; state authorities sign 
Gdansk Accords, acceding to striker demands and au- 
tonomy or the Solidarity trade union. 

1980-81 Solidarity, spearhead of political and social reform 

movement, exists legally; constant friction between 
Solidarity and government; Warsaw Pact threatens 
intervention. 

1981 General Wojciech Jaruzelski becomes party head, 

declares martial law, and carries out military takeover 
in name of communist party; Solidarity banned, its 
leadership imprisoned, other union activists driven 
underground. 

1 983 Solidarity leader Lech Walesa receives Nobel Prize for 

Peace. 

1984 Father Jerzy Popieluszko murdered by Polish secret 

police. 

1985-1988 Period of gradual liberalization corresponding to ad- 

vent of Mikhail Gorbachev in Soviet Union; economic 
crisis and popular frustration deepen. 

1988 Renewed labor strikes convince Jaruzelski to initiate 

talks with opposition. 

1989 Round Table talks produce formula for power sharing 

between communists and Solidarity; partly free elec- 
tions result in sweeping Solidarity victories; com- 
munist regime crumbles. 

1989 August First postcommunist prime minister, Tadeusz Mazo- 

wiecki, forms coalition government. 

1990 January "Shock therapy" economic reform program of Finance 

Minister Leszek Balcerowicz goes into effect; PZPR 
formally dissolved and renamed Social Democracy 
of Republic of Poland (SdRP). 

December Walesa becomes first popularly elected postcommunist 

president. 

1991 July Warsaw Pact alliance dissolved. 
Summer Comecon economic grouping dissolved. 

August Coup fails to take over government of Soviet Union. 

xviii 



Table A. — Continued 



Period 



Description 



October 

December 

1992 February 

May 
August 

1993 October 



Parliamentary elections seat fragmented Sejm; Jan Ol- 
szewski chosen compromise prime minister. 

Soviet Union officially breaks up. 

Parliament passes strict antiabortion law after bitter so- 
cial and political struggle. 

Sejm's rejection of Olszewski economic program leads 
to Olszewski's ouster; final accord signed on with- 
drawal of Russian troops from Poland. 

Hanna Suchocka chosen prime minister. Her coalition 
government then oversees period of economic growth 
and continued political fragmentation. 

Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak forms new govern- 
ment dominated by SdPR. 



XIX 



Country Profile 




Country 

Formal Name: Republic of Poland. 
Short Form: Poland. 
Capital: Warsaw. 

Flag: Two equal-sized horizontal bands — upper white and lower 
red. 

NOTE — The Country Profile contains updated information as available. 



XXI 



Geography 

Size: 312,683 square kilometers, including inland waters. 

Topography: Chiefly plains, most notably in vast central lowlands; 
significant highlands in southwest (Sudeten Mountains) and 
southeast (Tatra Mountains, northernmost part of Carpathian 
range). Only 3 percent above 500 meters, about 90 percent below 
300 meters. Wide lake region above central lowland dotted with 
lakes occupying about 10 percent of surface area. 

Climate: Dominant continental climate year round, but consider- 
able winter snow and fog from maritime air currents. Summers 
less humid with occasional showers; rainy season in November. 
Longest growing season in southwest, shortest in northeast. Aver- 
age annual precipitation 600 millimeters, higher in mountains. 
Summer precipitation averages twice that in winter. 

Society 

Population: According to 1981 official estimate, 36.1 million. Ac- 
cording to 1991 official estimate, 38.3 million; projected 2000 popu- 
lation, 39.5 million. 

Ethnic Groups and Languages: About 98 percent of population 
ethnic Poles; largest minority groups Ukrainians, Belarusians, and 
Germans; estimates of minority populations vary greatly. Polish, 
a West Slavic language, official and universally used; regional di- 
alects do not impede communication. 

Religion: About 96 percent of population Roman Catholic, ac- 
cording to 1991 survey; small numbers in various Protestant and 
Orthodox denominations and small Jewish population. 

Education: About 98 percent of population over age fifteen liter- 
ate. Eight grades of primary school compulsory; secondary pro- 
gram divided into college preparatory (26 percent in 1991) and 
vocational tracks. Institutions of higher learning include universi- 
ties, poly technical schools, and specialized academies such as med- 
ical and agricultural schools. 

Health: Former communist system of free health care for all work- 
ers underwent reform in early 1990s. Privatization of medical prac- 
tice, already common under communism, expanded but raised 
prices and did not make care consistently available. Obsolescence 
of equipment and shortage of medicines a continued problem; drive 
for consolidation closed many facilities; national health insurance 
plan slow in developing. 



xxn 



Economy 



Salient Features: Wide-ranging measures taken beginning in 1990 
to convert communist economy into market-oriented system, in- 
cluding commercialization of interest and exchange rates, aboli- 
tion of price subsidies and wage indexation, and encouragement 
of foreign investment. Enterprise privatization, a central policy goal, 
met with uneven success; substantial portion of production capac- 
ity remained state-owned in 1993. 

Mining: Major deposits of industrially useful minerals exploited, 
including coal, copper, lead, zinc, sulfur, and salt. Natural gas and 
petroleum reserves expanded, with new gas discoveries 1980s and 
early 1990s. 

Energy: Coal, major energy source, generated 70 percent of elec- 
trical power, 80 percent of total energy, 1989. Imported and domes- 
tic petroleum and natural gas other major fuels. Imported fuel and 
power 21 percent of total import expenses in 1990. Nuclear pro- 
gram ended for financial, environmental reasons. Major reorgani- 
zation planned for fuel-energy sector in early 1990s, including 
market pricing. 

Manufacturing: Employed 25.2 percent of labor force in 1989. 
Principal branches food products, machinery and computer equip- 
ment, metals and metal products, textiles and clothing, transport 
equipment (including ships), and chemical products. In light and 
heavy industry, many plants outmoded and required wholesale 
modernization and Western investment. After 1990 consumer goods 
production up to bolster exports. 

Agriculture: Never collectivized on large scale in communist era. 
In 1989 some 79 percent of agricultural production from private 
land, 17 percent from state farms. In 1989 agriculture employed 
25.7 percent of labor force. Private farms, much more numerous, 
also mostly small and inefficient, suffering from poor availability 
of materials and infrastructure. Major reform and land redistri- 
bution contemplated. Main products: grains, potatoes, sugar beets, 
fodder, pigs, and cattle. 

Foreign Trade: Principal exports coal, copper, coke, sulfur, ships, 
foods, and chemicals. Principal imports crude oil, iron ore, fer- 
tilizers, wheat, machinery, and electronic equipment. Maintained 
60 percent of trade with members of Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (Comecon) in 1980s; major shift away from that group 
by 1990. Associate membership in European Community (EC) 



xxiii 



1991 began reemphasis on opening Western markets; Comecon 
group export share declined to 9.8 percent 1991. 

Currency: Zloty; exchange rate March 1993, US$1 equalled 15,900 
zloty. 

Fiscal Year: calendar year. 

Transportation 

Railroads: Standard gauge routes totaled 24,287 kilometers 1990, 
of total 26,644 kilometers in state network. Some 1 1 ,016 kilometers 
electrified. Locomotive fleet about 55 percent diesel, 41 percent elec- 
tric, and 4 percent steam 1990. Substantial modernization planned 
for 1990s. 

Roads and Road Transport: Of 363, 1 16 kilometers of roads 1991 , 
159,000 kilometers hard surface and 257 kilometers motorway. Bus 
routes totaling 121,000 kilometers carried 2.6 million passengers 
1989. Passenger cars 4.85 million, trucks 977,000 in 1989. Irregular- 
ities in petroleum import restrained road transport periodically in 
1980s, early 1990s. 

Pipelines: In 1987, operational domestic pipeline 6,846 kilometers, 
carrying crude oil, natural gas, and refined products. Druzhba Pipe- 
line major source of crude oil from Russia. 

Inland Waterways: About 4,000 kilometers navigable by regular 
transport services, 1989. Main systems Vistula (60 percent) and 
Oder rivers, connected by Kanal Bydgoski in north-central Poland. 
Total canal network 1 ,215 kilometers. Major inland ports Gliwice, 
Warsaw, and Wroclaw. Inland waterways carried 3.8 million pas- 
sengers, 9.8 million tons of freight in 1990. Some 69 passenger ves- 
sels, 1,380 barges in use 1989. 

Ports and Shipping: Four large Baltic harbors: Gdynia, Gdansk, 
Swinoujscie, and Szczecin. In 1989 merchant fleet had 249 ships, 
total displacement 4 million deadweight tons, including 16 over 
30,000 tons. Regular lines to London, Asian ports, Australia, and 
some African and Latin American countries. 

Civil Aviation: State-owned Polish Airlines (LOT) operated nine 
internal, thirty-four international routes 1990, using Soviet- and 
United States-made aircraft. Fleet renovation began 1990. At 
Ok^cie International Airport (Warsaw), largest airport, new ter- 
minal scheduled 1992. Eighty of 140 airports had hard-surface 
runways 1989. 



xxiv 



Government and Politics 



Government: Prescribed by 1952 constitution, its many amend- 
ments, and 1992 Little Constitution that defines executive pow- 
ers. Legislative power centered in popularly elected bicameral 
National Assembly (upper, 100-member Senate; lower, 460-mem- 
ber Sejm). President, popularly elected to five-year term, acts as 
head of state, approves Sejm nominations for prime minister (head 
of government), and has decree power on many issues. Prime 
minister chooses Council of Ministers (cabinet), responsible to Sejm 
and president, to administer government. 

Politics: Domination of communist Polish United Workers Party 
(Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza — PZPR) ended 1989. Um- 
brella opposition coalition Solidarity split several ways in 1990, 
joined by various new and revived groups in complex structure 
dominated by none. All governments 1989-93 based on at least 
seven parties in coalition, with constant threat of conflicting agen- 
das causing collapse. Influential parties had religious (Party of 
Christian Democrats, Christian National Union), class-based (Po- 
lish Peasant Party, Peasant Alliance), or broadly political (Demo- 
cratic Union, Liberal-Democratic Congress) agendas. Social 
Democracy of the Republic of Poland succeeded PZPR, maintained 
some power with democratized platform, and achieved plurality 
in 1993 election as dominant faction of Alliance of the Democratic 
Left coalition. 

Administrative Divisions: Forty-nine districts and three munic- 
ipalities (Warsaw, Krakow, Lodz) with special status. Counties basic 
form of local government, run by directly elected county councils. 
Both levels with substantial autonomy from central government. 

Foreign Relations: After collapse of Soviet Union and its alliances, 
1990-91, major shift toward relations with individual former Soviet 
states, especially Belarus, Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine. Long- 
term national security goal integration into Western Europe, in- 
cluding European Community (EC) and North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). Regional security sought in Visegrad alli- 
ance with Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia. Improved re- 
lations with Germany, continued tension with Lithuania 1992. 

National Security 

Armed Forces: Polish Army (until 1990 Polish People's Army) 
divided into ground forces, navy, air and air defense forces, and 
territorial defense forces. Ground forces conscription for eighteen 



xxv 



months, navy and air force two years. Mid- 1992 total active-duty 
strength 296,500. Of 194,200 army personnel, 109,800 conscripts; 
of 83,000 air force personnel, 47,000 conscripts; of 19,300 navy 
personnel, 10,600 conscripts. Estimated 435,000 reservists. Ter- 
ritorial defense forces assigned as regional defense forces in case 
of invasion, reduced in size and role in early 1990s. 

Major Military Units: Administered in four military districts, in- 
cluding Krakow district newly formed 1992. Major restructuring 
and streamlining undertaken 1990; in 1992 configuration, Pomer- 
anian district had three mechanized divisions and a coastal defense 
unit, Silesian district four mechanized divisions, Warsaw district 
two mechanized divisions, and Krakow two mechanized divisions 
(projected). Navy operated three submarines, one destroyer, and 
one frigate. Air force operated 423 combat aircraft, 31 attack 
helicopters, in two air divisions. Substantial reliance on Soviet heavy 
equipment remaining from Warsaw Pact era; increasing domestic 
production of light equipment, early 1990s. 

Military Budget: Major cuts 1989-92 during reassessment of doc- 
trine and strategy. 1991 budget 16 trillion zloty. Equipment pur- 
chase reduced by high allotment for personnel maintenance in 1991 
budget. 

Internal Security Forces: Restructured and under civilian con- 
trol after 1989. Office of State Protection, main state security agency 
after 1990, stripped of independent surveillance power but still ob- 
ject of public suspicion. Role of militia in riot control substantially 
reduced. Regular police upgraded, retrained, and reequipped. 
Border Guard streamlined, retrained for customs work and preven- 
tion of illegal entry. 



xxvi 



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HUNGARY 'V. 

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Introduction 



A NEW ERA BEGAN for the nation of Poland in 1989, when the 
last communist regime ended unexpectedly and the Poles began 
to explore the potentials and pitfalls of true independence. That 
exploration process, which was accompanied by a firm commit- 
ment to democratic government, proved more chaotic and ambig- 
uous than most Poles expected; it meant recovering long-dormant 
political and social traditions and reshaping them to meet Poland's 
needs as a capitalist member of post-Soviet Europe. It also meant 
inventing a political structure to accommodate the numerous in- 
terest groups that emerged from behind the communist monolith. 

The cultural heritage of Poland, and the sense of nationhood 
that accompanies that heritage, evolved in a continuous process 
that began before the year A.D. 1000. Over the same period, the 
nation's history was a long series of dramatic shifts that included 
changes of dynasties, drastic realignment of frontiers, foreign in- 
vasion and occupation, and repeated partition by more powerful 
neighbors. Especially in the era that followed the collapse of Poland's 
400-year federation with neighboring Lithuania at the end of the 
eighteenth century, the political and physical geography of Europe 
played a key role in Poland's fate. For the next two centuries, Poland 
was surrounded and often dominated by powerful expansionist Aus- 
trian, German, and Russian states. Poland's flat topography and 
central location invited invasion and made it strategically impor- 
tant during the many wars among European powers. 

In the most recent phase of foreign domination, the post- World 
War II period between 1945 and 1989, Poland lay at the center 
of Soviet-dominated economic and military alliances, Comecon (see 
Glossary) and the Warsaw Pact (see Glossary), respectively. So- 
cially, Poles suffered totalitarian repression of independent groups 
of all kinds, state-prescribed monolithic education doctrine, strict 
censorship, and repeated attempts to stifle their religious self- 
expression. Economically, Poland's subjugation resulted in a Soviet- 
style centralized planning system that produced early industrial 
growth but then stagnated in spite of repeated government restruc- 
turing programs. Comecon also isolated Poland's foreign trade from 
market competition throughout the communist era. 

Politically, economic inertia and repression by communist re- 
gimes stimulated major incidents of nationwide social unrest that 
forced several changes of government between 1956 and 1981. Cer- 
tain state controls were also relaxed during that period. The last 



xxix 




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tindery representation 
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HUNGARY 



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xxviii 



and most enduring expression of social discontent was initiated by 
the Solidarity labor movement in 1980. Although officially illegal 
from 1981 to 1989, Solidarity was the symbolic spearhead of 
Poland's national revival and the foundation of the democratiza- 
tion movement that unexpectedly ousted communist rule in 1989. 

In 1989 Poland was in the vanguard of political upheaval that 
swept communism from most of Eastern Europe and set the mem- 
bers of the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact on the course of dras- 
tic political and economic reform. In important ways, however, 
Poland had remained beyond the control of the communist polit- 
ical system that swallowed up Eastern Europe, even when that 
system was at its most formidable in the 1950s. As Poland's govern- 
ment bureaucracy, army, and internal security system assumed 
the classic forms of centralized totalitarianism, Polish society ad- 
justed to official regimentation by establishing pragmatic alterna- 
tive channels for economic and spiritual sustenance. The most 
visible and structured social institution of all, the Roman Catholic 
Church, actually increased in stature in the communist era. Most 
Poles responded to foreign domination by intensifying the unique 
linkage between their religion and their sense of secular nationali- 
ty. Especially in the 1980s, the activism and stature of the church 
and labor groups prepared the ground for Poland to reassert the 
national independence that it had enjoyed only briefly in the previ- 
ous 200 years. 

The last communist government was voted out of office in 
mid- 1989. In the reform period that followed, the groups that had 
mounted unified opposition to communist rule during the 1980s 
dispersed to pursue their own special interests in Poland's newly 
democratized political atmosphere. This dispersal lent a chaotic 
quality to the making of government policy on the country's most 
pressing problems: instituting rapid privatization of the key enter- 
prises in Poland's formerly state-run economy; providing adequate 
social services during the severe dislocations of the privatization 
process; resuming economic growth while dealing with the desper- 
ately polluted environment inherited from communist industrial 
policy; and establishing a new set of foreign commercial and politi- 
cal connections to support Poland's new market economy and maxi- 
mize national security. In 1992 experts agreed that, given Poland's 
strong sense of nationhood and dynamic entrepreneurial culture, 
the main obstacle to solving those problems was the acute frag- 
mentation of its political system. In the second half of 1992, the 
new government of Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka began an 
energetic drive to refocus attention on issues of national concern 



xxx 



and to regain the public trust that had eroded since the initial post- 
communist optimism of 1990. 

At the stage when Poland emerged from Soviet dominance, it 
had a homogeneous ethnic culture. The near-unanimity of com- 
mitment to the Polish nation minimized the eruptions of nation- 
alistic rivalry that plagued the postcommunist transitions of 
Czechoslovakia, Romania, the former components of the Soviet 
Union, and, most disastrously, Yugoslavia. In 1993 Poland was 
the only country in Eastern Europe whose borders were universally 
accepted, that faced no danger of disintegration, and that had no 
territorial claims on its neighbors. A monolithic ethnic structure 
was quite new to Poland, however: its cities had a long history as 
richly diverse cultural centers that tolerated religious and intellec- 
tual beliefs deemed heretical in other parts of Europe. Before 1939 
the three largest ethnic minorities, the Ukrainians, Jews, and Ger- 
mans, made up more than 25 percent of Poland's population. 

World War II was the most recent and conclusive influence on 
Poland's ethnic structure. A large proportion of the prewar Ger- 
man and Ukrainian minorities were removed by forcible resettle- 
ment or the postwar redrawing of Poland's frontiers. Most of 
Poland's Jewish population (the largest in Europe in 1939) was ex- 
terminated in Nazi death camps; many of the surviving Jews 
emigrated after the war. Although the nation that emerged from 
those changes faced less ethnic unrest (the Ukrainians had been 
a particularly bothersome minority in the interwar years), many 
older Poles recalled that ethnic and cultural diversity had contrib- 
uted much to the fabric of Polish life before 1939. 

The Roman Catholic Church commanded the loyalty of Poles 
in such a way that communist dogma never penetrated much be- 
low the surface of Polish social or spiritual life. This status made 
the church the most powerful opponent of communist regimes in 
Poland throughout the postwar period. Most notably in the 1970s 
and 1980s, popular loyalty to the church forced communist govern- 
ments to compromise in major church-state confrontations. Church 
support was vital to the initial success of the Solidarity movement 
in 1980 and to the movement's eventual accession to power in 1989. 

In the political and social culture that emerged from totalitari- 
anism in 1989, the church occupied an extremely influential and 
controversial position. After 1989, the church sought to preserve 
and extend the social leadership role it had played as an opposi- 
tion force. Accordingly, it pushed legislation outlawing abortion, 
making religious education mandatory in public schools, and per- 
mitting active church participation in political elections. Politicians 
and the public were split between preserving the separation of 



xxxi 



church and state, which was a fundamental of the Western con- 
stitutional democracy to which Poland aspired, and preserving the 
thorough penetration of Polish secular life by religion-based ethics. 
Debate on the relation of church to state was especially heated in 
the prolonged framing of a new Polish constitution, a process that 
showed no sign of ending in early 1993. 

Because the Soviet-modeled constitution of 1952 remained in 
force, with amendments, in 1992, all political factions considered 
a new constitution absolutely necessary as a foundation for Western- 
style commercial and human rights legislation. As in the other East 
European countries, governance in postwar Poland had been domi- 
nated by the national communist party, in this case the Polish 
United Workers' Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza — 
PZPR). The party channeled policy decisions through a nominally 
democratic rubber-stamp political system that included a single- 
chamber parliament, the Sejm, and an executive Council of Min- 
isters. After 1952 Poland had no president; the functions of chief 
of state were conducted by a Council of State elected by the Sejm. 
After 1989 those institutions proved inadequate for the return of 
democratic governance, however. 

The Round Table Agreement of 1989, forged by the govern- 
ment of Wojciech Jaruzelski and by opposition forces led by Solidar- 
ity and the church, created a new presidency with formidable 
parliamentary curbs to limit the power of the communist Jaruzel- 
ski, who was expected to continue as head of state. The Senate 
was also restored as a second house of Poland's parliament, the 
National Assembly. Then the opposition unexpectedly won the na- 
tional elections of 1989, and the total rebuilding of the Polish state 
began. Under those circumstances, the institution of the presidency 
was not powerful enough to push needed reforms through parlia- 
ment. Lech Walesa, a strong personality committed to rapid re- 
form, was chosen president by direct election in 1990. He faced 
twin frustrations: a government structure that constitutionally with- 
held most of Poland's executive powers from the president and a 
parliament fragmented among the numerous political parties that 
emerged when communist dominance ended. That fragmentation 
also blocked passage of a full constitution in the first three post- 
communist years. The Little Constitution, ratified in October 1992, 
was a pragmatic compromise that defined the roles of the presi- 
dent and parliament and quieted the power struggles that had flared 
in early 1992 between head of state Walesa and Prime Minister 
(head of government) Jan Olszewski. More important, previously 
irreconcilable factions of the Sejm finally compromised on a political 



xxxn 



system that would promote economic reform, which all sides recog- 
nized as Poland's top priority. 

The Little Constitution helped reduce the confusion and near 
paralysis that had afflicted the central government since early 1 990 . 
The most controversial aspect of the document was the role assigned 
the president and the president's relationship to the Sejm, the lower 
house of parliament. Because the Little Constitution deleted the 
previous description of the Sejm as the supreme organ of state 
authority, many deputies feared that the president would now 
dominate the government. The new document empowered the 
president to submit a candidate for prime minister to the Sejm and 
to approve the prime minister's choices to fill cabinet positions. 
The president would also approve all important military and na- 
tional security appointments and play a key role in selecting the 
most powerful ministers, those of defense, foreign affairs, and in- 
ternal affairs. Thus, in contrast to the previous system, whose divid- 
ed responsibility for naming a government had brought the gridlock 
of 1992, all roles were clearly delineated. 

On August 1 , 1992, a majority of 241 approved the Little Con- 
stitution in the Sejm. The issues resolved by the Little Constitu- 
tion had been debated hotly and inconclusively many times before. 
Especially significant was the concept of the government's ''spe- 
cial powers," which Walesa had advocated to avoid the legislative 
morass of Poland's multiparty parliament in building the legal 
framework for economic reform. Special powers meant that the 
government (cabinet) could now issue decrees with the force of law, 
provided the cabinet had the support of an absolute majority of 
the Sejm. The Sejm still decided, however, which policy areas were 
subject to such circumvention of the legislative process. Accord- 
ing to the Little Constitution, areas protected from the force of 
decree were elections at all levels, constitutional amendments, the 
state budget, and civil and political liberties. 

In early 1993, Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka requested ex- 
pansion of the government's decree power to specifically include 
management of the economy, local government reform, public ser- 
vices, and adaptation of Polish laws to the standards of the Eu- 
ropean Community (EC) — areas considered vital to accelerate 
urgently pending economic decisions. According to her proposal, 
numerous safeguards would prevent the Council of Ministers from 
inappropriate action under the new law. 

Because the Sejm retained substantial powers and met continu- 
ously, Walesa complained of the tyranny of the "Sejmocracy. " 
Although the role of the presidency was better defined after mid- 
1992, the role of Walesa himself remained unclear. He continued 



xxxin 



strong advocacy of rapid capitalization of the economy, but in 1992 
his traditional constituency, the workers in large factories, increas- 
ingly resisted painful transition steps such as wage controls and 
the closing of inefficient state-owned enterprises. Walesa failed to 
gain control of the national security policy-making apparatus in 
1993, when the Sejm blocked legislation empowering the Nation- 
al Security Council that he had appointed. 

In the first months of 1993, Walesa's position was destabilized 
by charges that his closest aide had collaborated with the communist 
secret police. This new phase in the campaign of Jaroslaw Ka- 
czynski, Walesa's former chief of staff, to topple Walesa, aroused 
new questions about the deeds of present government officials in 
the communist era. It also endangered the unprecedented harmony 
that existed between Walesa and the Suchocka government in early 
1993. 

As an institution, the Sejm's performance in 1992 was mixed. 
Some sixty laws were passed, and numerous commissions met con- 
stantly. But most of the completed legislation covered rather nar- 
row topics. Urgent and fundamental issues such as privatization, 
electoral law, the role of the prosecutor general, and financial and 
penal law, were tabled, and the Sejm often was preoccupied with 
trivial disputes. Passage of the Little Constitution was considered 
a remarkable achievement, but emotional issues such as separa- 
tion of church and state made passage of a full constitution unlikely 
in the foreseeable future. Finally, the political qualifications of the 
average Sejm deputy were quite limited. Of the 460 members, six- 
teen were economists, twenty-two were lawyers, and few had sig- 
nificant political experience. This background had particular impact 
on the quality of legislation because in 1992 more bills were pro- 
posed by deputies than by the Council of Ministers. 

The coalition government of Prime Minister Suchocka, who took 
office in the summer of 1992, brought together seven parties with 
diverse programs. By that time, Solidarity, the political linchpin 
of the anticommunist drive and the soil from which many of the 
ruling parties had sprung, had disappeared as a unifying force. The 
branches that emerged reflected two major lines of thought from 
the old Solidarity. The Suchocka coalition united most of the major 
parties on the right side of Poland's political spectrum. Within that 
grouping, the traditionalist right advocated continuing enough state 
intervention from the old communist system to protect social pro- 
grams for the disadvantaged; at the same time, it backed strong 
state regulation in religious and moral issues such as abortion. The 
leader of this subcoalition was the strongly Catholic Christian Na- 
tional Union. The "liberal" group, led by Suchocka 's Democratic 



xxxiv 



Union, advocated rapid introduction of a free-market system (with 
relatively little state protection from its inevitable social stresses), 
tighter monetary policy to stabilize the currency, and much less 
government intervention in personal freedom issues such as abor- 
tion and education. In the second half of 1992, the latter group 
was able to dominate economic issues by compromising on issues 
such as increasing church influence over policy on abortion, reli- 
gious education, government control of broadcast programming, 
and the new constitution's position on separation of church and 
state. 

In a national survey at the end of 1992, 80 percent of Poles ex- 
pressed trust in Suchocka, a rating that had risen steadily through 
her first months in office. But, in a series of key parliamentary votes 
in early 1993, elements of her coalition defected, somewhat weaken- 
ing her hold on power. Experts predicted that a confidence vote 
on the 1993 budget, due in midyear, would determine whether 
Suchocka stayed in power, but her position was not considered in 
immediate danger. Meanwhile, calls for a new presidential elec- 
tion multiplied as Walesa's political base eroded. Although his term 
would not be up until 1995, voices from both right and left sug- 
gested Suchocka and others as alternative candidates. 

Suchocka was the first postcommunist Polish head of govern- 
ment with experience in foreign affairs. Under her government, 
Poland continued its strong efforts to solidify foreign relations with 
neighbors and, most urgently, with Western Europe. Poland's 
minister of foreign affairs, Krzystof Skubiszewski, remained in office 
through several changes of government and lent continuity to 
primary foreign policies such as fostering good relations with power- 
ful neighbors Germany and the Soviet Union/Russia and moving 
Poland into the prosperous and secure sphere of Western Europe. 

In 1990 Poland followed a two-track policy toward the Soviet 
Union. It maintained relations with central Soviet institutions while 
cultivating new relations with the Soviet republics. When the Soviet 
Union crumbled in 1991 , Poland extended the latter policy by recog- 
nizing the newly independent post-Soviet states and seeking for- 
mal bilateral treaties with them. Thus, declarations of friendship 
and cooperation were signed with "new" neighbors Ukraine and 
Belarus in 1990 and 1991, respectively. In 1992 Polish trade and 
communications links increased with those countries in a fragment- 
ed, localized fashion. Poland also joined the Baltic Council, which 
theoretically linked it in a cooperative structure with the former 
Baltic republics of the Soviet Union. 

Polish policy toward Russia had the short-term goal of expedit- 
ing removal of the Russian troops that had been on Polish soil since 



xxxv 



World War II. Thus early support for the independence of the non- 
Russian Soviet republics was stated carefully to avoid antagoniz- 
ing Russia. In mid- 1992 Russia accepted a troop withdrawal agree- 
ment that achieved complete combat troop removal in October 
1992; all Russian troops were to leave by the end of 1993. Mean- 
while, both nations saw the treaty of friendship and good-neighborly 
relations signed in May 1992 as beginning a new era of general 
bilateral cooperation. 

The city of Kaliningrad was the capital of a small piece of Rus- 
sian territory bordering northeast Poland and the Baltic Sea and 
isolated from the rest of Russia when Belarus, Lithuania, and 
Ukraine became independent in 1991. By 1992 the city had be- 
come a significant issue for Poland because of its continued role 
as a large Russian military base and its potential as a transporta- 
tion and trading hub for the entire region. Although Poland and 
Russia held high-level talks on opening borders, regulating trade, 
and initiating joint transportation projects along their only com- 
mon border, no other notable accords were reached in 1992. 

In late 1992, Poland proposed new international standards for 
European border contacts, with the goal of easing multinational 
policies on issues such as the environment, regional development, 
communications, and transportation. By the end of 1993, two Eu- 
roregions had been established: the Nysa Euroregion at the junc- 
tion of Poland, Germany, and the Czech Republic, and the 
Pomeranian Euroregion, including far northeast Germany and far 
northwest Poland (see fig. 1). The latter was viewed as a way of 
attracting support from the EC regional fund. Polish nationalist 
groups attacked proposals for such regions, however, as threats to 
the ethnic identity and the territorial integrity of the Polish state. 
In the fall of 1992, Poland signed a convention of the Council of 
Europe on cross-border cooperation. In early 1993, however, the 
Sejm rejected the government's proposal for Polish participation 
in a Carpathians Euroregion that also would include Ukraine, Hun- 
gary, and Slovakia. 

In 1992 a new spate of European refugees moved northward and 
westward from war-torn territories of the former Yugoslavia and 
the countries of the former Soviet Union. Germany, the destina- 
tion of choice for Muslim Slavs and other displaced groups, sought 
to return to Poland some of those who had entered Germany 
through Poland. Because Germany had acted without reaching 
agreement with Poland, and because Poland could not afford an 
influx of refugees, intense debates resulted over Poland's proper 
role and the economic and ethnic consequences of opening the 
borders. 



xxxvi 



After 1989 Poland entered two regional cooperation groupings 
of postcommunist East European states. The first was the Central 
European Initiative (CEI), which originally included Austria, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Italy, and Yugoslavia. After the breakup 
of Yugoslavia in 1991, however, Poland distanced itself from the 
organization to avoid taking sides in the explosive Yugoslav polit- 
ical disputes that followed. In early 1993, however, Poland partic- 
ipated in many mulliiational working groups within the CEI and 
still considered the grouping potentially helpful in gaining entry 
into Western Europe. 

A second grouping, the so-called Visegrad Triangle that included 
Hungary and the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic (see Glos- 
sary), was a promising economic and human-rights coalition aimed 
at moving its members faster into the institutions of Western Eu- 
rope. The structure of that grouping was jeopardized, however, 
by the split of the Czech Republic and Slovakia at the start of 1993. 
In early 1993, Poland took a conciliatory role between the Czechs 
and Slovaks and between the Hungarians and Slovaks, whose re- 
lations had been strained for several years by ethnic and environ- 
mental disputes. In March 1993, after many postponements, the 
former triangle members (now known as the Visegrad Four or the 
Visegrad Group) established a free-trade zone that would eliminate 
customs duties among them by the year 2001. The agreement, 
whose timetable matched that already established between trian- 
gle and EC countries, signaled a shift in the triangle's attention 
from gaining EC membership to improving trade conditions within 
their group. 

In 1993 Poles continued to feel anxiety about German reunifi- 
cation and the prospect of rapprochement between Poland's tradi- 
tional threats, Germany and Russia. A strong opposing argument, 
however, held that fragmentation of the Soviet Union and the 
weakening of postcommunist Russia had significantly reduced the 
danger of domination from either East or West and that, on the 
contrary, Poland now had unique opportunities to establish ad- 
vantageous relations with both sides. The latter assumptions formed 
the basis of Poland's policy toward Germany and Russia early in 
1993. 

In 1993 the national economy remained the most important issue 
to most Poles, but much of the country's economic policy remained 
unsettled. In 1990 the first postcommunist government had in- 
troduced the Balcerowicz Plan to introduce rapid market-oriented 
reforms in the national economy. (The first reform step, cessation 
of agricultural and food subsidies, occurred in mid- 1989.) The gen- 
eral goals of the Balcerowicz Plan were macroeconomic stabilization, 



xxxvn 



liberalization of prices from state control, deregulation of economic 
activity, privatization, and drastic industrial restructuring. In tan- 
dem with those steps would be ending wage indexation, taxation 
of excessive wage increases, and devaluation of Poland's unit of 
currency, the zloty (see Glossary). The plan initially eliminated 
shortages, curbed inflation, and prompted international financial 
institutions to pledge loans and encourage investment. But in 1990 
and 1991, stabilization also drove unemployment far higher than 
expected while reducing real wages and productivity. The nation- 
al budget deficit grew alarmingly because of Poland's negative trade 
balance and the inability of the state to collect taxes from large state 
enterprises. During the next two years, the contradictory short- 
term results of the Balcerowicz Plan fueled passionate economic 
debates. 

In the first half of 1992, the government of Jan Olszewski at- 
tempted to soften the effects of the shock therapy. Olszewski's policy 
change was motivated by falling income, rising unemployment, 
higher prices, lower worker productivity, and a general feeling in 
Polish society that a market economy might not be worth the 
sacrifice needed to attain it. The worldwide recession that began 
in 1990 was a further disadvantage for economic recovery. Socie- 
ty's skepticism toward postcommunist reform was fueled by dras- 
tic budget cuts in education, health services, housing, and cultural 
activities. The idealistic egalitarianism of the old system, which 
many Poles cherished long after the end of communism, was sharp- 
ly deflated by the rise of a small but visible wealthy class at a time 
when most Poles were struggling to maintain a minimal standard 
of living. 

Olszewski's plan would have restored state spending for welfare, 
agricultural subsidies, and price supports, among other items. At 
the same time, it would have increased the national deficit, raised 
inflation, and destabilized the currency. This process in turn would 
jeopardize loan agreements with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF — see Glossary) and other Western sources considered vital 
in the economic transition period. By the middle of 1992, those 
disadvantages had caused Olszewski to reverse the retrenchment 
experiment; his failure to carry through promised improvements 
contributed to rejection of his government. 

Although the political chaos of early 1992 brought national eco- 
nomic policy making to a virtual halt, the Polish economy had be- 
gun a noticeable upturn by midyear. Price increases were the 
smallest since 1988, inflation showed signs of being under control, 
worker productivity increased about 12 percent, and the stabiliza- 
tion of unemployment at around 13 percent exceeded the most 



xxxvin 



optimistic government predictions. The budget deficit, center of 
great controversy in the Olszewski government, was controlled 
enough in the first half of 1992 to fulfill IMF loan requirements. 

The Suchocka government was able to stabilize somewhat the 
economic policy-making apparatus, which had been paralyzed by 
three changes in the positions of prime minister and finance minister 
between 1990 and 1992. In the first half of 1992, controversies in 
the crucial ministries of ownership transformation and foreign eco- 
nomic relations had further complicated economic planning. 

Indicators at the end of 1992 confirmed some of the optimistic 
midyear figures: inflation for the year was 45 percent, unemploy- 
ment 13.5 percent, and decline in production zero. In the last 
category, Poland's performance surpassed Bulgaria, the Czech and 
Slovak Federative Republic, Hungary, and Romania; Poland's in- 
flation and unemployment figures were either better than or not 
far behind those of its former Comecon partners. Poland's end- 
of-1992 budget deficit, however, was about 50 percent higher than 
the midyear forecast. The size of the deficit ignited new acrimoni- 
ous government conflict over budget cuts. In February 1993, af- 
ter nearly three months of debate and Walesa's threat to dissolve 
parliament, the Sejm passed a stringent budget that promised ad- 
ditional short-term reductions in the living standards of many Poles. 

In 1992 much of Poland's economic progress stemmed from 
growth in private sector productivity rather than from systematic 
government reform of the old system. Private firms were mostly 
small-scale and had minimal foreign-trade connections, but they 
generally adapted to recession conditions much better than state- 
owned enterprises. Thus between 1990 and 1992, employment in 
the private sector doubled, and by the end of 1992 well over half 
of Poland's workers held jobs in that sector. In foreign trade, the 
private sector provided 20 percent of sales, an increase of 3 per- 
cent over 1991. The magnitude of that statistic exerted great in- 
fluence on the restructuring of industry and the development of 
capital markets in the early 1990s. 

A second important factor in the upturn was 12.5 percent growth 
in hard-currency exports between 1991 and 1992. This trend in- 
cluded both Western and former Comecon trading partners, with 
the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic and Hungary (the part- 
ners in the Visegrad Triangle) registering the largest increases in 
the latter category. Poland's trade with EC countries rose much 
faster, however. EC trade reached a new high by the end of 1991 , 
giving Poland the highest percentage of total exports (55.6 percent) 
to the EC among former Comecon countries. Experts considered 



xxxix 



this trend positive because it signaled the prosperity of firms able 
to survive in a Western market environment. 

Germany retained its usual place as Poland's top overall trad- 
ing partner. The combined countries of the former Soviet Union 
occupied second place overall, mainly because of large increases 
in sales of Polish agricultural and chemical products to those coun- 
tries. Imports from most postcommunist European countries to 
Poland declined in 1992, however. 

The permanence of the 1992 economic upturn was a matter of 
dispute at year's end because similar trends had proved illusory 
in 1990 and 1991. But falling inflation rates and a trade surplus 
now gave the government the opportunity to loosen restrictions 
on capital flow without again losing control of inflation. Also, the 
negative one-time effect of ending Poland's favorable trade status 
within Comecon had been absorbed fully by late 1992, and the un- 
precedented size of the private sector promised greater overall sta- 
bility. 

On the negative side, in the second half of 1992 strikes in major 
industries threatened to derail wage control policy and raise infla- 
tion while hampering productivity. But, by that time, the grow- 
ing role of private enterprise and the service sector had blunted 
the traditional political impact of blue-collar labor actions. Although 
Suchocka's stringent economic policy continued to threaten work- 
ers in large enterprises through the end of 1992, labor failed to 
present a united front on the issue. Many strikes ended without 
inflationary pay raises, and by early 1993 worker discontent seemed 
to pose a diminished threat to government stability. 

At the end of 1992, the financial structure of large state enter- 
prises remained a severe obstacle to economic reform because those 
firms still supplied a major part of Poland's output and employ- 
ment. Through mid- 1992 the banking system had continued for- 
giving large debts incurred by such enterprises, a practice that 
automatically restricted credit available to finance new private en- 
terprises. Many state enterprises had avoided bankruptcy (preserv- 
ing their inefficient practices as part of the Polish economy) by 
making loans to each other, threreby creating a network of indebt- 
edness outside the accountability of the national bank system. In 
mid- 1992 the total state firm debt was an estimated US$24 billion, 
with 45 percent of state firms contributing to that figure. 

In late 1992, the Suchocka government proposed a "pact on state 
firms" that would attack both the inefficient structure and the work- 
er unrest in Poland's state firms. The basis of the proposal was 
a government grant of greater unemployment security and liber- 
alized wage policy in return for active worker support of a range 



xl 



of privatization plans for their enterprises. The pact also would 
install Poland's first organized debt relief plan to allow both debtor 
and creditor organizations to regain financial health. The pact 
received considerable criticism. Many Poles feared that such a com- 
promise would give trade unions too much power over government 
economic policy. And debt relief depended upon generous infu- 
sion of foreign capital into the national banking system, hence con- 
tributing to further indebtedness to the West. Under the 1990 
agreement with the Paris Club (see Glossary) of seventeen Western 
creditors, Poland's total indebtedness was US$30 billion, with pro- 
visions for additional relief. At the end of 1992, the Polish govern- 
ment reached an agreement with the IMF for a loan of US$600 
million that was expected to initiate a new series of negotiations 
with other Western lenders. But all agreements depended on Po- 
land's demonstrating fiscal restraint by controlling its national bud- 
get deficit. That goal meant further cuts in pensions and welfare 
support and continued wage controls, policies that would affect most 
Poles in 1993. 

The rate of privatization remained the single most important 
aspect of Polish economic policy. Between 1989 and the end of 1992, 
the most frequent form of privatization was liquidation, an interim 
solution that shifted ownership within the firm but retained state 
ownership. It predominated because outside private investment 
funds remained very scarce. Of at least 1 ,200 firms in liquidation 
in late 1992, more than half had declared bankruptcy. 

The sale of shares to a joint-stock company was the predominant 
method of privatizing large state companies in the early 1990s. That 
process, which began with interim partnership with the State Trea- 
sury, went very slowly after that stage. Shares in state-owned firms 
were offered increasingly rarely on the Warsaw Stock Exchange, 
and only seven of 348 existing State Treasury partnerships were 
sold between January and August 1992. Overall, only twenty-five 
large or medium-sized companies had been sold to foreign owners 
on this plan. 

The Ministry of Ownership Transformation, established to de- 
termine the type of disposal or restructuring required by Polish 
firms, faced political forces that prevented a comprehensive ap- 
proach to transition. In late 1992, parliament was still sharply divid- 
ed over issues such as foreign ownership and distribution of property 
rights, making liquidation the only generally accepted privatiza- 
tion formula. Long-term plans called for the Ministry of Owner- 
ship Transformation to begin a mass privatization program in 1994 
that would move 400 state companies at one time into private 
ownership. Equity in the companies would be transferred into 



xli 



twenty national investment funds, shares of which would be avail- 
able to all adult Poles according to a complex distribution scheme. 

The predominance of debtor firms in Poland's major heavy in- 
dustries made their restructuring a high priority in 1993. Among 
mines and steel mills, only a handful of firms showed a profit in 
1992, and twenty of twenty-eight firms in the armaments industry 
were in the red. At the end of 1992, the power industry had amassed 
US$1 billion of credits from large enterprises, mainly shipyards, 
mines, and steel mills. The power industry had no leverage to col- 
lect its debts because energy supply could not be curtailed without 
hampering industrial output. 

In late 1992, Polish mines were regrouped and their financial 
status examined, and plans were set for drastic shrinkage of the 
metallurgical industry, which was also a relic of communist ineffi- 
ciency. Shipbuilding firms, expecting an upturn in their flagging 
international business in 1993, were spared major overhaul, but 
the armaments industry faced a depleted market and the prospect 
of retooling for some type of peacetime production. Such conver- 
sion promised a longterm "disarmament dividend," but it also re- 
quired substantial short-term investment that had not materialized 
by early 1993. The insecurity of the post-Soviet arms market led 
to a series of illegal or quasi-legal arms sales by major Polish 
manufacturers. 

Replacing or securing Russian fuel supplies was a major goal 
of industrial planners, who were dismayed by the disorganized state 
of the Russian fuel industry. Although two- thirds of Poland's natur- 
al gas came from Russia in 1993, two years after the end of Come- 
con the two countries still had not solidified terms of delivery or 
the standing of previous debts. Two factors made oil and natural 
gas vital to the Polish economy. Coal was recognized as a primary 
cause of Poland's environmental and health problems, especially 
because most coal-burning power plants lacked pollution controls. 
And Poland had ceased construction of its two nuclear power plants 
in 1990. Polish prospects for supplementing foreign fuel supplies 
were boosted in 1992 by discovery of large offshore Baltic oil de- 
posits, however. Early estimates projected their output as 500,000 
tons per year, compared with the 11.4 million tons of crude oil 
imported by Poland in 1990. Poland also sought agreements that 
would ensure regular fuel supplies from Russia and Ukraine, where 
political uncertainty had made export policy unreliable after the 
end of Comecon. 

As Poles adjusted to the open exchange of ideas in the postcom- 
munist era, certain issues of social policy became quite divisive. 
Central to this process was the Roman Catholic Church, to which 



xlii 



about 98 percent of Poles professed allegiance in early 1993, and 
which had gained enormous prestige in the communist era. After 
ultimately winning the struggle to protect Polish spiritual life from 
the effects of communist dogma, the church immediately took a 
powerful role in determining social policy in the transition period. 
In doing so, the church successfully reapplied the linkage of reli- 
gious and secular ethics that had become traditional in the com- 
munist era. Between 1989 and 1993, the promotion of "Christian 
values" became a routine element in the agendas of political and 
social groups, and by 1993 the meetings of nearly all political par- 
ties began with Holy Mass. 

Significant numbers of Roman Catholic Poles, however, defended 
the idea of a "neutral state" that would set secular policy indepen- 
dent of ideological or religious tenets. Between 1990 and 1993, ten- 
sion grew as the church sought to influence key items of legislation: 
religious instruction in public schools, abortion rights, government 
control of the broadcast media, and a new constitutional formula- 
tion of the relationship of church and state. Although mandatory 
religious instruction was reintroduced into public schools in 1991, 
public resentment toward the change escalated noticeably in 1992. 

A majority of Poles also disagreed with their church's position 
that abortion was a crime and that the liberal communist-era abor- 
tion laws must be reversed completely. Although abortions in 
Poland already had decreased drastically in the early 1990s, par- 
liamentary debates over illegalizing abortion were quite bitter in 
late 1992 and early 1993. Abortion rights advocates mounted a sub- 
stantial drive for a national referendum on the issue, in the expec- 
tation that Polish public opinion would support their position. But 
Prime Minister Suchocka used her now substantial influence to 
block a referendum, calling it a bad precedent that might erode 
the government's recently acquired legitimacy. 

In January 1993, the Sejm passed a bill outlawing abortion un- 
der most conditions. The Senate, where radicals considered the 
Sejm bill too lenient, forged with the Sejm a compromise provi- 
sion that made abortion officially illegal except under life-threat- 
ening conditions. That version was passed into law in February 
1993. At the same time, many Roman Catholic Poles who disap- 
proved of dogmatic social positions and feared establishment of 
a theocratic state demanded internal liberalization, and some church 
authorities were alarmed by their institution's sharp drop in pub- 
lic trust in the postcommunist years. Open public criticism was 
a new phenomenon for the church, which in the communist period 
enjoyed strong public support when threatened by state authori- 
ties. In 1993, however, the conventional hierarchy of the Polish 



xliii 



Episcopate still possessed unprecedented political power and resisted 
strongly any policy-making democratization that would threaten 
its influence. Although the episcopate moderated its official posi- 
tions on some social questions, individual priests used their pul- 
pits to advocate radical change. 

In 1992 Poland continued to feel the environmental and health 
consequences of previous communist policies. A 1993 report charac- 
terized 13 million Poles as living in regions of environmental danger, 
and disorders associated with environmental pollution — especially 
respiratory and circulatory problems — continued far above the Eu- 
ropean average. The report also noted bad living conditions, poor 
eating habits, smoking, excessive alcohol consumption, drug abuse, 
and poor personal hygiene as factors contributing to poor national 
health. National health care coverage remained in an uneven, poorly 
funded transitional stage between the full state-sponsored program 
of the old regime and a privatized system of yet unknown structure. 

By 1993 Poland had environmental programs for protection of 
the atmosphere and forests and for water management. Funding, 
however, was a major problem. A high percentage of fines assessed 
against polluting industries went unpaid, especially in the indus- 
trial Katowice District. The Ecofund, an arrangement by which 
part of debts forgiven by Western banks would be channeled into 
environmental programs, received little funding in its early stages 
in 1993. And environmental agencies remained cautious about 
strangling vital industries, especially in the power generation sec- 
tor, by levying excessive fines. 

Poland's rate of population growth was among the highest in 
Europe throughout the postwar period. It reached a postwar low 
in 1992, however, because of lower birth rates and the continuing 
decline in average life expectancy. Poland was expected to retain 
its place at the top of European growth rates, however, when the 
larger next generation of women reached childbearing age in the 
1990s. 

By early 1993, Poland had moved ahead of its East European 
neighbors in several economic measurements. Major economic in- 
dicators suggested that the worst fallout of Poland's "shock thera- 
py" might be past; growth in exports and major expansion of the 
private enterprise sector were reasons for economic optimism. But 
the overall privatization rate still lagged behind government plans, 
and Polish workers remained alienated or skeptical of reforms that 
seemed to produce only lower employment and lower standards 
of living. The domestic price for more international aid and debt 
forgiveness, considered vital to pump capital into the economy, in- 
cluded additional painful stringency measures to satisfy international 



xliv 



lenders. The main question was whether recognizable recovery 
could occur before the public abandoned its commitment to 
capitalist reform. 

In politics, Hanna Suchocka emerged as a strong leader respected 
by most of the Polish public, even as the members of her fragile 
coalition fought bitterly over social issues such as abortion. As 
Suchocka' s fortunes improved, however, the image of President 
Lech Walesa declined. In 1992 the pragmatic Little Constitution 
had clarified the main lines of government power, but agreement 
among political factions on a full constitution remained impossi- 
ble in early 1993. Aside from the calming influence of Suchocka, 
Polish politics remained confrontational and coalitions tenuous. For 
that reason, the potential for solid, long-term political and economic 
reform was unclear; in spite of positive economic signs, Polish so- 
ciety reacted to the turmoil of postcommunist transition with in- 
creased restlessness as it approached the fourth anniversary of the 
end of communist rule. 

June 1, 1993 

* * * 

In the months following preparation of this manuscript, signifi- 
cant events occurred in the process of political and economic reform 
in postcommunist Poland. The upturn of economic productivity 
that began at the end of 1992 continued through 1993 and brought 
Poland recognition as the best example of postcommunist progress 
toward a market economy among the nations that had been in the 
Soviet sphere. Despite economic improvement, however, the 
government of Hanna Suchocka, the fourth prime minister of 
Poland since the fall of the Jaruzelski regime in 1989, was rejected 
decisively in the parliamentary election of September 19, 1993. 
Through the remainder of 1993, a new governing coalition negotiat- 
ed toward workable approaches to the programs already in progress. 

By midsummer the simmering test of wills between President 
Walesa and the Sejm had erupted in a parliamentary no-confidence 
vote toppling the Suchocka government, which Walesa had support- 
ed strongly. Ironically, the initial no-confidence vote was proposed 
by Solidarity deputies as a bargaining ploy to gain wage increases 
for public employees. With no agreement on a successor to Suchoc- 
ka, Walesa dissolved parliament and called for a new election. 

An important result of the ensuing election was rejection of the 
political elite that had dominated the political scene since 1989. 
In fact, all parties favoring rapid transition to a full-scale market 
economy met defeat in 1993. Also defeated were the most radical 



xlv 



advocates of a return to the state central planning of the communist 
era. The representation thresholds in the election law of May 1993 
were the main cause of this upheaval. The law succeeded in reducing 
fragmentation, because only six parties or coalitions gained one 
or more seats in the National Assembly. The main beneficiaries 
of the change were the Alliance of the Democratic Left (Sojusz 
Lewicy Demokratycznej — SLD), direct heir to the PZPR, and the 
Polish Peasant Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe — PSL), which 
had been a figurehead opposition party in the communist era. 

The election also reduced the influence of the two most promi- 
nent political figures in Poland, Suchocka and Walesa, both of 
whom had pushed market reform at a rate judged by some as harm- 
ful to employment and social stability. Walesa, not due to stand 
for reelection until 1995, was expected to lose considerable influence 
on policy making because of declining support for the Solidarity- 
based parties. His newly restructured pro-reform coalition was 
second to Suchocka' s Democratic Union (Unia Demokratyczna — 
UD) among opposition groups pressing for reform in the new Sejm. 
Walesa was also damaged by renewed allegations of connections 
with the communist-era internal security agencies. Suchocka, who 
had weathered major crises and gained unexpected personal 
popularity in 1993, easily retained her seat in the Sejm. 

After the election, the shape of the Polish government and the 
fate of economic reform remained unclear for some time. Despite 
its historical connections with communist regimes, by 1993 the con- 
stituency of the SLD had changed markedly, and the party's tri- 
umph did not threaten a return to centralized state planning. The 
SLD now included substantial support from private entrepreneurs, 
together with part of the structure remaining from the communist 
days. New diversity and unforeseen growth complicated forma- 
tion of a ruling-party platform, but a majority of the SLD favored 
continuing most of the Suchocka program. The PSL continued to 
represent mostly agricultural interests, many of which contradicted 
SLD's more urban economic priorities. Under pressure from 
Walesa, the two groups agreed to compromise their differences on 
financial policy, privatization, agricultural policy, trade, and other 
key issues to form a new government. 

The SLD and the PSL formed a loose, pragmatic, majority coa- 
lition that backed Waldemar Pawlak of the PSL as prime minister 
and SLD members as heads of key economic ministries and speaker 
of the Sejm. The new Polish cabinet did not take shape until late 
October 1993. Although Pawlak technically headed the Council 
of Ministers, Walesa and SLD leader Aleksandr Kwasniewski both 
used their positions to control parts of Pawlak' s cabinet. At the end 



xlvi 



of 1993, this arrangement promised a new struggle for power in- 
volving personalities as much as policy. The last months of the year 
included debate about which policies of the previous government 
should be retained, which modified, and which rejected. Domes- 
tic policies under dispute included the rate and emphasis of privati- 
zation activity; improvement of tax revenues and application of 
taxes more fairly to minimize the suffering of the transition process; 
subsidies for Polish exporters to enhance competitiveness in West 
European agricultural markets; and the need for a more auton- 
omous, streamlined system of local and regional government, 
including reestablishment of the powiat (county) level of local gov- 
ernment. 

Also unresolved between Walesa and the Sejm was official 
authority for national security policy making. In November 1993, 
the National Defense Committee (renamed the National Security 
Council by the Little Constitution but unchanged in membership 
or unofficial nomenclature since that time) resolved to cede its 
authority to a restructured National Security Council. The Sejm 
refused to pass legislation for the change, however, because Walesa 
would then control the agency whose national security decisions 
were binding on the Sejm. 

The election of September 1993 sent signals in other directions 
as well. After receiving strong criticism for its activism in the 1991 
election, the Polish Catholic Church limited itself to quietly ad- 
vocating a conservative coalition in the 1993 election. When the 
right-of-center parties most closely identified with church positions 
gained no seats in the new parliament, the strong showing of the 
SLD brought warnings from church officials about Poland's left- 
ward swing. Experts predicted that the moral issues that church- 
affiliated parties had pushed in the previous parliament would 
receive much less attention in 1994. 

In the first two months of its operation, parliament impressed 
most observers as more competent and less given to procedural 
wrangling than its predecessor. In November 1993, the National 
Assembly established a new constitutional committee charged with 
drafting the full constitution that had eluded previous legislation. 
A six-month period was fixed for the committee to create its own 
text and consider other constitutional bills submitted by the major 
political parties or by Walesa. 

In 1993 Poland also suffered increased ethnic tensions in Silesia. 
In the 1991 treaty of friendship and cooperation with Germany, Po- 
land had recognized several hundred thousand citizens of Poland as 
ethnic Germans with separate cultural identities and political rights. 
Nevertheless, in 1993 the new freedoms of the postcommunist 



xlvii 



era continued to breed expression of animosity from parts of the 
Silesian German population toward the Poles. Encouraged by 
ultranationalist groups in Germany, an expanded Germanization 
movement included replacing Polish place-names in Silesia with 
the German form applied by the Nazis during their occupation of 
Poland. 

According to a report on the state of the nation by outgoing Prime 
Minister Suchocka, in late 1993 economic indicators were more 
favorable than at any previous point since 1989. At that time, about 
60 percent of the work force and half of the gross domestic product 
(GDP — see Glossary) was in the private sector, and an estimated 
1 . 1 million new jobs had appeared in that sector since 1990. Project- 
ed GDP growth for 1994 was 4 to 4.5 percent, the highest esti- 
mate in all of Europe. Still, 2.8 million Poles, over 15 percent of 
the work force, were unemployed at the end of 1993. Economic 
growth was hindered by scarce credit, which stemmed from low 
bank reserves and a frequent failure to repay loans. The cost of 
social welfare continued to be high in 1993, and no change was 
forecast. In late 1993, some 6.5 million pensioners were support- 
ed by the social security payments of about 13 million working Poles. 
Meanwhile, the new government increased retirement pensions for 
1994 by an average of 40 percent. 

The 1994 budget, which the cabinet passed and presented to 
parliament at the the end of December 1993, featured a deficit of 
about US$4. 1 billion. On the one hand, although this amount was 
less than the 5 percent of GDP stipulated for credit approval by 
international lenders, it was criticized for failing to set a long-term 
budgetary structure while it substantially increased state debt. On 
the other hand, the final figure was reached under protest from 
several of the larger ministries, which demanded a bigger share. 
Major funding increases were to go to the Ministry of National 
Defense (for purchase of domestically produced equipment), to 
agricultural subsidies, to the Ministry of Justice (to hire more 
judges, among other purposes), and to the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs for improved public security. The main revenue sources 
were to be value-added and personal income taxes and excise duties. 

Although Poland maintained its diversified foreign-trade policy 
through the end of 1993, it met obstacles in expanding partner- 
ships. Trade with former partners to the East, notably Russia and 
Ukraine, remained meager. To the West, a combination of general 
recession and protective trade barriers discouraged Polish initia- 
tives and created resentment among Polish exporters. As an alter- 
native, the Pawlak government sought improved trade with the five- 
member nations of the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) in 



xlviii 



1994. Under these circumstances, a final trade deficit of at least 
US$2 billion was forecast for 1993, and domestic producers called 
for limitation of consumer goods imports in 1994 to improve the 
trade balance. Meanwhile, the new government took up negotia- 
tions with the London Club (see Glossary), to whose European 
member banks Poland owed over US$12 billion at the end of 1993, 
to gain more favorable repayment terms and protect Poland's im- 
age as a responsible borrower. Prime Minister Pawlak identified 
foreign and internal debt among the most urgent problems that 
Poland would face in 1994. 

Political unrest in Russia in the fall of 1993 and the very strong 
showing of militant nationalists in the Russian elections of December 
1993 increased Polish worries about Russia's long-term intentions 
toward the lost empire of Eastern Europe. In response to pressure 
from the members of the Visegrad Group (known as the Visegrad 
Triangle before the split of Czechoslovakia) for immediate full mem- 
bership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO — see 
Glossary), that organization offered a compromise, gradual admis- 
sion procedure. The program, dubbed the Partnership for Peace, 
would set up a system of joint military planning, maneuvers, and 
eventual operations of NATO forces and forces of the Visegrad 
Group and the other East European nations. The proposal did not 
promise full membership, nor did it guarantee specifically the secu- 
rity of the new democracies in the region, however. The proposal 
did require participating nations to divert additional defense funds 
to joint activities. 

Poland's official response was a warning that, although Russi- 
an military domination was not an immediate threat, nationalist 
forces within the East European countries could push those coun- 
tries back to anti-Western positions if the people viewed overtures 
to the West as unproductive. Thus the insecurities of the Cold War 
could resume if NATO did not make immediate security guaran- 
tees and integrate those nations speedily into the European Union 
(formerly the European Community). When the other members 
of the Visegrad Group accepted the partnership readily, however, 
Walesa reluctantly accepted the arrangement at a meeting with 
President William J. Clinton in Prague in January 1994. 

Elsewhere, in December 1993 Poland concluded a treaty with 
Ukraine setting procedures for solving border issues. And the sen- 
sitive issue of rights for Lithuania's Polish minority calmed some- 
what in the second half of 1993; negotiations with Lithuania, the 
only neighbor with whom Poland had achieved no major treaty 
in the postcommunist era, thus offered hope for a 1994 treaty of 
friendship and cooperation. 



xlix 



Although no direct military threat existed at the end of 1993, 
internal conditions remained a vital concern to Poland's national 
security. Although the outburst of crime that had accompanied the 
fall of communism in 1990 had stabilized, banditry, financial scan- 
dals, and organized crime continued to rise. Improvements in the 
equipment and methods of police and internal security agencies 
(including better communications technology and stricter licens- 
ing and regulation of commercial activities) promised a long-range 
reduction in street crime and white-collar crime. 

Among the chief obstacles facing Poland in 1994 were the fol- 
lowing: the threat of labor unrest caused by continued unemploy- 
ment and low wages; continued resistance to reform from former 
communists entrenched in influential policy-making positions; 
doubts among potential Western investors about Poland's long- 
term economic and political health; continued ambiguity in Russian 
policy toward Eastern Europe; and the collapse of Eastern mar- 
kets combined with protectionist tendencies among trade partners 
in the West. Although skeptics saw the economic success of 1993 
as a short-term anomaly, the ever-expanding private sector re- 
mained a vigorous support for the entire economic system. The 
efficiency of the political system, depending at the end of 1993 on 
a tenuous parliamentary alliance of two quite diverse parties and 
an unproven prime minister, remained the chief unknown factor 
as 1994 began. 



January 14, 1994 Glenn E. Curtis 



1 



Chapter 1. Historical Setting 




Clio, the muse of history, from a sculpture in Warsaw's Saxon 
Gardens 



The poles possess one of the richest and most venerable 
historical traditions of all European peoples. Convention fixes the 
origins of Poland as a nation near the middle of the tenth century, 
contemporaneous with the Carolingians, Vikings, and Saracens, 
and a full hundred years before the Norman conquest of Britain 
in 1066. Throughout the subsequent centuries, the Poles managed 
despite great obstacles to build and maintain an unbroken cultur- 
al heritage. The same cannot be said of Polish statehood, which 
was notoriously precarious and episodic. Periods of independence 
and prosperity alternated with phases of foreign domination and 
disaster. Especially in more recent centuries, frequent adversity 
subjected the Poles to hardships scarcely equaled in European 
history. 

Many foreign observers perceive Poland as a perennial victim 
of history, whose survival through perseverance and a dogged sense 
of national identity has left a mixed legacy of indomitable courage 
and intolerance toward outsiders. To Poles, their history includes 
brighter recollections of Poland as a highly cultured kingdom, 
uniquely indulgent of ethnic and religious diversity and precociously 
supportive of human liberty and the fundamental values of Western 
civilization. The contrast between these images reflects the extremes 
of fortune experienced by Poland. The two visions of history com- 
bine in uneasy coexistence in the Polish consciousness. One strik- 
ing feature of Polish culture is its fascination with the national past; 
the unusual variety and intensity of that past defy tidy conclusions 
and produce energetic debate among Poles themselves on the mean- 
ing of their history. 

Early History until 1385 

In the first centuries of its existence, the Polish nation was led 
by a series of strong rulers who converted the Poles to Christen- 
dom, created a strong Central European state, and integrated 
Poland into European culture. Formidable foreign enemies and 
internal fragmentation eroded this initial structure in the thirteenth 
century, but consolidation in the 1300s laid the base for the dom- 
inant Polish Kingdom that was to follow. 

The Origins of Poland 

According to Polish myth, the Slavic nations trace their ances- 
try to three brothers who parted in the forests of Eastern Europe, 



3 



Poland: A Country Study 



each moving in a different direction to found a family of distinct 
but related peoples. Fanciful elements aside, this tale accurately 
describes the westward migration and gradual differentiation of the 
early West Slavic tribes following the collapse of the Roman Em- 
pire. About twenty such tribes formed small states between A.D. 
800 and 960. One of these tribes, the Polanie or Poliane ("people 
of the plain"), settled in the flatiands that eventually formed the 
heart of Poland, lending their name to the country. Over time the 
modern Poles emerged as the largest of the West Slavic groupings, 
establishing themselves to the east of the Germanic regions of Eu- 
rope with their ethnographic cousins, the Czechs and Slovaks, to 
the south. 

In spite of convincing fragmentary evidence of prior political and 
social organization, national custom identifies the starting date of 
Polish history as 966, when Prince Mieszko (r. 963-92) accepted 
Christianity in the name of the people he ruled. In return, Poland 
received acknowledgment as a separate principality owing some 
degree of tribute to the German Empire (later officially known as 
the Holy Roman Empire — see Glossary). Under Otto I, the Ger- 
man Empire was an expansionist force to the West in the mid-tenth 
century. Mieszko accepted baptism directly from Rome in prefer- 
ence to conversion by the German church and subsequent annex- 
ation of Poland by the German Empire. This strategy inaugurated 
the intimate connection between the Polish national identity and 
Roman Catholicism that became a prominent theme in the history 
of the Poles. 

Mieszko is considered the first ruler of the Piast Dynasty (named 
for the legendary peasant founder of the family), which endured 
for four centuries. Between 967 and 990, Mieszko conquered sub- 
stantial territory along the Baltic Sea and in the region known as 
Little Poland to the south. By the time he officially submitted to 
the authority of the Holy See in Rome in 990, Mieszko had trans- 
formed his country into one of the strongest powers in Eastern 
Europe. 

Mieszko' s son and successor Boleslaw I (r. 992-1025), known as 
the Brave, built on his father's achievements and became the most 
successful Polish monarch of the early medieval era. Boleslaw con- 
tinued the policy of appeasing the Germans while taking advan- 
tage of their political situation to gain territory wherever possible. 
Frustrated in his efforts to form an equal partnership with the Holy 
Roman Empire, Boleslaw gained some non-Polish territory in a 
series of wars against his imperial overlord in 1003 and 1004. The 
Polish conqueror then turned eastward, extending the boundaries 
of his realm into present-day Ukraine. Shortly before his death in 



4 




Cathedral at Gniezno, 
where Poland's first Roman 
Catholic archbishopric was 
established circa A. D. 1000 
Courtesy Ronald D. Bachman 

















li 





















1025, Boleslaw won international recognition as the first king of 
a fully sovereign Poland (see fig. 2). 

The Medieval Era 

During the eleventh century and the first half of the twelfth cen- 
tury, the building of the Polish state continued under a series of 
successors to Boleslaw I. But by 1150, the state had been divided 
among the sons of Boleslaw III, beginning two centuries of frag- 
mentation that brought Poland to the brink of dissolution. 

Fragmentation and Invasion, 1025-1320 

The most fabled event of the period was the murder in 1079 of 
Stanislaw, the bishop of Krakow. A participant in uprisings by the 
aristocracy against King Boleslaw II, Stanislaw was killed by or- 
der of the king. This incident, which led to open rebellion and ended 
the reign of Boleslaw, is a Polish counterpart to the later, more 
famous assassination of Thomas a Becket on behalf of King Hen- 
ry II of England. Although historians still debate the circumstances 
of the death, after his canonization the martyred St. Stanislaw en- 
tered national lore as a potent symbol of resistance to illegitimate 
state authority — an allegorical weapon that proved especially ef- 
fective against the communist regime. 

During the eleventh and twelfth centuries, Poland lost ground 
in its complex triangular relationship with the German Empire to 



5 



Poland: A Country Study 

the west and the kingdom of Bohemia to the south. New foreign 
enemies appeared by the thirteenth century. The Mongol inva- 
sion cut a swath of destruction through the country in 1241; for 
fifty years after their withdrawal in 1242, Mongol nomads mount- 
ed devastating raids into Poland from bases in Ruthenia to the 
southeast. Meanwhile, an even more dangerous foe arrived in 1226 
when a Polish duke invited the Teutonic Knights (see Glossary), 
a Germanic crusading order, to help him subdue Baltic pagan tribes. 
Upon completing their mission with characteristic fierceness and 
efficiency, the knights built a stronghold on the Baltic seacoast, 
from which they sought to enlarge their holdings at Polish expense. 
By that time, the Piasts had been parceling out the realm into ever 
smaller units for nearly 100 years. This policy of division, initiated 
by Boleslaw II to appease separatist provinces while maintaining 
national unity, led to regional governance by various branches of 
the dynasty and to a near breakdown of cohesiveness in the face 
of foreign aggression. As the fourteenth century opened, much Pol- 
ish land lay under foreign occupation (two-thirds of it was ruled 
by Bohemia in 1300). The continued existence of a united, indepen- 
dent Poland seemed unlikely. 

The Later Piasts 

In the fourteenth century, after a long period of instability and 
growing menace from without, the Polish state experienced a half 
century of recovery under the last monarchs of the house of Piast. 
By 1320 Wladyslaw Lokietek (r. 1314-33), called the Short, had 
manipulated internal and foreign alignments and reunited enough 
territory to win acceptance abroad as king of an independent 
Poland. His son Kazimierz III (r. 1333-70) would become the only 
Polish king to gain the sobriquet "great." In foreign policy, 
Kazimierz the Great strengthened his country's position by com- 
bining judicious concessions to Bohemia and the Teutonic Knights 
with eastward expansion. 

While using diplomacy to win Poland a respite from external 
threat, the king focused on domestic consolidation. He earned his 
singular reputation through his acumen as a builder and adminis- 
trator as well as through foreign relations. Two of the most im- 
portant events of Kazimierz 's rule were the founding of Poland's 
first university in Krakow in 1364, making that city an important 
European cultural center, and his mediation between the kings of 
Bohemia and Hungary at the Congress of Krakow (also in 1364), 
signaling Poland's return to the status of a European power. Lack- 
ing a male heir, Kazimierz was the last ruler in the Piast line. The 
extinction of the dynasty in 1370 led to several years of renewed 



6 



Historical Setting 



political uncertainty. Nevertheless, the accomplishments of the four- 
teenth century began the ascent of the Polish state toward its histor- 
ical zenith. 

Integration into European Civilization 

Without question the most significant development of the for- 
mative era of Poland's history was the gradual absorption of the 
country into the culture of medieval Europe. After their relatively 
late arrival as pagan outsiders on the fringes of the Christian world, 
the Western Slavs were fully and speedily assimilated into the civili- 
zation of the European Middle Ages. Latin Christianity came to 
determine the identity of that civilization and permeate its intellect 
and creativity. Over time the Central Europeans increasingly pat- 
terned their thought and institutions on Western models in areas 
of thought ranging from philosophy, artistic style, literature, and 
architecture to government, law, and social structure. The Poles 
borrowed especially heavily from German sources, and successive 
Polish rulers encouraged a substantial immigration of Germans and 
Jews to invigorate urban life and commerce. From its beginning, 
Poland drew its primary inspiration from Western Europe and de- 
veloped a closer affinity with the French and Italians, for exam- 
ple, than with nearer Slavic neighbors of Eastern Orthodox and 
Byzantine (see Glossary) heritage. This westward orientation, which 
in some ways has made Poland the easternmost outpost of Latinate 
and Catholic tradition, helps to explain the Poles' tenacious sense 
of belonging to the "West" and their deeply rooted antagonism 
toward Russia as the representative of an essentially alien way of life. 

The Jagiellon Era, 1385-1572 

The next major period was dominated by the union of Poland 
with Lithuania under a dynasty founded by the Lithuanian grand 
duke Jagiello. The partnership proved profitable for the Poles, who 
played a dominant role in one of the most powerful empires in Eu- 
rope for the next three centuries. 

The Polish-Lithuanian Union 

Poland's unlikely partnership with the adjoining Grand Duchy 
of Lithuania, Europe's last heathen state, provided an immediate 
remedy to the political and military dilemma caused by the end 
of the Piast Dynasty. At the end of the fourteenth century, Lithu- 
ania was a warlike political unit with dominion over enormous 
stretches of present-day Belarus and Ukraine. Putting aside their 
previous hostility, Poland and Lithuania saw that they shared com- 
mon enemies, most notably the Teutonic Knights; this situation 



7 



Poland: A Country Study 





LIVONIA 



COURLAND 



DENMARK 



PRUSSIA 



X 



Gdansk} 



8 




Poznarr 



WIELKOPOLSKA 

(Great Poland) 

• \ 
Wroctaw\ 



Prague^ 
BOHEMIA 



MALOPOLSKA 

(Little Poland) 

Krakow 



■mbm Boundary of Poland at the 
death of Bolesfaw 
the Brave, 1025 
« » » « * Boundary of Poland during 
the reign of Kazimierz 
the Great, 1333-70 
• Populated place 
LIVONIA Country or region 
YyC^A Lands of the Polanie, 
early tenth century 
Lands of the Teutonic 

Knights, thirteenth century 
Fiefs of the Polish crown, 
fourteenth century 

50 100 150 Kilom eters 
50 100 150 Miles 



E3 



-9- 



Kiev 



RO^ V 



PODOUA \ 



HUNGARY 



A 



Figure 2. Piast Poland, 966 to 1370 



was the direct incentive for the Union of Krewo in 1385. The com- 
pact hinged on the marriage of the Polish queen Jadwiga to Jagiello, 
who became king of Poland under the name Wladyslaw J agiello. 
In return, the new monarch accepted baptism in the name of his 
people, agreed to confederate Lithuania with Poland, and took the 
name Wladyslaw II. In 1387 the bishopric of Wilno was established 
to convert Wladyslaw 's subjects to Roman Catholicism. (Eastern 
Orthodoxy predominated in some parts of Lithuania.) From a mili- 
tary standpoint, Poland received protection from the Mongols and 
Tatars, while Lithuania received aid in its long struggle against 
the Teutonic Knights. 

The Polish- Lithuanian alliance exerted a profound influence on 
the history of Eastern Europe (see fig. 3). Poland and Lithuania 
would maintain joint statehood for more than 400 years, and over 
the first three centuries of that span the "Commonwealth of Two 
Nations" ranked as one of the leading powers of the continent. 



8 



Fortress of Malbork, seat of grand masters of the Teutonic 
Knights in fourteenth and fifteenth centuries 
Courtesy Jean R. Tartter 
Part of the old city wall of Krakow, established in the fourteenth century 

Courtesy Ronald D. Bachman 



Poland: A Country Study 

The association produced prompt benefits in 1410 when the forces 
of Poland-Lithuania defeated the Teutonic Knights in battle at 
Grunwald (Tannenberg), at last seizing the upper hand in the long 
struggle with the renegade crusaders. The new Polish-Lithuanian 
dynasty, called "Jagiellon" after its founder, continued to aug- 
ment its holdings during the following decades. By the end of the 
fifteenth century, representatives of the Jagiellons reigned in Bo- 
hemia and Hungary as well as Poland-Lithuania, establishing the 
government of their clan over virtually all of Eastern Europe and 
Central Europe. This far-flung federation collapsed in 1526 when 
armies of the Ottoman Empire (see Glossary) won a crushing vic- 
tory at the Battle of Mohacs (in Hungary), wresting Bohemia and 
Hungary from the Jagiellons and installing the Turks as a menac- 
ing presence in the heart of Europe. 

The "Golden Age" of the Sixteenth Century 

The Jagiellons never recovered their hegemony over Central Eu- 
rope, and the ascendancy of the Ottomans foreshadowed the even- 
tual subjection of the entire region to foreign rule; but the half 
century that followed the Battle of Mohacs marked an era of sta- 
bility, affluence, and cultural advancement unmatched in national 
history and widely regarded by Poles as their country's golden age. 

Poland- Lithuania as a European Power 

The Teutonic Knights had been reduced to vassalage, and despite 
the now persistent threats posed by the Turks and an emerging 
Russian colossus, Poland-Lithuania managed to defend its status 
as one of the largest and most prominent states of Europe. The 
wars and diplomacy of the century yielded no dramatic expansion 
but shielded the country from significant disturbance and permit- 
ted significant internal development. An "Eternal Peace" concluded 
with the Ottoman Turks in 1533 lessened but did not remove the 
threat of invasion from that quarter. 

A lucrative agricultural export market was the foundation for 
the kingdom's wealth. A population boom in Western Europe 
prompted an increased demand for foodstuffs; Poland-Lithuania 
became Europe's foremost supplier of grain, which was shipped 
abroad from the Baltic seaport of Gdansk. Aside from swelling Po- 
lish coffers, the prosperous grain trade supported other notable 
aspects of national development. It reinforced the preeminence of 
the landowning nobility that received its profits, and it helped to 
preserve a traditionally rural society and economy at a time when 
Western Europe had begun moving toward urbanization and 
capitalism. 



10 



Historical Setting 



The Government of Poland-Lithuania 

In other respects as well, the distinctive features of Jagiellon 
Poland ran against the historical trends of early modern Europe. 
Not the least of those features was its singular governmental struc- 
ture and practice. In an era that favored the steady accumulation 
of power within the hands of European monarchs, Poland-Lithuania 
developed a markedly decentralized system dominated by a land- 
ed aristocracy that kept royal authority firmly in check. The Polish 
nobility, or szlachta, enjoyed the considerable benefits of landowner- 
ship and control over the labor of the peasantry. The szlachta in- 
cluded 7 to 10 percent of the population, making it a very large 
noble class by European standards. The nobility manifested an im- 
pressive group solidarity in spite of great individual differences in 
wealth and standing. Over time, the gentry induced a series of royal 
concessions and guarantees that vested the noble parliament, or 
Sejm, with decisive control over most aspects of statecraft, includ- 
ing exclusive rights to the making of laws. The Sejm operated on 
the principle of unanimous consent, regarding each noble as ir- 
reducibly sovereign. In a further safeguard of minority rights, Polish 
usage sanctioned the right of a group of gentry to form a confeder- 
ation, which in effect constituted an uprising aimed at redress of 
grievances. The nobility also possessed the crucial right to elect 
the monarch, although the Jagiellons were in practice a hereditary 
ruling house in all but the formal sense. The prestige of the Jagiel- 
lons and the certainty of their succession supplied an element of 
cohesion that tempered the disruptive forces built into the state 
system. 

In retrospect historians frequently have derided the idiosyncratic, 
delicate governmental mechanism of Poland-Lithuania as a recipe 
for anarchy. Although its eventual breakdown contributed greatly 
to the loss of independence in the eighteenth century, the system 
worked reasonably well for 200 years while fostering a spirit of civic 
liberality unmatched in the Europe of its day. The host of legal 
protections that the nobility enacted for itself prefigured the rights 
generally accorded the citizens of modern democracies, and the 
memory of the "golden freedoms" of Poland-Lithuania is an im- 
portant part of the Poles' present-day sense of their tradition of 
liberty. On the other hand, the exclusion of the lower nobility from 
most of those protections caused serious resentment among that 
largely impoverished class, and the aristocracy passed laws in the 
early sixteenth century that made the peasants virtual slaves to the 
flourishing agricultural enterprises. 



11 



Poland: A Country Study 




— — Boundary of Poland-Lithuania j j Fiefs of the Polish crown 

and vassal states, 1 466 F77^\ Lands of the Teutonic Knights 

• Populated place | | Royal Prussia, incorporated into 
^ Battle Poland in 1466 

BOHEMIA Country or region II 1 1 1 1 1 1 Fief of the Polish crown after 1466 



Figure 3. Jagiellon Poland- Lithuania, Fifteenth Century 

Poland-Lithuania in the Reformation Era 

In modern eyes, the most saliently liberal aspect of Jagiellon 
Poland is its relative toleration of religious dissent. This tolerance 
prevailed in Poland even during the religious upheavals, war, 
and atrocities associated with the Protestant Reformation (see Glos- 
sary) and its repercussions in many parts of sixteenth-century Eu- 
rope. The Reformation arrived in Poland between 1523 and 1526. 
The small Calvinist, Lutheran, and Hussite groups that sprang 
up were harshly persecuted by the Roman Catholic Church in their 
early years. Then in 1552 the Sejm suspended civil execution of 



12 



Historical Setting 



ecclesiastical sentences for heresy. For the next 130 years, Poland 
remained solidly Roman Catholic while refusing to repress con- 
tending faiths and providing refuge for a wide variety of religious 
nonconformists. 

Such broad-mindedness derived as much from practical neces- 
sity as from principle, for Poland-Lithuania governed a populace 
of remarkable ethnic and religious diversity, embracing Roman 
Catholics, Eastern Orthodox, Protestants, and numerous non- 
Christians. In particular, after the mid-sixteenth century the Po- 
lish lands supported the world's largest concentration of Jews, whose 
number was estimated at 150,000 in 1582. Under the Jagiellons, 
Jews suffered fewer restrictions in Poland- Lithuania than elsewhere 
in Europe while establishing an economic niche as tradesmen and 
managers of noble estates. 

The Polish Renaissance 

The sixteenth century was perhaps the most illustrious phase of 
Polish cultural history. During this period, Poland- Lithuania drew 
great artistic inspiration from the Italians, with whom the Jagiel- 
lon court cultivated close relations. Styles and tastes characteristic 
of the late Renaissance were imported from the Italian states. These 
influences survived in the renowned period architecture of Krakow, 
which served as the royal capital until that distinction passed to 
Warsaw in 1611. The University of Krakow gained international 
recognition as a cosmopolitan center of learning, and in 1543 its 
most illustrious student, Nicolaus Copernicus (Mikolaj Kopernik), 
literally revolutionized the science of astronomy. 

The period also bore the fruit of a mature Polish literature, once 
again modeled after the fashion of the West European Renaissance. 
The talented dilettante Mikolaj Rej was the first major Polish writer 
to employ the vernacular, but the elegant classicist Jan Kochanowski 
(1530-84) is acknowledged as the genius of the age. Accomplished 
in several genres and equally adept in Polish and Latin, Kocha- 
nowski is widely regarded as the finest Slavic poet before the 
nineteenth century. 

The Eastern Regions of the Realm 

The population of Poland-Lithuania was not overwhelmingly 
Catholic or Slavic. This circumstance resulted from the federation 
with Lithuania, where ethnic Poles were a distinct minority. In 
those days, to be Polish was much less an indication of ethnicity 
than of rank; it was a designation largely reserved for the landed 
noble class, which included members of Polish and non-Polish origin 
alike. Generally speaking, the ethnically non-Polish noble families 



13 



Poland: A Country Study 




— Boundary of Poland-Lithuania, 1569 |X I Polish fiefs ceded to Sweden, 1660 

Boundary between Poland and Lithuania fc>^>] Ceded to Poland by Muscovy, 1619 

at the Union of Lublin, 1569 iBiM Ceded to Poland by Muscovy. 1619; 

® National capital (after 1611) returned to Muscovy, 1630-1640 

• Populated place Ceded to Muscovy by Poland, 1667 

Bohemia Country or region mmmm Habsburg domains 
I i Polish fiefs 
|| | [ I I | Polish fiefs ceded to 

Duchy of Prussia, 1657 



Figure 4. Polish- Lithuanian Commonwealth from the Union of Lublin, 
1569 to 1667 



of Lithuania adopted the Polish language and culture. As a result, 
in the eastern territories of the kingdom a Polish or Polonized 
aristocracy dominated a peasantry whose great majority was neither 
Polish nor Catholic. This bred resentment that later grew into 
separate Lithuanian, Belorussian, and Ukrainian nationalist move- 
ments. 

In the mid-sixteenth century, Poland-Lithuania sought ways to 
maintain control of the diverse kingdom in spite of two threaten- 
ing circumstances. First, since the late 1400s a series of ambitious 
tsars of the house of Rurik had led Russia in competing with Poland- 
Lithuania for influence over the Slavic territories located between 
the two states. Second, Sigismund II Augustus (r. 1548-72) had no 



14 



Historical Setting 



male heir. The Jagiellon Dynasty, the strongest link between the 
halves of the state, would end after his reign. Accordingly, the 
Union of Lublin of 1569 transformed the loose federation and per- 
sonal union of the Jagiellonian epoch into the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth, deepening and formalizing the bonds between 
Poland and Lithuania (see fig. 4). 

The Noble Republic, 1572-1795 

Although most accounts of Polish history show the two centu- 
ries after the end of the Jagiellon Dynasty as a time of decline leading 
to foreign domination, Poland-Lithuania remained an influential 
player in European politics and a vital cultural entity through most 
of the period. 

The Elective Monarchy 

The death of Sigismund II Augustus in 1572 was followed by 
a three-year interregnum during which adjustments were made in 
the constitutional system. The lower nobility was now included in 
the selection process, and the power of the monarch was further 
circumscribed in favor of the expanded noble class. From that point, 
the king was effectively a partner with the noble class and con- 
stantly supervised by a group of senators. Once the Jagiellons passed 
from the scene, the fragile equilibrium of the commonwealth 
government began to go awry. The constitutional reforms made 
the monarchy electoral in fact as well as name. As more and more 
power went to the noble electors, it also eroded from the govern- 
ment's center. 

In its periodic opportunities to fill the throne, the szlachta exhibited 
a preference for foreign candidates who would not found another 
strong dynasty. This policy produced monarchs who were either to- 
tally ineffective or in constant debilitating conflict with the nobility. 
Furthermore, aside from notable exceptions such as the able Tran- 
sylvanian Stefan Batory (r. 1576-86), the kings of alien origin were 
inclined to subordinate the interests of the commonwealth to those 
of their own country and ruling house. This tendency was most 
obvious in the prolonged military adventures waged by Sigismund 
III Vasa (r. 1587-1632) against Russia and his native Sweden. On 
occasion, these campaigns brought Poland near to conquest of Mus- 
covy and the Baltic coast, but they compounded the military bur- 
den imposed by the ongoing rivalry with the Turks, and the Swedes 
and Russians extracted heavy repayment a few decades later. 

The Deluge, 1648-67 

Although Poland-Lithuania escaped the ravages of the Thirty 



15 



Poland: A Country Study 

Years' War (see Glossary), which ended in 1648, the ensuing two 
decades subjected the country to one of its severest trials. This color- 
ful but ruinous interval, the stuff of legend and the popular histor- 
ical novels of Nobel laureate Henryk Sienkiewicz (1846-1916), 
became known as the potop, or deluge, for the magnitude of its hard- 
ships. The emergency began with an uprising of Ukrainian Cos- 
sacks that persisted in spite of Warsaw's efforts to subdue it by force. 
After the rebels won the intervention of Muscovy on their behalf, 
Tsar Alexis conquered most of the eastern half of the country by 
1655. Taking advantage of Poland's preoccupation, Charles X of 
Sweden rapidly overran much of the remaining territory of the com- 
monwealth in 1655. Pushed to the brink of dissolution, Poland- 
Lithuania rallied to recover most of its losses to the Swedes. Swed- 
ish brutality raised widespread revolts against Charles, whom the 
Polish nobles had recognized as their ruler in the meantime. Un- 
der Stefan Czarniecki, the Poles and Lithuanians drove the Swedes 
from their territory by 1657. Further complicated by noble dissen- 
sion and wars with the Ottoman Turks, the thirteen-year struggle 
over control of Ukraine ended in the Truce of Andrusovo in 1667. 
Although Russia had been defeated by a new Polish-Ukrainian al- 
liance in 1662, Russia gained eastern Ukraine in the peace treaty. 

Despite the improbable survival of the commonwealth in the face 
of the potop, one of the most dramatic instances of the Poles' knack 
for prevailing in adversity, the episode inflicted irremediable damage 
and contributed heavily to the ultimate demise of the state. When 
Jan II Kazimierz abdicated in 1668, the population of the com- 
monwealth had been nearly halved by war and disease. War had 
destroyed the economic base of the cities and raised a religious fervor 
that ended Poland's policy of religious tolerance. Henceforth, the 
commonwealth would be on the strategic defensive facing hostile 
neighbors. Never again would Poland compete with Russia as a 
military equal. 

Decay of the Commonwealth 

Before another 100 years had elapsed, Poland- Lithuania had vir- 
tually ceased to function as a coherent and genuinely independent 
state. The commonwealth's last martial triumph occurred in 1683 
when King Jan Sobieski drove the Turks from the gates of Vienna 
with a cavalry charge. Poland's important role in aiding the Euro- 
pean alliance to roll back the Ottoman Empire was rewarded with 
territory in western Ukraine by the Treaty of Karlowicz (1699). 
Nonetheless, this isolated success did little to mask the internal weak- 
ness and paralysis of the Polish-Lithuanian political system. For 
the next quarter century, Poland was often a pawn in Russia's 



16 



Historical Setting 



campaigns against other powers. Augustus II of Saxony (r. 1697- 
1733), who succeeded Jan Sobieski, involved Poland in Peter the 
Great's war with Sweden, incurring another round of invasion and 
devastation by the Swedes between 1704 and 1710. 

In the eighteenth century, the powers of the monarchy and the 
central administration became purely trivial. Kings were denied 
permission to provide for the elementary requirements of defense 
and finance, and aristocratic clans made treaties directly with for- 
eign sovereigns. Attempts at reform were stymied by the determi- 
nation of the szlachta to preserve their "golden freedoms" as well 
as the rule of unanimity in the Sejm, where any deputy could ex- 
ercise his veto right to disrupt the parliament and nullify its work. 
Because of the chaos sown by the veto provision, under Augustus 
III (r. 1733-63) only one of thirteen Sejm sessions ran to an or- 
derly adjournment. 

Unlike Spain and Sweden, great powers that were allowed to 
settle peacefully into secondary status at the periphery of Europe 
at the end of their time of glory, Poland endured its decline at the 
strategic crossroads of the continent. Lacking central leadership 
and impotent in foreign relations, Poland- Lithuania became a chat- 
tel of the ambitious kingdoms that surrounded it, an immense but 
feeble buffer state. During the reign of Peter the Great (1682-1725), 
the commonwealth fell under the dominance of Russia, and by the 
middle of the eighteenth century Poland-Lithuania had been made 
a virtual protectorate of its eastern neighbor, retaining only the 
theoretical right to self-rule. 

The Three Partitions, 1764-95 

During the reign of Empress Catherine the Great (1762-96), Rus- 
sia intensified its manipulation of Polish affairs. Prussia and Aus- 
tria, the other powers surrounding the republic, also took advantage 
of internal religious and political bickering to divide up the coun- 
try in three partition stages. The third partition in 1795 wiped 
Poland-Lithuania from the map of Europe. 

First Partition 

In 1764 Catherine dictated the election of her former favorite, 
Stanislaw August Poniatowski, as king of Poland- Lithuania. Con- 
founding expectations that he would be an obedient servant of his 
mistress, Stanislaw August encouraged the modernization of his 
realm's ramshackle political system and achieved a temporary 
moratorium on use of the individual veto in the Sejm (1764-66). 
This turnabout threatened to renew the strength of the monarchy 
and brought displeasure in the foreign capitals that preferred an 



17 



Poland: A Country Study 




Boundary of Poland [ • . \ I Annexed by Russia 

prior to partition ' ' 1 

® National capital Annexed by Prussia 

• Populated place 

RUSSIA Country or region I^S^j Annexed by Austria 



Figure 5. The First Partition of Poland, 1 772 

inert, pliable Poland. Catherine, among the most displeased by 
Poniatowski's independence, encouraged religious dissension in 
Poland-Lithuania's substantial Eastern Orthodox population, which 
earlier in the eighteenth century had lost the rights enjoyed dur- 
ing the Jagiellon Dynasty. Under heavy Russian pressure, the Sejm 
restored Orthodox equality in 1767. This action provoked a Catholic 
uprising by the Confederation of Bar, a league of Polish nobles 
that fought until 1772 to revoke Catherine's mandate. 

The defeat of the Confederation of Bar again left Poland exposed 
to the ambitions of its neighbors. Although Catherine initially op- 
posed partition, Frederick the Great of Prussia profited from Aus- 
tria's threatening military position to the southwest by pressing a 



18 



Historical Setting 



long-standing proposal to carve territory from the commonwealth. 
Catherine, persuaded that Russia did not have the resources to con- 
tinue unilateral domination of Poland, agreed. In 1772 Russia, 
Prussia, and Austria forced terms of partition upon the helpless 
commonwealth under the pretext of restoring order in the anar- 
chic Polish situation (see fig. 5). 

National Revival 

The first partition in 1772 did not directly threaten the viability 
of Poland-Lithuania. Poland retained extensive territory that in- 
cluded the Polish heartland. In fact, the shock of the annexations 
made clear the dangers of decay in government institutions, creating 
a body of opinion favorable to reform along the lines of the Euro- 
pean Enlightenment (see Glossary). King Stanislaw August sup- 
ported the progressive elements in the government and promoted 
the ideas of foreign political figures such as Edmund Burke and 
George Washington. At the same time, Polish intellectuals discussed 
Enlightenment philosophers such as Montesquieu and Rousseau. 
During this period, the concept of democratic institutions for all 
classes was accepted in Polish society. Education reform included 
establishment of the first ministry of education in Europe. Taxa- 
tion and the army underwent thorough reform, and government 
again was centralized in the Permanent Council. Landholders eman- 
cipated large numbers of peasants, although there was no official 
government decree. Polish cities, in decline for many decades, were 
revived by the influence of the Industrial Revolution, especially 
in mining and textiles. 

Stanislaw August's process of renovation reached its climax on 
May 3, 1791, when, after three years of intense debate, the "Four 
Years' Sejm" produced Europe's first written constitution. Con- 
ceived in the liberal spirit of the contemporaneous document in 
the United States, the constitution recast Poland-Lithuania as a 
hereditary monarchy and abolished many of the eccentricities and 
antiquated features of the old system. The new constitution abol- 
ished the individual veto in parliament; provided a separation of 
powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of 
government; and established "people's sovereignty" (for the no- 
ble and bourgeois classes). Although never fully implemented, the 
Constitution of May 3 gained an honored position in the Polish 
political heritage; tradition marks the anniversary of its passage 
as the country's most important civic holiday. 

Destruction of Poland-Lithuania 

Passage of the constitution alarmed nobles who stood to lose 



19 



Poland: A Country Study 




Figure 6. The Second Partition of Poland, 1793 

considerable stature under the new order. In autocratic states such 
as Russia, the democratic ideals of the constitution also threatened 
the existing order, and the prospect of Polish recovery threatened 
to end domination of Polish affairs by its neighbors. In 1792 domes- 
tic and foreign reactionaries combined to end the democratization 
process. Polish conservative factions formed the Confederation of 
Targowica and appealed for Russian assistance in restoring the sta- 
tus quo. Catherine gladly used this opportunity; enlisting Prussian 
support, she invaded Poland under the pretext of defending Poland's 
ancient liberties. The irresolute Stanislaw August capitulated, 
defecting to the Targowica faction. Arguing that Poland had fallen 
prey to the radical Jacobinism (see Glossary) then at high tide in 



20 



Historical Setting 




100 200 Kilometers 



100 



200 Miles 



A 



— — Boundary of Poland 
prior to partition 

• Populated place 

RUSSIA Country or region 



Annexed by Russia 
Annexed by Prussia 
Annexed by Austria 



Figure 7. The Third Partition of Poland, 1795 



France, Russia and Prussia abrogated the Constitution of May 3, 
carried out a second partition of Poland in 1793, and placed the 
remainder of the country under occupation by Russian troops. 

The second partition was far more injurious than the first (see 
fig. 6). Russia received a vast area of eastern Poland, extending 
southward from its gains in the first partition nearly to the Black 
Sea. To the west, Prussia received an area known as South Prus- 
sia, nearly twice the size of its first-partition gains along the Bal- 
tic, as well as the port of Gdansk (then renamed Danzig). Thus, 
Poland's neighbors reduced the commonwealth to a rump state and 
plainly signaled their designs to abolish it altogether at their con- 
venience. 



21 



Poland: A Country Study 

In a gesture of defiance, a general Polish revolt broke out in 1794 
under the leadership of Tadeusz Kosciuszko, a military officer who 
had rendered notable service in the American Revolution. Ko- 
sciuszko' s ragtag insurgent armies won some initial successes, but 
they eventually fell before the superior forces of Russian Gen- 
eral Alexander Suvorov. In the wake of the insurrection of 1794, 
Russia, Prussia, and Austria carried out the third and final par- 
tition of Poland-Lithuania in 1795, erasing the Commonwealth 
of Two Nations from the map and pledging never to let it return 
(see fig. 7). 

Much of Europe condemned the dismemberment as an inter- 
national crime without historical parallel. Amid the distractions 
of the French Revolution and its attendant wars, however, no state 
actively opposed the annexations. In the long term, the dissolu- 
tion of Poland-Lithuania upset the traditional European balance 
of power, dramatically magnifying the influence of Russia and pav- 
ing the way for the Germany that would emerge in the nineteenth 
century with Prussia at its core. For the Poles, the third partition 
began a period of continuous foreign rule that would endure well 
over a century. 

Partitioned Poland 

Although the majority of the szlachta was reconciled to the end of 
the commonwealth in 1795, the possibility of Polish independence 
was kept alive by events within and outside Poland throughout the 
nineteenth century. Poland's location in the very center of Europe 
became especially significant in a period when both Prussia/Germa- 
ny and Russia were intensely involved in European rivalries and 
alliances and modern nation states took form over the entire con- 
tinent. 

The Napoleonic Period 

At the turn of the nineteenth century, Europe had begun to feel 
the impact of momentous political and intellectual movements that, 
among their other effects, would keep the "Polish Question" on 
the agenda of international issues needing resolution. Most immedi- 
ately, Napoleon Bonaparte had established a new empire in France 
in 1804 following that country's revolution. Napoleon's attempts 
to build and expand his empire kept Europe at war for the next 
decade and brought him into conflict with the same East Europe- 
an powers that had beleaguered Poland in the last decades of the 
previous century. An alliance of convenience was the natural result 
of this situation. Volunteer Polish legions attached themselves to 



22 



Historical Setting 



Bonaparte's armies, hoping that in return the emperor would al- 
low an independent Poland to reappear out of his conquests. 

Although Napoleon promised more than he ever intended to 
deliver to the Polish cause, in 1807 he created a Duchy of Warsaw 
from Prussian territory that had been part of old Poland and was 
still inhabited by Poles (see fig. 8). Basically a French puppet, the 
duchy did enjoy some degree of self-government, and many Poles 
believed that further Napoleonic victories would bring restoration 
of the entire commonwealth. 

In 1809, under Jozef Poniatowski, nephew of Stanislaw II Au- 
gustus, the duchy reclaimed the land taken by Austria in the sec- 
ond partition. The Russian army occupied the duchy as it chased 
Napoleon out of Russia in 1813, however, and Polish expectations 
ended with the final defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815. In the 
subsequent peace settlement of the Congress of Vienna, the victori- 
ous Austrians and Prussians swept away the Duchy of Warsaw and 
reconfirmed most of the terms of the final partition of Poland. 

Although brief, the Napoleonic period occupies an important 
place in Polish annals. Much of the legend and symbolism of 
modern Polish patriotism derives from this period, including the 
conviction that Polish independence is a necessary element of a just 
and legitimate European order. This conviction was simply ex- 
pressed in a fighting slogan of the time, "for your freedom and 
ours." Moreover, the appearance of the Duchy of Warsaw so soon 
after the partitions proved that the seemingly final historical death 
sentence delivered in 1795 was not necessarily the end of the Po- 
lish nation. Instead, many observers came to believe that favora- 
ble circumstances would free Poland from foreign domination. 

The Impact of Nationalism and Romanticism 

The intellectual and artistic climate of the early nineteenth cen- 
tury further stimulated the growth of Polish demands for self- 
government. During these decades, modern nationalism took 
shape and rapidly developed a massive following throughout the 
continent, becoming the most dynamic and appealing political doc- 
trine of its time. By stressing the value and dignity of native cul- 
tures and languages, nationalism offered a rationale for ethnic 
loyalty and resistance to assimilation. The associated principle of 
the nation state, or national homeland, provided a rallying cry for 
the stateless peoples of Europe. 

Romanticism was the artistic element of nineteenth-century Euro- 
pean culture that exerted the strongest influence on the Polish 
national consciousness. The Romantic movement was a natural part- 
ner of political nationalism, for it echoed the nationalist sympathy 



23 



Poland: A Country Study 




Figure 8. Duchy of Warsaw, 1807-13, and Congress Poland, 1815 



for folk cultures and manifested a general air of disdain for the con- 
servative political order of post-Napoleonic Europe. Under this in- 
fluence, Polish literature flourished anew in the works of a school 
of nineteenth-century Romantic poets, led by Adam Mickiewicz 
(1798-1855). Mickiewicz concentrated on patriotic themes and the 
glorious national past. Frederic Chopin (1810-49), a leading com- 
poser of the century, also used the tragic history of his nation as 
a major inspiration. 

Nurtured by these influences, nationalism awoke first among 
the intelligentsia and certain segments of the nobility, then more 



24 



Historical Setting 



gradually in the peasantry. At the end of the process, a broader 
definition of nationhood had replaced the old class-based ' ' gentry 
patriotism" of Poland. 

The Era of National Insurrections 

For several decades, the Polish national movement gave priori- 
ty to the immediate restoration of independence, a drive that found 
expression in a series of armed rebellions. The insurgencies arose 
mainly in the Russian zone of partition to the east, about three- 
quarters of which was formerly Polish territory. After the Congress 
of Vienna, St. Petersburg had organized its Polish lands as the Con- 
gress Kingdom of Poland, granting it a quite liberal constitution, 
its own army, and limited autonomy within the tsarist empire. In 
the 1820s, however, Russian rule grew more arbitrary, and secret 
societies were formed by intellectuals in several cities to plot an 
overthrow. In November 1830, Polish troops in Warsaw rose in 
revolt. When the government of Congress Poland proclaimed 
solidarity with the insurrectionists shortly thereafter, a new Polish- 
Russian war began. The rebels' requests for aid from France were 
ignored, and their reluctance to abolish serfdom cost them the sup- 
port of the peasantry. By September 1831, the Russians had sub- 
dued Polish resistance and forced 6,000 resistance fighters into exile 
in France, beginning a time of harsh repression of intellectual and 
religious activity throughout Poland. At the same time, Congress 
Poland lost its constitution and its army. 

After the failure of the November Revolt, clandestine con- 
spiratorial activity continued on Polish territory. An exiled Polish 
political and intellectual elite established a base of operations in 
Paris. A conservative group headed by Adam Czartoryski (leader 
of the November Revolt) relied on foreign diplomatic support to 
restore Poland's status as established by the Congress of Vienna, 
which Russia had routinely violated beginning in 1819. Otherwise, 
this group was satisfied with a return to monarchy and traditional 
social structures. 

The radical factions never formed a united front on any issue 
besides the general goal of independence. Their programs insisted 
that the Poles liberate themselves by their own efforts and linked 
independence with republicanism and the emancipation of the 
peasants. Handicapped by internal division, limited resources, 
heavy surveillance, and persecution of revolutionary cells in Poland, 
the Polish national movement suffered numerous losses. The move- 
ment sustained a major setback in the 1846 revolt organized in Aus- 
trian Poland by the Polish Democratic Society, the leading radical 
nationalist group. The uprising ended in a bloody fiasco when the 



25 



Poland: A Country Study 

peasantry took up arms against the gentry rebel leadership, which 
was regarded as potentially a worse oppressor than the Austrians. 
By incurring harsh military repression from Austria, the failed revolt 
left the Polish nationalists in poor position to participate in the wave 
of national revolution that crossed Europe in 1848 and 1849. The 
stubborn idealism of this uprising's leaders emphasized individu- 
al liberty and separate national identity rather than establishment 
of a unified republic — a significant change of political philosophy 
from earlier movements. 

The last and most tenacious of the Polish uprisings of the mid- 
nineteenth century erupted in the Russian-occupied sector in Janu- 
ary 1863. Following Russia's disastrous defeat in the Crimean War, 
the government of Tsar Alexander II enacted a series of liberal 
reforms, including liberation of the serfs throughout the empire. 
High-handed imposition of land reforms in Poland aroused hostility 
among the landed nobles and a group of young radical intellectuals 
influenced by Karl Marx and the Russian liberal Alexander Herzen. 
Repeating the pattern of 1830-31, the open revolt of the January 
Insurrection by Congress Poland failed to win foreign backing. 
Although its socially progressive program could not mobilize the 
peasants, the rebellion persisted stubbornly for fifteen months. After 
finally crushing the insurgency in August 1864, Russia abolished 
the Congress Kingdom of Poland altogether and revoked the 
separate status of the Polish lands, incorporating them directly as 
the Western Region of the Russian Empire. The region was placed 
under the dictatorial rule of Mikhail Muravev, who became known 
as the Hangman of Wilno. All Polish citizens were assimilated into 
the empire. When Russia officially emancipated the Polish serfs 
in early 1864, it removed a major rallying point from the agenda 
of potential Polish revolutionaries. 

The Time of "Organic Work" 

Increasing oppression at Russian hands after failed national 
uprisings finally convinced Polish leaders that insurrection was 
premature at best and perhaps fundamentally misguided and 
counterproductive. During the decades that followed the January 
Insurrection, Poles largely forsook the goal of immediate inde- 
pendence and turned instead to fortifying the nation through the 
subtler means of education, economic development, and modern- 
ization. This approach took the name Organic Work for its phi- 
losophy of strengthening Polish society at the grass roots. For some, 
the adoption of Organic Work meant permanent resignation to for- 
eign rule, but many advocates recommended it as a strategy to 



26 



Historical Setting 



combat repression while awaiting an eventual opportunity to achieve 
self-government. 

Not nearly as colorful as the rebellions nor as loftily enshrined 
in national memory, the quotidian methods of Organic Work 
proved well suited to the political conditions of the later nineteenth 
century. The international balance of forces did not favor the recov- 
ery of statehood when both Russia and Germany appeared bent 
on the eventual eradication of Polish national identity. The Ger- 
man Empire, established in 1871 as an expanded version of the 
Prussian state, aimed at the assimilation of its eastern provinces 
inhabited by Poles. At the same time, St. Petersburg attempted 
to Russify the former Congress Kingdom, joining Berlin in levy- 
ing restrictions against use of the Polish language and cultural ex- 
pression. Poles under Russian and German rule also endured official 
campaigns against the Roman Catholic Church: the Cultural Strug- 
gle (Kulturkampf) of Chancellor Otto von Bismarck to bring the 
Roman Catholic Church under state control and the Russian cam- 
paign to extend Orthodoxy throughout the empire. 

The Polish subjects under Austrian jurisdiction (after 1867 the 
Habsburg Empire (see Glossary) was commonly known as Austria- 
Hungary) confronted a generally more lenient regime. Poles suf- 
fered no religious persecution in predominantly Catholic Austria, 
and Vienna counted on the Polish nobility as an ally in the com- 
plex political calculus of its multinational realm. In return for 
loyalty, Austrian Poland, or Galicia, received considerable adminis- 
trative and cultural autonomy. Galicia gained a reputation as an 
oasis of toleration amidst the oppression of German and Russian 
Poland. The Galician provincial Sejm acted as a semiautonomous 
parliamentary body, and Poles represented the region in the em- 
pire government in Vienna. In the late 1800s, the universities of 
Krakow and L'vov (Lwow in Polish) became the centers of Po- 
lish intellectual activity, and Krakow became the center of Polish 
art and thought. Even after the restoration of independence, many 
residents of southern Poland retained a touch of nostalgia for the 
days of the Habsburg Empire. 

Social and Political Transformation 

Throughout the later nineteenth century, profound social and 
economic forces operated on the Polish lands, giving them a more 
modern aspect and altering traditional patterns of life. Especially 
in Russian Poland and the Silesian regions under German con- 
trol, mining and manufacturing commenced on a large scale. This 
development sped the process of urbanization, and the emergence 
of capitalism began to reduce the relative importance of the landed 



27 



Poland: A Country Study 



aristocracy in Polish society. A considerable segment of the peasan- 
try abandoned the overburdened land. Millions of Poles emigrat- 
ed to North America and other destinations, and millions more 
migrated to cities to form the new industrial labor force. These 
shifts stimulated fresh social tensions. Urban workers bore the full 
range of hardships associated with early capitalism, and the intensely 
nationalistic atmosphere of the day bred frictions between Poles 
and the other peoples remaining from the old heterogeneous Com- 
monwealth of Two Nations. The movement of the former noble 
class into cities created a new urban professional class. Mirroring 
a trend visible throughout Central Europe, antisemitic sentiment 
mounted visibly, fed by Poles competing for the urban livelihoods 
long regarded as Jewish specialties. 

These transformations changed the face of politics as well, giv- 
ing rise to new parties and movements that would dominate the 
Polish landscape for the next century. The grievances of the lower 
classes led to the formation of peasant and socialist parties. Com- 
munism gained only a marginal following, but a more moderate 
socialist faction led by Jozef Pilsudski (1867-1935) won broader 
support through its emphatic advocacy of Polish independence. By 
1905 Pilsudski's party, the Polish Socialist Party, was the largest 
socialist party in the entire Russian Empire. The National Democra- 
tic Party of Roman Dmowski (1864-1939) became the leading ve- 
hicle of the right by espousing a doctrine that combined national- 
ism with mistrust of Jews and other minorities. By the turn of the 
century, Polish political life had emerged from the relative quies- 
cence of Organic Work and entered a stage of renewed assertive- 
ness. In particular, Pilsudski and Dmowski had initiated what would 
be long careers as the paramount figures in the civic affairs of 
Poland. After 1900 political activity was suppressed only in the Prus- 
sian sector. 

Independence Won and Lost, 1914-45 

Beginning in 1914, the newly invigorated Polish political scene 
combined with cataclysmic events on the European continent to 
offer both new hope and grave threats to the Polish people. By the 
end of World War II, Poland had seen the defeat or retreat of all 
three occupying powers, establishment of a shaky independent 
government, world economic crisis, then occupation and total domi- 
nation by the resurgent Germans and Russians. 

World War I 

The first general European conflict since the Napoleonic Wars 
exerted a huge impact on the Poles, although their position in 



28 



Historical Setting 



Europe was not an issue among the combatants. Again, however, 
Poland's geographical position between Germany and Russia meant 
much fighting and terrific human and material losses for the Poles 
between 1914 and 1918. 

War and the Polish Lands 

The war split the ranks of the three partitioning empires, pit- 
ting Russia as defender of Serbia and ally of Britain and France 
against the leading members of the Central Powers, Germany and 
Austria- Hungary. This circumstance afforded the Poles political 
leverage as both sides offered pledges of concessions and future au- 
tonomy in exchange for Polish loyalty and recruits. The Austrians 
wanted to incorporate Congress Poland into their territory of 
Galicia, so they allowed nationalist organizations to form there. 
The Russians recognized the Polish right to autonomy and allowed 
formation of the Polish National Committee, which supported the 
Russian side. In 1916, attempting to increase Polish support for 
the Central Powers, the German and Austrian emperors declared 
a new kingdom of Poland. The new kingdom included only a small 
part of the old commonwealth, however. 

As the war settled into a long stalemate, the issue of Polish self- 
rule gained greater urgency. Roman Dmowski spent the war years 
in Western Europe, hoping to persuade the Allies to unify the Polish 
lands under Russian rule as an initial step toward liberation. In 
the meantime, Pilsudski had correctly predicted that the war would 
ruin all three of the partitioners, a conclusion most people thought 
highly unlikely before 1918. Pilsudski therefore formed Polish le- 
gions to assist the Central Powers in defeating Russia as the first 
step toward full independence for Poland. 

Much of the heavy fighting on the war's Eastern Front took place 
on the territory of the former Polish state. In 1914 Russian forces 
advanced very close to Krakow before being beaten back. The next 
spring, heavy fighting occurred around Gorlice and Przemysl, to 
the east of Krakow in Galicia. By the end of 1915, the Germans 
had occupied the entire Russian sector, including Warsaw. In 1916 
another Russian offensive in Galicia exacerbated the already desper- 
ate situation of civilians in the war zone; about 1 million Polish 
refugees fled eastward behind Russian lines during the war. 
Although the Russian offensive of 1916 caught the Germans and 
Austrians by surprise, poor communications and logistics prevented 
the Russians from taking full advantage of their situation. 

A total of 2 million Polish troops fought with the armies of the 
three occupying powers, and 450,000 died. Several hundred thou- 
sand Polish civilians were moved to labor camps in Germany. The 



29 



Poland: A Country Study 



scorched-earth retreat strategies of both sides left much of the war 
zone uninhabitable. 

Recovery of Statehood 

In 1917 two separate events decisively changed the character of 
the war and set it on a course toward the rebirth of Poland. The 
United States entered the conflict on the Allied side, and a process 
of revolutionary upheaval in Russia weakened and then removed 
the Russians from the Eastern Front, finally bringing the Bolshe- 
viks (see Glossary) to power in that country. After the last Rus- 
sian advance into Galicia failed in mid-1917, the Germans went 
on the offensive again, the army of revolutionary Russia ceased 
to be a factor, and the Russian presence in Polish territory ended 
for the next twenty- seven years. 

The defection of Russia from the Allied coalition gave free rein 
to the calls of Woodrow Wilson, the American president, to trans- 
form the war into a crusade to spread democracy and liberate the 
Poles and other peoples from the suzerainty of the Central Powers. 
Polish opinion crystallized in support of the Allied cause. Pilsudski 
became a popular hero when Berlin jailed him for insubordination. 
The Allies broke the resistance of the Central Powers by autumn 
1918, as the Habsburg monarchy disintegrated and the Ger- 
man imperial government collapsed. In November 1918, Pilsudski 
was released from internment in Germany, returned to Warsaw, 
and took control as provisional president of an independent Poland 
that had been absent from the map of Europe for 123 years. 

Interwar Poland 

Pilsudski' s first task was to reunite the Polish regions that had 
assumed various economic and political identities since the parti- 
tion in the late eighteenth century, and especially since the advent 
of political parties. Pilsudski took immediate steps to consolidate 
the Polish regions under a single government with its own curren- 
cy and army, but the borders of the Second Polish Republic were 
not established until 1921 (see fig. 9). Between 1921 and 1939, 
Poland achieved significant economic growth despite world eco- 
nomic crisis. The Polish political scene remained chaotic and shift- 
ing, however, especially after Pilsudski' s death in 1935. 

Formative Years, 1918-21 

From its inception, the Second Polish Republic struggled to secure 
and maintain its existence in difficult circumstances. The extraor- 
dinary complications of defining frontiers preoccupied the state in its 
infancy. To the southwest, Warsaw encountered boundary disputes 



30 



Historical Setting 



with Czechoslovakia. More ominously, an embittered Germany 
begrudged any territorial loss to its new eastern neighbor. The 1919 
Treaty of Versailles (see Glossary) settled the German-Polish bor- 
ders in the Baltic region. The port city of Danzig, a city predomin- 
antly German but as economically vital to Poland as it had been 
in the sixteenth century, was declared a free city. Allied arbitra- 
tion divided he ethnically mixed and highly coveted industrial and 
mining district of Silesia between Germany and Poland, with Poland 
receiving the more industrialized eastern section. These terms would 
be a primary incentive to the German aggression that ignited World 
War II. 

Military force proved the determinant of Poland's frontiers in 
the east, a theater rendered chaotic by the repercussions of the Rus- 
sian revolutions and civil war. Pilsudski envisioned a new federa- 
tion with Lithuania and Polish domination of western Ukraine, 
centered at Kiev, forming a Polish-led East European confedera- 
tion to block Russian imperialism. Vladimir I. Lenin, leader of 
the new communist government of Russia, saw Poland as the bridge 
over which communism would pass into the labor class of a disor- 
ganized postwar Germany. When Pilsudski carried out a military 
thrust into Ukraine in 1920, he was met by a Red Army counter- 
attack that drove into Polish territory almost to Warsaw. Although 
many observers marked Poland for extinction and Bolshevization, 
Pilsudski halted the Soviet advance before Warsaw and resumed 
the offensive. The Poles were not able to exploit their new advan- 
tage fully, however; they signed a compromise peace treaty at Riga 
in early 1921 that split disputed territory in Belorussia and Ukraine 
between Poland and Soviet Russia. The treaty avoided ceding his- 
torically Polish territory back to the Russians. 

From Democracy to Totalitarianism 

Reborn Poland faced a host of daunting challenges: extensive 
war damage, a ravaged economy, a population one-third composed 
of wary national minorities, and a need to reintegrate the three 
zones kept apart forcibly during the era of partition. Under these 
trying conditions, the experiment with democracy faltered. For- 
mal political life began in 1921 with adoption of a constitution that 
designed Poland as a republic modeled after the French example, 
vesting most authority in the legislature. The postwar parliamen- 
tary system proved unstable and erratic. In 1922 disputes with po- 
litical foes caused Pilsudski to resign his posts as chief of state and 
commander of the armed forces, but in 1926 he assumed power 
in a coup that followed four years of ineffectual government. For 
the next decade, Pilsudski dominated Polish affairs as strongman 



31 



Poland: A Country Study 




International boundary 

Boundary of Poland established 1921 
® National capital 
• Populated place 
LATVIA Country or region 



I I From Soviet Russia 

l"- - -"-"- - ! From Austria 
ZZJ From Germany 
I . ' . ' J Determined by plebiscites, 1920-21 
Annexed from Czechoslovakia, 1938 



75 150 Kilometers 

I ' r— 1 1 

75 150 Miles 



Figure 9. Independent Poland, 1921-39 



of a generally popular centrist regime. Military in character, the 
government of Pilsudski mixed democratic and dictatorial elements 
while pursuing sanacja, or national cleansing. After Pilsudski's death 
in 1935, his protege successors drifted toward open authoritarianism. 

In many respects, the Second Republic fell short of the high ex- 
pectations of 1918. As happened elsewhere in Central Europe, the 
attempt to implant democracy did not succeed. Minority peoples 
became increasingly alienated, and antisemitism rose palpably in 



32 



Historical Setting 



the general population. Nevertheless, interwar Poland could justifi- 
ably claim some noteworthy accomplishments: economic advances, 
the revival of Polish education and culture after decades of official 
curbs, and, above all, reaffirmation of the Polish nationhood that 
had been disputed so long. Despite its defects, the Second Repub- 
lic retained a strong hold on later generations of Poles as a genuinely 
independent and authentic expression of Polish national aspirations. 

Poland's International Situation 

By far the gravest menace to Poland's longevity came from 
abroad, not from internal weaknesses. The center of Poland's post- 
war foreign policy was a political and military alliance with France, 
which guaranteed Poland's independence and territorial integrity. 
Although Poland attempted to join the Little Entente, the French- 
sponsored alliance of Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia, 
Czechoslovak suspicions of Polish territorial ambitions prevented 
Polish membership. Beginning in 1926, Pilsudski' s main foreign 
policy aim was balancing Poland's still powerful neighbors, the 
Soviet Union and Germany. Pilsudski assumed that both powers 
wished to regain the Polish territory lost in World War I. There- 
fore, his approach was to avoid Polish dependence on either power. 
Above all, Pilsudski sought to avoid taking positions that might 
cause the two countries to take concerted action against Poland. 
Accordingly, Poland signed nonaggression pacts with both coun- 
tries in the early 1930s. After Pilsudski's death, his foreign minister 
Jozef Beck continued this policy. 

The failure to establish planned alliances in Eastern Europe 
meant great reliance on the French, whose enthusiasm for inter- 
vention in the region waned markedly after World War I. The 
Locarno Pact, signed in 1926 by the major West European pow- 
ers with the aim of guaranteeing peace in the region, contained 
no guarantee of Poland's western border. Over the next ten years, 
substantial friction arose between Poland and France over Polish 
refusal to compromise with the Germans and French refusal to resist 
Adolf Hitler's rise to power in the early 1930s. The Polish nonag- 
gression treaties with Germany and the Soviet Union resulted from 
this bilateral deterioration of confidence. 

The Polish predicament worsened in the 1930s with the advent 
of Hitler's openly expansionist Nazi regime in Germany and the 
obvious waning of France's resolve to defend its East European 
allies. Pilsudski retained the French connection but had progres- 
sively less faith in its usefulness. As the decade drew to an end, 
Poland's policy of equilibrium between potential enemies was fail- 
ing. Complete Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia in early 1939 



33 



Poland: A Country Study 

encircled Poland on three sides (East Prussia to the northeast had 
remained German). Hitler's next move was obvious. By 1939 Hit- 
ler had shattered the continental balance of power by a concerted 
campaign of armed diplomatic extortion that brought most of Cen- 
tral Europe into his grasp. 

World War II 

Profiting from German national resentment of World War I 
peace terms and international aversion to new armed conflict, Hit- 
ler began driving a new German war machine across Europe in 
1939. His invasion of Poland in September 1939 was the tripwire 
that set off World War II, the most devastating period in the his- 
tory of the Polish state. Between 1939 and 1945, 6 million people, 
over 15 percent of Poland's population, perished, with the uniquely 
cruel inclusion of mass extermination of Jews in concentration 
camps in Poland. Besides its human toll, the war left much of the 
country in ruins, inflicting indelible material and psychic scars. 

The Outbreak of War 

The crisis that led directly to renewed European conflict in 1939 
commenced with German demands against Poland, backed by 
threats of war, for territorial readjustments in the region of Dan- 
zig and the Baltic coast to connect East Prussia with the rest of Ger- 
many. When Warsaw refused, correctly reading Hitler's proposal 
as a mere prelude to further exactions, it received only hesitant 
promises of British and French backing. Hitler overcame the de- 
terrent effect of this alliance on August 23 when Nazi Germany 
and the Soviet Union signed a nonaggression treaty that ended their 
interwar hostility. A secret provision of the treaty essentially divided 
all of Eastern Europe into Soviet and German spheres of domina- 
tion. This provision signified the blessing of Soviet dictator Joseph 
V. Stalin for Berlin to attack Poland without fear of Soviet inter- 
ference. 

The Hitler-Stalin pact sealed Poland's fate and put the country 
in an indefensible position. On September 1, Germany hurled the 
bulk of its armed forces at its eastern neighbor, touching off World 
War II. Based on existing guarantees of security, Britain and France 
declared war two days later, but they gave no effective assistance 
to their ally. By mid- September, Warsaw was surrounded in spite 
of stout resistance by outnumbered Polish forces. As Poland reeled 
under the assault from the west, the Soviet Union administered 
the coup de grace by invading from the east on September 17. 
By the end of the month, the "September campaign" was over, 
Hitler and Stalin had reached terms defining their respective 



34 




35 



Poland: A Country Study 



gains, and the Polish lands had been subjected once more to occu- 
pation. 

German and Soviet Rule 

For the next five years, Poland endured the most severe war- 
time occupation conditions in modern European history. Initial- 
ly, Germany annexed western Poland directly, establishing a brutal 
colonial government whose expressed goal was to erase complete- 
ly the concept of Polish nationhood and make the Poles slaves of 
a new German empire. About 1 million Poles were removed from 
German-occupied areas and replaced with German settlers. An ad- 
ditional 2.5 million Poles went into forced labor camps in Germany. 

Until mid- 1941 , Germany and the Soviet Union maintained good 
relations in the joint dominion they had established over Poland. 
Moscow had absorbed the eastern regions largely inhabited by 
Ukrainians and Belorussians. By 1941 the Soviets had moved 1.5 
million Poles into labor camps all over the Soviet Union, and Sta- 
lin's secret police had murdered thousands of Polish prisoners of 
war, especially figures in politics and public administration. The 
most notorious incident was the 1940 murder of thousands of Po- 
lish military officers; the bodies of 4,000 of them were discovered 
in a mass grave in the Katyn Forest near Smolensk in 1943. Be- 
cause Soviet authorities refused to admit responsibility until nearly 
the end of the Soviet Union in 1991, Polish opinion regarded the 
Katyn Massacre as the ultimate symbol of Soviet cruelty and men- 
dacity (see Soviet Union and Russia, ch. 4). 

After Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, all the 
Polish lands came under control of the Third Reich, whose occu- 
pation policies became even more bloodthirsty as the war continued 
(see fig. 10). Hitler considered Poland to be an integral part of Ger- 
man Lebensraum, his concept of German domination of the Eu- 
ropean continent. Eastern Europe would be purged of its population 
of putative racial inferiors and prepared as the hinterland of a gran- 
diose Germanic empire. This vision fueled the genocidal fanati- 
cism of the conquerors. Reduced to slave status, the Poles lived 
under severe restrictions enforced with savage punishment. As the 
principal center of European Jewry, Poland became the main kill- 
ing ground of the Nazi Holocaust; several of the most lethal death 
camps, including Auschwitz, Majdanek, and Treblinka, operated 
on Polish soil. The Germans annihilated nearly all of Poland's 3 
million Jews. Roughly as many Polish gentiles also perished un- 
der the occupation. 



36 



Historical Setting 



Resistance at Home and Abroad 

Poland was the only country to combat Germany from the first 
day of the Polish invasion until the end of the war in Europe. After 
the disaster of September 1939, a constitutionally legitimate Polish 
government-in-exile established a seat in London under the di- 
rection of General Wladyslaw Sikorski. In the early years of the 
war, Stalin maintained a strained cooperation with the Polish 
government-in-exile while continuing to demand retention of the 
eastern Polish territories secured by the Hitler-Stalin pact and as- 
surances that postwar Poland would be "friendly" toward the Soviet 
Union. 

Shortly after Germany invaded the Soviet Union, the Kremlin 
sought to organize Polish forces to aid in repelling the Nazis on 
the Eastern Front. Although 75,000 Polish troops were amassed 
on Soviet soil from Soviet camps, they never were deployed on the 
Soviet front because of disagreements about their utilization. In- 
stead, the forces under the command of the "London Poles" fought 
with great distinction in the British Eighth Army in North Africa 
and Italy. The armored Polish I Corps played an important role 
in the Normandy invasion. Although some Polish units fought with 
the Red Army on the Eastern Front in the early years of the war, 
by 1943 Stalin had broken relations with the Sikorski government, 
and the Soviet Union formed a rival front group, the Union of Po- 
lish Patriots, led by Polish communists in the Soviet Union. That 
group formed an entire field army that aided the Red Army in the 
last year of the war. 

Polish intelligence personnel also made a major contribution to 
the Allied side. In the 1930s, Polish agents had secured informa- 
tion on the top-secret German code machine, Enigma, and in the 
war emigre Polish experts aided the British in using this informa- 
tion to intercept Hitler's orders to German military leaders. 

In Poland itself, most elements of resistance to the German 
regime organized under the banner of the Home Army (Armia 
Krajowa), which operated under direction of the London govern- 
ment-in-exile. The Home Army became one of the largest and most 
effective underground movements of World War II. Command- 
ing broad popular support, it functioned both as a guerrilla force, 
conducting a vigorous campaign of sabotage and intelligence gather- 
ing, and as a means of social defense against the invaders. The 
Home Army became the backbone of a veritable underground 
state, a clandestine network of genuine Polish institutions and 
cultural activities. By 1944 the Home Army claimed 400,000 mem- 
bers. Acting independently of the overall Polish resistance, an 



37 



Poland: A Country Study 




Boundary of Poland, 1939 

Soviet-German demarcation line, 
September 1939 

Frontier of Greater Germany, 1941 

National capital 

Populated place 



[A'xV'AI Annexed by Germany, 1939 

I I Annexed by Soviet Union, 1939; 

occupied by Germany, 1941 

I • ' • \ Under German occupation authority, 
1939-45 

I ' ' ' I Under German occupation authority, 
1941 

150 Kilometers 



75 



150 Miles 



Figure 10. Occupied Poland in World War II 



underground Jewish network organized the courageous but un- 
successful 1943 risings in the ghettos of Warsaw, Bialystok, and 
Vilnius. 

Soviet Liberation of Poland 

Later in the war, the fate of Poland came to depend on the Soviet 
Union, which was initially the agent of deliverance from Nazi tyran- 
ny but later was the bearer of a new form of oppression. Stalin 



38 



Historical Setting 



responded to Polish indignation over the Katyri Massacre by es- 
tablishing an alternative Polish government of communists. The 
underground Polish Workers' Party (Polska Partia Robotnicza) had 
already been active in German-occupied Poland for over a year. 
In 1943 it established a small military arm, the People's Army (Ar- 
mia Ludowa). The Home Army and the Polish Workers' Party 
acted separately throughout the war. 

As the tide of war turned in favor of the Allies, the Soviet shadow 
over Poland and Central Europe loomed larger. When Soviet forces 
neared Warsaw in the summer of 1944, the Home Army, anticipat- 
ing imminent Red Army assistance, launched a rebellion against 
the German garrisons in the capital. Instead, the Soviets halted 
their advance just short of Warsaw, isolating the uprising and ena- 
bling the Germans to crush it after two months of intense fight- 
ing. In retaliation against the Poles, the Germans demolished 
Warsaw before retreating westward, leaving 90 percent of the city 
in ruins. 

Just before the Home Army uprising, the communist factions 
had formed the Polish Committee of National Liberation, later 
known as the Lublin Committee, as the official legal authority in 
liberated territory. In January 1945, the Lublin Committee became 
a provisional government, was recognized by the Soviet Union, and 
was installed in Warsaw. From that time, the Polish communists 
exerted primary influence on decisions about the restoration of Po- 
land. Given this outcome, there is a strong suspicion that the Soviet 
failure to move on Warsaw in 1944 was an intentional strategy used 
by Stalin to eliminate the noncommunist resistance forces. The Red 
Army expelled the last German troops from Poland in March 1945, 
several weeks before the final Allied victory in Europe. 

The Polish People's Republic 

Soviet success in liberating Poland began an entirely new stage 
in Polish national existence. With the reluctant blessing of the Al- 
lies, the communist-dominated government was installed in 1945. 
During the next seven years, Poland became a socialist state mod- 
eled on the Soviet Union. Although Poland remained within this 
political structure through the 1980s, open social unrest occurred 
at intervals throughout the communist period. Protests in 1980 
spawned the Solidarity (Solidarnosc) labor movement, which forced 
fundamental compromise in the socialist system. 

Consolidation of Communist Power 

The shattered Poland that emerged from the rubble of World 



39 



Poland: A Country Study 




International boundary after 1945 AUSTRIA Country or region 

Boundary of Poland in 1939 V / A From Germany 

® National capital I • ' • ' • I To Soviet Union 

• Populated place [ .J Returned to Czechoslovakia 



75 150 Kilometers 

I 1 1 ' 1 

75 150 Miles 



Figure 11. Postwar Territorial Adjustments, 1945 



War II was reconstituted as a communist state and incorporated 
within the newly formed Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Eu- 
rope, despite the evident wishes of the overwhelming majority of 
the Polish nation. The deciding factor in this outcome was the 
dominant position gained by the victorious Red Army at the end 
of the war. At the conferences of Yalta and Potsdam in 1945, United 
States presidents and Britain's prime minister, Winston Churchill, 
met with Stalin to determine postwar political conditions, including 



40 



Historical Setting 



the disposition of Polish territory occupied by the Red Army. At 
Yalta in February, Stalin pledged to permit free elections in Poland 
and the other Soviet-occupied countries of Eastern Europe. At Pots- 
dam in July- August, the Allies awarded Poland over 100,000 square 
kilometers of German territory, west to the Oder and Neisse rivers, 
commonly called the Oder-Neisse Line (see fig. 11). In turn, about 
3 million Poles were removed from former Polish territory award- 
ed to the Soviet Union and resettled in the former German lands; 
similarly about 2 million Germans had to move west of the new 
border. 

The Yalta accords sanctioned the formation of a provisional Po- 
lish coalition government composed of communists and proponents 
of Western democracy. From its outset, the Yalta formula favored 
the communists, who enjoyed the advantages of Soviet support, 
superior morale, control over crucial ministries, and Moscow's de- 
termination to bring Eastern Europe securely under its thumb as 
a strategic asset in the emerging Cold War. The new regime in 
Warsaw subdued a guerrilla resistance in the countryside and gained 
political advantage by gradually whittling away the rights of their 
democratic foes. By 1946 the coalition regime held a carefully con- 
trolled national referendum that approved nationalization of the 
economy, land reform, and a unicameral rather than bicameral 
Sejm. Rightist parties had been outlawed by that time, and a pro- 
government Democratic Bloc formed in 1947 included the fore- 
runner of the communist Polish United Workers' Party (Polska 
Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza — PZPR) and its leftist allies. 

The first parliamentary election, held in 1947, allowed only op- 
position candidates of the now-insignificant Polish Peasant Party, 
which was harassed into ineffectiveness. Under these conditions, 
the regime's candidates gained 417 of 434 seats in parliament, ef- 
fectively ending the role of genuine opposition parties. Within the 
next two years, the communists ensured their ascendancy by 
restyling the PZPR as holder of a monopoly of power in the Po- 
lish People's Republic. 

From Stalinism to the Polish October 

Communist social engineering transformed Poland nearly as 
much as did the war. In the early years of the new regime, Poland 
became more urban and industrial as a modern working class came 
into existence. The Polish People's Republic attained its principal 
accomplishments in this initial, relatively dynamic phase of its ex- 
istence. The greatest gains were made in postwar reconstruction 
and in integration of the territories annexed from Germany. Im- 
position of the Soviet model on the political, economic, and social 



41 



Poland: A Country Study 

aspects of Polish life was generally slower and less traumatic than 
in the other East European countries following World War II. The 
PZPR took great care, for example, to limit the pace of agricul- 
tural collectivization lest Soviet- style reform antagonize Polish farm- 
ers (see Agriculture, ch. 3). 

Nevertheless, in the late 1940s and early 1950s, PZPR rule grew 
steadily more totalitarian and developed the full range of Stalinist 
features then obligatory within the Soviet European empire: ideo- 
logical regimentation, the police state, strict subordination to the 
Soviet Union, a rigid command economy, persecution of the Ro- 
man Catholic Church, and blatant distortion of history, especially 
as it concerned the more sensitive aspects of Poland's relations with 
the Soviet Union. Stringent censorship stifled artistic and intellec- 
tual creativity or drove its exponents into exile. At the same time, 
popular restiveness increased as initial postwar gains gave way to 
the economic malaise that would become chronic in the party-state 
(see System Structure, ch. 3). 

Soviet-style centralized state planning was introduced in the First 
Six-Year Plan, which began in 1950. The plan called for acceler- 
ated development of heavy industry and forced collectivation of 
agriculture, abandoning the previous go-slow policy in that area. 
As the earlier policy had cautioned, however, collectivization met 
stubborn peasant resistance, and the process moved much more 
slowly than anticipated. The state also took control of nearly all 
commercial and industrial enterprises. Leaving only family-run 
shops in the private sector, the government harassed such indepen- 
dent shopkeepers with bureaucratic requirements. 

In its relations with the Roman Catholic Church, the communist 
government carefully avoided open intervention, seeking rather to 
foment anticlerical sentiment in society. Polish Catholic clergy 
denounced the atheism and materialism in the regime; in 1949 the 
Vatican's excommunication of Catholics belonging to the PZPR 
brought open hostility from both sides, including state control of 
church institutions and propaganda against them and church offi- 
cials. By 1954 nine high Polish churchmen, including Stefan Cardi- 
nal Wyszynski, had been imprisoned (see Religion, ch. 2). 

A brief liberalizing "thaw" in Eastern Europe followed the death 
of Stalin in early 1953. In Poland this event stirred ferment, calls 
for systemic reform, and conflict in the ranks of the PZPR. The de- 
Stalinization of official Soviet dogma left Poland's Stalinist regime 
in a difficult position, especially following Nikita S. Khrushchev's 
1956 attack on Stalin's cult of personality. In the same month as 
Khrushchev's speech, the death of hard-liner Boleslaw Bierut ex- 
acerbated an existing split in the PZPR. In 1951 Bierut had won 



42 



Historical Setting 



a struggle with Wladyslaw Gomuika for the top position in the party. 
In June 1956, scores of demonstrators died when army troops 
quelled street riots in Poznari, inaugurating a recurrent phenome- 
non of Polish worker protest against the self-proclaimed workers' 
state. 

Realizing the need for new leadership, the PZPR chose Gomuika 
as first secretary in October 1956. This decision was made despite 
Moscow's threats to invade Poland if the PZPR picked Gomuika, 
a moderate who had been purged after losing his battle with Bierut. 
When Khrushchev was reassured that Gomuika would not alter 
the basic foundations of Polish communism, he withdrew the in- 
vasion threat. On the other hand, Gomuika' s pledge to follow a 
"Polish road to socialism" more in harmony with national tradi- 
tions and preferences caused many Poles to interpret the dramatic 
"Polish October" confrontation of 1956 as a sign that the end of 
the dictatorship was in sight. 

The Gathering Crisis of People's Poland, 1956-80 

Although Gomuika' s accession to power raised great hopes, the 
1956 incident proved to be a prelude to further social discontent 
when those hopes were disappointed. The 1960s and 1970s saw 
Gomuika' s decline in power and his eventual ouster; spectacular 
economic reforms without long-term results; widespread dissent, of- 
ten including open confrontations, from intellectuals, the church, and 
the workers; and, finally, the near-collapse of the Polish economy. 

The Gomuika Years 

The elevation of Gomuika to first secretary marked a milestone 
in the history of communist Poland. Most importantly, it was the 
first time that popular opinion had influenced a change at the top 
of any communist government. Gomulka's regime began auspi- 
ciously by curbing the secret police, returning most collective farm- 
land to private ownership, loosening censorship, freeing political 
prisoners, improving relations with the Catholic Church, and pledg- 
ing democratization of communist party management. In general, 
Gomulka's Poland gained a deserved reputation as one of the more 
open societies in Eastern Europe. The new party chief disappoint- 
ed many Poles, however, by failing to dismantle the fundamentals 
of the Stalinist system. Regarding himself as a loyal communist and 
striving to overcome the traditional Polish-Russian enmity, Gomuika 
came to favor only those reforms necessary to secure public tolera- 
tion of the party's dominion. The PZPR was to be both the defender 
of Polish nationalism and the keeper of communist ideology. By the 
late 1960s, Gomulka's leadership had grown more orthodox and 



43 



Poland: A Country Study 

stagnant as the memory of the Poznari uprising faded. In 1968 
Gomuika encouraged the Warsaw Pact (see Glossary) military sup- 
pression of the democratic reforms in Czechoslovakia. 

Gomulka's hold on power weakened that year when Polish stu- 
dents, inspired by the idealism of the Prague Spring (see Glossary), 
demonstrated to protest suppression of intellectual freedom. Popular 
disenchantment mounted as police attacked student demonstrators 
in Warsaw. The PZPR hardliners, who had been alarmed by Go- 
mulka's modest reforms, seized the opportunity to force the first 
secretary into purgingjews from party and professional positions, 
exacerbating discontent among the most vocal elements of Polish 
society. 

The downfall of the Gomuika regime in December 1970 was trig- 
gered by a renewed outbreak of labor violence protesting drastic 
price rises on basic goods. When strikes spread from the Lenin Ship- 
yard in Gdansk to other industrial centers on the Baltic coast, 
Gomuika interpreted the peaceful stoppages and walkouts as coun- 
terrevolution and ordered them met with deadly force. The blood- 
shed claimed hundreds of victims and inflamed the entire coastline 
before the party annulled the price increases and pushed Gomuika 
into retirement. The Baltic slayings permanently embittered mil- 
lions of workers, while the events of the later Gomuika period con- 
vinced Polish progressives that enlightened communist rule was 
a futile hope. Many of the future leaders of Solidarity and other 
opposition movements gained their formative political experiences 
in 1968 and 1970. 

Consolidation of the Opposition in the 1970s 

In the wake of the Baltic upheavals, Edward Gierek was select- 
ed as party chief. A well-connected party functionary and tech- 
nocrat, Gierek replaced all of Gomulka's ministers with his own 
followers and blamed the former regime for all of Poland's trou- 
bles. Gierek hoped to pacify public opinion by administering a dose 
of measured liberalization coupled with a novel program of eco- 
nomic stimulation. The center of the program was large-scale bor- 
rowing from the West to buy technology that would upgrade 
Poland's production of export goods. Over the long term, the ex- 
port goods would pay for the loans and improve Poland's world 
economic position. The program paid immediate dividends by rais- 
ing living standards and expectations, but it quickly soured because 
of worldwide recession, increased oil prices, and the inherent weak- 
nesses and corruption of communist planning and administration. 
By the mid-1970s, Poland had entered a seemingly irreversible eco- 
nomic nosedive compounded by a crushing burden of external debt. 



44 



Historical Setting 



Another attempt to raise food prices in 1976 failed after an addi- 
tional round of worker protests (see Reliance on Technology in 
the 1970s, ch. 3). 

Domestic economic problems were accompanied by increased 
pressure from the Soviet Union for closer Polish cooperation with 
the other members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(Comecon — see Glossary). In 1971 Poland abandoned Gomulka's 
strict opposition to closer economic integration, and a series of long- 
term agreements committed Polish resource and capital investment 
to Soviet-sponsored projects. Such agreements guaranteed Poland 
access to cheap Soviet raw materials, especially oil and natural gas. 
Nonetheless, in the 1970s Poland experienced shortages of capital 
goods such as computers and locomotives because Comecon obli- 
gations moved such products out of Poland. 

Meanwhile, the Helsinki Accords (see Glossary) of 1975 inspired 
open dissent over human rights issues. The immediate objects of 
dissent were the regime's proposal of constitutional amendments 
that would institutionalize the leading role of the PZPR, Poland's 
obligations to the Soviet Union, and the withholding of civil rights 
pending obedience to the state. In 1976 a group of intellectuals 
formed the Committee for Defense of Workers (Komitet Obrony 
Robotnikow — KOR), and students formed the Committee for Stu- 
dent Solidarity. Together those organizations intensified public pres- 
sure on Gierek to liberalize state controls, and many publications 
emerged from underground to challenge official dogma. 

By the end of the 1970s, the hard-pressed Gierek regime faced 
an implicit opposition coalition of disaffected labor, dissident in- 
telligentsia, and Roman Catholic clergy and lay spokespeople sym- 
pathetic to dissident activities. Democratically oriented activists grew 
more adept at defending workers' interests and human rights, a 
strategy that paid off handsomely in 1980. Under the stellar leader- 
ship of its longtime primate Cardinal Stefan Wyszyhski, the Catholic 
Church attained unrivaled moral authority in the country. The pres- 
tige of the church reached a new peak in 1978 with the elevation 
to the papacy of the archbishop of Krakow, Cardinal Karol Wojtyla. 
As John Paul II, Wojtyla became the first non-Italian pope since 
the sixteenth century. The election of the Polish pope sparked a 
surge of joy and pride in the country, and John Paul's triumphant 
visit to his homeland in 1979 did much to precipitate the extraor- 
dinary events of the next year. 

The Birth of Solidarity 

When the government enacted new food price increases in the 



45 



Poland: A Country Study 

summer of 1980, a wave of labor unrest swept the country. Partly 
moved by local grievances, the workers of the Lenin Shipyard in 
Gdansk went on strike in mid- August. Led by electrician and veter- 
an strike leader Lech Walesa, the strikers occupied the shipyard 
and issued far-reaching demands for labor reform and greater civil 
rights. The workers' top priority was establishment of a trade un- 
ion independent of communist party control and possessing the legal 
right to strike. Buoyed by a wave of popular support and formally 
acknowledged by other striking enterprises as their leader, the 
Gdansk workers held out until the government capitulated. The 
victorious strikers hailed the Gdansk Agreement (see Glossary) of 
August 31 as a veritable social contract, authorizing citizens to in- 
troduce democratic change to the extent possible within the con- 
fines of the communist system. 

Solidarity, the free national trade union that arose from the 
nucleus of the Lenin Shipyard strike, was unlike anything in the 
previous experience of Comecon nations. Although primarily a 
labor movement led and supported by workers and represented 
by its charismatic chairman Walesa, Solidarity attracted a diverse 
membership that quickly swelled to 10 million people, or more than 
one of every four Poles. Because of its size and massive support, 
the organization assumed the stature of a national reform lobby. 
Although it disavowed overtly political ambitions, the movement 
became a de facto vehicle of opposition to the communists, who 
were demoralized but still in power. With the encouragement of 
Pope John Paul II, the church gave Solidarity vital material and 
moral support that further legitimized it in the eyes of the Polish 
population. 

In the sixteen months following its initial strike, Solidarity waged 
a difficult campaign to realize the letter and spirit of the Gdansk 
Agreement. This struggle fostered an openness unprecedented in 
a communist East European society. Although the PZPR ousted 
Gierek as first secretary and proclaimed its willingness to cooper- 
ate with the fledgling union, the ruling party still sought to frus- 
trate its rival and curtail its autonomy in every possible way. In 
1980-81, repeated showdowns between Solidarity and the party- 
state usually were decided by Solidarity's effective strikes. The 
movement spread from industrial to agricultural enterprises with 
the founding of Rural Solidarity, which pressured the regime to 
recognize private farmers as the economic foundation of the coun- 
try's agricultural sector. 

Meanwhile, the persistence of Solidarity prompted furious ob- 
jections from Moscow and other Comecon members, putting 
Poland under constant threat of invasion by its Warsaw Pact allies. 



46 



Historical Setting 



This was the first time a ruling communist regime had accepted 
organizations completely beyond the regime's control. It was also 
the first time an overwhelming majority of the workers under such 
a regime were openly loyal to an organization fundamentally op- 
posed to everything for which the party stood. In 1981 an estimat- 
ed 30 percent of PZPR members also belonged to an independent 
union. 

In late 1981 , the tide began to turn against the union movement. 
In the midst of the virtual economic collapse of the country, many 
Poles lost the enthusiasm that had given Solidarity its initial impe- 
tus. The extremely heterogeneous movement developed internal 
splits over personality and policy. Walesa's moderate wing empha- 
sized nonpolitical goals, assuming that Moscow would never per- 
mit Poland to be governed by a group not endorsed by the Warsaw 
Pact. Walesa sought cooperation with the PZPR to prod the re- 
gime into reforms and avoid open confrontation with the Soviet 
Union. By contrast, the militant wing of Solidarity sought to 
destabilize the regime and force drastic change through wildcat 
strikes and demonstrations. 

In 1981 the government adopted a harder line against the un- 
ion, and General Wojciech Jaruzelski, commander in chief of the 
Polish armed forces, replaced Stanislaw Kania as party leader in 
October. Jaruzelski 's very profession symbolized a tougher ap- 
proach to the increasingly turbulent political situation. At the end 
of 1981 , the government broke off all negotiations with Solidarity, 
and tension between the antagonists rose sharply. 

The Jaruzelski Interlude 

The Jaruzelski regime marked another historic turning point in 
governance of the Polish state. Beginning with repressive mea- 
sures to silence all opposition, Jaruzelski eventually presided over 
the popular rejection of Polish communism. 

Martial Law 

In December 1981, Jaruzelski suddenly declared martial law, 
ordering the army and special police units to seize control of the 
country, apprehend Solidarity's leaders, and prevent all further 
union activity. In effect, Jaruzelski executed a carefully planned 
and efficient military coup on behalf of the beleaguered and para- 
lyzed PZPR. The motives of this act remain unclear. The general 
later claimed that he acted to head off the greater evil of an immi- 
nent Soviet invasion; detractors dismissed this explanation as a 
pretext for an ironfisted attempt to salvage party rule. In any case, 
the junta suppressed resistance with a determination that cost 



47 



Poland: A Country Study 

the lives of several protesters, and by the new year the stunned 
nation was again under the firm grip of a conventional communist 
regime. 

Under martial law, Jaruzelski's regime applied draconian res- 
trictions on civil liberties, closed the universities, and imprisoned 
thousands of Solidarity activists, including Walesa. During the suc- 
ceeding months, the government undid much of Solidarity's work 
and finally dissolved the union itself. Official pressure overcame 
repeated attempts by Solidarity sympathizers to force the nullifi- 
cation of the December coup. By the end of 1982, the junta felt 
sufficiently secure to free Walesa, whom it now characterized as 
the "former leader of a former union. ' ' After gradually easing the 
most onerous features of the state of emergency, Warsaw lifted mar- 
tial law in July 1983, but Jaruzelski and his generals continued 
to control the most critical party and government posts. 

Poland at an Impasse 

From the viewpoint of the regime, implementing martial law 
efficientiy extinguished the immediate challenge posed by Solidarity. 
It did nothing, however, to resolve the long-standing crisis of "Peo- 
ple's Poland," which in many ways originated in the very foun- 
dation of communist rule and the shadow of illegitimacy and 
ineptitude from which it never escaped. Jaruzelski presented him- 
self as a realistic moderate, a proponent of reform who neverthe- 
less insisted on the leading role of the party. Polish society remained 
sullenly unresponsive to his appeals, however. At the same time, 
he encountered resistance from the PZPR conservatives. These so- 
called hardheads, held in contempt by the public, regarded the party 
chief as too conciliatory and resented the interference of Jaruzel- 
ski's fellow generals in the affairs of the civilian party apparatus. 

Time proved that Jaruzelski's coup had staggered Solidarity but 
not killed it. Adherents of the union operated underground or from 
jail cells, advocating a waiting game to preserve the principles of 
the Gdansk Agreement. Walesa in particular refused to fade into 
obscurity; he gained added luster by his receipt of the Nobel Prize 
for Peace in 1983. In the next year, the Jaruzelski government 
suffered embarrassment when secret policemen were discovered 
to have abducted and murdered Father Jerzy Popieluszko, a priest 
who had gained recognition as the spiritual adviser of the repressed 
Solidarity. At that juncture, Poland seemed mired in frustrating 
deadlock, with no reasonable prospect of resuscitating the stricken 
economy or achieving political harmony. 



48 



Historical Setting 

Collapse of the Communist Regime 

The deadlock was broken chiefly by events elsewhere in the Soviet 
alliance. The birth of Solidarity proved to be a precursor of forces 
of change across all of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Once 
again Poland was in the midst of cataclysmic European events, but 
in this case Poland had a decisive influence on events in neighbor- 
ing countries. Beginning with the liberalization programs of Mi- 
khail S. Gorbachev in the Soviet Union and continuing with the 
unforeseen and sudden demise of Poland's communist regime, de- 
cades of tension had been released throughout the region by the 
end of 1989. 

Toward the Round-Table Talks 

The first break in the Polish logjam occurred in 1985 when Gor- 
bachev assumed leadership of the Soviet Union. Although Gor- 
bachev in no way willed the demolition of the communist order 
in Poland and elsewhere in Eastern Europe, his policies of glas- 
nosV (see Glossary) and perestroika (see Glossary) inadvertently ac- 
celerated the indigenous systemic rot in those countries. As the literal 
and figurative bankruptcy of East European communism became 
obvious, apologists resorted more frequently to the Brezhnev 
Doctrine — the understanding that Moscow would use force to pre- 
vent ceding any territory once under its control — as the ultimate 
justification of the status quo. But the sustained liberalism of the 
Gorbachev era undermined the credibility of this last-ditch argu- 
ment. The inhibiting fear of Soviet Army retaliation, which had 
blocked reform in Poland and elsewhere in earlier years, gradually 
faded. Hastening to identify itself with Gorbachev, the Jaruzelski 
team welcomed the spirit of reform wafting from the east and cau- 
tiously followed suit at home. By 1988 most political prisoners had 
been released, unofficial opposition groups were flourishing, and 
Solidarity, still nominally illegal, operated quite openly. 

In the meantime, however, economic malaise and runaway in- 
flation had depressed Polish living standards and deepened the anger 
and frustration of society. In early 1988, strikes again were called 
in Gdansk and elsewhere, and a new generation of alienated work- 
ers called for representation by Solidarity and Walesa. Amid 
widespread predictions of a social explosion, Jaruzelski took the 
momentous step of beginning round table talks with the banned 
trade union and other opposition groups. This measure was taken 
over the objections of the still-formidable hard-line faction of the 
PZPR. 



49 



Poland: A Country Study 

The 1989 Elections and Their Aftermath 

After months of haggling, the round table talks yielded a histor- 
ic compromise in early 1989: Solidarity would regain legal status 
and the right to post candidates in parliamentary elections (with 
the outcome guaranteed to leave the communists a majority of 
seats). Although to many observers the guarantee seemed a fool- 
ish concession by Solidarity at the time, the election of June 1989 
swept communists from nearly all the contested seats, demonstrating 
that the PZPR's presumed advantages in organization and fund- 
ing could not overcome society's disapproval of its ineptitude and 
oppression. 

Solidarity used its newly superior position to broker a coalition 
with various small parties that until then had been silent satellites 
of the PZPR. The coalition produced a noncommunist majority 
that formed a cabinet dominated by Solidarity. Totally demoral- 
ized and advised by Gorbachev to accept defeat, the PZPR held 
its final congress in January 1990. In August 1989, Tadeusz Mazo- 
wiecki became prime minister of a government committed to 
dismantling the communist system and replacing it with a Western- 
style democracy and a free-market economy. By the end of 1989, 
the Soviet alliance had been swept away by a stunning succession 
of revolutions partly inspired by the Polish example. Suddenly, the 
history of Poland, and of its entire region, had entered the post- 
communist era. 

The list of English-language literature on the history of Poland, 
formerly sparse, has improved considerably in recent years, stimu- 
lated in great part by the dramatic events of contemporary times. 
The leading survey is Norman Davies's two- volume God's 
Playground. Davies covers the same territory in a single volume, 
Heart of Europe, recommended despite its confusing reverse chrono- 
logical organization. The older, two- volume Cambridge History of 
Poland and Oskar Halecki's The History of Poland are standard but 
dated. Adam Zamoyski's The Polish Way is a popular account aimed 
at the general reader. One of the most significant and controver- 
sial topics arising from the Polish tradition of heterogeneity receives 
sound and balanced coverage in the composite work The Jews in 
Poland, edited by Chimen Abramsky and others. 

For the medieval period, Eastern and Western Europe in the Middle 
Ages, edited by Geoffrey Barraclough, discusses Poland in its regional 
context. Pawel Jasienica's The Commonwealth of Both Nations addresses 



50 



Historical Setting 



the early modern era in colorful style. The nineteenth century is 
best summarized in The Lands of Partitioned Poland, 1795-1918 by 
Piotr S. Wandycz. 

Recommended general sources for the modern period include 
M.K. Dziewanowski's Poland in the Twentieth Century, The History 
of Poland since 1863, edited by R.F. Leslie, and Hans Roos's A History 
of Modern Poland (all of which predate the upheavals of the 1980s). 

Monographic treatment has not caught up with the collapse of 
East European communism, and no complete English survey of 
the rise and fall of the Polish People's Republic yet exists. The most 
perceptive commentator on contemporary Central Europe, the jour- 
nalist Timothy Garton Ash, covers the developments of the de- 
cade from the rise of Solidarity to the end of communist rule in 
his three works The Polish Revolution, The Uses of Adversity, and The 
Magic Lantern. (For further information and complete citations, see 
Bibliography.) 



51 



Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 



Monument to Poland's greatest classical composer, Frederic Chop 
Lazienki Park, Warsaw 



THE SEVENTH-LARGEST country in Europe, Poland is lo- 
cated in the middle of the North European Plain that extends from 
the Netherlands to the Ural Mountains of Russia. Although its 
topography is broken by some terrain variations, especially in the 
south, most of Poland lacks significant changes of elevation. The 
combination of geographic location and topography has strongly 
influenced Polish society and the country's relations with surround- 
ing nations. 

In the years following World War II, Poland, like other East 
European countries, underwent a rapid, planned transition from 
a predominantly agrarian to a predominantly industrial society. 
When the country came under communist control in 1945, Polish 
society also was subjected to a set of rigid ideological tenets. Com- 
munist dogma failed to change the intellectual or spiritual outlook 
of most Poles, however, because traditional institutions such as the 
Roman Catholic Church and the family remained strong support 
structures for alternative viewpoints. On the other hand, the insti- 
tutions created by the communist regimes fundamentally influenced 
the day-to-day functions of Polish society. This influence was es- 
pecially pervasive in areas such as health and education, where state 
programs made services accessible to more of the population, al- 
beit in a homogenized and regimented form. 

Among the permanent results of communist ideology was the 
disappearance of the landed aristocracy, which had played an es- 
pecially large role in governance and in preserving Polish culture 
and national consciousness, especially during the more than 100 
years when Poland was partitioned. The disruption of traditional 
social hierarchies and barriers also brought substantially more up- 
ward mobility as the urban population came into direct contact 
with the peasants. Within a decade of the communist takeover, 
however, the initial benefits of this social engineering had faded, 
and in 1956 the first of several waves of unrest swept the country. 
Subsequent social and economic stagnation mobilized intellectu- 
als and workers to stage increasingly widespread and effective pro- 
tests. These protests eventually overthrew communism and ended 
its suppression of social diversity. Nevertheless, the forty-four-year 
postwar communist period left permanent marks on the Polish way 
of life even after the state control structures crumbled in 1989. 

World War II resulted in a marked homogenization of the Po- 
lish population, which previously had been ethnically and religiously 



55 



Poland: A Country Study 

rather diverse. Massive relocations of ethnic populations resulting 
from boundary changes and the destruction of most of Poland's 
Jewish population in the Holocaust meant that a country previ- 
ously two- thirds ethnically Polish and spiritually Roman Catholic 
entered the postwar era with a population over 90 percent Catho- 
lic and over 98 percent ethnically Polish. 

Demographically, Poland in 1992 was a young country, more 
than 64 percent of whose population was under forty years of age. 
The country also had one of Europe's highest birth rates. By 1980 
nearly half of employed Poles belonged to a socioeconomic group 
different from that of their parents, showing the mobility of the 
younger generations across traditional class lines. By 1980 less than 
one-quarter of working Poles remained in agriculture, and about 
two-thirds were either manual or white-collar workers in urban 
areas. About one-third of the postwar intelligentsia came from work- 
er families, while about one-quarter came from peasant families. 
These numbers represented a drastic change from the predominance 
of the aristocracy in the intelligentsia before World War II. 

Both by cultural tradition and by recent social policy, Poles are 
relatively well educated. The 1990 literacy rate was 98 percent. 
At that time, more than 17 percent of Poles had postsecondary edu- 
cation, and 4 percent had achieved advanced college degrees. 

The end of communist rule in 1989 presented new challenges 
to Polish society and to government policy makers. The concept 
of universal, state- guaranteed protection from unemployment, sick- 
ness, and poverty was challenged as Poland turned toward privati- 
zation and opened its economy to market forces. Although society 
had retained a healthy skepticism about the benefits of total so- 
cialization, postcommunist governments could not devise replace- 
ment social programs fast enough to avoid bitter social dissatisfaction 
when the security of the old system disappeared. 

Physical Setting 

Generally speaking, Poland is an unbroken plain reaching from 
the Baltic Sea in the north to the Carpathian Mountains in the 
south. Within that plain, terrain variations generally run in bands 
from east to west. The Baltic coast lacks natural harbors except 
for the Gdansk-Gdynia region and Szczecin in the far northwest. 
The northeastern region, called the Lake District, is sparsely popu- 
lated and lacks agricultural and industrial resources. To the south 
and west of the lake district, a vast region of plains extends to the 
Sudeten (Sudety) Mountains on the Czech border to the south- 
west and to the Carpathians on the Slovak and Ukrainian bor- 
ders to the southeast. The country extends 649 kilometers from 



56 



The Society and Its Environment 



north to south and 689 kilometers from east to west. Poland's to- 
tal area is 312,683 square kilometers, including inland waters — a 
slightly smaller area than that of New Mexico. The neighboring 
countries are Germany to the west, the Czech and Slovak Federa- 
tive Republic (see Glossary) to the south, Ukraine and Belarus to 
the east, and Lithuania and the Russian province of Kaliningrad 
to the northeast. 

Topography 

The average elevation of Poland is 173 meters, and only 3 per- 
cent of Polish territory, along the southern border, is higher than 
500 meters. The highest elevation is Mount Rysy, which rises 2,499 
meters in the Tatra Range of the Carpathians, 95 kilometers south 
of Krakow. About 60 square kilometers along the Gulf of Gdansk 
are below sea level. Poland is traditionally divided into five topo- 
graphic zones from north to south (see fig. 12). The largest, the 
central lowlands, is narrow in the west, then expands to the north 
and south as it extends eastward. Along the eastern border, this 
zone reaches from the far northeast to within 200 kilometers of the 
southern border. The terrain in the central lowlands is quite flat, 
and earlier glacial lakes have been filled by sediment. The region 
is cut by several major rivers, including the Oder (Odra), which 
defines the Silesian Lowlands in the southwest, and the Vistula 
(Wista), which defines the lowland areas of east-central Poland. 

To the south of the lowlands are the lesser Poland uplands, a 
belt varying in width from ninety to 200 kilometers, formed by 
the gently sloping foothills of the Sudeten and Carpathian moun- 
tain ranges and the uplands that connect the ranges in south-central 
Poland. The topography of this region is divided transversely into 
higher and lower elevations, reflecting its underlying geological 
structure. In the western section, the Silesia-Krakow Upthrust con- 
tains rich coal deposits. 

The third topographic area is located on either side of Poland's 
southern border and is formed by the Sudeten and Carpathian 
ranges. Within Poland, neither of these ranges is forbidding enough 
to prevent substantial habitation; the Carpathians are especially 
densely populated. The rugged form of the Sudeten range derives 
from the geological shifts that formed the later Carpathian uplift. 
The highest elevation in the Sudeten is 1,602 meters, in the Kar- 
konosze Mountains. The Carpathians in Poland, formed as a dis- 
crete topographical unit in the relatively recent Tertiary Era, are 
the highest and most picturesque mountains in the country. They 
are the northernmost edge of a much larger range that extends 
into Slovakia, Ukraine, Hungary, and Romania. Within Poland 



57 



Poland: A Country Study 




The Society and Its Environment 




Poland: A Country Study 

the range includes two major basins, the Oswi^cim (Auschwitz) 
and Sandomierz, which are rich in several minerals and natural 
gas (see Fuels and Energy, ch. 3). 

To the north of the central lowlands, the lake region includes 
the only primeval forests remaining in Europe and much of Poland's 
shrinking unspoiled natural habitat. Glacial action in this region 
formed lakes and low hills in the otherwise flat terrain adjacent 
to Lithuania and the Baltic Sea. Small lakes dot the entire north- 
ern half of Poland, and the glacial formations that characterize the 
lake region extend as much as 200 kilometers inland in western 
Poland. Wide river valleys divide the lake region into three parts. 
In the northwest, Pomerania is located south of the Baltic coastal 
region and north of the Warta and Notec rivers. Masuria occupies 
the remainder of northern Poland and features a string of larger 
lakes. Most of Poland's 9,300 lakes that are more than one hect- 
are in area are located in the northern part of the lake region, where 
they occupy about 10 percent of the surface area. 

The Baltic coastal plains are a low-lying region formed of sedi- 
ments deposited by the sea. The coastline was shaped by the ac- 
tion of the rising sea after the Scandinavian ice sheet retreated. 
The two major inlets in the smooth coast are the Pomeranian Bay 
on the German border in the far northwest and the Gulf of Gdansk 
in the east. The Oder River empties into the former, and the Vistula 
forms a large delta at the head of the latter. Sandbars with large 
dunes form lagoons and coastal lakes along much of the coast. 

Drainage 

Nearly all of Poland is drained northward into the Baltic Sea 
by the Vistula, the Oder, and the tributaries of these two major 
rivers. About half the country is drained by the Vistula, which 
originates in the Tatra Mountains in far south-central Poland. The 
Vistula Basin includes most of the eastern half of the country and 
is drained by a system of rivers that mainly join the Vistula from 
the east. One of the tributaries, the Bug, defines 280 kilometers 
of Poland's eastern border with Ukraine and Belarus. The Oder 
and its major tributary, the Warta, form a basin that drains the 
western third of Poland into the bays north of Szczecin. The 
drainage effect on a large part of Polish terrain is weak, however, 
especially in the lake region and the inland areas to its south. The 
predominance of swampland, level terrain, and small, shallow lakes 
hinders large-scale movement of water. The rivers have two high- 
water periods per year. The first is caused by melting snow and 
ice dams in spring adding to the volume of lowland rivers; the sec- 
ond is caused by heavy rains in July. 



60 



The Society and Its Environment 

Climate 

Poland's long-term and short-term weather patterns are made 
transitional and variable by the collision of diverse air masses above 
the country's surface. Maritime air moves across Western Europe, 
Arctic air sweeps down from the North Atlantic, and subtropical 
air arrives from the South Atlantic. Although the Arctic air domi- 
nates for much of the year, its conjunction with warmer currents 
generally moderates temperatures and generates considerable 
precipitation, clouds, and fog. When the moderating influences 
are lacking, winter temperatures in mountain valleys may drop 
to -40°C. 

Spring arrives slowly in April, bringing mainly sunny days af- 
ter a period of alternating wintry and springlike conditions. Sum- 
mer, which extends from June to August, is generally less humid 
than winter. Showers alternate with dry sunny weather that is gener- 
ated when southern winds prevail. Early autumn is generally sun- 
ny and warm before a period of rainy, colder weather in November 
begins the transition into winter. Winter, which may last one to 
three months, brings frequent snowstorms but relatively low total 
precipitation. 

The range of mean temperatures is 6°C in the northeast to 8°C 
in the southwest, but individual readings in Poland's regions vary 
widely by season. On the highest mountain peaks, the mean tem- 
perature is below 0°C. The Baltic coast, influenced by moderat- 
ing west winds, has cooler summers and warmer winters. The other 
temperature extreme is in the southeast along the border with 
Ukraine, where the greatest seasonal differences occur and winter 
temperatures average 4.5°C below those in western Poland. The 
growing season is about forty days longer in the southwest than 
in the northeast, where spring arrives latest. 

Average annual precipitation for the whole country is 600 mil- 
limeters, but isolated mountain locations receive as much as 1,300 
millimeters per year. The total is slightly higher in the southern 
uplands than in the central plains. A few areas, notably along the 
Vistula between Warsaw and the Baltic and in the far northwest, 
average less than 500 millimeters. In winter about half the precipi- 
tation in the lowlands and the entire amount in the mountains falls 
as snow. On the average, precipitation in summer is twice that in 
winter, providing a dependable supply of water for crops. 

Environment and Pollution 

Poland suffered as heavily as any other East European country 



61 



Poland: A Country Study 

from the environmental negligence inherent in the central plan- 
ning approach to resource development. Although some warnings 
reached the public during the 1980s, the communist regimes typi- 
cally had portrayed economic activity in the capitalist countries as 
the true enemy of the environment. Investigations after 1989 re- 
vealed that enormous damage had been inflicted on water, air, and 
soil quality and on forests, especially surrounding the industrial 
centers in Upper Silesia and the Krakow region. But because the 
economy had depended for over forty years on unrestrained abuse 
of Poland's natural resources, environmental planners in the early 
1990s faced the prospect of severe economic disruption if they 
abruptly curtailed the industrial practices causing pollution. 

Environmental Conditions and Crises 

In 1991 Poland designated five official ecological disaster areas. 
Of the five, the densely concentrated heavy industry belt of Up- 
per Silesia had suffered the most acute pollution. In that area, public 
health indicators such as infant mortality, circulatory and respira- 
tory disease, lead content in children's blood, and incidence of 
cancer were uniformly higher than in other parts of Poland and 
dramatically higher than indicators for Western Europe (see Health 
Conditions, this ch.). Experts believed that the full extent of the 
region's environmental damage was still unknown in 1992. The 
situation was exacerbated by overcrowding; 11 percent of Poland's 
population lived in the region. With 600 persons per square kilo- 
meter, Upper Silesia ranked among the most densely populated 
regions of Europe. In 1991 the region's concentrated industrial ac- 
tivity contributed 40 percent of Poland's electrical power, more 
than 75 percent of its hard coal, and 51 percent of its steel. 

A variety of statistics reflect the effects of severe environmental 
degradation in Upper Silesia. In 1990 the infant mortality rate was 
over 30 deaths per 1 ,000 births, nearly five times the levels in some 
countries of Western Europe; some 12,000 hectares of agricultur- 
al land had been declared permanently unfit for tillage because of 
industrial waste deposition; and between 1921 and 1990 the aver- 
age number of cloudy days per year had increased from ten to 183. 
Average life expectancy in southern Poland was four years less than 
elsewhere in the country (see Health and Welfare, this ch.). 

Water and air pollution affect the entire country, however. A 
1990 report found that 65 percent of Poland's river water was so 
contaminated that it corroded equipment when used in industry. 
After absorbing contaminants from the many cities on its banks, 
the Vistula River was a major polluter of the Baltic Sea. River water 
could not be used for irrigation. In 1990 about half of Poland's 



62 



The Society and Its Environment 



lakes had been damaged by acid rain, and 95 percent of the coun- 
try's river water was considered undrinkable. Because Polish forests 
are dominated by conifers, which are especially vulnerable to acid 
rain, nearly two- thirds of forestland had sustained some damage 
from air pollution by 1990. In 1989 Polish experts estimated total 
economic losses from environmental damage at over US$3.4 bil- 
lion, including soil erosion, damage to resources and equipment 
from air and water pollution, and public health costs. 

In 1988 about 4.5 million hectares, or 14.3 percent of Poland's 
total area, were legally protected in national and regional parks 
and reserves. But all fourteen national parks were exposed to heavy 
air pollution, and half of them received substantial agricultural, 
municipal, and industrial runoff. 

A special environmental problem was discovered when Polish 
authorities began inspecting the military bases occupied by Soviet 
troops for forty- six years. Uncontrolled fuel leakage, untreated sew- 
age release, noise pollution from air bases, and widespread destruc- 
tion of vegetation by heavy equipment were among the most serious 
conditions observed when inspections began in 1990. The govern- 
ment of Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki was late in pursu- 
ing the issue with the Soviet government, however, and in 1991 
the Soviet Union continued its longstanding refusal to pay fines 
and natural resource usage fees required by Polish law. In 1992 
the Poles dropped all demands for compensation as part of the with- 
drawal protocol (see Threat Perception, ch. 5). 

Environmental Groups 

The burst of political activity in the late 1980s and the early 1990s 
included establishment of over 2,000 organizations with environ- 
mental agendas. A precedent for such groups was set in 1980, 
however, when the Green Solidarity movement forced closure of 
an aluminum plant in Krakow. The diverse groups that appeared 
in the next decade achieved some additional successes, but lack 
of cohesion and common goals deprived the movement of political 
influence. No environmental group or party was represented in 
the Polish legislative branch in 1992. 

Among the objects of protest in the 1980s were Poland's lack 
of a national plan for dealing with ecological disasters; construc- 
tion of a Czechoslovak coking plant near the Polish border; con- 
tinued reliance on high-sulfur and high-ash coal in electric power 
plants; and the severe environmental damage caused by Soviet 
troops stationed in Poland. In 1986 the explosion and resulting fall- 
out from the Soviet Union's Chernobyl' nuclear power plant gal- 
vanized environmental activism, which in Poland was dominated 



63 



Poland: A Country Study 

by the professional classes. But environmental groups faced sever- 
al obstacles. Volunteer recruitment, a critical aspect of organiza- 
tional development, was hindered by the necessity for many Poles 
to work two jobs to survive. Refining practical operational priori- 
ties proved difficult for organizations whose initial inspiration came 
from broad statements of environmental ethics. And the agendas 
of the many activist groups remained fragmented and dissimilar 
in 1992. Meanwhile, the most influential political parties were split 
between advocates of preserving jobs ahead of protecting the en- 
vironment and those who saw unchanged economic activity as the 
paramount danger to the health of workers and society (see Solidar- 
ity, ch. 4). Public attitudes toward environmental problems also 
were divided. In a 1992 nationwide survey, only 1 percent of Poles 
cited the environment as the country's most serious problem, 
although 66 percent rated environmental issues "very serious." 
By contrast, 72 percent cited economic issues as the country's most 
serious problem. 

Government Environmental Policy 

Poland established a Ministry of Environmental Protection and 
Natural Resources in 1985, but the new department exerted little 
authority. Between 1987 and 1988, for example, government in- 
vestment in environmental protection increased by only 6 percent. 
In 1990 the initial postcommunist environmental timetable was to 
achieve "substantial" reduction of extreme environmental hazards 
in three years and to reach the level of European Community 
(EC — see Glossary) requirements in seven to ten years. In early 
1991, the ministry drafted a new state ecological policy, the core 
of which eliminated the communist rationale of "social interest" 
in the arbitrary consumption of natural resources. Instead, the new 
policy fixed responsibility for the negative results of resource con- 
sumption at the source. The Ministry of Environmental Protec- 
tion and Natural Resources officially identified the eighty enterprises 
causing the most pollution and promised to shut them down if pol- 
lution were not reduced. The role of nongovernmental environ- 
mental organizations in policy making was recognized officially for 
the first time. In late 1991 , a State Environmental Protection Inspec- 
torate was established, with broad powers to regulate polluting 
industries. Penalties for environmental damage also were increased 
at that time. 

At the same time, government policy steered carefully away from 
measures that would sacrifice economic development, and policy 
makers debated the appropriate standards for comparing imme- 
diate economic growth with the estimated longer-term gains of 



64 



The Society and Its Environment 



beginning a rigorous cleanup program. Accordingly, in 1990 the 
Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources 
adopted a policy of "ecodevelopment" emphasizing moderniza- 
tion and restructuring measures that theoretically would curtail pol- 
lution while they streamlined production operations. The policy 
included distribution of information to the public to gain accep- 
tance of economic sacrifice for environmental improvement; link- 
age of environmental law to the new market mechanism slowly 
being created; promotion of an awareness in Western Europe of 
the transnational impact of Poland's air and water pollution; and 
application of foreign capital and technology to environmental 
cleanup problems. At the end of 1990, Western banks began open- 
ing credit lines for Polish environmental protection, and plans for 
some multinational ecological enterprises included Poland. In 1991 
the United States government agreed to forgive part of Poland's 
debt in exchange for domestic investment in pollution control. 

Demography 

Between 1939 and 1949, the population of Poland underwent 
two major changes. The deaths, emigration, and geopolitical ad- 
justments resulting from World War II reduced the 1939 popula- 
tion of about 35 million to about 24 million by 1946. Only in the 
1970s did Poland again approach its prewar population level. In 
addition, the ethnic composition of the country was drastically 
homogenized by the mass annihilation of Polish Jews and the loss 
of much of the non-Polish Slavic population through the westward 
shift of the borders of the Ukrainian and Belorussian republics of 
the Soviet Union. 

Languages 

Beginning with the early postwar years, Polish has been the lan- 
guage of all but a very few citizens. Grouped with Czech and Slo- 
vak in the West Slavic subgroup of the Slavic linguistic family, 
Polish uses a Latin alphabet because the Roman Catholic Church 
has been dominant in Poland since the tenth century (see The Ori- 
gins of Poland, ch. 1). Documents written in Polish survive from 
the fourteenth century; however, the literary language largely de- 
veloped during the sixteenth century in response to Western reli- 
gious and humanistic ideas and the availability of printed materials. 
In the eighteenth century, the Enlightenment stimulated a second 
period of advances in the literary language. When the Polish state 
fell at the end of the eighteenth century, the language played an 
important role in maintaining the Polish national identity (see The 
Three Partitions of Poland, 1764-95, ch. 1). 



65 



Poland: A Country Study 

Although modern Polish was homogenized by widespread edu- 
cation, distribution of literature, and the flourishing of the mass 
media, several dialects originating in tribal settlement patterns sur- 
vived this process in the late twentieth century. Among the most 
significant are Greater Polish and Lesser Polish (upon a combina- 
tion of which the literary language was based), Silesian, Mazovi- 
an, and Kashubian, which is sometimes classified as a separate 
language. 

Population Growth and Structure 

In the immediate postwar period, Poland's birth rate surged up- 
ward and many Poles were repatriated from military duty or im- 
prisonment abroad. This population increase was tempered, 
however, by continued emigration of ethnic groups such as the Jews 
and non-Polish Slavs after the war ended. The annual growth rate 
peaked in 1953 at more than 1 .9 percent; between 1955 and 1960, 
it averaged 1.7 percent before dropping to 0.9 percent in 1965. 
The growth rate then remained fairly steady through 1980. In the 
early 1980s, however, Poland's growth rate of 1.0 percent placed 
it behind only Albania, Ireland, and Iceland among European coun- 
tries. The population increase in the early 1980s was attributed 
to childbearing by women born in the postwar upswing as well as 
to lower death rates. 

Later in the 1980s, as many women passed their peak childbear- 
ing years, growth rates again dropped. From 1985 through 1991, 
the actual population increase was smaller every year. The actual 
increase in 1991 was 122,000. Nevertheless, in 1988 one in five 
persons added to the population of Europe outside the Soviet Union 
was a Pole. Experts forecast that in the year 2000 Poland would 
be contributing virtually all the natural growth in Europe's em- 
ployed population. In 1990 the shape of Poland's population 
pyramid was expected to remain relatively constant; it was com- 
posed of a relatively small base of young people, with a wider com- 
ponent of citizens over age sixty and a bulge in the cohort born 
during the postwar upswing. In 1990 this group ranged in age from 
thirty-five to forty-four. At the end of 1991, the total population 
was estimated at 38.3 million; projected population in the year 2000 
was 39.5 million. 

In 1988 about 51 percent of Poland's population was female, 
a statistic reflecting the fact that average life expectancy was about 
nine years greater for women (66.5 years for men, 75.5 for wom- 
en). The ratio of men to women was significantly higher (as much 
as five to two) in rural areas, from which many women migrated to 



66 



Man in traditional 
local costume, Krakow 
Courtesy Sam and Sarah Stulberg 




escape poor conditions on private farms (see The Working Classes; 
The Role of Women, this ch.). Over a period of years, a lower rural 
birth rate led to a smaller agricultural work force. Already in 1981 , 
only 55 percent of the rural population was of working age, com- 
pared with 63 percent of the urban population. (Working age was 
defined as eighteen to fifty-nine for women, eighteen to sixty-four 
for men.) In 1991 some 29.4 percent of the overall population was 
below working age, and 13 percent was past working age. The former 
figure had fallen since the mid-1980s, while the latter rose in the 
same period. The 547,000 live births in Poland in 1991 equaled 14.3 
births per 1,000 people (see Health Issues, this ch.). However, the 
74 deaths versus 100 births recorded that year was a higher ratio 
than in any recent year. (In the early 1980s, the ratio was less than 
50 to 100.) 

In the late 1980s, emigration from Poland was stimulated main- 
ly by poor economic conditions. The 1989 total of 26,000 emigres 
dropped to 18,500 in 1990, but the slow progress of economic re- 
form caused the rate to increase again in 1991. In this period, the 
group most likely to emigrate was healthy men between the ages 
of twenty- six and thirty who had completed high school or trade 
school. The majority in this group came from regions of high unem- 
ployment and had experience working abroad. In 1991 polls showed 
that as much as one-third of the Polish population viewed emigration 
as at least a theoretical option to improve their standard of living. 



67 



Poland: A Country Study 

Population Density and Distribution 

The most important change in postwar Poland's population dis- 
tribution was the intense urbanization that took place during the 
first two decades of communist rule. The priorities of central eco- 
nomic planning undoubtedly hastened this movement, but experts 
hypothesize that it would have occurred after World War II in any 
case (see Establishing the Planning Formula, ch. 3). In 1931 some 
72.6 percent of the population was classified as rural, with nearly 
60 percent relying directly on agriculture for their livelihood. By 
1978 those figures had diminished to 42.5 and 22.5 percent, respec- 
tively. In the next ten years, the share of rural population dropped 
by only 3.7 percent, however, indicating that the proportions had 
stabilized. 

In 1989 Poland had twenty-four cities with populations of at least 
150,000 people. Major urban centers are distributed rather even- 
ly through the country; the most concentrated urban region is the 
cluster of industrial settlements in Katowice District (see fig. 13). 
In 1990 overall population density was 121 persons per square 
kilometer, up from 115 per square kilometer in 1981. The most 
densely populated places are the cities of Lodz (over 3,000 per- 
sons per square kilometer) and Warsaw (about 2,000 persons per 
square kilometer). Urban areas, which contain over 60 percent of 
Poland's population, occupy about 6 percent of the country's to- 
tal area. In 1990 average population density in rural areas was fifty- 
one persons per square kilometer, a small increase over the 1950 
figure of forty-seven persons per square kilometer. 

The Social Order 

The dislocations during and after World War II changed Poland's 
class structure and ethnic composition. Important parts of the Polish 
middle class — which between the world wars had become the foun- 
dation of industrial and commercial activity — were annihilated or 
forced to emigrate, and those that survived the war lost their social 
status with the advent of state socialism. Nazi and Soviet occupa- 
tion also decimated the intelligentsia that had supplied expertise 
to the legal, medical, and academic professions. Under the post- 
war communist regimes, leaders of the ruling Polish United Work- 
er's Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza — PZPR) formed 
a new elite class by combining workers, peasants, and members 
of the intelligentsia in their ranks. Then in the late 1970s, the in- 
telligentsia began to carry greater weight in the social structure by 



68 




Source: Based on information from The Statesman's Year-Book, 1991-1992, New York, 19! 

Figure 13. Population Density by District, 1992 
70 




n, 1012. 



The Society and Its Environment 



leading an intermittent, long-term protest movement. That move- 
ment culminated in the overthrow of the communist elite and re- 
emergence of the dormant entrepreneurial segments of society. 

Ethnic Groups 

During most of its history, Poland was a multiethnic society that 
included substantial numbers of Belarusians (prior to 1992 known 
as Belorussians), Germans, Jews, and Ukrainians. This ethnic 
diversity was reduced sharply by World War II and the migra- 
tions that followed it. The Jewish population, which in the inter- 
war period was over 10 percent of Poland's total and over 30 percent 
of Warsaw's, was reduced by about 3 million in the Holocaust. 
Postwar resettlement and adjustment of borders sent about 2 mil- 
lion Germans from Polish territory westward and awarded the Pol- 
ish territory inhabited by 500,000 Ukrainians, Belarusians, and 
Lithuanians to the Soviet Union. These multiethnic emigres were 
replaced by an estimated 3 million ethnic Poles repatriated from 
the Soviet Union and by thousands of others who returned from 
emigration or combat in the West. (Poland's communist govern- 
ments, which consistently emphasized ethnic homogeneity, did not 
differentiate ethnic groups in official census statistics.) As a result 
of this process, in 1990 an estimated 98 percent of Poland's popu- 
lation was ethnically Polish. 

Jews 

Although an estimated 200,000 Polish Jews survived the Holo- 
caust, only about 10,000 remained in Poland in 1991, and that 
population was mostly elderly. As the postcommunist era began, 
relations with the now very small Jewish community retained an 
ambiguous but prominent place in the consciousness of Polish so- 
ciety. Beginning in the late 1970s, public interest in past Polish- 
Jewish relations increased significantly despite the dwindling of the 
Jewish population. Social observers attributed this partly to nostalgia 
for prewar times, when the Jews had made a dynamic contribu- 
tion to Poland's diverse urban cultural environment. Another source 
of renewed interest was a need to finally understand the long and 
tangled historical connection of the Poles and the Jews. That con- 
nection was formed most prominently by the Holocaust, which had 
wrought havoc upon both Poles and Jews, and by the role of an- 
tisemitic elements in Polish society before and after World War 
II. In the early 1990s, these issues still provoked deep emotional 
responses as well as intellectual contemplation. 

When communist rule ended, the phenomenon of "antisemitism 
without Jews" came under renewed scrutiny. In the first national 



71 



Poland: A Country Study 

elections of postcommunist Poland, candidates frequently ex- 
changed charges of antisemitism and, conversely, of undue Jew- 
ish influence in policy making. In 1991 Solidarity leader Lech 
Walesa apologized personally before the Israeli parliament, the 
Knesset, for antisemitic statements by some of his supporters dur- 
ing the presidential campaign. According to a 1992 survey, 40 per- 
cent of Poles estimated the current Jewish population in Poland 
at above 750,000 people; 16 percent believed the Jews were a threat 
to Poland's political development in the 1990s; and 26 percent said 
the Jews exerted too much influence in Polish society. On the other 
hand, 81 percent said that the memory of the Holocaust should 
be preserved indefinitely to prevent a recurrence. Extreme right- 
wing parties with antisemitic platforms gained no seats in the 
parliamentary elections of 1991. 

Germans 

The German population of Poland is centered in the southern 
industrial region of Silesia, but a small population remains in the 
northeastern region that had been East Prussia in the nineteenth 
century. As was the case with other ethnic minorities, only approxi- 
mate estimates of numbers were available in 1991 . Definition and 
quantification of the German population of Polish Silesia vary gready 
according to the time and the source of statistics. The communist 
regimes of Poland counted only 2,500 Germans through 1989. In 
1992 German minority organizations, whose activities increased 
markedly after 1990, claimed that over 300,000 Silesians, concen- 
trated in Opole District, were ethnic Germans (see fig. 1). The official 
Polish estimate at that time, however, was 100,000 ethnic Germans. 
The constant shifting of Silesia between Polish and German con- 
trol during several centuries created a unique ethnic amalgam and 
regional self-consciousness. Whatever the original ethnic compo- 
sition of the region, the Silesians themselves developed a separate 
culture that borrowed liberally from both Polish and German. The 
predominant spoken language is a heavily Germanized dialect of 
Polish. 

Although the Silesians retained close traditional ties with their 
locality and their own group, in the early 1990s they could not ig- 
nore the difference between their standard of living and that of near- 
by Germany. Many non-German Silesians very likely declared 
themselves ethnic Germans to receive preferential treatment from 
the German government; this practice played a major role in the 
diversity of minority population estimates. 

Some Silesians were bitter over the resettlement policy of the 
postwar communist governments and other forms of anti-German 



72 



The Society and Its Environment 



discrimination. Immediately following the end of Polish communist 
rule, a well-organized German faction in Silesia demanded that 
dual citizenship and other privileges be guaranteed the German 
minority in Poland by the forthcoming Polish-German friendship 
treaty (see Foreign Relations, ch. 4). In this demand they were 
joined by German citizens who had been expelled from the Ger- 
man territory awarded Poland after World War II. Ratification 
of the Polish-German treaty of friendship and cooperation in 1991 
blunted the impact of radicals, however, and promoted pragmatic 
local cooperation rather than confrontation between Poles and Ger- 
mans in Silesia. 

Postcommunist Polish governments established no firm criteria 
for proving German nationality; in most cases, oral declarations 
were accepted as sufficient proof. Beginning in 1989, the Social 
Cultural Association began propagating German culture in Sile- 
sia. By 1992 the group had initiated German instruction in 260 
schools, stocked libraries with German materials, and arranged tech- 
nical instruction in Germany for Silesian health and education work- 
ers. The special ties with Germany make Opole one of the most 
prosperous regions in Poland; the Silesian Germans provide im- 
portant resources to the local economy, and the lifestyle of many 
Silesian communities resembles that of Germany more than that 
of Poland. Although many non-German Silesians feared that the 
spread of German economic and cultural influences would erase 
the unique ethnic qualities of their region and the idea of German 
dominance retained some negative historical associations, in the 
early 1990s postcommunist aspirations for the prosperity promised 
by German connections remained an important factor in public 
opinion on the German ethnic issue. 

A smaller concentration of Germans became active and visible 
for the first time in 1990 in Olsztyn District in northeastern Poland, 
although the resettlement of the 1950s and ongoing emigration had 
reduced the German population there substantially between 1956 
and 1980. In 1992 estimates of the group's size ranged from 5,000 
to 12,000. Beginning in 1990, several German cultural associations 
appeared in the region with the aims of preventing discrimination 
and preserving German culture. Association members received 
transportation to and employment opportunities in Germany, and 
the German government contributed money to support associa- 
tion activities in the early 1990s. 

Ukrainians and Belarusians 

Before World War II, the Ukrainian population, concentrated 
in the far southeast along the Carpathian Mountains, constituted 



73 



Poland: A Country Study 



13.8 percent of interwar Poland's total, making the Ukrainians by 
far the largest ethnic minority. Postwar border changes and reset- 
tlement removed most of that ethnic group, whose persistent de- 
mands for autonomy in the 1930s had become a serious worry for 
the postwar communist government. In 1947 most remaining 
Ukrainians were resettled from their traditional centers in Rzeszow 
and Lublin districts in southeastern Poland to northern territory 
gained from Germany in the peace settlement. State propaganda 
designed to further isolate the Ukrainians reminded Poles of war- 
time atrocities committed by Ukrainians. In 1991 some 130,000 
Ukrainians remained in the resettlement regions, while the rest of 
the Ukrainian population was widely dispersed and assimilated. 

Beginning in 1989, Ukrainians in Poland sought redress for the 
abuses they had endured under communist regimes. The Union 
of Ukrainians in Poland demanded that the postcommunist govern- 
ment condemn the postwar deportation policy and compensate 
Ukrainians and their churches for state confiscation of property 
in the resettlement period. In 1992 all such claims awaited approval 
by parliament. Property claims by the Greek Catholic (Uniate) 
Church aroused controversy for two reasons. First, the Polish 
Catholic Church had occupied many former Greek Catholic 
churches and refused to return or share them. Second, conflicting 
claims between Greek Catholic Ukrainians and the Ukrainians of 
the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church threatened the minority 
with a major rift along religious lines (see Other Churches, this ch.). 

In 1992 estimates of the Ukrainian population in Poland ranged 
from 200,000 to 700,000. Of that number, roughly one-third be- 
longed to the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church, a branch 
of the Greek Orthodox Church. The remainder belonged to the 
Greek Catholic Church, which recognizes the authority of the Vati- 
can. Orthodox Ukrainians are especially visible in Poland because 
they compose nearly the entire population of the Polish Orthodox 
Church. Because of the importance of religion in Polish society, 
the relations of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland with the 
two major minority religions influence the status of Ukrainian com- 
munities in areas other than religion. In the communist era, the 
government attempted to minimize the danger of Ukrainian na- 
tionalism by shifting its support as the two Ukrainian churches 
sought recognition. The Ukrainian Social and Cultural Society, 
founded in 1956, published a weekly newspaper in Ukrainian and 
supported several schools in Warsaw, with the purpose of preventing 
the assimilation of Ukrainians into Polish society. 

The size of the Belarusian population also was disputed in the 
early 1990s. In 1991 the official figure was 250,000, but minority 



74 



The Society and Its Environment 



spokesmen claimed as many as 500,000 people. Although concen- 
trated in a smaller area (nearly all live in the Bialystok District ad- 
joining the Belarusian border), the Belarusian minority has been 
less assertive of its national identity than have been the Ukraini- 
ans. Bialystok is one of Poland's least prosperous and most sparsely 
populated regions. Mainly composed of peasants, the minority in- 
cludes few educated citizens, and the group has received little sup- 
port from Belarus itself. Therefore, low national self- awareness has 
led to easy assimilation into Polish society. The Belarusian Social 
and Cultural Society, founded in 1956 as the minority's official 
mouthpiece in Poland, remained under the control of former com- 
munists in 1991 because of Belarusian distrust of Solidarity's ties 
with the Polish Catholic Church. Since 1989, however, some new 
ethnic organizations have appeared. A weekly newspaper is pub- 
lished in Belarusian, and a few new student, political, and social 
organizations have brought a modest revival of Belarusian ethnic 
community in the early postcommunist years. 

Gypsies 

The Gypsies (Rom, in the preferred vernacular term), a major 
sociopolitical issue in most other East European countries, are much 
less numerous and less controversial in Poland. Estimates of the 
Gypsy population in Poland range from 15,000 to 50,000. Czecho- 
slovakia's Gypsy population, by contrast, numbered 500,000 in 
the 1980s, when Poland became a transit point on the illegal migra- 
tion route from Romania to Germany. Emigration of Polish Gypsies 
to Germany in the late 1980s reduced Poland's Gypsy population 
by as much as 75 percent. Nevertheless, negative stereotypes re- 
main strong in Polish society, and acts of violence and discrimina- 
tion against this most visible minority are common in Poland. In 
1991 a mob destroyed a wealthy Gypsy neighborhood in central 
Poland. The Polish government has adopted no comprehensive poli- 
cy on Gypsies but instead has treated violent acts against them as 
isolated incidents. 

The Intelligentsia 

The Polish intelligentsia played a unique and vital role in sever- 
al phases of Polish history. During the partition period of the 
nineteenth century, the intelligentsia was the chief repository of 
national consciousness. Containing the last vestiges of the landed 
gentry that had led the country during its heyday as an independent 
commonwealth, the intelligentsia was the chief means by which new 
and progressive ideas entered the fabric of partitioned Poland's soci- 
ety. As such, the class became the chief repository of a romanticized, 



75 



Poland: A Country Study 



idealistic concept of Polish nationhood (see The Elective Monar- 
chy; The Impact of Nationalism and Romanticism, ch. 1). Well 
into the twentieth century, the roughly 50 percent of the intelligent- 
sia that had roots in the landowning class maintained the aristocratic 
values of their ancestors. Although those values conferred a dis- 
tinctly higher social status on the intelligentsia in everyday life, they 
also included the cultural heritage that all Poles recognized. 

In the first part of the twentieth century, the intelligentsia was 
diversified and enriched as more middle- and lower-class Poles at- 
tained education and upward mobility. At this point, the intelligent- 
sia divided philosophically into conservative idealists of the past 
(whose landholdings gave them a vested interest in maintaining 
the status quo) and liberal reformers advocating development of 
capitalism. In the interwar period, Poland's social structure was 
further complicated by the rise of a vigorous, practical upper mid- 
dle class. After the war, however, socialism drastically reduced the 
influence of this entrepreneurial class. 

Facing a severe shortage of educated citizens, in 1945 the com- 
munists expanded opportunities for political loyalists to advance 
through education into the professions and the bureaucracy (see 
Education, this ch.). Of the 300,000 college graduates produced 
by the education system between 1945 and 1962, over 50 percent 
were from worker or peasant families. The introduction of these 
groups sharply diversified the class basis of the postwar intelligentsia. 
In the late 1960s, however, the policy of preferential treatment in 
education ended. The percentage of working-class university ad- 
missions dropped to below 25 percent. Because the chief means 
of entry into the professional classes remained educational achieve- 
ment, the drop in university admissions drastically slowed mobility 
from the working classes into the intelligentsia. In the postwar years, 
the intelligentsia diversified into several categories of employment: 
highly educated professionals, government and party officials, se- 
nior civil servants, writers and academics, and top-level economic 
managers. 

Especially in the 1970s, many members of the intelligentsia es- 
tablished careers in the ruling party or its bureaucracy, joining the 
cause of the socialist state with varying degrees of commitment. 
By 1987 all but one of the forty-nine provincial PZPR first secre- 
taries had at least a bachelor's degree. The strong presence of the 
intelligentsia in the party influenced the policy of the ruling elite 
away from standard Soviet practice, flavoring it instead with prag- 
matic nationalism (see PZPR and Successor Parties, ch. 4). Then, 
as that force exerted subtle influence within the establishment, other 
elements of the intelligentsia joined with worker and student groups 



76 



The Society and Its Environment 



to express open dissent from the system. They objected to the sys- 
tem as a whole and decried the increasingly stressful conditions 
it imposed on Polish society in the 1970s and 1980s. The most salient 
result of this class alliance was the Solidarity movement, nominal- 
ly a workers' movement that achieved broad support in the intel- 
ligentsia and finally toppled the last communist regime. 

In the 1980s, the activist elements of the intelligentsia resumed 
the traditional role as protectors of national ideals from outside po- 
litical interference. In this role, the Polish intelligentsia retained 
and gradually spread the values it had inherited from its nineteenth- 
century predecessors: admiration for Western society, disdain for 
contact with and reliance on Russia and the Soviet Union, and 
reverence for the prepartition commonwealth of the nobility and 
the romantic patriotism of the partition era. 

As it had after Poland regained its independence in 1918, 
however, the intelligentsia reverted to its naturally fragmented state 
once the common enemy fell. In the early 1990s, the official com- 
munist leadership elite had disappeared (although in reality that 
group continued to control powerful economic positions), and no 
comparably identifiable and organized group had taken its place. 
In this atmosphere, a wide variety of social and political agendas 
competed for attention in the government, reflecting the diverse 
ideas proposed by the intelligentsia, the source of most of Poland's 
reformist concepts in the early 1990s. 

The Working Classes 

In the years following World War II, the composition of the Po- 
lish working classes changed significantly. Agriculture, which un- 
derwent several major changes in government policy during this 
period, consistently lost stature as an occupation and as a life- style 
in competition with expanded urban industrial opportunities. The 
postwar rural exodus left an aging farm population, split apart 
the traditional multigenerational families upon which rural society 
had been based, and fragmented landholdings into inefficient plots. 
In the same period, the augmented Polish industrial work force 
struggled to achieve the social gains promised in Marxist-Leninist 
ideology. In the early days, the central planning system yielded 
impressive gains in the education level and living standards of many 
industrial workers. Later in the communist era, this group made 
less tangible gains in social status and began actively opposing the 
regressive government policies that prevented its further progress. 
In the early postcommunist era, industrial workers faced high un- 
employment as privatization and the drive for efficiency restruc- 
tured their enterprises. By the early 1980s, the working population 



77 



Poland: A Country Study 

reached a stable proportion of 40 percent in industry, 30 percent 
in agriculture, and 30 percent in the service sector (which, like in- 
dustry, had tripled in size in the postwar era). 

Agricultural Workers 

Although the communist leadership's economic agenda was the 
immediate cause of large-scale shifts from agriculture to industry, 
prewar conditions also contributed to this trend. Contrary to the 
nineteenth-century romanticization of the Polish peasant class as 
a homogeneous repository of national virtue, agricultural workers 
in the interwar period were stratified economically. A few peasants 
had large farms, many more farmed small plots, and fully 20 per- 
cent of peasants did not own the land they farmed. In 1921 only 
43 percent of peasants owned their own house. The depression of 
the 1930s hit the peasants especially hard because much of their 
income depended on world commodity prices. By the late 1930s, 
Poland had several million superfluous agricultural workers, but 
industry had not developed sufficiently to offer alternative em- 
ployment. 

At the close of World War II, little had changed in the society 
of rural Poland. At that time, Poland's peasants made up 60 per- 
cent of the population. Although many villages were wrecked or 
diminished and 500,000 farms were destroyed, war dead included 
a much higher proportion of urban Poles. After the war, the large 
estates owned by former noblemen and rich peasants and worked 
by rural proletarians still dominated the rural social structures. The 
first step of the postwar communist regime was confiscation of the 
largest estates. Those lands were redistributed to private owners, 
although to avoid alienating the peasants, plots smaller than fifty- 
hectares were allowed to remain with their original owners. At this 
point, rapidly expanding local industry began to offer peasants sup- 
plementary income, and industrial expansion in urban centers 
relieved prewar overpopulation and starvation in many rural areas. 
After the war, rural life increasingly was transformed by electrifi- 
cation, improved roads, and state-supplied equipment and materi- 
als. Nevertheless, on most Polish farms the fundamental relationship 
of the peasant to the land remained as it was before World War II. 

Although Soviet- style collectivization remained a nominal state 
goal until 1956, early attempts caused precipitous declines in pro- 
duction and an estimated 1 million farmers to leave the land. As 
a result of the decollectivization program of the late 1950s, only 
6 percent of farms remained collectivized. In the long term, the 
state's attempts at collectivization fostered a permanent resistance 
among peasants to direct state interference. In the next thirty years, 



78 





Haystacks at the foot of the Tatra Mountains 
Highlanders guiding their sheep to pasture in the Tatra Mountains 

Courtesy Sam and Sarah Stulberg 



79 



Poland: A Country Study 



the peasant family farm, whose value system made distribution of 
farm products to the rest of society clearly subordinate to immedi- 
ate household needs, continued to be the dominant form of agricul- 
tural organization. Improved communications and agricultural 
education programs gradually broke the isolation of rural existence, 
however; as more contact with the outside world brought new 
values, it weakened the family cohesion and the inherited patterns 
of life that were the foundations of the purely domestic farm. 

Immediately after the collectivization drive ended in 1956, mid- 
sized farms (those between five and fifteen hectares) predominat- 
ed in the private sector, but in the next decades farms of that size 
were split repeatedly. By 1986 nearly 60 percent of private farms 
were smaller than five hectares. Furthermore, the holdings of in- 
dividual farmers often were scattered across considerable distances. 
In the late 1980s, state efforts to stimulate reconcentration were 
stalled by peasant suspicion and by ideological disagreements among 
communist policy makers over the solution to agricultural problems. 
Prevented by government inertia and distribution policies from ob- 
taining tractors and other equipment, many small landowners used 
horses for cultivation or simply ignored portions of their land. Fre- 
quent reliance on nonagricultural employment for a livelihood fur- 
ther reduced peasants' concentration on improving the use of their 
rural plots. 

In the mid-1980s, only 50 percent of Poland's rural population 
was involved in agriculture. The other 50 percent commuted to 
jobs in towns. Of the private farmers in the first group, 33 percent 
were full-time farmers, 34 percent earned most of their income from 
agricultural employment, and more than 21 percent earned most 
of their income from nonagricultural sources. The remaining 11 
percent worked for institutions with land allotments smaller than 
0.5 hectare. The large group of landless rural laborers of the inter- 
war years had virtually disappeared by 1980. 

In the postcommunist era, experts projected large numbers of 
peasants would continue their split lifestyles unless major invest- 
ments were made to upgrade Poland's rural infrastructure. In the 
late 1980s, new housing units and water mains were still extreme- 
ly rare and sewage lines virtually nonexistent in rural areas. Only 
half of Polish villages were accessible by paved roads, and many 
poorer villages lacked a retail store of any type. An important failure 
of the collectivization effort had been the exclusion of peasants from 
the broad social welfare benefits instituted by the socialist state for 
urban workers. Although the peasantry received nominal coverage 
under the state medical system beginning in 1972, rural education 



80 



The Society and Its Environment 



and health services remained far behind those in the cities for the 
next twenty years. 

The lack of rural amenities caused the most promising young 
Poles from rural families to move to the cities. As the traditional 
rural extended family began to collapse, the aging population that 
remained behind further strained the inadequate rural social ser- 
vices. The communist state modified its pension and inheritance 
policies in the 1970s to encourage older peasants to pass their rural 
plots to the next generation, but the overall disparity in allocation 
of benefits continued through the 1980s. In the early postcommunist 
era, however, urban unemployment and housing shortages began 
to drive workers back to rural areas. Experts predicted that as many 
as 1 million people might return to rural areas if urban employ- 
ment continued to fall. 

Industrial Workers 

Between 1947 and 1958, the number of agricultural workers mov- 
ing to industrial jobs increased by 10 percent each year. In those 
years, most industrial jobs did not require even basic education. 
Therefore, over 40 percent of recruits from agriculture were basi- 
cally illiterate in 1958. From that time, however, the level of edu- 
cation among Polish industrial workers rose steadily. By 1978 only 
5 percent of workers lacked a complete elementary education. A 
fundamental change in the social status of workers was heralded 
by the first workers' councils, founded in the late 1950s to voice 
opinions on industrial policy. Those increasingly articulate leader- 
ship groups, dominated by the 5 percent of the work force that had 
a secondary education at that time, led to the formidable labor or- 
ganizations that shook Poland's political structure in the 1980s. 

In the 1980s, workers age thirty-five and younger were better 
educated and more likely to come from urban families than their 
elders. Also, unlike their elders, the young workers had been raised 
under a communist regime and were accustomed to the social sta- 
tus conferred by membership in workers' organizations. Many saw 
their laborer status as an intermediate social step between their 
agricultural past and anticipated advancement to white-collar em- 
ployment. Conversely, association with the working class was an 
important qualification for advancement into social leadership po- 
sitions both during and after the communist era. Labor's active 
role in the political and social life of the 1980s revived the self-esteem 
and prestige of workers. On the other hand, a 1985 study showed 
that 70 percent of workers did not wish their children to pursue 
a manual occupation. 



81 



Poland: A Country Study 

In the late 1980s, some 45 percent of industrial workers had sec- 
ond jobs. Increasing numbers of moonlighting workers sharply 
stratified the working class, as workers without supplementary in- 
come were less able to maintain their living standard. Major ineq- 
uities were inherent in the wage system as well. In 1986 the best-paid 
workers earned nearly five times the pay of the average Polish work- 
er, while 33 percent of workers received less than 65 percent of 
the average wage. Postcommunist reforms brought new financial 
risk to industrial workers by lowering the upper end of the pay scale. 
That change, combined with the scarcity of supplementary jobs, 
pulled a significant new section of Polish workers below the offi- 
cial poverty line in the early 1990s. 

In 1992 workers in many industries, including coal and copper 
mining, aviation, and automobiles, organized strikes to protest low- 
er wages and the displacement caused by economic reform. Out- 
side the jurisdiction of Solidarity, which advocated negotiation with 
the government, the strikes escalated under the leadership of radi- 
cal labor leaders. Coal miners, who had enjoyed the highest pay 
and the best perquisites throughout the communist era because of 
coal's importance as a hard-currency export, played a central role 
in the strikes as they sought to protect their privileges. 

Social Relationships 

In the forty-four years of their rule, the communists built a 
monocentric society whose social and political fabric was dominated 
by a new elite of loyal government functionaries. In the 1950s, so- 
cial institutions such as political groups, voluntary organizations, 
youth and professional organizations, and community associations 
lost their autonomy and were forced into a hierarchical state- 
controlled network. Only the Polish Catholic Church retained some 
degree of independence during this period (see Religion, this ch.). 
At the same time, however, smaller groups, initially isolated and 
fragmented, developed informal, pragmatic networks for economic 
supply, mediation of interests, and expression of antiestablishment 
views. Such groups functioned both within state-sanctioned insti- 
tutions and among families, groups of friends, and small commu- 
nities. In this context, dojscie (informal access to useful connections) 
was the means by which ordinary citizens remained above subsis- 
tence level. 

The family, the traditional center of Polish social life, assumed 
a vital role in this informal system. In this respect, everyday urban 
life assumed some characteristics of traditional rural life. For both 
professional and working classes, extended families and circles of 
friends helped when a family or individual was not self-sufficient. 



82 



The Society and Its Environment 



Private exchange arrangements eased the chronic scarcities of the 
official supply system (see Reform Failure in the 1980s, ch. 3). Es- 
pecially important within the family structure were parental sup- 
port of grown children until they became self-sufficient and care 
by the children for their aging parents and grandparents. In the 
economic slump of the 1980s, urban food shortages often were al- 
leviated by exchanges with rural relatives. 

The inventive and independent networking process formed a 
distinct tier within Polish society. Seen by its participants as the 
repository of Polish nationhood and tradition, the world of dojscie 
increasingly contrasted with the inefficient, rigid, invasive, and cor- 
rupt state system. The emergence of Solidarity was a first step 
toward restoring the variety of social structures and independent 
cultural activities present in interwar Poland. In 1980 the phenome- 
non of public figures rising to tell the truth about Poland's problems 
began to break the wall between private and public morality, 
although the subsequent declaration of martial law temporarily 
dampened its effect (see The Birth of Solidarity, ch. 1). 

The second tier involved illegal and quasi-legal actions as well 
as the pragmatic rearrangement of social relationships. Especially 
in the 1980s, the relationships between work performed and offi- 
cial wages and between job qualification and salary level (which 
for "ideological" reasons was higher for many classes of unskilled 
workers) were objects of general ridicule in Polish society. Under 
these circumstances, Poles increasingly saw the second tier, rather 
than the official economy, as the more rewarding investment of 
their initiative and responsibility. By the 1980s, this allocation of 
energy led some sociologists to argue that the second tier was neces- 
sary in order for communist societies such as Poland's to function. 

The end of communism brought no rapid change in social atti- 
tudes. In the early postcommunist period, many Poles retained a 
deep-seated cynicism toward a state long perceived as an untrust- 
worthy privileged elite. Direct and indirect stealing from such a 
state was at worst an amoral act that could never match the hypocri- 
sy and corruption of high authorities who claimed to govern in the 
name of all the Polish people. But society's habit of separating "us" 
from "them" became a major obstacle to enlisting widespread pub- 
lic cooperation and sacrifice or large-scale economic and political 
reform. Between October 1990 and January 1992, public confi- 
dence in the national government declined from 69 percent to 27 
percent, according to a national poll. 

The Role of Women 

By the mid-1970s, nearly half the Polish work force was made 



83 



Poland: A Country Study 



up of women. On a purely statistical basis, Poland, like the rest 
of the Soviet alliance in Eastern Europe, offered women more op- 
portunities for higher education and employment than did most 
West European countries. Between 1975 and 1983, the total number 
of women with a higher education doubled, to 681 ,000 graduates. 
Many professions, such as architecture, engineering, and univer- 
sity teaching, employed a considerably higher percentage of women 
in Poland than in the West, and over 60 percent of medical stu- 
dents in 1980 were women (see table 2, Appendix). In many house- 
holds in the 1980s, women earned more than their husbands. Yet 
the socialist system that yielded those statistics also uniformly ex- 
cluded women from the highest positions of economic and politi- 
cal power. In the mid-1980s, only 15 percent of graduates in 
technical subjects were women, while more than 70 percent of jobs 
in health, social security, finance, education, and retail sales were 
filled by women. During the 1980s, very few women occupied top 
positions in the PZPR (whose 1986 membership was 27 percent 
women). Similar statistics reflected the power relationships in 
Solidarity, the diplomatic corps, and the government. By defini- 
tion, women were excluded completely from the other great center 
of power, the Catholic Church. In mid- 1992, Poland elected its 
first woman prime minister, Hanna Suchocka (see The Suchocka 
Government, ch. 4). Her coalition government included no other 
women. In 1992 the head of the National Bank of Poland, a very 
powerful position, was a woman, and Ewa L^towska, former com- 
missioner of citizens' rights, was prominently mentioned as a 
presidential candidate. 

Some experts assert that the male power structure protects its 
dominance by limiting the opportunities for the advancement of 
Polish women to those that fill an existing need in the male- 
dominated society. Another factor in the role of women, however, 
is the high priority that Polish society continues to give to their 
role within the family and in raising children (see table 3, Appen- 
dix). In the 1980s, one in ten Polish mothers was single, and many 
single mothers had never been married. In 1991 over 6 percent 
of Polish families consisted of a single mother caring for one or 
more children. The extended family provided support for such un- 
conventional arrangements. During the 1980s, both the state (by 
adjusting school schedules and providing nurseries and substan- 
tial paid maternity leave) and the church (by its influential em- 
phasis on the sanctity of the family) successfully promoted the 
traditional role of women in raising the next generation. In the 
early 1980s, a very small women's liberation movement began at 
Warsaw University, but in the years following it failed to expand 



84 



Musicians at the Zywiec Folk Festival 
Courtesy Sam and Sarah Stulherg 

its membership significantly. In 1990 women in Warsaw set a prece- 
dent by demonstrating against church-inspired legislation making 
abortion illegal. 

Even with the support of state institutions, however, during the 
communist era working women with families often had the equiva- 
lent of two full-time jobs because their husbands did not make major 
contributions to household work. According to one study, work- 
ing women averaged 6.5 hours per day at their jobs and 4.3 hours 
per day on household duties. In the times of scarcity in the 1980s, 
standing in line to make purchases occupied a large part of the lat- 
ter category. Women without jobs, by contrast, spent an average 
of 8.1 hours per day on household duties. The increased unem- 
ployment of the early 1990s generally affected more women than 
men. According to official figures, in 1992 forty women were job- 
less for every vacancy they were qualified to fill, while the ratio 
for men was fourteen to one. Women made up 52.4 percent of the 
total unemployed, a higher percentage than their overall share of 
the work force. 

In 1992 women ran about 20 percent of Polish farms, a much 
higher percentage than in Western countries. In most cases, such 
arrangements reflected necessity rather than choice. Nearly 70 per- 
cent of these women were single, and over 40 percent were over 



85 



Poland: A Country Study 

age sixty. In most cases, grown children had left the farm for bet- 
ter opportunities and the husband had died or become incapacitated. 

The end of communist government brought a new debate about 
women's role in Polish society. After 1989 many Poles began to 
associate women's rights with the enforced equality of the discredited 
communist past. A significant part of society saw the political trans- 
formation as an appropriate time for women to return full-time 
to the home after communism had forced them into the workplace 
and weakened the Polish family. 

The rights of women were central to the controversy over state 
abortion law that escalated sharply in 1991 and 1992, although few 
women had policy-making roles and no major women's groups took 
advocacy positions (see The Polish Catholic Church and the State, 
this ch.). Some of the social policies of the postcommunist govern- 
ments complicated the situation of working mothers. A 1992 na- 
tional study revealed discrimination against women in hiring 
practices and payment of unemployment benefits, and no law pro- 
hibited such sex discrimination. Because child-support payments 
were not indexed to the cost of living, the payments many women 
received became nearly worthless in periods of high inflation. In 
the communist system, daycare for the children of working mothers 
had been cheap and widely available, but by 1992 more than half 
the Polish daycare centers had closed. Striving to become self- 
supporting, the remaining centers raised their prices sharply in the 
reform period. 

Housing 

At the end of the communist era, housing was a major social 
problem. Although the postwar era saw steady growth in housing 
quality and quantity, that growth fell far short of demand in both 
geographic distribution and total availability. In 1990 the dispari- 
ty between available dwellings and number of households requir- 
ing housing was estimated at between 1.6 million and 1.8 million 
units. The causes of this enduring shortage were complex. They 
included the failures of the communist centralized approach to hous- 
ing policy before 1989 and the economic downturns that occurred 
in the 1980s and after the reform era began in 1990. 

Communist Housing Policy 

As in most other economic and social areas, postwar Polish hous- 
ing policy followed the Soviet model. The principle behind that 
model was that housing should be public property and a direct tool 
of the state's social policy. Accordingly, the Soviet model elimi- 
nated private ownership or construction of multifamily residential 



86 



The Society and Its Environment 



buildings. Except for single-family units, the government had the 
legal power to take over private houses and land required for build- 
ing. Private construction firms were turned into state enterprises 
that did contract building for central state organizations. State hous- 
ing policy disregarded supply and demand in favor of administra- 
tive space allocation norms, standardized design and construction 
practices, and central rent control. Maintaining rents at a very low 
level was supposed to ensure that housing was available to even 
the poorest citizens. However, housing policy was subordinate to 
the requirements of central economic planning, so resources for 
housing construction were directed to industrial areas critical to 
fulfilling plans and advancing state policy. Materials distribution 
for housing also was subject to delays or disruption caused by the 
urgency of other types of construction projects. Although rural and 
small-town housing nominally escaped direct control, materials ra- 
tioning and deliberate state hindrance of private construction limited 
the availability of new housing in such areas. 

Polish Housing in Practice 

In practice the housing policy of Polish communist regimes was 
more pragmatic than the Soviet model. In some regions, high hous- 
ing demand inspired locally controlled cooperatives that pooled state 
and private resources. State housing construction actually was halted 
in the 1960s to create demand for cooperative housing, for which 
rents were much higher. Thereafter, however, the cooperatives 
gradually became centralized national monopolies, and construc- 
tion in the 1970s was dominated again by large state enterprises. 
The monopoly status of the builders and the cooperatives insulat- 
ed those groups from market competition and enabled them to pass 
along the costs of inefficient operations to the tenant or to the state. 

Under these conditions, housing construction was extremely 
wasteful and inefficient. The economic crisis of 1980 combined with 
existing weaknesses in industrial policy to begin a housing short- 
age that lasted through most of the decade. Between 1978 and 1988, 
annual housing completions dropped by nearly 45 percent, and 
investment in housing dropped by nearly 20 percent. At the same 
time, the Polish birth rate added pressure to the housing situation. 
By the late 1980s, the average waiting time to buy a house was 
projected at between fifteen and twenty years if construction con- 
tinued at the same rate. The housing shortage was a primary cause 
of social unrest; however, the structural flaws of Polish building 
continued unchanged. Construction remained of low quality, 
builders maintained the monopoly control granted by centralized 



87 



Poland: A Country Study 



planning, labor productivity dropped, and distribution and trans- 
port remained centralized and inefficient. 

Housing also remained subordinate to industrial goals. In the 
1980s, this meant that new workplaces were the center of housing 
construction activity, which produced dormitories for workers. By 
1988 Poland ranked last in Europe in housing with only 284 dwell- 
ings per 1,000 persons; 30 percent of Polish families did not have 
their own housing accommodations; and the average number of 
persons per dwelling was 20 percent above the European average. 
In addition, the average usable area per dwelling in Poland was 
10 to 15 percent below the average for other socialist countries and 
30 percent below the average for Western Europe (see table 4, Ap- 
pendix). 

Private housing revived somewhat in the 1980s, altnough in- 
dependent cooperatives still faced critical materials shortages in the 
construction stage. An easing of tax regulations and other economic 
changes raised the profitability of private property in that period. 
In 1988 the percentage of housing construction projects in which 
individuals invested had risen to nearly 34 percent from its 1978 
level of 26 percent. Although state investment also rose slightly in 
that period, both increases were at the expense of cooperative in- 
vestment, which dropped by 10 percent. Nevertheless, in towns 
privately owned properties remained insignificant until 1989, mainly 
because high inflation in the 1980s devalued the long-term, low- 
interest loans offered on state property. In 1989 the new govern- 
ment's anti-inflation measures realigned such loans with present 
currency values and raised interest rates, stimulating conversion 
of two-thirds of cooperative flats into private property by early 1990. 
At the same time, the monopolistic Central Cooperatives Asso- 
ciation was split into numerous genuine cooperatives, the state 
housing administration was abolished, and new incentives were in- 
troduced to stimulate private building and rentals. 

Housing after 1989 

In 1990 Poland's traditionally low rents rose drastically when 
government subsidies of fuel, electricity, and housing maintenance 
ended. The long-term goal of housing reform was to let rents rise 
to market levels. A housing benefits program was to help the poorest 
groups in society, and new rules were put in place for financing 
housing purchases. In the transitional period that followed the end 
of communist government, however, the gap between demand and 
supply grew. Rising rental and purchase prices, the new obstacles 
created for housing construction firms by competitive conditions, 
and the economic downturn that began in 1990 also contributed 



88 



The Society and Its Environment 



to this gap. To function efficiently, the housing industry also re- 
quired more substantial investment in modern technology, par- 
ticularly in chronically wasteful areas such as cement production 
and building assembly. 

In 1989 and 1991, new housing legislation concentrated on 
privatizing the ownership of housing units. Of the 2.7 million 
cooperative apartments in Poland, 57 percent were still tenant- 
occupied rather than owner-occupied in 1991. An additional 1.5 
million apartments were owned by enterprises, which continued 
the uneconomical communist system of subsidizing as much as 80 
percent of the property upkeep for their tenant workers. Begin- 
ning in 1989, private owners of multifamily houses could receive 
subsidies for maintenance, for which they had paid in full under 
the old system. The 1991 legislation set financial and legal condi- 
tions under which renters of cooperative-owned and enterprise- 
owned housing could assume ownership, creating individual 
property units from the larger units formerly administered by a 
central agency. 

Religion 

World War II essentially transformed Poland into a state domi- 
nated by a single religion. According to a 1991 government sur- 
vey, Roman Catholicism was professed by 96 percent of the 
population. The practice of Judaism declined more dramatically 
than any other religion after the war, but the numbers of adher- 
ents of Greek Orthodox, Protestant, and other groups also fell sig- 
nificantly. Although the claim of religious affiliation signified 
different levels of participation for different segments of society (80.6 
percent of professed Catholics described themselves as attending 
mass regularly), the history of Roman Catholicism in Poland formed 
a uniquely solid link between nationality and religious belief. As 
a result of that identity, Poland is the only country where the 
advent of communism had very little effect on the individual 
citizen's practice of organized religion. During the communist era, 
the Catholic Church enjoyed varying levels of autonomy, but the 
church remained the primary source of moral values, as well as 
an important political force. Of the 4 percent of Poles who were 
not Roman Catholic, half belonged to one of forty- two other 
denominations in 1991, and the rest professed no religion. The 
largest of the non-Catholic faiths is the Polish Autocephalous Or- 
thodox Church. Although Poland returned to its tradition of reli- 
gious tolerance after the communist era, jurisdictional issues have 
complicated relations between the Orthodox and Roman Catholic 
churches. 



89 




90 




91 



Poland: A Country Study 



The Polish Catholic Church and the State 

Throughout the 1800s and 1900s, the Catholic Church was not 
only a spiritual institution but also a social and political force. The 
dynamics of church-state relations in Poland after the communist 
era were shaped by the multifaceted identity the church had as- 
sumed during many decades when conventional social and politi- 
cal institutions were suppressed. That identity, called by one scholar 
a 4 'civil religion," combined religious and political symbols in Poles' 
conception of their national history and destiny. Important aspects 
of this social and political role remained intact after 1989, fueling 
a controversial new drive for church activism. 

Church and State Before 1945 

The first impetus for an expanded church role was the social 
repression Poles experienced during the era of the third partition, 
from 1795 to 1918. In this period, the partitioning nations severe- 
ly limited freedom of organization, education, and publication in 
Polish territory (see The Era of Partitioned Poland, ch. 1). With 
the exception of the post- 1867 Austrian-occupied sector, public use 
of the Polish language was also forbidden. These restrictions left 
religious practice as the only means of national self-expression and 
the preservation of social bonds among lay Catholics. From that 
situation came a strong new sense of national consciousness that 
combined nineteenth- century literary, philosophical, and religious 
trends within the formal structure of the church. In 1925 the new- 
ly independent Polish state signed a concordat that prescribed 
separate roles for church and state and guaranteed the church free 
exercise of religious, moral, educational, and economic activities. 

Although Poland enjoyed fourteen years of independence between 
the signing of the concordat and the Nazi invasion, the special role 
of the church continued and intensified when postwar communist 
rule again regimented other forms of self-expression. During the 
communist era, the church provided a necessary alternative to an 
unpopular state authority, even for the least religious Poles. Be- 
tween 1945 and 1989, relations between the Polish Catholic Church 
and the communist regimes followed a regular pattern: when the 
state felt strong and self-sufficient, it imposed harsh restrictions on 
church activities; in times of political crisis, however, the state 
offered conciliatory measures to the church in order to gain popu- 
lar support. 

The Early Communist Decades 

The Polish Catholic Church suffered enormous losses during the 



92 



The Society and Its Environment 



Nazi occupation of Poland in World War II. Its leadership was 
scattered or exterminated, its schools were closed, and its property 
was destroyed. Ironically, in the war years this destruction fostered 
the church's conversion from an aloof hierarchy with feudal over- 
tones to a flexible, socially active institution capable of dealing with 
the adversity of the postwar years. In the first two postwar years, 
the church enjoyed considerable autonomy. In 1947, however, con- 
solidation of the East European nations under the hegemony of 
the Stalinist Soviet Union led to the closing of Polish seminaries 
and confiscation of church property in the name of the state. The 
state abolished the concordat and assumed legal supremacy over 
all religious organizations in 1948. 

In the decades that followed, the church adapted to the new con- 
straints, pragmatically reaching compromise agreements with the 
state and avoiding open confrontation over most issues. Between 
1948 and 1981, the church was led by Cardinal Stefan Wyszyri- 
ski, an expert on Catholic social doctrine whose commanding per- 
sonality augmented the power of the church hierarchy as a direct 
conduit from the Vatican to the people of Poland. As a general 
policy in the early communist decades, Wyszynski avoided fruit- 
less direct campaigning against communist oppression. Instead, 
he stressed the church's role as advocate of Christian morality. 
Nevertheless, the cardinal's criticism of PZPR party leader Boleslaw 
Bierut earned Wyszynski three years under house arrest (1953-56), 
as well as international stature as a spokesman against communism. 
During this period, a total of 1 ,000 priests and eight bishops were 
imprisoned, and convents were raided by the police in the com- 
munist drive to destroy completely the authority of the church in 
Polish society. 

Wyszynski was released in 1956 as a result of severe social un- 
rest that forced a change in party leadership. The release was fol- 
lowed by a church-state agreement significandy relaxing restrictions 
in such areas as religious teaching and jurisdiction over church 
property. This agreement marked a general softening of state reli- 
gious policy at the end of the period of hard-line Stalinism. Ten 
years later, the church's lavish celebration of the millennium of 
Polish Christianity strengthened the identification of Polish national 
consciousness with the church and, in the process, the state's respect 
for the church as representative of national opinion. 

Relations in the 1970s and 1980s 

When the "reform" regime of Edward Gierek came to power 
in 1970, it took conciliatory measures to enlist church support. The 
1970s were a time of bargaining and maneuvering between a state 



93 



Poland: A Country Study 

increasingly threatened by social unrest and a church that was in- 
creasingly sure of its leadership role but still intent on husbanding 
its political capital. Between 1971 and 1974, the church demand- 
ed the constitutional right to organize religious life and culture in 
Poland, using education institutions, religious groups, and the mass 
media. Major protest documents were issued in 1973 and 1976 
against the weakening or withdrawal of state guarantees of such 
a right. 

In 1976 church support for workers' food price riots began a new 
phase of political activism that would endure until the end of com- 
munist rule. In late 1977, a meeting of Gierek and Wyszynski, 
prompted by continuing social unrest, promised a new reconcilia- 
tion, but the church continued its harsh criticism of state interfer- 
ence in religious affairs. In 1978 the selection of Cardinal Karol 
Wojtyla of Krakow as pope opened vital new lines of communica- 
tion between Polish Catholics and the outside world and gave the 
Poles a symbol of hope in a period of economic and political de- 
cay. In 1979 the triumphal visit of Pope John Paul II to Poland 
boosted the Polish cultural self-image and turned international at- 
tention to Poland's political and spiritual struggles. The next year, 
the church lent vital moral support to the Solidarity labor move- 
ment while counseling restraint from violence and extreme posi- 
tions. In 1981 the government requested that the church help it 
to establish a dialog with worker factions. Needing church approval 
to gain support among the people, the government revived the Joint 
Episcopal and Government Commission, through which the church 
gradually regained legal status in the early 1980s. In 1981 the 
Catholic University of Lublin reopened its Department of Social 
Sciences, and in 1983 clubs of the Catholic intelligentsia reopened 
in sixty cities. Twenty-three new church-oriented periodicals ap- 
peared in the 1980s, reaching a total printing of more than 1.2 mil- 
lion copies in 1989. Nevertheless, state censorship, paper rationing, 
and restriction of building permits provoked serious conflicts with 
the Polish government in the last decade of communist rule (see 
Politics and the Media, ch. 4). 

Wyszynski died in 1981 . He was replaced as primate by the less 
dynamic Cardinal Jozef Glemp, who attempted to continue the dual 
policy of conciliation and advancement of religious rights. 

By 1983 several activist bishops and priests had broken with an 
official church policy they saw as too conciliatory toward the re- 
gime. In a 1984 meeting with Prime Minister Wojciech Jaruzel- 
ski, Glemp again attempted to obtain official recognition of the 
church's legal status as well as freedom for imprisoned dissidents. 
Later that year, the murder of dissident priest Jerzy Popiehiszko 



94 



The Society and Its Environment 



by Polish security agents fueled a new confrontation between church 
and state. The Jaruzelski government, which had met with Glemp 
seeking the legitimacy that would come from renewed diplomatic 
relations with the Vatican, abandoned its conciliatory tone and 
returned to the pre- 1970 demand that the church limit itself to pure- 
ly spiritual matters and censure politically active priests. During 
1985 and 1986, the church hierarchy replied with renewed demands 
for the release of political prisoners and for constitutional guaran- 
tees of free assembly. By the end of 1986, 500 political prisoners 
had received amnesty, and Pope John Paul IPs second visit to 
Poland included a meeting with Jaruzelski — signals that relations 
were again improving. 

The last two years of communist rule brought intensified bar- 
gaining as social unrest continued to weaken the government's po- 
sition. The church demanded that the government open dialogs 
with opposition organizations, arguing that social and economic 
problems could not be solved without considering all views. When 
national strikes hit Poland in mid- 1988, the church attempted to 
arbitrate between labor organizations and the government and to 
prevent labor from adopting radical positions. The Polish Episco- 
pate, the administrative body of the Polish Catholic Church, took 
part in the talks that began in September 1988 between Solidarity 
representatives and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Those talks 
ultimately led to restoration of Solidarity's legal status. In early 
1989, round table discussions between church and state represen- 
tatives yielded a new law on church-state relations passed by the 
Sejm (the lower legislative house) in May 1989. The religious free- 
dom guaranteed by that law allowed the church to resume official- 
ly its role as intermediary between the state and society. The law 
also set the stage for organized activity by the Catholic laity never 
permitted in the communist era. The Vatican resumed full diplo- 
matic relations with the Polish government two months later. 

Church and State after 1989 

The approach of the Polish Catholic Church to the Polish state 
changed drastically after 1989. The church's influential role in 
promoting opposition views, its close relationship with Solidarity, 
and its mediation between factions in the tumultuous 1980s brought 
it enhanced political power in the postcommunist system. In 1989 
virtually every significant public organization in Poland saw the 
church as a partner in its activities and decisions. One result of 
this identification was that when the Sejm began deliberations on 
a new constitution in 1990, the Episcopate requested that the docu- 
ment virtually abolish the separation of church and state. Such a 



95 



Poland: A Country Study 

change of constitutional philosophy would put the authority of 
the state behind such religious guarantees as the right to religious 
education and the right to life beginning at conception (hence a 
ban on abortion). Throughout the communist era, the separation 
of church and state had been the basis of the church's refusal to 
acknowledge the authority of atheistic political regimes over ec- 
clesiastical activities. In justifying its new approach to the separation 
doctrine, the Episcopate explained that the communist regimes had 
discredited the doctrine as a constitutional foundation for post- 
communist governance by using the separation of church and state 
to defend their totalitarian control of society against church in- 
terference. 

As a political matter, however, the unleashing of stronger church 
influence in public life began to alienate parts of the population 
within two years of the passage of the bill that restored freedom 
of religion. Catholic intellectuals, who had shared opposition sym- 
pathies with the church in the communist era, also had opposed 
the autocratic rule of Cardinal Wyszynski. Many people feared that 
compromise between the church and the communist state might 
yield an alliance that in effect would establish an official state church. 
Once the common opponent, the communist system, disappeared 
in 1989, these fears revived and spread to other parts of Polish 
society. 

In the period that followed, critical issues were the reintroduc- 
tion of religious instruction in public schools — which happened na- 
tionwide at church insistence, without parliamentary discussion, 
in 1990 — and legal prohibition of abortion. Almost immediately 
after the last communist regime fell, the church began to exert pres- 
sure for repeal of the liberal communist-era abortion law in effect 
since 1956. Between 1990 and 1992, church pressure brought three 
progressively tighter restrictions on birth control and abortion, 
although surveys showed that about 60 percent of Poles backed free- 
dom of individual choice on that issue. By 1991 , the proper bound- 
ary of church intervention in social policy making was a divisive 
social and political issue. At that point, only 58 percent of citizens 
polled rated the church the most-respected institution in Polish pub- 
lic life — second behind the army. By contrast, one year before 90 
percent of citizens polled had rated the church as most respected. 

The church responded to the conditions of the reform era in other 
ways as well. It campaigned vigorously (but unsuccessfully) to pre- 
vent dissemination of pornographic materials, which became quite 
abundant in all East European nations after 1989 and were viewed 
as a moral threat. The church strongly defended aid for the poor, 
some aspects of which were suspended in the period of austerity 



96 



The "Black Madonna, " 
Poland's most significant 
religious relic 
Courtesy Reverend Edward 
Mroczynski, S. Ch. 



that accompanied Poland's drive toward capitalism, although some 
policy makers saw welfare programs as remnants of the communist 
state (see The Welfare System, this ch.). Following the issuance 
of a papal encyclical on the condition of the poor, Cardinal Glemp 
stressed the moral dangers of the free market. 

After 1989 the church had to cut its highly professional publica- 
tion operations drastically. In 1992 the church discussed improving 
access to the lay community, however, by publishing a mass-cir- 
culation newspaper and establishing a Catholic press agency. Glemp 
also considered decentralization of the church hierarchy and es- 
tablishment of more dioceses to reach the faithful more directly. 

The Polish Catholic Church and the People 

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, more than 90 percent of Po- 
lish children were baptized in the Catholic Church, showing that 
the younger generation shared loyalty to traditional religion. Sur- 
veys of young people in the 1980s showed an increase in professed 
religious belief over the decade, from 74 percent to 96 percent. Also, 
the number of men preparing for the priesthood rose from 6,285 
to 8,835 between 1980 and 1986. The church's influence extend- 
ed far beyond the limits of a traditional predominant religion, 
however. Especially in rural areas and among the less-educated 
urban population, religion permeated everyday life, and church 
attendance was higher in the communist era than it had been before 



97 



Poland: A Country Study 

World War II. As other forms of social affiliation were repressed 
or reorganized, churches continued as the de facto arbiters of a 
wide range of moral and ethical problems in their communities, 
a role they had assumed initially during the war. Although church 
affiliation was less prevalent among the educated elite, over 60 per- 
cent of that group (which included most of the nominally atheistic 
communist ruling class) professed belief in Catholicism in 1978. 

Experts point to certain characteristics of Polish Catholicism to 
explain its unique resilience in a population bombarded for decades 
with state- sponsored atheistic propaganda. Polish Catholic religiosity 
focuses more strongly on the Virgin Mary and the saints than on 
the direct relationship of the individual to God or on abstract reli- 
gious doctrine. The most important pilgrimage destination for Po- 
lish Roman Catholics is the image of the Virgin (called the Black 
Madonna) at Jasna Gora Monastery in Cz^stochowa. The image 
is believed to have rescued Poland miraculously from invasions by 
the Tatars and the Swedes, and some Solidarity leaders wore repli- 
cas of the icon. 

Especially for less-educated Poles, Mary represents a tangible 
yet mystical connection with God much preferable to contempla- 
tion of abstract theological doctrine. During the communist era, 
this more immediate and anthropocentric religiosity seemed unique- 
ly resistant to replacement by the intellectual doctrine of atheism. 
On the other hand, in the early 1990s, once the specter of state- 
sponsored atheism had disappeared, this immediacy promoted in- 
dividual expression of beliefs in ways that questioned the church's 
authority over secular social ethics. Thus, the official church that 
had protected the spiritual interests of all Poles under communism 
risked separation from the everyday religious practice that retained 
great meaning for the average Polish Catholic. 

Other Churches 

A total of forty-two non-Catholic church groups existed in Poland 
in 1989, accounting for about 2 percent of the population. In the 
communist era, the legal status of these communities was severely 
restricted. In March 1988, the Polish Ecumenical Council, which 
represented the major non-Catholic groups, began participating 
in a commission with government representatives to restore un- 
restricted freedom of religion. The 1989 law on freedom of con- 
science and creed redefined the state's relationship to all religions, 
conferring equal status on the Roman Catholic and the minority 
churches. 



98 



The Society and Its Environment 



The Greek Catholic Church 

The Greek Catholic Church (also called the Uniate Church) was 
established in 1596 by the Union of Brest-Litovsk. That agreement 
brought several million Eastern Orthodox Belorussians and Ukrai- 
nians under the authority of the Roman Catholic Church, although 
they preserved Orthodox religious rites. From the outset, many 
in the Orthodox Church strongly opposed Latinization and what 
they perceived as the compromise of tradition, and conflict between 
the Greek Catholic Church and both the Polish Catholic Church 
and the Orthodox Church flared periodically into the early 1990s. 
In Poland the tense relations between proponents of the Latin and 
the Greek Catholic rites had relaxed significantly in the 1980s, 
although serious issues remained unsolved. Among the foremost 
of those issues was Catholic occupation of Greek Catholic Church 
property confiscated by the state in the late 1940s. 

In 1947 the resettlement of the Ukrainian population from 
southeastern Poland substantially reduced the practice of Greek 
Catholicism in Poland. In 1949 Pope Pius XII appointed Wyszynski 
as the papal delegate to the Greek Catholic congregations of Poland. 
In 1956 Wyszynski named sixteen Ukrainian priests as the cleri- 
cal body of the Greek Catholic Church, and a vicar general was 
also named and installed in Przemysl. In 1981 Glemp named two 
vicars general for Warsaw and Legnica to improve the church's 
ministry to the dispersed Ukrainian Greek Catholic communities. 
Beginning at that time, church administration was divided into 
northern and southern districts. In 1989 the total membership of 
the Greek Catholic Church in Poland was estimated at 300,000, 
with eighty-five centers of worship and fifty-five priests. Twelve 
candidates were preparing for the Greek Catholic priesthood at the 
Catholic University of Lublin in 1989; five monasteries and three 
orders of nuns were active. 

The Evangelical Church of the Augsburg Confession 

The largest Protestant church in Poland, the Evangelical Church 
of the Augsburg Confession, or Old Lutheran Church, had about 
90,000 members in six dioceses in 1989, figures substantially 
reduced by postwar resettlement of the German minority that made 
up a large part of the church's membership (see Ethnic Groups, 
this ch.). Services were conducted in Polish. The membership was 
concentrated in the Cieszyn Diocese, on the Czechoslovak border 
southwest of Krakow. Of the original twenty-six parishes founded in 
German communities of Silesia and Pomerania, nineteen remained 



99 



Poland: A Country Study 

in 1985. Despite its name, the church was not a formal member 
of the Germany-based Evangelical Church of the Augsburg Con- 
fession. 

The Old Catholic Churches 

The Polish National Catholic Church, one of a number of so- 
called Old Catholic churches worldwide, had about 50,000 mem- 
bers in 1989, organized in dioceses centered in Katowice, Warsaw, 
Krakow, and Wroclaw. The church claims to retain all genuine 
Roman Catholic doctrine, while rejecting mainstream Roman 
Catholic tenets such as the infallibility of the pope and the immacu- 
late conception and assumption of the Virgin Mary. The thrust 
of the Polish National Catholic Church's beliefs is a return to "origi- 
nal" doctrine untainted by the addition of any new belief. The 
church belongs to the Union of Utrecht, which includes Old Catho- 
lic churches from many countries and is overseen from the Nether- 
lands by the archbishop of Utrecht. 

The Mariavite Catholic Church of Poland is a schismatic Old 
Catholic group excluded from the Union of Utrecht because of un- 
orthodox beliefs. In 1989 its membership in Poland was about 
25,000, divided into three dioceses administered from Plock. About 
thirty priests were active in 1989. 

The Polish Ecumenical Council 

Founded in 1946 to promote interchurch cooperation, the Pol- 
ish Ecumenical Council includes nearly all churches except the Pol- 
ish Catholic Church. In 1989 member churches included the 
Orthodox, Lutheran, Methodist, Baptist, Reformed (Calvinist), 
Old Catholic, and Evangelical churches of Poland. Cooperation 
with the Polish Catholic Church began in 1974 when the council 
established a Combined Ecumenical Commission to deal with the 
analogous ecumenical commission of the Polish Catholic Bishops' 
Conference. In 1977 the council named a subcommittee for dis- 
cussion of individual theological questions; by 1980 bilateral dia- 
logs had begun among members sharing similar doctrine. Given 
Poland's history of religious tolerance, the restoration of religious 
freedom in 1989 was expected to expand the tentative ecumenical 
contacts achieved during the communist era. 

Education 

Throughout the modern history of Poland, education has played 
a central role in Polish society. Together with the church, formal 
and informal education helped to preserve national identity and 
prepare society for future independence during the partition period. 



100 



The Society and Its Environment 



In the communist era, education was the chief mode of restructur- 
ing society and improving the social mobility of hitherto un- 
privileged workers. The postcommunist era brought an extensive 
debate over the goals of restructuring the system and the role of 
the church in secular education. 

The Education Tradition 

The education of Polish society was a goal of rulers as early as 
the twelfth century, when monks were brought from France and 
Silesia to teach agricultural methods to Polish peasants. Krakow 
University, founded in 1364 by Kazimierz the Great, became one 
of Europe's great early universities and a center of intellectual toler- 
ance (see The Medieval Era, ch. 1). Through the eighteenth cen- 
tury, Poland was a refuge for academic figures persecuted elsewhere 
in Europe for unorthodox ideas. The dissident schools founded by 
these refugees became centers of avant-garde thought, especially 
in the natural sciences. The Renaissance and Enlightenment peri- 
ods in Western Europe brought advanced educational theories to 
Poland. In 1773 King Stanisiaw August established his Commis- 
sion on National Education, the world's first state ministry of edu- 
cation. This body set up a uniform national education system 
emphasizing mathematics, natural sciences, and language study. 
The commission also stressed standardizing elementary education, 
integrating trade and agricultural skills into the elementary school 
curriculum, and improving textbooks at all levels. 

Eras of Repression 

Partition challenged the work of the Commission on National 
Education because Germany, Austria, and Russia sought to de- 
stroy Polish national consciousness by Germanizing or Russifying 
the education system. During the 123-year partition, pockets of 
resistance continued teaching and publishing in Polish, and some 
innovations such as vocational training schools appeared. In gener- 
al, the Austrian sector had the least developed education system, 
whereas the least disruption in educational progress occurred in 
the Prussian sector (see fig. 7). 

Between 1918 and 1939, the newly independent Poland faced 
the task of reconstructing a national education system from the three 
separate systems imposed during partition. Although national second- 
ary education was established in the 1920s, the economic crisis of 
the 1930s drastically decreased school attendance. Among the ed- 
ucational accomplishments of the interwar period were establish- 
ment of state universities in Warsaw, Wilno (Vilnius), and Poznari 



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Poland: A Country Study 



(available only to the upper classes), numerous specialized secon- 
dary schools, and the Polish Academy of Learning. 

Between 1939 and 1944, the Nazi occupation sought to annihi- 
late the national Polish culture once again. All secondary and higher 
schools were closed to Poles, and elementary school curricula were 
stripped of all national content during this period. In response, an 
extensive underground teaching movement developed under the 
leadership of the Polish Teachers' Association and the Committee 
for Public Education. An estimated 100,000 secondary students 
attended classes in the underground system during the Nazi occu- 
pation. 

Under communist regimes, the massive task of postwar educa- 
tion reconstruction emphasized opening institutions of secondary 
and higher education to the Polish masses and reducing illiteracy. 
The number of Poles unable to read and write had been estimated 
at 3 million in 1945. In harmony with the principles of Marxism- 
Leninism, wider availability of education would democratize the 
higher professional and technical positions previously dominated 
by the gentry-based intelligentsia and the wealthier bourgeoisie. 
Because sweeping industrialization goals also required additional 
workers with at least minimum skills, the vocational school sys- 
tem was substantially expanded. At least in the first postwar de- 
cade, most Poles welcomed the social mobility that these policies 
offered. On the other hand, Poles generally opposed Marxist revi- 
sion of Polish history and the emphasis on Russian language and 
area studies to the detriment of things Polish — practices especially 
stringent in the first postwar decade, when Stalinist doctrine was 
transferred wholesale from the Soviet Union and dominated pedago- 
gical practice. During this period, all levels of Polish education were 
plagued by shortages of buildings and teachers. Capital investment 
lagged far behind the grandiose goals of centralized planning. 

Education reform was an important demand of widespread Polish 
demonstrations against Stalinism in 1956. Under the new PZPR 
first secretary, Wladyslaw Gomulka, government education poli- 
cy rejected the dogmatic programs of Stalinism and in their place 
began the first period of (fragmentary) postwar education reform. 
Religious instruction was restored, at the option of parents; by 1957 
over 95 percent of schools had resumed offering such instruction. 
In the vocational program, agricultural training schools were ad- 
ded, and technical courses were restructured to afford greater con- 
tact with actual industrial operations. By 1961, however, state 
doctrine followed the generally conservative turn of Polish politics 
by again describing the goal of education as preparing workers to 
build the socialist state. 



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The Society and Its Environment 



The Law on the Development of Education Systems, passed in 
1961, established four formal principles that reiterated the goals 
of the pre- 1956 system and endured through the rest of the com- 
munist era. The education system was to prepare qualified em- 
ployees for industry, to develop proper attitudes of citizenship in 
the Polish People's Republic, to propagate the values of the work- 
ing classes everywhere, and to instill respect for work and national 
values. Education was specifically described as a function of the 
state, and schools were to be secular in nature. Religious institu- 
tions could sponsor schools under strict limitations, however, and 
the church was permitted to establish a network of separate reli- 
gious education centers to compensate for this restriction. In 1968 
the return of strict communist dogma to school curricula was an 
important stimulus for a national wave of student demonstrations. 
Although the Gierek regime sought broad education reform when 
it took power in 1970, the uneven progress of reform programs 
in the 1970s led to further unrest and diminished the role of edu- 
cation in state control of society. 

In the communist era, two levels of education management ex- 
isted. At the central level, the Ministry of National Education was 
the chief organ of state administration. That agency prescribed 
course content, textbooks, principles of school operation, standards 
for admissions and scholarship awards, examination procedures, 
and interschool relations throughout the country. At the local lev- 
el, superintendents established personnel policy, hired and trained 
personnel, and oversaw other local institutions having education- 
al functions. The daily functioning of each individual school was 
administered by a headmaster and a pedagogical council. 

The Drive for Education Reform 

In the Solidarity movement of 1980, student and teacher organi- 
zations demanded a complete restructuring of the centralized 
system and autonomy for local educational jurisdictions and insti- 
tutions. In response, the Jaruzelski government issued sympathetic 
statements and appointed committees, but few meaningful changes 
ensued in the 1980s. Although an education crisis was recognized 
widely and experts advised that education could not be viewed in 
isolation from Poland's other social problems, the PZPR continued 
making cosmetic changes in the system until the party was voted 
out of office in 1989. The political events of that year were the 
catalyst for fundamental change in the Polish education system. 

The round table discussions of early 1989 between the govern- 
ment and opposition leaders established a special commission on 



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Poland: A Country Study 



education questions, which was dominated by the Solidarity view 
that political dogma should be removed from education and the 
heavily bureaucratized state monopoly of education should end (see 
The Round Table Agreement, ch. 4). That view also required au- 
tonomy for local school administrations and comprehensive upgrad- 
ing of material support. Accordingly, the Office of Innovation and 
Independent Schools was established in 1990 to create the legisla- 
tive basis for government support of private schools established by 
individuals and civic organizations. In a compromise with com- 
munists remaining in parliament, state subsidies were set at 50 per- 
cent of the state's per-student cost. The new private schools featured 
smaller classes of ten to fifteen students, higher teacher salaries, 
and complete freedom for educational innovation. Tuition was to 
be high, from 40,000 to 50,000 zloty per month (for value of the 
zloty- — see Glossary), with scholarships available for poorer students 
with high grades. In the first eighteen months, about 250 new pri- 
vate schools appeared, 100 of which were affiliated with the Catholic 
Church. In 1990 the total enrollment of 15,000 reflected parental 
caution toward the new system, but the figure rose steadily in 1992. 
The Ministry of National Education viewed the alternative schools 
as a stimulus for reform of the public school system. 

In 1990 Minister of National Education Henryk Samsonowicz 
established interim national minimum requirements while offering 
teachers maximum flexibility in choosing methodology. The drafts 
of new education laws to replace the 1961 law called for the " au- 
tonomy of schools as societies of students, teachers, and parents," 
with final responsibility for instructional content and methods. Con- 
troversy over the laws centered not on their emphasis on autonomy 
and democracy, but on the relative status of interest groups within 
the proposed system. Disagreements on such issues postponed the 
effective date of the new Polish education laws until September 1991 . 

The most controversial aspect of the new law was the status of 
religious education in public schools (see table 5, Appendix). A 
1991 directive from the Ministry of National Education required 
that every student receive a grade in religion or ethics. For many 
Poles, this meant an invasion of the constitutional right to keep 
silent about religious convictions as well as recognition of a church 
education authority rivaling secular authority. Many other Poles, 
however, considered separation of the church from education to 
be a continuation of communist policies and a weakening of the 
national moral fabric. 

Structure of the Education System 

Poland's postcommunist education legislation left intact the public 



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The Society and Its Environment 



structures established by the 1961 education law. In that system, 
the first stage was kindergarten, attended by children between three 
and seven years of age. City kindergarten schools were open from 
seven to eleven hours per day and designed their programs to ac- 
commodate the schedules of working parents. Schools in rural areas 
were open from five to eight hours, depending on the season and 
on agricultural requirements. The level of education and auxiliary 
services was generally much lower in rural schools, and kinder- 
garten attendance there was roughly half that in the cities. Some 
primary schools also had kindergarten sections, whose graduates 
continued to the next level in the same institution. The cost of kin- 
dergarten education was shared by the government and parents. 
Under the communist system, the cost of kindergarten education 
had been paid wholly by the parents. In 1992 the 23,900 kinder- 
gartens in operation included 1 1 ,000 separate kindergartens and 
12,900 kindergarten sections. 

Eight years of primary school were obligatory in both the com- 
munist and the postcommunist systems (see table 6, Appendix). 
Children entered this phase at age seven and remained until they 
completed the program or until they turned seventeen. Foreign- 
language instruction was widely available (see table 7, Appendix). 
Some special schools were available for students gifted in the arts 
or sports, and special courses were designed for physically or men- 
tally handicapped students. 

Poland's acute shortage of classroom space required double shifts 
and large classes (thirty to forty students) in most primary schools. 
Some schools provided after- school programs for students in grades 
one to three whose parents both worked; older students, however, 
were released at the end of the school day, regardless of their home 
situation. In 1992 some 5.3 million children were in primary school; 
new enrollments dropped 2.9 percent from the previous year. 

In 1991 over 95 percent of primary- school graduates continued 
to some form of secondary education. Admission to the secondary 
level was by examination and overall primary-school records. In 
general, the students with the highest primary achievement went 
into a college preparatory track, those with the lowest into a trade- 
school track. Of pupils completing primary school in 1991, about 
43 percent went to three-year trade schools (specializing in vari- 
ous trades, from hairdressing to agriculture), 25 percent to four- 
year vocational lycea and to technical schools, and 26 percent to 
college preparatory schools. The last category grew by 3.2 percent 
between 1990 and 1991, while the other two fell slightly. Of the 
three categories, only the first provides a trade immediately upon 
graduation. Students in the other two categories require further 



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Poland: A Country Study 

education at a university or at a two-year postsecondary school to 
prepare them for employment. Some college preparatory schools 
combine a variety of nontechnical subjects in their curricula; others 
specialize in humanities, mathematics and physical sciences, biology 
and chemistry, sports, or classical subjects. In 1987 these schools 
enrolled more than twice as many girls as boys; about 11 percent 
of secondary- school students received scholarships. Students pass- 
ing final exams in the college preparatory program are permitted 
to take university entrance exams. 

Most technical programs are five years in length. Such programs 
are offered in economics, art, music, theater production, and teacher 
training (a six-year track). Many students live at secondary tech- 
nical schools because some districts have only one such school. The 
government and parents share board and room expenses; tuition 
is free. The Polish Catholic Church also operates fourteen high 
schools, whose curricula were state-mandated until 1989. 

To enroll at the university level, students have to pass entrance 
exams. Institutions at this level include full universities (of which 
Poland had twelve in 1990), polytechnical schools, academies, and 
specialized colleges. In 1988 the largest of these were Warsaw 
University (23,300 students), Marie Curie-Sklodowska Universi- 
ty in Lublin (12,900), Adam Mickiewicz University at Poznah 
(12,100), the Warsaw Technical School (12,000), and the Silesian 
University at Katowice (11,400). 

The polytechnical schools offer theoretical and applied training 
in such fields as electronics, engineering, computer science, and 
construction. Academies specialize in medicine, fine arts, econom- 
ics, agriculture, sports, or theology; thirty-four academies were in 
operation in 1990. In that year, twenty-nine specialized colleges 
were training students in pedagogy, oceanography, and art. Col- 
lege enrollment increased each year between 1989 and 1992. In 
1992 some 430,000 persons attended college, 330,000 as full-time 
students; initial enrollment for the 1991-92 school year was 17.7 
percent higher than for the previous year. 

As a rule, students pursue postgraduate degrees as members of 
an academic team working under a single professor. Continued 
progress through the academic ranks depends on regular evalua- 
tion of scholarly activity and publications, and failure to meet re- 
quirements means removal from the program. Polish postgraduate 
studies programs, which culminate in doctoral degrees, suffer from 
lack of material support, low salaries, and low demand for individu- 
als with advanced degrees in the job market. In the late 1980s, these 
factors made the dropout rate very high and forced cancellation 
of several programs. Between 1982 and 1992, Poland suffered a 



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The Society and Its Environment 



serious "brain drain" in higher education and the sciences as more 
than 15,000 scientists emigrated or changed their profession. 

Health and Welfare 

The fall of centralized state planning and the onset of massive 
economic and social reform put new strains on Poland's health and 
welfare systems, whose nominally full and equal coverage had been 
increasingly faulty in the 1980s. In the last decade of communist 
rule, national health care suffered from poor material support, in- 
accessible medical personnel and facilities, and poor organization. 
At the same time, critical national health indicators for the 1970s 
and 1980s showed many negative trends. Likewise, access to so- 
cial services, nominally equal for all workers, was limited by the 
availability of welfare funds in individual enterprises during the 
communist era. Because no national standards existed, some en- 
terprises offered their employees no social services at all, while others 
offered a wide range. By 1989 the material position of low-income 
families and pensioners was especially desperate. The economic 
"shock therapy" begun in 1990 by the Balcerowicz Plan further 
reduced the level of guaranteed health and welfare services, to which 
a large part of Polish society had become accustomed under com- 
munist regimes (see Marketization and Stabilization, ch. 3). 

Health Conditions 

In the two decades after World War II, the health of Poland's 
people improved overall, as antibiotics became available and the 
standard of living rose in most areas. In the 1970s and 1980s, 
however, alarming trends appeared in certain national health statis- 
tics. Between 1970 and 1986, the mortality rate rose from 8.1 to 
10.1 persons per 1 ,000, and from 8.8 to 10.9 males per 1 ,000. The 
increase was sharpest among males between the ages of forty-five 
and fifty-four. For the same period, working days lost because of 
illness or accidents increased by 45 percent (see table 8, Appen- 
dix). Between 1988 and 1991, the incidence of newborns requir- 
ing intensive care rose from 2.9 to 4.5 percent. Experts listed the 
major contributing factors as high levels of air and water pollu- 
tion, unsatisfactory working conditions, overcrowded housing, psy- 
chological depression because of deteriorating economic conditions, 
poorly balanced diets, alcoholism, and deterioration of health ser- 
vices, especially in prenatal and postnatal care, (see Environmen- 
tal Conditions and Crises; Housing, this ch.). 

The Health Care System 

The constitution of 1952 guaranteed universal free health care. 



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Poland: A Country Study 

In the last two decades of the communist era, however, such care 
became progressively less dependable for those without informal 
support networks or enough money to buy health care outside the 
official system (see Social Relations, this ch.). As early as 1970, 
Polish governments recognized the need to reform the cumbersome, 
inefficient national health care system, but vested interests in the 
central planning system prevented meaningful change. From the 
beginning, administration of the system was inefficient. The struc- 
ture of the medical profession did not supply enough general prac- 
titioners, and medical personnel such as dentists and nurses were 
in short supply (see table 9; table 10, Appendix). Treatment facil- 
ities were too few and crowded, preventive medicine received lit- 
tle attention, and the quality of care was generally much poorer 
in rural areas. As in other communist countries, the finest medi- 
cal facilities were reserved for the party elite. 

In the postcommunist reform period, constriction of the state 
budget and fragmentary privatization of medical practices made 
the availability of health care unpredictable for many Poles. After 
inheriting a deteriorating health care system, Polish policy mak- 
ers placed their near-term hopes on reducing bureaucracy, en- 
couraging self-government in the medical profession, shifting 
resources to more efficient departments, and streamlining admis- 
sions and diagnosis procedures. 

In 1992 Poland had fifty-seven hospital beds per 10,000 citizens, 
about half the ratio of beds available in France and Germany. The 
ratio had been declining since the 1960s; in 1991 alone, however, 
over 2,500 beds and nearly 100 clinics and dispensaries were elimi- 
nated in the drive for consolidation and efficiency. Already in the 
mid-1980s, about 50 percent of the medicines officially available 
could not be obtained by the average Pole, and the average hospi- 
tal had been in service sixty-five years. Because the reform bud- 
gets of the early 1990s included gradual cuts in the funding of the 
Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, additional targeted cuts 
of 10 to 20 percent were expected in clinics and hospital beds by 
1994. The long-term goal of Polish health policy was a complete 
conversion of state budget-supported socialized medicine to a pri- 
vately administered health system supported by a universal obliga- 
tory health insurance fee. Under such a system, fees would be shared 
equally by workers and enterprises. Before introduction of that sys- 
tem, which was not expected until at least 1995, interim funding 
was to depend heavily on a patchwork of voluntary contributions 
and local and national health-care taxes. Even after 1995, however, 
planners projected that the state budget would continue contributing 
to the national health care fund until the insurance system became 



108 



The Society and Its Environment 



self-sufficient. The state would now contribute directly, however, 
bypassing the old health care bureaucracy. 

Health Issues 

In 1991 Poland's overall mortality rate increased to 10.6 deaths 
per 1,000 persons, from the 1990 figure of 10.2 per 1,000 (see ta- 
ble 11, Appendix). In the same period, infant mortality remained 
constant at 15.9 per 1,000. About 50 percent of the 405,000 deaths 
in 1991 were attributed to circulatory diseases, and another 20 per- 
cent were caused by malignant tumors. Poland's communist re- 
gimes partially or completely ignored a number of major health 
problems, including acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), 
drug addiction, and alcoholism. Only with the open discussion that 
began in 1989 did the extent of these problems become clear. So- 
lutions, on the other hand, were often blocked in the postcommunist 
years by popular distrust of state authority, controversy between 
church and state, and lack of resources. 

AIDS 

AIDS emerged as an issue in Poland later than in the West — 
partly because of communist suppression of statistics, partly be- 
cause the epidemic apparently reached Poland later. In 1991 the 
government officially estimated that 2,000 Poles had been infect- 
ed with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), whereas an in- 
dependent health expert put the figure at 100,000. This statistical 
discrepancy reflects Poland's late start in testing the groups at 
highest risk of infection. Narcotics addicts are endangered partic- 
ularly because the drug in widest use in Poland is administered 
and distributed by syringe, one of the most potent means of HIV 
transmission. Early efforts to control the spread of HIV were ham- 
pered by public ignorance and superstition; in 1992 about 70 per- 
cent of Poles believed they could not be infected, while many 
believed that water and mosquitoes were carriers. The total lack 
of sex education programs in the schools (the Polish Catholic Church 
forced their removal after the communist era) and the disinclina- 
tion of political and religious leaders to address the issue publicly 
have further hindered prevention efforts. 

Twice in 1991 , World Health Organization (WHO) teams evalu- 
ated the Polish situation and proposed a program to combat the 
spread of AIDS. The teams advised that, to prevent the disease 
from spreading from high-risk groups to society at large, informa- 
tion on the epidemic be given maximum dissemination to certain 
less visible groups that were likely victims of the second phase of 
the disease. The most urgent target groups were the prostitute 



109 



Poland: A Country Study 

community — whose numbers in 1992 were estimated to be as high 
as 180,000 — and their potential customers. At that point, however, 
a comprehensive information program was impossible because the 
country lacked trained workers and money for training programs. 
Other obstacles were lack of modern diagnostic technology and poor 
hygiene in public health facilities. In 1991 WHO allocated a small 
fund for a three-year education and prevention program in Poland. 

Narcotics 

As in the case of AIDS victims, communist regimes denied the 
existence of drug addicts. The first private drug treatment center 
opened in 1970, and in the 1970s health and legal professionals 
discussed the drug problem guardedly. Not until the 1980s were 
organizations founded to combat drug addiction, and they were 
harassed and limited by government agencies until 1989. In 1992 
between 4,000 and 5,000 Poles dependent on narcotics were be- 
ing treated at facilities of the national health service or social or- 
ganizations. The Ministry of Health and Social Welfare estimated 
that 200,000 to 250,000 persons were taking drugs at that time, 
however. In 1991 some 190 deaths were attributed to drug over- 
doses. Addicts under treatment were predominantly from the work- 
ing class and the intelligentsia, male, and younger than thirty years 
of age (nearly half were under twenty-four). The most commonly 
abused substance, kompot, is a powerful and physically devastat- 
ing drug readily produced from the poppy plants grown widely in 
Poland. The drug is injected intravenously. Kompot moves through 
society via informal networks operating independently of the in- 
ternational drug market. 

In the period from 1986 to 1992, drug abuse in Poland remained 
stable despite declining standards of living, rising unemployment, 
and a rising overall crime rate. As barriers to the West fell, however, 
amphetamine manufacture and trafficking introduced a new threat. 
By 1992, amphetamines from Poland were considered as serious 
a threat in Germany and Scandinavia as imported cocaine and 
heroin; at that time, an estimated 20 percent of amphetamines in 
Western Europe originated in Polish laboratories. The confisca- 
tion of 150 kilograms of cocaine in Poland in 1991 also indicated 
that domestic narcotics production was diversifying, and local 
authorities feared that Colombian drug cartels were investing in 
that activity. To counter criminal drug producers, who also were 
involved in other types of crime, Poland established a National Drug 
Bureau in 1991 . Because kompot remained much cheaper and more 
accessible in the early 1990s, however, the Polish market for am- 
phetamines remained very small. Meanwhile, a 1990 law made 



110 



The Society and Its Environment 



illegal the cultivation of poppies without a government permit, and 
a new, morphine-free poppy species was introduced in 1991 to ena- 
ble farmers to continue poppy cultivation. 

In 1992 nineteen of Poland's drug rehabilitation centers were 
operated by the Young People's Movement to Combat Drug Ad- 
diction (known by its Polish acronym, MONAR). Although 
hundreds of people were cured in such centers in the 1980s, the 
severe treatment methods of MONAR' s two-year program caused 
controversy in the Polish health community. For that reason, in 
1990 the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare began opening clin- 
ics that emphasized preparing individuals for life after treatment. 

Alcoholism 

The older generations of Poles escaped narcotics addiction, but 
alcoholism is a problem in all generations. Alcohol consumption 
is an integral part of Polish social tradition, and nondrinkers are 
relatively rare. Per capita consumption increased significantly af- 
ter World War II, however, and consumption remained above the 
European average throughout the communist period. Children often 
began drinking when still in primary school. Government programs 
nominally discouraged excessive drinking, but the importance of 
revenue from the Polish alcohol industry restricted their activity. 
Throughout the 1980s, the percentage of strong alcoholic bever- 
ages in overall consumption rose steadily, putting Poland near the 
top among nations in that statistic. In 1977 an estimated 4.3 mil- 
lion Poles consumed the equivalent of more than 48 liters of pure 
alcohol per person per year; of that number, about 1 million were 
believed to be clinically alcohol-dependent. In 1980 the average 
male Pole over sixteen years of age consumed the equivalent of 
16.6 liters of pure alcohol per year. 

The Welfare System 

The communist central planning system made a wide variety 
of payments to subsidize citizens in certain categories and encourage 
or discourage the activities of citizens in other categories. By the 
mid-1980s, the planning labyrinth created by such payments was 
such a fiscal burden that severe cuts were made in some payments. 
Like the health system, Poland's welfare system underwent sub- 
stantial decentralization and restructuring, and all parts of the sys- 
tem suffered from limited funding in the transition period that began 
in 1989. Although a higher percentage of the population needed 
welfare services because of high unemployment in that period, the 
need to reduce the government's budget deficit caused drastic cuts 
in many services. Eventual reversal of this trend depends upon the 



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Poland: A Country Study 

speed with which Poland's economy rebounds from its transition 
crisis and upon the efficiency of the new welfare bureaucracies. 

Structural Change 

Until 1989 social policy making was centralized in the Planning 
Commission of the Council of Ministers. The postcommunist re- 
forms placed social policy responsibility in the Ministry of Labor 
and Social Policy and the Ministry of Health and Welfare, with 
the aim of liberating social policy from its communist-era linkage 
with economic policy considerations. The social welfare policy of 
the postcommunist governments was planned in two phases. The 
first stage included short-term measures to offset the income loss- 
es of certain groups resulting from government anti-inflation poli- 
cy. These measures varied from the setting up of soup kitchens 
and partial payment of heating bills to reorganization of the social 
assistance system. The second, long-term policy aims at rebuild- 
ing the institutions of the system to conform with the future mar- 
ket economy envisioned by planners. Communal and regional 
agencies are to assume previously centralized functions, and authori- 
ty is to be shared with private social agencies and charities. 

Welfare Benefits 

In the late 1980s, Poland spent about 22 percent of its gross na- 
tional product (GNP — see Glossary) on social benefits in the form 
of monetary payments or services. At that time, over 5 million Poles 
received retirement or disability pensions, and about 100,000 were 
added yearly in the latter category. In the years of labor shortage, 
government incentives encouraged pensioners to continue to work 
past retirement age (sixty-five for men, sixty for women). In the 
early 1980s, the number of invalids receiving benefits increased 
from 2.5 million to 3.6 million, straining the welfare system. The 
communist system also paid benefits to single mothers with pre- 
school children, sickness benefits for workers, income supplements 
and nonrepayable loans to the poor, and education grants to near- 
ly 75 percent of students, in addition to providing nominally free 
health care, cultural and physical education facilities. By the mid- 
1980s, however, all the free, state-funded services were being con- 
sidered for privatization, fees, or rationing. 

In the first postcommunist years, social support programs for 
the unemployed underwent important changes. The initial post- 
communist policy guaranteed unemployment benefits and retrain- 
ing regardless of the reason for a person's unemployed status. 
Benefits were to be paid indefinitely and were based on previous 
pay or on the national minimum wage for those who had never 



112 



The Society and Its Environment 



worked. Benefits included old-age, disability, and survivors' pen- 
sions and compensation for work injuries, sickness, maternity, and 
family-related expenses. Although the system covered both indus- 
try and agriculture, enterprises in the industrial sector paid much 
higher surcharges (usually 45 percent of the worker's salary) to the 
benefit fund than did either the agriculture or housing sectors. 

In 1991 and early 1992, a series of laws drastically reduced the 
coverage of the unemployment program. Under the modified poli- 
cies, benefits no longer went to those who had never been employed; 
a twelve-month limit was placed on all payments; and benefit lev- 
els were lowered by pegging them to income the previous quarter 
rather than to the last salary received. This reform immediately 
disqualified 27 percent of previous beneficiaries, and that percen- 
tage was expected to rise in ensuing years. 

In 1992 the Warsaw welfare office divided its benefit payments 
among 4,500 recipients of permanent benefits, 8,500 recipients of 
temporary benefits, and 25,500 recipients of housing assistance. 
The public assistance law entitled one person per family to per- 
manent benefits at the official minimum subsistence level. Through- 
out Poland, the demand for welfare assistance grew steadily between 
1990 and 1992, well beyond the financial and organizational capa- 
bilities of the state system. The shortage affected a wide range of 
social categories: the homeless and unemployed, AIDS victims, 
families of alcoholics, and the elderly. According to a 1991 study, 
18 percent of Polish children lived in poverty. Thus, the postcom- 
munist conversion of a state-sponsored and state-controlled econ- 
omy reverberated strongly in the "social security" that communism 
had promised but very often failed to deliver in the 1980s. 

* * * 

Numerous useful monographs cover all or parts of Poland's so- 
ciety and environment. The Poles by Stewart Steven and Janine 
Wedel's The Private Poland are anecdotal treatments of the general 
fabric of Polish society. Landerbericht Polen is a collection of essays 
in German edited by Wilhelm Wohlke covering religion, ethnic 
groups, health and welfare, and geography. Economic Reforms and 
Welfare Systems in the USSR, Poland, and Hungary, edited by J an Adam, 
includes treatment of the postcommunist welfare structure. Ken- 
neth R. Wulff s Education in Poland is a detailed description of the 
subject before, during, and after the communist regimes. Poland 
into the 1990s, edited by George Blazyca and Ryszard Rapacki, con- 
tains informative chapters on social structure in the communist 
era and on the condition of the environment after communism. 



113 



Poland: A Country Study 

Aleksander Gella's Development of Class Structure in Eastern Europe re- 
lates the evolution of social classes in Poland to those found in sur- 
rounding countries. And George Kolankiewicz and Paul G. Lewis's 
Poland: Politics, Economics, and Society treats a number of social issues 
in the context of the country's political and economic structure. 
(For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



114 



Chapter 3. The Economy 




Polish coin from the early eleventh- century reign of Bolestaw I the Brave 



POLAND'S ECONOMIC GROWTH was favored by relatively 
rich natural resources for both agriculture and industry. Eastern 
Europe's largest producer of food, Poland based its sizeable and 
varied industrial sector on ample coal supplies that made it the 
world's fourth largest coal producer in the 1970s. The most produc- 
tive industries, such as equipment manufacturing and food process- 
ing, were built on the country's coal and soil resources, respectively, 
and energy supply still depended almost entirely on coal in the early 
1990s. 

After World War II, Poland's new communist rulers reorganized 
the economy on the model of state socialism established by Joseph 
V. Stalin in the Soviet Union. The result was the predominance 
of heavy industry, large enterprises, and a topheavy centralized 
bureaucracy controlling every aspect of production. Considerations 
such as consumer demand and worker job satisfaction, familiar in 
Western capitalist systems, were ignored. Isolated from the process- 
es of the marketplace, pricing and production levels were set to 
advance the master plans of the ruling party. The socioeconomic 
disproportions that resulted from this isolation were a burdensome 
legacy to the reform governments in the early postcommunist era. 

Poland's abundant agricultural resources remained largely in pri- 
vate hands during the communist period, but the state strongly 
influenced that sector through taxes, controls on materials, and 
limits on the size of private plots. Many small industries and crafts 
also remained outside direct state control. 

The Polish economy also was isolated from the international 
economy by the postwar nationalization of foreign trade. Reforms 
in the 1970s and 1980s gradually gave individual enterprises more 
direct control over their foreign trade activities, bypassing much 
of the state planning machinery. But until 1990 Polish trade policy 
remained severely limited by its obligations to the Council for Mutu- 
al Economic Assistance (Comecon — see Glossary), which was domi- 
nated by the Soviet Union. Although price supports helped Poland's 
balance of trade within the system, they also encouraged ineffi- 
cient and low-quality production that discouraged trade with the 
rest of the world. 

Failure of central state planning to yield economic growth in- 
spired social unrest and official policy reform in the 1970s and the 
early 1980s, but no real change occurred until the installation of 
a noncommunist government in mid- 1989 (see The 1989 Elections 



117 



Poland: A Country Study 

and Their Aftermath, ch. 1). With massive public support, the first 
noncommunist government imposed a shock-therapy reform pro- 
gram in 1990. This program included privatization of all parts of 
the Polish economy and a rapid shift from the unrealistic state plan- 
ning system to a Western- style market economy. The momentum 
of the early reform days flagged in the next two years, however. 
In 1992 signs of economic progress were very uneven. Consumer 
goods became much more available, but the continued existence 
of inefficient state enterprises lowered productivity significantly, 
unemployment rose, and inflation became a serious threat after 
initially being reduced to virtually zero. 

In its efforts to westernize its economy after 1989, Poland relied 
heavily on expertise and financial support from international finan- 
cial institutions. Although its substantial hard-currency debt was 
partially forgiven in 1991, the remains of the communist man- 
agement system hindered efficient use of foreign capital and dis- 
couraged the foreign investment that Poland vigorously sought. 
Thus, by 1992 what was initially planned as a brief period of painful 
economic adjustment had become a much longer ordeal that had 
brought mixed results. 

Natural Resources 

Poland's rapid postwar industrialization was supported by a com- 
bination of readily available natural resources, especially econom- 
ically important minerals. After the era of communist economics 
and politics ended in 1989, however, industrial policy makers con- 
templated major changes in the balance of resource consumption. 

Minerals and Fuels 

Coal is Poland's most important mineral resource. In 1980 to- 
tal reserves were estimated at 130 billion tons. The largest coal 
deposits are located in Upper Silesia in the southwestern part of 
the country, where large-scale mining began in the nineteenth cen- 
tury. Silesian deposits, generally of high quality and easily acces- 
sible, accounted for about 75 percent of the country's hard coal 
resources and 97 percent of its extraction in the 1980s. The Lub- 
lin region of eastern Poland was exploited in the 1980s as part of 
an expansion program to supplement Silesian hard coal for indus- 
try and export. But development of this relatively poor, geologi- 
cally difficult, and very expensive field ended in 1990. A number 
of unprofitable Upper Silesian mines also were to be closed in the 
early 1990s. 

Poland also has significant quantities of lignite in the district of 
Zielona Gora in the west and in two districts located in the central 



118 



The Economy 



part of the country between the Vistula and the Oder rivers. This 
low-quality fuel has been used on a large scale for the production 
of electricity, despite its very damaging effect on the environment 
(see Environment and Pollution, ch. 2). Plans called for gradual 
reduction of lignite extraction and use in the 1990s (see Fuels and 
Energy, this ch.). 

Natural gas is extracted mostly in Upper Silesia, Lower Silesia, 
and the southeastern part of the country. Production expanded in 
the 1960s and 1970s, then declined in the next decade. In 1989 
domestic production covered 43 percent of the country's total re- 
quirement. 

A major offshore oilfield was discovered in the Baltic Sea in 1985. 
Including that field and the older fields in the Carpathian Moun- 
tains in southeastern Poland, total oil reserves were estimated at 
100 million tons in 1990. Poland remained heavily dependent on 
the Soviet Union for petroleum throughout the 1980s. 

Large reserves of sulfur at Tarnobrzeg and Staszow in the south- 
central region make that material Poland's most important non- 
metallic export mineral. Favorable geological conditions have 
supported large-scale operations in three mines yielding about 5 
million tons annually. About 3 million tons of sulfuric acid, along 
with several other chemicals, are produced each year. 

Poland has limited deposits of some nonferrous metal ores. The 
most significant is copper, which is extracted in large quantities 
at ten mines in Lower Silesia in southwestern Poland. Copper 
production expanded greatly after discovery of major new deposits 
in the 1960s and 1970s. In 1990 annual copper ore output was about 
26 million tons, and 51 percent of electrolytic copper was export- 
ed. In 1982 Poland had the world's fifth-largest deposits of lead 
and zinc (which occur in association). The annual output of lead 
and zinc ores was about 5 million tons, supporting annual produc- 
tion of 164 thousand tons of zinc and 78,000 tons of lead. In 1990 
about 76 percent of Poland's zinc and nearly all its lead were used 
by domestic industry. 

Although Poland has some fairly large iron ore deposits, this ore 
requires enrichment before processing. Until the 1970s, the main 
source of iron ore was the district of Cz^stochowa; but output there 
declined sharply in the early 1980s, and other deposits are of poor 
quality or provide such small quantities that exploitation is un- 
profitable. The country depended on iron imports from the Soviet 
Union and Sweden to support the rapid expansion of the steel in- 
dustry that is a high priority in the communist era. 

Rich deposits of salt provide an important raw material for the 
chemical industry. Salt mining, which began in the Middle Ages, 



119 



Poland: A Country Study 



was concentrated in the Wieliczka-Bochnia area near Krakow un- 
til the middle of the twentieth century; then the major salt-mining 
operations moved to a large deposit running northwest from Lodz 
in central Poland. Salt is extracted in two ways: by removing it 
in solid form and by dissolving it underground, then pumping brine 
to the surface. Annual output declined from 6.2 million tons in 
1987 and 1988 to 4.7 million tons in 1989. Other mineral resources 
include bauxite, barite, gypsum, limestone, and silver (a byproduct 
of processing other metals). 

Agricultural Resources 

Poland's climate features moderate temperatures and adequate 
rainfall that enable cultivation of most temperate-zone crops, in- 
cluding all the major grains, several industrial crops, and several 
varieties of fruit (see Agriculture, this ch.; Climate, ch. 2). Crops 
are distributed according to the substantial regional variations in 
soil and length of growing season (see Topography, ch. 2). The 
sandy soils of the central plains are most suitable for rye, the richer 
soil in the south favors wheat and barley, and the poorer soil of 
the north is used for oats. All parts of Poland favor potato cultiva- 
tion; sugar beets, the most important industrial crop, grow main- 
ly in the west and southeast. 

Labor Force 

At the end of 1991, about 30.7 percent of Poland's estimated 
population of 38.3 million lived in urban centers with populations 
of 100,000 or more. The priority given urbanization and industri- 
alization in postwar Poland caused the urban working class to grow 
dramatically and the rural working class to shrink proportionately 
in the first decade of communist rule. This process slowed con- 
siderably over the next three decades (see Demography, ch. 2). 

In 1989 nearly 22 million Poles were of working age: 11.3 mil- 
lion men between the ages of eighteen and sixty-four years and 
10.6 million women between ages eighteen and fifty-nine. The 
population was relatively well educated. In 1988 about 1 .8 million 
people had a postsecondary education, another 7.0 million had a 
secondary education, and 6.7 million had a basic trade education 
(see Education, ch. 2). 

In 1989 the total labor force of 18.4 million included 36.8 per- 
cent employed in manufacturing, mining, and construction; 25.7 
percent in agriculture, forestry, and fishing; and 7.1 percent in 
transport and communications. About 12 million workers, or 70 
percent of the work force, worked in the state sector in 1990 (see 
table 12, Appendix). 



120 



The Economy 



The communist system was marked by major inequality of labor 
allocation. In spite of considerable overstaffing in both production 
and administrative units, labor shortages were a perennial problem 
in other areas of the economy. Unemployment began to grow in 
January 1990, partly as the result of the reform policies of the post- 
communist governments and partly because of the collapse of mar- 
kets in the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic 
(East Germany), which were Poland's most important trading part- 
ners in Comecon. At the end of 1991 , unemployment had reached 
11.4 percent. Unemployment benefits, an unemployment insur- 
ance system, and some retraining were introduced in early 1990. 

Wage increases in the state sector were controlled by a very steep 
tax on wages that exceeded prescribed levels. In the private sec- 
tor, the labor market operated without such restrictions, however. 
Wages generally were low in the first reform years. In 1991 the 
average monthly wage was 2,301 ,200 zloty (for value of the zloty — 
see Glossary), not including agricultural labor and positions in edu- 
cation, health and social services, culture, law and order, national 
defense, and public administration. At that time, however, rents 
were low, electricity, gas, and fuels remained partly subsidized, 
and medical services were free (see The Welfare System, ch. 2). 

In 1992 two nationwide labor unions existed. The Solidarity labor 
union (Solidarnosc) was internationally known for the decade of 
strikes and efforts to achieve reform that finally thrust it into a cen- 
tral political role in 1989. The National Coalition of Labor Unions, 
originally established by the communist government after the 
suppression of Solidarity in the early 1980s, became independent 
of state control in 1990 and began to compete with Solidarity for 
members. 

The Economy under the Communist System 

After World War II, a centrally planned socialist system was 
transplanted to Poland from the Soviet Union without any con- 
sideration for the differences in the level of development of the coun- 
try, or its size, resource endowment, or cultural, social, and political 
traditions. The inadequacies of that system left Poland in an eco- 
nomic crisis in the late 1980s. 

System Structure 

The new system was able to mobilize resources, but it could not 
ensure their efficient use. High but uneven rates of growth of the 
net material product (NMP — see Glossary), also called "national 
income" in Marxist terminology, were recorded over a rather long 
period. However, these gains were made at the expense of large 



121 



Poland: A Country Study 



investment outlays. Lacking support from foreign capital, these 
outlays could be financed only by severe restriction of consump- 
tion and a very high ratio of accumulation (forced saving) in the 
NMP. 

During the communist period, the same cycle of errors occurred 
in Poland as in the other state-planned economies. The political 
and economic system enabled planners to select any rate of accumu- 
lation and investment; but, in the absence of direct warning sig- 
nals from the system, accumulation often exceeded the optimum 
rate. Investment often covered an excessively broad front and 
had an over-extended gestation period; disappointingly low growth 
rates resulted from diminishing capital returns and from the lower- 
ing of worker incentives by excessive regulation of wages and con- 
striction of consumption. Planners reacted to these conditions by 
further increasing the rate of accumulation and the volume of 
investment. 

Investment funds mobilized in this wasteful way then were allo- 
cated without regard to consumer preference. Planners directed 
money to projects expected to speed growth in the economy. Again, 
considerable waste resulted from overinvestment in some branches 
and underinvestment in others. To achieve the required labor in- 
creases outside agriculture, planners manipulated participation ra- 
tios, especially of women, and made large-scale transfers of labor 
from rural areas. Shortages of capital and labor became prevalent 
despite government efforts to maintain equitable distribution. 

An example of inefficient state planning was the unpaid exchange 
of technical documentation and blueprints among Comecon mem- 
bers on the basis of the Sofia Agreement of 1949. The countries 
of origin had no incentive to make improvements before making 
plans available to other members of Comecon, even when improved 
technology was known to be available. For this reason, new facto- 
ries often were obsolete by the time of completion. In turn, the 
machines and equipment these factories produced froze industry 
at an obsolete technological level. 

The institutional framework of the centrally planned economy 
was able to insulate it to some extent from the impact of world eco- 
nomic trends. As a result, domestic industry was not exposed to 
foreign competition that would force improvements in efficiency 
or to foreign innovations that would make such improvements pos- 
sible. Above all, the isolation of the system kept domestic prices 
totally unrelated to world prices. 

Prices were determined administratively on the basis of costs plus 
a fixed percentage of planned profit. Because every increase in 
production costs was absorbed by prices, the system provided no 



122 



The Economy 



incentive for enterprises to reduce costs. On the contrary, higher 
costs resulted in a higher absolute value of profit, from which the 
enterprise hierarchy financed its bonuses and various amenities. 
When the price was fixed below the level of costs, the government 
provided subsidies, ensuring the enterprise its planned rate of profit. 
Enterprises producing the same types of goods belonged to adminis- 
trative groups, called associations in the 1980s. Each of these groups 
was supervised by one of the industrial ministries. The ministry 
and the association controlled and coordinated the activities of all 
state enterprises and defended the interests of a given industry. 
The enterprises belonging to a given industrial group were not al- 
lowed to compete among themselves, and the profit gained by the 
most efficient was transferred to finance losses incurred by the least 
efficient. This practice further reduced incentives to seek profits 
and avoid losses. 

In this artificial atmosphere, prices could not be related to mar- 
ket demand; and without a genuine price mechanism, resources 
could not be allocated efficiently. Much capital was wasted on en- 
terprises of inappropriate size, location, and technology. Further- 
more, planners could not identify which enterprises contributed 
to national income and which actually reduced it by using up more 
resources than the value added by their activities. The inability 
to make such distinctions was particularly harmful to the selection 
of products for export and decisions concerning import substitu- 
tion, i.e. , what should be produced within the country rather than 
imported. 

Development Strategy 

In the postwar years, all East European countries including 
Poland adopted a fundamentally similar inward-looking develop- 
ment strategy following the Soviet model of accelerated industri- 
alization and collectivization of agriculture. Planners attempted to 
enforce excessively high rates of growth and to achieve a relatively 
high degree of self-sufficiency. Strong autarkic tendencies were 
modified only by the shifting import requirements of the Soviet 
Union and by specialization agreements within Comecon; those 
agreements were limited, however, by their insulation from the 
factors of real profitability and comparative advantage. 

In 1945 the Polish economy was completely disorganized and 
urgently needed reestablishment of its prewar industrial base. The 
initial central planning organization that began work in Poland in 
late 1945 stressed socialist rather than communist economic goals: 
relative decentralization, increased consumer goods production to 
raise the standard of living, and moderate investment in production 



123 



Poland: A Country Study 

facilities. In 1949, however, that approach was scrapped in favor 
of the completely centralized Soviet planning model. During the 
1950s, planners followed Stalin's requirements for a higher growth 
rate in heavy industry than the overall industrial rate and a higher 
growth rate in the steel industry than that of heavy industry as a 
whole. This approach neglected the other economic sectors: agricul- 
ture, infrastructure, housing, services, and consumer goods. The 
sectors that were emphasized were all capital- , fuel- , and material- 
intensive. Materials shortages had developed already in the Come- 
con group by the 1960s. In response, Poland was required to 
expand its extraction of coal, copper, and sulfur, as well as its 
production of steel and other basic industrial materials without con- 
sidering costs. 

Stalinist planning also forcibly redirected foreign economic re- 
lations. Poland's extensive interwar commercial links with Western 
Europe were reduced, and some important prewar markets were 
lost as trade with the Soviet Union expanded rapidly. For Poland 
this trade was based mainly on export of coal and manufactured 
goods primarily from the rapidly growing heavy industries. In 
return, Poland became dependent on the supply of Soviet oil, natur- 
al gas, iron ore, and some other raw materials. This arrangement 
meant that Poland's industrial structure adjusted to Soviet needs 
and specifications, yielding many products that could be sold only 
to the Soviet Union or its allies. Thus exports became heavily de- 
pendent on markets in Comecon. 

Development of the Centrally Planned Economy 

This development strategy brought about a specific pattern of 
economic growth in Poland. As in the other centrally planned econ- 
omies, rates of growth depended on increases in the quantity of 
inputs rather than on improvements in productivity. Material 
production remained high as long as greater quantities of inputs 
were available. This pattern of growth priorities and the emerg- 
ing industrial structure left no possibility of raising wages signifi- 
cantly. Wages had been reduced during the first industrialization 
drive of the early 1950s. For this reason, the Polish standard of 
living lagged behind that of Western Europe as the continent re- 
covered from World War II. Already in the first postwar decade, 
awareness of this disparity began to cause social unrest, a situa- 
tion that became a tradition during the next thirty-five years. 

Establishing the Planning Formula 

Centralized planning ranged from broad, long-range statements 
of fundamental future development to guidance on the operation 



124 



A family harvesting potatoes on a private farm 
Courtesy Polish Information Agency, Warsaw 



125 



Poland: A Country Study 

of specific enterprises. The basic planning unit for transformation 
of the Polish economy was the five-year plan, the first of which 
began in 1956. Within that framework, current production goals 
were established in an annual operational plan, called the National 
Economic Plan. As the years passed, these plans contained more 
and more specific detail; because requirements and supplies could 
not be forecast in advance, plans were inconsistent and constantly 
needed revision. 

The Soviet system had already encountered difficulties, however, 
in the overly ambitious Six-Year Plan of 1950-55. Maladjustments, 
shortages, and bottlenecks appeared in the implementation of that 
plan, which was intended to create the infrastructure for the in- 
dustrial future: heavy industry, mining, and power generation. In 
1956, after workers' riots in Poznari, a general uprising was averted 
only by a change in the leadership of the communist party, the 
Polish United Workers' Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robot- 
nicza — PZPR). The new government of Wladystaw Gomulka 
promised modification of the system and changes in the develop- 
ment strategy. Consumer goods received a larger share of the na- 
tional product, and some quantities of grain and food were imported 
from the West. State control was mitigated by giving limited policy 
input to enterprises, and the rate of investment was reduced. 
Although a lively debate occurred on so-called "market socialism," 
actual systemic reforms were limited and short-lived. Among the 
reform measures of 1956, the only significant lasting change was 
the decollectivization of agriculture. 

Retrenchment and Adjustment in the 1960s 

By the early 1960s, economic directives again came only from 
the center, and heavy industry once more received disproportion- 
ate investment. At that point, the government began a new indus- 
trialization drive, which was again far too ambitious. Rates of 
investment were excessive, the number of unfinished industrial 
projects increased, and the time required for project completion 
was considerably extended. Structural distortions increased, and 
the rates of growth in high-priority sectors were adversely affected 
by the slower than expected growth in low-priority sectors. Bottle- 
necks and shortages increased inefficiency. By the late 1960s, the 
economy was clearly stagnant, consumer goods were extremely 
scarce, and planners sought new approaches to avoid repetition 
of the social upheavals of 1956. At this point, suppression of con- 
sumption to its previous levels had become politically dangerous, 
making a high rate of accumulation problematic at a time when 
demand for investment funds was growing rapidly. Because of these 



126 



The Economy 



factors, additional investment funds were allocated to the neglected 
infrastructure and to the production of consumer goods. 

Modernization efforts stressed technological restructuring rather 
than fundamental systemic reforms. However, a policy of "se- 
lective development," introduced in 1968, required another accel- 
eration of investments at the expense of consumption. Selective 
development and a new system of selectively applied financial in- 
centives ended in the worker riots of December 1970 and a second 
forced change in the communist leadership in Poland. Meanwhile, 
no funds were invested in remedying the environmental crisis al- 
ready being caused by excessive reliance on "dirty" lignite in the 
drive for heavy industrialization. 

These conditions necessitated a switch from an "extensive" 
growth pattern (unlimited inputs) to an "intensive" pattern of 
growth that would ensure high rates of growth through improve- 
ments in productivity rather than in the amount of inputs. The 
new emphasis helped drive another reorganization of industry in 
the early 1970s. State enterprises were combined into a number 
of huge conglomerates called Big Economic Organizations. They 
were expected to increase efficiency by economies of scale. Wage 
increases were tied to net increases in the value of outputs as an 
incentive to labor productivity. In practice, however, central plan- 
ners could now control a smaller number of industrial units and 
regulate their activities more intensely. The system was never im- 
plemented fully, and no improvement in efficiency resulted. The 
failure of the 1973 reform demonstrated that the technological level 
of industrial products was still too low to permit significant increases 
in efficiency. 

Reliance on Technology in the 1970s 

In the early 1970s, East-West detente, the accumulation of 
petrodollars in Western banks, and a recession in the West created 
an opportunity for Eastern Europe to import technology and capital 
from the West to restructure and modernize its industrial base. 
Poland was relatively late in introducing this so-called "new de- 
velopment strategy," but it eventually went farther in this direc- 
tion than its Comecon allies. The share of trade with Comecon 
declined, and trade with other countries increased quite dramati- 
cally during the first half of the 1970s. 

The technology import strategy was based on the assumption 
that, with the help of Western loans, a large-scale influx of advanced 
equipment, licenses, and other forms of technology transfer would 
automatically result in efficient production of modern, high-quality 
manufactured goods suitable for export to the West. Under those 



127 



Poland: A Country Study 

conditions, repayment of debts would not be difficult. Expansion 
of exports encountered considerable difficulties, however, partly 
because of the oil crisis and stagflation in the West, but mainly 
because the central planners remained unable to effect the required 
changes in the structure of production. The investment drive, 
financed by foreign borrowing, exceeded the possibilities of the econ- 
omy. Removed from direct contact with the foreign markets, cen- 
tralized selection of exportables was ineffective in expanding the 
markets for Polish goods. At the same time, the dependence of the 
economy on imported Western materials, components, and machines 
inevitably increased. By the middle of the 1970s, large trade deficits 
had been incurred with the Western countries. The negative balance 
of payments in convertible currencies increased from US$100 mil- 
lion in 1970 to US$3 billion in 1975. During the same period, the 
gross convertible currency debt increased from US$1.2 billion to 
US$8.4 billion. Unable to expand exports to the West at the neces- 
sary pace, Polish planners began centralized restriction of imports. 
This policy in turn had an adverse effect on domestic production, 
including the production of exportables. 

Reform Failure in the 1980s 

By 1980 it had become clear that the large-scale import of capital 
and technology from the West could not substitute for economic re- 
form. On the contrary, systemic reforms were needed to ensure satis- 
factory absorption and diffusion of imported technology. Significant 
expansion of profitable exports to the world markets was impossible 
for an inflexible and overly centralized economic system. On the 
other hand, without an increase in exports, reducing or even ser- 
vicing Poland's rapidly increasing international debt was extremely 
difficult. 

Meanwhile, the enormous investment drive of the early 1970s 
had destabilized the economy and developed strong inflationary pres- 
sure. Rates of NMP growth dropped throughout the second half 
of the decade, and the first absolute decline took place in 1979. 
Although planners should have been adjusting the level of aggregate 
demand to the declining aggregate supply, they found this task po- 
litically and administratively difficult. The authorities also feared 
major price revisions, especially after workers' riots forced withdrawal 
of a revision introduced in 1976. In the late 1970s, some prices were 
increased gradually whereas other increases were concealed by desig- 
nating them for new, higher quality, or luxury items. The rest of 
the inflationary gap was suppressed by fixing prices administratively. 

By the late 1970s, the shortage of consumer goods was acute. 
Nominal income increases continued as a "money illusion" to 



128 



The Economy 



minimize social discontent and provide a work incentive. This 
strategy increased the "inflationary overhang," the accumulated 
and unusable purchasing power in the hands of the population. 
At the same time, suppressed inflation spurred maladjustments and 
inequities in the production processes, further reducing the sup- 
ply of goods. The deteriorating situation in the consumer goods 
market resulted in a series of watershed events: a wave of strikes 
that led to the formation of the Solidarity union in August 1980, 
a third enforced change in the communist leadership in Septem- 
ber 1980, and the imposition of martial law in December 1981. 

Between 1978 and 1982, the NMP of Poland declined by 24 per- 
cent, and industrial production declined by 13.4 percent. The 
decline in production was followed by prolonged stagnation. Recog- 
nizing a strong grass-roots resistance to the existing system, the 
new government of Stanislaw Kania, who had replaced Edward 
Gierek, established the Commission for Economic Reform in late 
1980. This body presented a weakened version of drastic reforms 
recommended by the independent Polish Economic Society, an ad- 
visory board of economists formed earlier in 1980. Implemented 
hastily in mid- 1981 , the reforms nominally removed the PZPR from 
day-to-day economic management and gave the enterprises respon- 
sibility for their own financial condition and for planning. These 
decentralizing reforms were distorted by the constraints of martial 
law that had been imposed nationally in December 1981 , however, 
and they failed to improve the economic situation (see The Jaruzel- 
ski Interlude, ch. 1). Internally inconsistent and insufficiently far- 
reaching, the reforms reduced central administrative control without 
establishing any of the fundamentals of an alternative market sys- 
tem. Thus, in effect, the economy operated from 1981 to 1989 in 
a systemic vacuum. 

After 1985 the foreign trade situation further complicated 
Poland's economic crisis. The relative importance of Comecon trade 
declined yearly, necessitating expanded trade with the West, par- 
ticularly the European Community (EC — see Glossary). This shift 
was a policy change for which neither the communist regime nor 
the economic system was prepared in the late 1980s. 

After the Fall of the Communist System 

In 1989 the NMP declined by 0.2 percent to a level 1 percent 
below the 1978 figure, and industrial production also declined slight- 
ly. Despite price controls, inflation increased from 25.3 percent 
in 1987 to 343.8 percent in 1989. As the scarcity of goods rose 
sharply, lines in front of stores lengthened and social unrest grew. 



129 



Poland: A Country Study 



Shortages of materials and fuels, unreliable supply, and adminis- 
trative disarray caused frequent shutdowns of industrial produc- 
tion lines. 

Disequilibrium also increased rapidly in the external economy. 
The balance of payments deficit in hard currency (denominations 
exchanged on the world market) increased from US$392 million 
in 1987 to US$1,922 million in 1989, and the national debt grew 
from US$39.2 billion to US$40.8 billion during that period. In 
the last years of communist rule, hard-currency deficits were ex- 
acerbated by the priority still given to economic relations within 
Comecon. In its Comecon transactions between 1987 and 1989, 
Poland converted a current account deficit of 424 million transfer- 
able rubles (the artificial currency used in Comecon transactions 
but unrecognized outside the trading bloc) to a positive balance 
of 1,104 million transferable rubles as its ruble debt declined from 
5.8 billion to 0.6 billion (see table 13; table 14, Appendix). These 
transactions meant that Poland was ignoring the catastrophic con- 
dition of its domestic economy to help alleviate the general short- 
ages within Comecon by supporting a net outflow of capital (more 
exports than imports), most of which went to the Soviet Union. 

In 1989 new policies in the Soviet Union made clear that Soviet 
retaliation against liberalization in Poland was no longer a real pos- 
sibility. Under a new set of international conditions, the long his- 
tory of riots and strikes by workers and students, criticism by the 
intellectual classes, and general lack of cooperation by society with 
the economic programs of successive communist governments ended 
in the collapse of the communist regime of Wojciech Jaruzelski in 
May 1989. The proximate cause of its fall, however, was deepen- 
ing economic crisis. Although the crisis was a very effective politi- 
cal weapon for Polish noncommunist parties, the underlying 
structural defects of the national economy became a legacy of per- 
sistently intractable problems for the noncommunist governments 
that followed Jaruzelski. 

Marketization and Stabilization 

The first noncommunist government in Eastern Europe was 
formed in Poland by Tadeusz Mazowiecki after Solidarity won an 
overwhelming victory in the parliamentary election of June 1989. 
The government came to office on September 1 2 and within one 
month announced an ambitious program of economic reforms. The 
objective was not to improve the socialist system, as had been the 
case in previous reforms, but to accomplish a rapid and complete 
transformation from the Soviet-type economy into a capitalist sys- 
tem and to reintegrate the Polish economy into the world economy. 



130 



The Economy 



Under the best of circumstances, accomplishing such a trans- 
formation would be an enormous task. But, like other Comecon 
countries, Poland had an inefficient industrial structure that was 
fuel- and material-intensive and a foreign trade mechanism incom- 
patible with expansion of exports to the West. The inherited sys- 
tem did not support greater supply of consumer goods, nor was 
it any longer appropriate for trade with Poland's Comecon part- 
ners, all of which were now restructuring their economies accord- 
ing to national requirements and resources. Without fundamental 
restructuring, the economy faced further declines in production, 
high unemployment, and strong inflationary pressure. Therefore, 
the first postcommunist Polish governments pursued economic re- 
form with great urgency, although they had limited success. 

Required Short-Term Changes 

Modernization was a fundamental requirement. Because a con- 
siderable part of Poland's capital stock was obsolete or in poor con- 
dition, a very large share of the country's industrial products was 
of poor quality. The system lacked a well-developed modern in- 
frastructure, particularly in financial institutions, transportation 
and telecommunications, and housing (see Transportation and 
Communications, this ch.; Housing, ch. 2). Without major im- 
provement of infrastructure, the economy's overall efficiency could 
not be raised significandy. Reform was further hampered by a short- 
age of well-trained managers and enterprise staff who understood 
the workings of the modern free-enterprise economy and could func- 
tion efficiently in such a system. Expenditures necessary to meet 
these needs were restricted or delayed, however, by simultaneous 
requirements to reduce inflation and the balance of payments dis- 
equilibrium. 

The Shock Strategy 

The gravity of the economic crisis and the immediate threat of 
hyperinflation caused the Mazowiecki government to choose a 
"shock strategy." Called the Balcerowicz Plan after its chief ar- 
chitect, Minister of Finance Leszek Balcerowicz, the program 
received approval and financial support from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF — see Glossary). On January 1, 1990, a pro- 
gram for marketization was introduced together with harsh stabili- 
zation measures, a restructuring program, and a social program 
to protect the poorest members of the society. The program in- 
cluded liberalizing controls on almost all prices, eliminating most 
subsidies, and abolishing administrative allocation of resources in 
favor of trade, free establishment of private businesses, liberalization 



131 



Poland: A Country Study 

of the system of international economic relations, and introduc- 
tion of internal currency convertibility with a currency devalua- 
tion of 32 percent. 

At the same time, a very strict income policy was introduced. 
Although prices were allowed to rise suddenly to equalize supply 
and demand, nominal wage increases were limited to a fraction 
of the overall price increase of the previous month. Very heavy 
tax penalties were imposed on state enterprises whose wages ex- 
ceeded these ceilings. This policy reduced real incomes and the real 
value of accumulated balances that, combined with inadequate sup- 
plies of goods and services, had caused prolonged inflationary pres- 
sure. Together with the lifting of restrictions on private economic 
activity, import policy reform and internal convertibility, the wage- 
and-price policy reestablished market equilibrium. 

Initial Results 

Within one month, stores were well stocked, and the long lines 
in front of them had disappeared. Individual budgets rather than 
the availability of goods became the primary determinant of buy- 
ing patterns. A large number of street vendors appeared, contribut- 
ing to the supply of consumer goods and competing with established 
stores. This new type of enterprise often was the starting point for 
launching more established business units. 

Besides income policy, the new government used highly restric- 
tive monetary and fiscal policies to reduce aggregate demand. The 
reorganized central bank drastically limited the quantity of money 
by imposing a positive real rate of interest, introducing and sub- 
sequently increasing obligatory reserve ratios for the commercial 
banks, and imposing caps on credits (see Banking and Finance, 
this ch.). The budgetary deficit in 1989 had been equal to 11 per- 
cent of expenditures. In 1990 this deficit was converted into a sur- 
plus of 1.3 percent of expenditures. The surplus then began to 
decline, however, in the second half of the year, and by the spring 
of 1991 negative economic factors had again created a large deficit. 
The government eliminated most enterprise subsidies from its bud- 
get and introduced specific tax reductions to force state enterprises 
to depend on their revenues. In the many cases where the govern- 
ment action threatened their operations, state enterprises gained 
time by developing a system of interenterprise credits, selling some 
extra equipment and materials, and obtaining extensions for the 
payment of taxes and debts. 

Long-Term Requirements 

These rapidly introduced short-term policies quickly and 



132 



Wine caves, traditional part of local economy and culture in Tatra Mountains 

Courtesy Sam and Sarah Stulberg 

fundamentally changed the workings of the Polish economy. Es- 
tablishment of a full market system has other requirements, 
however, that take more time and are more problematic. The new 
Polish economy required a reorganized legal and institutional frame- 
work. Financial institutions, capital and labor markets, the taxa- 
tion system, and contract laws required revision. Establishing 
systems for protection of consumers and of the environment was 
another priority. For these institutional changes, legislation had 
to be prepared, considered, and enacted by the government; then 
key personnel had to be trained to gradually bring the system to 
full efficiency. Because many flaws in new legislation or regula- 
tions were only detectable after implementation, policy making took 
on an unstable, trial-and-error quality. Reform and stabilization 
measures did not meet expectations, and the country's economic 
situation deteriorated in 1990-91. 

Macroeconomic Indicators for 1990-91 

Postcommunist economic reform initially brought both positive 
and negative results in the key areas of prices, productivity, infla- 
tion, and wages (see table 15, Appendix). In general, early indi- 
cators showed that the adjustment to a market economy would 
require more time and greater social discomfort than was antici- 
pated in 1989. 



133 



Poland: A Country Study 
Price Increases 

Sudden liberalization of prices brought an average price increase 
of 79.6 percent in the program's first month. The high prices were 
intended to eliminate some major distortions in pricing and begin 
to adjust demand to the existing limited supply. Price liberaliza- 
tion stopped hyperinflation but, unexpectedly, inflation remained 
high. 

Annual price increases were 250 percent in 1990 and 70.3 per- 
cent in 1991. Except for the first quarter, however, average quar- 
terly price increases in 1990 were considerably smaller than the 
equivalent increases in 1989, when the administrative system of 
price determination and controls still dominated. The average 
quarterly price increases were lower in 1991 than in 1990. 

Impact on Productivity and Wages 

Experts predicted that the highly restrictive stabilization policy 
would suppress production, but the extent of the decline exceeded 
all projections. Industrial output declined by 24 percent in 1990 
and by another 12 percent in 1991 . In 1990 all branches of indus- 
try registered a substantial decline. In 1991 only the food industry 
showed a modest increase in output. In agriculture the situation 
was somewhat better. Gross agricultural production declined by 
2.2 percent in 1990 and by 2.4 percent in 1991. In both years, 
however, the grain harvest was a very robust 28 million tons. 

Gross domestic product (GDP — see Glossary) declined by 1 2 per- 
cent in 1990 and by 8 percent in 1991. Gross fixed investment, 
after declining by 2.4 percent in 1989, decreased by 10.6 percent 
in 1990 and by 7.5 percent in 1991 . Consumption declined by 11.7 
percent in 1990 but increased by 3.7 percent in 1991. The decline 
in investment meant that no significant modernization and restruc- 
turing could take place, which in turn jeopardized future growth. 
The number of unemployed people reached 1 . 1 million, or 6. 1 per- 
cent of the labor force, at the end of 1990 and 2.2 million people, 
or 11.4 percent, at the end of 1991 (see table 16, Appendix). 

Real personal incomes decreased by 22.3 percent in 1990, but 
they increased by 12.7 percent in January-September 1991. Real 
wages, excluding agriculture and jobs financed directly from the 
state budget, declined by 29.2 percent in 1990 and increased by 
2.0 percent in 1991 . The average real value of pensions decreased 
by 14 percent in 1990, then increased by 15 percent in 1991. 

Statistical Distortions 

Comparative statistics for this period, which generally caused 



134 



The Economy 



overstatement of the 1990 decline, must be understood in their con- 
text. Two factors contributed to this faulty estimate. First, 1989 
figures provided the basis for evaluating the economy's 1990 per- 
formance. Traditionally, output statistics in centrally planned econ- 
omies were inflated to show success in every case. Also, the 1989 
figures did not reflect the low-quality, unprofitable goods produced 
by subsidized state enterprises. Unprofitable production was shown 
as a statistical increase in NMP even as it reduced national income 
in the real world. Furthermore, until 1989 personal income and 
real wage calculations used the artificial official price index, so they 
were not a true measure of consumer purchasing power. 

On the other hand, official statistics for 1990 and 1991 reflected 
a downward bias. Revenues and incomes deliberately were under- 
estimated in order to avoid higher taxes. Because of these distor- 
tions, decentralized economic activity in the state sector and rapid 
growth in the private sector clearly required new methods of col- 
lecting and presenting statistics. In 1992, however, the Central 
Statistical Office in Poland had not yet removed the distortions of 
the previous system from its statistical formats. Unemployment 
statistics also failed to keep pace with the actual economic situa- 
tion. The rapid expansion of private enterprise in 1990 provided 
jobs for many people who had registered for benefits established 
at the beginning of the reform period. Meanwhile, legislation was 
slow to reform the accounting system. Even after statistical adjust- 
ment, however, the first three years of economic reform brought 
Poland genuine, deep decline in industrial production, in GDP, 
and in real personal incomes and wages. 

Agricultural Imbalances 

A serious political problem developed in the agricultural sector 
during this period. Reduced domestic demand for food, the loss 
of Comecon markets, a rapid increase in imports, and relatively 
good harvests led to oversupply of agricultural products. Agricul- 
tural prices lagged behind the prices of goods and services purchased 
by Polish farmers. As a result, incomes fell farther than incomes 
in other sectors in 1990 and 1991. This situation made farmers 
one of the most dissatisfied groups in Poland; although tradition- 
ally not politically active, farmers demonstrated en masse to im- 
prove their situation. In 1992 they demanded that government 
policy include higher tariffs, guaranteed minimum prices, and cheap 
credits to protect them from economic hardship. 

Causes of Decline 

No single factor was responsible for Poland's large-scale decline 



135 



Poland: A Country Study 

in production and incomes in 1990 and 1991 . The very restrictive 
stabilization policy caused some of the decline in economic indica- 
tors as well as increased unemployment. But when some fiscal and 
monetary restrictions were eased and real incomes increased late 
in 1990, inflation again increased. A similar succession of events 
in 1991 indicated that under prevailing conditions any increase in 
aggregate demand would lead to an increase in prices (hence in- 
flation) rather than to an increase in output that would match the 
demand generated by higher wages. 

An important reason for the unresponsiveness of supply was the 
inherited industrial structure, especially the poor condition of capital 
stock and shortages of various components and materials only avail- 
able on the import market. But other factors also played a role. 
In many cases, enterprise managers failed to make responses and 
decisions appropriate to reform goals. The reform of 1981 had called 
for election of most managers by the workers' councils of their en- 
terprises. Under the communist system, the political leverage of 
this relationship meant that managers sought to satisfy the coun- 
cils by raising wages and avoiding layoffs through whatever strategy 
was available. Beginning in January 1990, however, the enterprises 
suddenly found themselves in a buyer's market instead of the tradi- 
tional seller's market. Substantial and rapid adjustments within 
the enterprises were needed to cope with a decline in the domestic 
demand caused by a drastic reduction in personal incomes, cuts 
in government expenditures, and rapidly increasing imports. At 
the same time, the sudden elimination of the formerly secure Come- 
con markets, especially those in the Soviet Union and East Ger- 
many, made establishment of new markets in the West a condition 
of survival for many enterprises. 

Few managers were prepared by training or experience to deal 
with this new requirement. No consulting or foreign trade broker- 
age firms were available to provide assistance, and the banking 
system that succeeded the old structure under the National Bank 
of Poland (Narodowy Bank Polski — NBP) had no experience in 
this respect. Although the elimination of price distortions and the 
introduction of an economically meaningful rate of exchange fi- 
nally made profit and loss projections meaningful, the system of 
internal accounting within the enterprises still required considera- 
ble adjustment in 1992. At that point, however, major changes in 
the product mix and improvements in quality were unlikely be- 
cause anti-inflationary macroeconomic policy had caused a scar- 
city of investment funds for modernization and restructuring. 

Another inhibiting factor was the persistent concentration of the 
postcommunist Polish industrial structure, which in 1992 was still 



136 



The Economy 



dominated by huge state-owned enterprises. In many cases, one 
enterprise monopolized an entire group of products. Antimonop- 
oly legislation and an antimonopoly office established in 1990 had 
limited effect in the early postcommunist years. Some large enter- 
prises were split, and some monopolistic practices were stopped. 
Rapidly increasing imports provided new competition, but imports 
also reduced the market for domestic products and created an ad- 
verse trade balance despite a surprisingly strong performance by 
Polish hard-currency exports. 

Closing bankrupt or unprofitable state- or municipally owned 
enterprises proved especially difficult when the livelihood of en- 
tire communities or regions was based on one or two such plants. 
Powerful workers' councils lobbied for continuation of the status 
quo. In 1992 thousands of bankrupt state enterprises survived on 
loans from other enterprises or from banks, which were not capa- 
ble of enforcing repayment under the financial conditions of the 
time. 

The External Balance of the Economy 

The collapse of Comecon put all former member countries in 
a state of economic crisis by completely changing the terms of trade 
among them. Those disturbances seriously damaged the Polish 
economy. Polish imports from the Comecon partners declined by 
34 percent in 1990 and by 45 percent in the first three quarters 
of 1991, whereas exports declined by 13 percent and 44 percent 
during the same periods. 

Beginning January 1, 1991, the former Comecon countries ceased 
using transferable rubles in most trade among themselves. In 1991 
imports paid for in rubles declined by 83.0 percent, and ruble ex- 
ports declined by 84.9 percent. At the end of the year, this category 
accounted for only 14.4 percent of Poland's overall imports and 
9.8 percent of its overall exports. Only five years earlier, these 
proportions were 51.9 and 46.1 percent, respectively. 

Particularly influential was the collapse of the Soviet Union's 
economic and geopolitical structure, an event that undermined that 
country's international commitments. Drastic declines in imports 
from the republics of the former Soviet Union rapidly eroded 
Poland's supply of fuels and raw materials critically needed for 
production. At the same time, Polish exports to the Soviet repub- 
lics also declined dramatically. In the general chaos of economic 
restructuring, potential importers in Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and 
other republics could pay in foreign currencies in amounts only 
up to 18 percent of their own trade earnings, and barter transac- 
tions were prohibited by their governments. Under these conditions, 



137 



Poland: A Country Study 



the overall share of Comecon partners and the former Soviet 
Union in Polish trade fell precipitously in 1990 and again in 1991 . 

Polish enterprises that traditionally had supplied the Soviet mar- 
ket suffered particularly strong losses as the Comecon system shat- 
tered. Before 1990 about 300 Polish enterprises exported a large 
proportion of their output to the Soviet Union, and more than thirty 
of them produced exclusively for the Soviet market. Producers of 
metalworking machinery, light airplanes, construction equipment, 
electronics, medical equipment, ships, textiles, clothing, and phar- 
maceuticals found themselves with little opportunity to adapt their 
product mix or shift exports to new markets before most or all of 
their traditional market was lost (see Foreign Trade, this ch.). 

Especially in light industries, entire enterprises became idle and 
contributed heavily to Poland's unemployment problem. Particu- 
larly hard hit was Lodz, the main textile center and second largest 
city. Lodz experienced 16.3 percent unemployment in 1991, the 
third highest figure in the country. The metallurgical industry ex- 
perienced the second biggest export decline in 1990. Ironically, this 
industry had received the largest share of investments in the 1970s 
drive for new technology. In 1990 declining demand led to worker 
layoffs at the giant Katowice Steel Mill and other centers. 

The Privatization Process 

Transformation of more fundamental aspects of the economy 
have proceeded much more slowly than did the reforms undertaken 
in 1990 and 1991. The most important feature of the longer-term 
transformation is the privatization of the means of production. The 
end of the communist system brought an immediate and dynamic 
growth in new privately owned businesses, most of which were small 
retailing, trade, and construction enterprises. In 1990 about 516,000 
new businesses were established, while 154,000 were liquidated, 
a net increase of 362,000. Another 100,000 small businesses for- 
merly owned by local government agencies were sold to private 
investors in the initial rush to privatization. By September 1991, 
an additional 1.4 million one-person businesses and 41,450 new 
companies had been registered since the beginning of the year. 
Overall, in 1990 and 1991 about 80 percent of Polish shops went 
into private hands, and over 40 percent of imports went through 
private traders. 

Legal and administrative preparations for privatization of state- 
owned enterprises took much longer than expected. The "small 
privatization" of shops, restaurants, and other service establish- 
ments was a relatively simple process, but privatization of large 
enterprises proved much more difficult. By October 1991, some 227 



138 



The Economy 



larger enterprises had been converted into stock exchange-listed 
companies, and twenty of them had been privatized by offering 
them for public or private sale. Some of these transactions involved 
foreign capital. To speed the process, the government of Prime 
Minister Jan Bielecki, which came to power in late 1990, had made 
capital vouchers available without charge to all adult citizens. The 
vouchers were to be exchangeable for shares in mutual investment 
funds. At first these funds were to be managed under contract with 
foreign and domestic management firms. Voucher holders would 
be allocated 27 percent of shares of the enterprises selected for "mass 
privatization" and would be able to purchase any 33 percent share 
of the privatized enterprises sold by auction. Because of their con- 
figuration, the vouchers were expected to give their holders effec- 
tive control of these enterprises. Various technical problems delayed 
implementation of this program, as did the change of government 
at the beginning of 1992. At that point, vouchers for fewer than 
ten major enterprises were being traded. 

Already in 1990, the private sector had emerged as the most dy- 
namic part of the economy. The economy's overall GDP declined 
in 1990 by 12 percent, but it increased by 17 percent in the pri- 
vate sector. Total industrial production dropped by 23 percent, 
but the private sector production increased by 8 percent. At the 
end of 1991, the private sector provided about 38 percent of em- 
ployment; it was responsible for 22.1 percent of total industrial 
production, 43.9 percent of construction output, 70 percent of re- 
tail sales, and 16.3 percent of transportation services. Surprising 
growth occurred in private foreign trade activity, which account- 
ed for 28 percent of foreign transactions in the first three quarters 
of 1991. 

By early 1992, some form of privatization had occurred in 17.4 
percent of state enterprises. At that point, plans called for conver- 
sion of half of Poland's state enterprises to private ownership by 
1995. The rate of privatization had already slowed in 1992, 
however, partly because of reduced government outlays and con- 
tinual alteration of program goals. Enterprises were restructured 
in several ways: medium-sized firms typically were liquidated, and 
large enterprises were transformed into stock companies and limited 
liability companies. 

Economic Policy Making in the 1990s 

The presidential election at the end of 1990 and the completely 
free parliamentary election one year later revealed widespread dis- 
satisfaction among the population about the hardships caused by 
the process of transformation, but not about its main direction. 



139 



Poland: A Country Study 

Campaigning politicians criticized the stabilization policy severe- 
ly and promised a better alternative to the approach taken by 
Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz. Election results, however, 
showed continued strong support for privatization and wide ac- 
ceptance of the principles of the stabilization program. The govern- 
ment of Prime Minister Jan Olszewski came to office in December 
1991 promising to ease the burden the austerity program had im- 
posed on society. A particularly thorny political issue was the threat 
that the communist-installed system of social services such as health 
care and pensions, to which Poles had become accustomed, would 
go unfunded at reformed government spending levels. Olszewski's 
proposals of higher spending were rejected by the Sejm (the lower 
chamber of the parliament), however, on the grounds that such 
spending would cause an excessive budgetary deficit whose effects 
would overshadow any revival of economic activity. Shortly there- 
after the IMF warned that a proposed return to agricultural subsi- 
dies and price supports would increase the deficit and jeopardize 
the financial aid package of US$2.5 billion that the IMF had offered 
on condition of economic reform. IMF disapproval of the budget 
would also have ended aid in reduction of the national debt (over 
half of which was to be forgiven by terms of a 1991 agreement) 
and cut off foreign credits. 

Because foreign funding was considered necessary to counter- 
act capital flight from Poland and finance the national deficit while 
encouraging private enterprise, the government revised its bud- 
get proposal. Its new austerity budget, containing a deficit of only 
5 percent of GDP, was approved by parliament in early 1992, and 
the IMF expressed approval as well. On a visit to the United States 
in spring 1992, Olszewski reassured the United States government, 
the IMF, and the World Bank (see Glossary) that his government 
remained determined to transform and stabilize the Polish economy. 

Whatever the form of the coalition government, in 1992 effec- 
tive political leadership was the most important requirement in deal- 
ing with the more intractable aspects of economic reform and 
balancing negative short-term effects with the long-term goals upon 
which most of Polish society still agreed. The Olszewski govern- 
ment did not pursue vigorously the expansion of its coalition or 
full- speed economic reform. Olszewski's fall provided an oppor- 
tunity for Hanna Suchocka, his successor, to reinvigorate the re- 
form program in the second half of 1992. 

Structure of the Economy 

Although Poland possessed abundant supplies of some natural 
resources, the structure and administration of the centrally planned 



140 



Coal vendor on a Krakow street 
Courtesy Sam and Sarah Stulberg 



Coal miner in the 
Andaluzja Mine, Silesia 
Courtesy Polish Information 
Agency, Warsaw 



system had long caused misallocation of those resources and of in- 
vestment funds among the economic sectors. In addition, the cutoff 
of critical industrial inputs from the Soviet Union required major 
restructuring and rebalancing of all sectors. 

Fuels and Energy 

Poland's fuel and energy profile is dominated by coal, the only 
fuel in abundant domestic supply. Because of lopsided and uneco- 
nomical dependence on this single fuel, the fuels and energy sec- 
tor of the economy was a primary target for reorganization and 
streamlining in the early 1990s. In 1989 production of coke and 
extraction and refining of gas and oil accounted for 4.9 percent of 
Poland's total industrial base. Electric power generation accounted 
for 2.9 percent. However, these statistics were downward biased 
by the very low, heavily subsidized prices of the products of those 
industries. Higher, market-established prices of fuels and electri- 
city were expected to induce more economical fuel consumption, 
as were modern fuel-saving technologies in industry, construction, 



141 



Poland: A Country Study 

and transportation and gradual elimination of the most heavily fuel- 
intensive industries. By 1991 official policy had recognized that mak- 
ing such changes was less expensive than continuing the cycle of 
higher energy demand and production characteristic of the cen- 
trally planned economy. 

Coal 

In 1992 coal continued to play a central role in the Polish econ- 
omy, both in support of domestic industry and as an export com- 
modity. In 1990 about 90 percent of the country's energy production 
was based on hard coal and lignite. The two largest mines extract- 
ed over six million tons each in 1991 , but the average mine produced 
between one million and three million tons. Compared with coal 
mines in Western Europe, Polish mining was quite inefficient be- 
cause of isolation from technical advances made in the 1980s and, 
more recently, lack of investment funds for modernization. 

Because the communist regimes ignored profitability in estab- 
lishing quantitative output targets, coal output was expanded ir- 
respective of costs, and inefficient mines were heavily subsidized. 
At the same time, the extensive type of mineral exploitation called 
for by central planning caused a very high ratio of waste (about 
24 percent of output) as well as heavy environmental damage. Un- 
der the new planning system, a lower annual output is expected, 
but production operations are to be justified by profitability. 

At the end of the 1980s, some eighty-four shaft mines and four 
large open-cast lignite mines were in operation. Plans for the 1990s 
call for closing many of those mines. In 1991 annual coal output 
declined from the 193 million tons mined in 1988 to 140 million 
tons, and output was expected to remain at the lower level in 1992. 
During the same period, extraction of lignite declined from 73 mil- 
lion tons to 69 million, with 70 million tons the maximum annual 
output expected for the next few years. In 1989 about 16 percent 
of Poland's coal and 19 percent of its coke were exported. In 1990 
these shares increased to 19 percent and 26.6 percent, respective- 
ly, because a recession reduced domestic demand for coal. 

The postcommunist governments abolished centralized alloca- 
tion of coal and partially liberalized prices. By 1992 a relatively 
free coal market had been created, and subsidies were gradually 
reduced. This process also abolished the central administrations 
for coal mining and for electricity generation that had ensured state 
monopoly of those industries and perpetuated wasteful resource 
management. The reform program made both coal mines and 
power generation plants autonomous state enterprises fully com- 
petitive among themselves. To offset the loss of subsidies, price 



142 



The Economy 



increases of as much as 13 percent were contemplated, although 
the planned rise of 5 percent had already aroused strong objec- 
tions from industrial customers. The 1991 economic restructuring 
program of the Bielecki government envisaged establishment of ten 
independent and competing coal-mining companies, several whole- 
salers, and one export agency. Following the World Bank's ad- 
vice, a holding company for lignite mines was also considered. 

By the end of 1991, however, the Polish coal industry was in 
serious economic trouble. Fifty-six of sixty-seven mines ended 1991 
showing losses, and only seven showed profits sufficient to cover 
all obligations. In 1991 government subsidies dropped from their 
1990 total of 9.1 billion zloty to 5.9 billion zloty, but individual 
mines still received as much as 2.2 billion. Liquidation, already 
accomplished at six mines by 1992, cost between 0.6 and 1.5 bil- 
lion zloty per mine, not counting the economic cost of added un- 
employment (coal mining in Poland is much more labor intensive 
than in the West). An alternative solution, combining individual 
mines into complexes, had been attempted in the 1970s efficiency 
campaign but did not have the expected impact. In mid- 1992, mines 
and power plants had large coal surpluses that seemingly could not 
be alleviated by domestic consumption. At that point, the dispari- 
ty between low domestic demand and continuing supply threatened 
to raise unemployment by forcing more mines to close. 

Oil and Gas 

After rising sharply in the early 1970s, domestic oil production 
dropped and remained at about 350,000 tons per year into the 1980s 
because no new deposits were discovered. Domestic oil had never 
accounted for more than 5 percent of total consumption, but even 
this figure had dropped sharply by 1980. Under these circum- 
stances, the Soviet Union supplied between 80 percent and 100 
percent of Poland's imported oil, with some purchases from the 
Middle East when market conditions permitted. Poland received 
Soviet oil through the Druzhba Pipeline, which remained the chief 
source of imported oil in early 1992. The line supplied the major 
refinery at Plock. Oil arriving by ship from other sources was 
processed at a refinery near Gdansk (see fig. 14). In 1992, however, 
the pattern of Polish oil imports changed markedly. Because the 
Druzhba Pipeline was considered subject to political pressure and 
delivery taxes by the countries through which it passed, and be- 
cause Russian crude oil was high in environmentally undesirable 
sulfur, Poland cut imports from that source from 63 percent in 1991 
to 36 percent in 1992. The gap was to be filled by North Sea (British 
and Norwegian) oil imports, which rose from 19.5 to 26 percent 



143 



Poland: A Country Study 

in 1991 , and by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Coun- 
tries (OPEC) imports, which rose from 17.5 to 38 percent in 1992. 
To accommodate more North Sea oil, the transloading capacity 
of the North Harbor facility at Gdansk was doubled in 1992. 

Domestic natural gas provided a much higher percentage of na- 
tional consumption than did domestic oil. Although pipeline im- 
ports of gas from the Soviet Union rose sharply in the 1970s and 
early 1980s, reaching 5.3 billion cubic meters in 1981, domestic 
output remained slightly ahead of that figure. Domestic natural 
gas exploration was pursued vigorously in the 1980s, but equip- 
ment shortages hampered the effort. By 1991, however, Polish ex- 
perts declared the country potentially self-sufficient in natural gas; 
in 1990 and 1991, large-scale agreements with United States firms 
brought about new exploration in Silesia and made possible ex- 
traction of gas from Poland's many intact coal seams. New domestic 
gas sources opened the prospect of reducing reliance on coal and 
saving the hard currency spent on the 7 billion cubic meters of gas 
imported (mostly from the former Soviet Union) in 1991. No 
natural gas was imported from the West in 1991, nor did plans 
for 1992 call for such imports. At the end of 1991, a new agree- 
ment with Russia maintained both oil and gas deliveries from that 
country at approximately their previous levels. (Some 5 million 
tons of oil were delivered from Russia in 1991 .) At the same time, 
plans called for linkage of Polish and German gas lines as early 
as 1993, making Poland's gas supply more flexible. 

Power Generation 

In 1989 the electric power generation industry comprised seventy 
enterprises. Between 1980 and 1991, the industry's power produc- 
tion increased from 122 billion kilowatt hours to 135 billion kilowatt 
hours. By 1990 a large proportion of obsolete or aging generation 
machines and equipment required replacement. Modernization was 
especially critical to achieve efficient utilization of fuels and to reduce 
transmission losses through the national power grid. A wide range 
of technical improvements and higher energy prices were expect- 
ed to reduce losses and waste in 1992, making possible a subse- 
quent reduction in annual power generation to 128 billion kilowatt 
hours. Estimates of energy price increases necessary to achieve con- 
servation ranged as high as five times the subsidized levels of the 
late 1980s. Meanwhile, obstacles to energy conservation included 
the lack of meters to measure consumption, widespread use of cen- 
tral heating without charges proportional to consumption, and the 
high cost of new generating equipment, such as boilers, needed 
to upgrade generation efficiency. 



144 



A 




Legnica 



Jelenia Gora 

JA/aftrzych 

*> ClJ * 






National capital 


(1 


Petroleum refining 


• 


Populated place 


* 


Shipbuilding 


w 


Ferrous and nonferrous 


Cu 


Copper 




mining and metallurgy 


PbZn 


Lead and zinc 




Machinery, metal goods, 
and building materials 

Chemicals 


<ZZ2> 


Coal 
Iron ore 




50 


100 Kilometers 




1 1 r— 

50 




100 Miles 



Chorzow 



K a town 

BielTko- Oswiec 
Biata 



Figure 14. Distribution of Heavy Industry and Mineral Resources, 1990 
146 



The Economy 



During the communist period, hydroelectric power stations were 
not expanded because of the easy availability of the lignite burned 
in conventional thermoelectric plants. All hydroelectric stations ex- 
isting in 1992 were built before World War II. Plans in the 1980s 
called for construction of three nuclear power stations. The first, 
at Zarnowiec in south-central Poland, was scheduled to open in 
1991 and be at full production in 1993. After long years of con- 
struction and controversy, however, doubts about the safety of the 
station's Soviet-made equipment (similar to that used at Cher- 
nobyl') caused the first postcommunist government to abandon the 
project. Some 86 percent of participants in a 1990 referendum voted 
against completion. A second station had been started near Klem- 
picz in west-central Poland, but work on it was stopped in 1989. 
The third station never passed the planning stage, and in 1992 
Poland remained without any nuclear power capacity. It had, how- 
ever, joined its Comecon partners in investing in large nuclear sta- 
tions in Ukraine, from which Poland received power in the 1980s. 

The World Bank's advice on restructuring Poland's power in- 
dustry included reorganization into four or five companies with 
seventeen regional subsidiaries responsible for power distribution. 
All these companies initially would be state owned but eventually 
would be privatized. 

Extractive and Manufacturing Industries 

The range of products manufactured in Polish plants increased 
greatly in the postwar years, mostly through construction of new 
facilities in the period of accelerated industrialization. By the 1980s, 
heavy industry produced processed metals (mainly iron, steel, zinc, 
lead, and copper) and derivative products; chemicals; a wide vari- 
ety of transportation equipment, including ships and motor vehi- 
cles; electrical and nonelectrical machines and equipment; and 
electronic and computer equipment. The most important light in- 
dustry was textiles. 

Under the central planning system, statistics on production by 
individual industries and on their relative shares in total industri- 
al production through the communist period were distorted by 
administrative price fixing and unequal distribution of industrial 
subsidies (see table 17, Appendix). In general, however, between 
1960 and 1989 the relative importance of food processing declined 
steadily while that of the engineering and chemical industries grew 
steadily. The share of light industry declined early in the period 
but then increased under the stimulus of expanded Soviet export 
markets. The relative importance of the metallurgical, mineral, and 
wood and paper industries remained basically unchanged. Within 



147 



Poland: A Country Study 



the engineering group, the machine building, transport equipment, 
and electrotechnical and electronic industries increased in relative 
importance between 1960 and 1989. 

The engineering and chemical industries received a considera- 
ble injection of Western technology, including patents and licenses, 
under the technology import program of the 1970s (see Reliance 
on Technology in the 1970s, this ch.). In the late 1980s and early 
1990s, however, economic crisis, recession, and postcommunist re- 
form measures brought a drastic decline in output in those indus- 
tries. For example, output of the artificial fertilizer industry dropped 
32 percent between 1989 and 1990, mostly because rising fertiliz- 
er prices reduced domestic demand. A sharper drop was prevent- 
ed by quadrupling fertilizer exports. In 1991 output of nitrogenous 
fertilizers remained stable, but output of phosphoric fertilizers again 
dropped sharply. 

Some existing manufacturing facilities could support expansion 
of production, but others required modernization before they could 
be exploited efficiently to meet Poland's new economic priorities. 
Other facilities offered no possibility of expansion or moderniza- 
tion and were simply closed. In the Polish steel industry, which 
was second only to that of the Soviet Union in Comecon, only two 
plants had been built between 1945 and 1982. The Lenin Iron and 
Steel Plant at Nowa Huta, the largest in the country, was built 
near Kielce in 1954 with aid from the Soviet Union. Although some 
plants were modernized in the intervening years, most of the prewar 
Polish steel plants featured low productivity, low-quality metal, and 
poor working conditions, as well as very high pollution levels. 

With the help of foreign experts, the Bielecki government un- 
dertook a number of sectoral studies. The objective was to draw 
attention to the existing obstacles to growth and to increase in- 
ternational competitiveness of industrial enterprises in various 
sectors. Four major restructuring programs were prepared in 
cooperation with United Nations experts. They included improv- 
ing the management and modernization of the agricultural machin- 
ery industry, restructuring the production of fertilizers, improving 
management and technology in the pharmaceutical industry, and 
increasing the degree of automation in various branches of in- 
dustry. 

Light Industry 

On behalf of the World Bank, United States experts assessed 
Polish light industry in early 1991. They found the critical differ- 
ence between Polish and West European manufacturing systems 
to be computerization; the high degree of computerization utilized 



148 



Hungarian beer produced at the Okocim Brewery 
Courtesy Polish Information Agency, Warsaw 

by the latter systems enabled them to use short production series 
and make quick design changes. In textiles, Polish machinery was 
geared to produce intermediate-quality yarn that could not be made 
into exportable products. Polish finishing machinery was also out- 
moded. Although textile enterprises had been privatized quite early, 
they nevertheless remained too labor-intensive and used materials 
inefficiently, according to the report. On the other hand, Polish 
combed woolens and linen products were rated as potentially com- 
petitive in the European market. 

Automotive Industry 

In 1992 the Polish automotive industry was expecting to modern- 
ize through a series of joint ventures with Western firms. In 1992 
Fiat Corporation, the pioneer of Western automobile production 
in Eastern Europe since 1973, invested in Polish production of a 
new model at its Bielsko-Biala plant. Fiat was to arrange for ex- 
port of a large part of the output of that model. Also in 1992, Gener- 
al Motors Europe, the European branch of the United States 
automotive giant, was expected to begin assembling cars in War- 
saw by agreement with the Warsaw-based Passenger Car Plant. 
Volvo of Sweden planned to produce buses, trucks, and tractors 



149 



Poland: A Country Study 

at a plant near Wroclaw following the signing of a joint venture 
agreement in early 1992. 

Construction Machinery 

The construction machinery industry, which expanded during 
the 1970s on the basis of Western licenses, traditionally exported 
a large proportion of its output to the Soviet Union, with which 
some joint ventures were established. Under license with Western 
firms, Polish machinery plants produced mobile cranes, heavy truck 
axles, hydraulic equipment, truck-mounted concrete mixers, and 
other construction machinery. In the 1980s, reduced Western in- 
vestments in Poland curtailed demand for these products. In the 
1990s, the highly centralized, bureaucratic construction machine 
industry was reorganized into a large number of small- and 
medium-sized private firms. The reorganization targeted expan- 
sion of the housing construction industry, which received high pri- 
ority in reform planning. The second goal of this reorganization 
was to revive demand for the relatively modern and sophisticated 
construction machines that the Polish industry was able to produce. 

Shipbuilding 

Polish shipbuilding expanded rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s, 
spurred by the Soviet drive to become a maritime superpower. In 
the 1980s, the industry included six shipyards, twenty-one equip- 
ment factories, and three research and development centers, al- 
together employing about 57,000 people. In that decade, Poland 
became the fifth largest producer of ships in the world, exporting 
most of its products to the Soviet Union. Some 1,000 plants all 
over the country supplied materials to the shipbuilding industry. 
At the end of the 1980s, however, the industry suffered greatly from 
drastic reduction in orders from the Soviet Union and other cus- 
tomers, the loss of government subsidies in the midst of produc- 
tion, and a rapid rise in domestic material costs for ships already 
contracted. Nevertheless, the shipbuilding firms were able to at- 
tract many Western licenses, and they retained a highly skilled labor 
force. If modernized and restructured, the industry had the potential 
to significantly accelerate its production of modern ships, includ- 
ing fishing vessels, factory ships, trawlers, car ferries, container 
vessels, roll on-roll off ships, and tankers. The well-equipped Gdynia 
Shipyard was capable of building very large bulk cargo ships, but 
it operated at only 30 percent of capacity in 1991 . Large new con- 
tracts were expected to more than double that level of production 
by 1994, however. In 1992 it seemed probable that the shipyard's 
very high debt would be eased by a two-step transition, first into 



150 



Polonez cars come off the assembly line at the Passenger 

Car Plant in Warsaw. 
Courtesy Polish Information Agency, Warsaw 

a partnership with the State Treasury and ultimately into a pri- 
vate enterprise. In 1991 the Ministry of Industry completed a 
restructuring program for the entire shipbuilding industry in cooper- 
ation with Western experts. 

Agriculture 

Of Poland's 18,727,000 hectares of agricultural land (about 60 
percent of the country's total area), 14,413,000 hectares were used 
for crop cultivation, 265,000 for orchards, and about 4,048,500 
for meadows and pastures in 1989. In most areas, soil and climat- 
ic conditions favored a mixed type of farming. In 1990 the most 
important crops were grains, of which the highest yields came from 
wheat, rye, barley, and oats. Other major crops were potatoes, 
sugar beets, fodder crops, flax, hops, tobacco, and fruits (see table 
18, Appendix). Cultivation of corn expanded during the 1980s but 
remained limited. The northern and east-central regions of the 
country mainly offered poorer sandy soils suitable for rye and pota- 
toes. The richer soils of the central and southern parts of the coun- 
try, excluding higher elevations, made those regions the centers 
of wheat, sugar beet, hops, and tobacco production. The more ac- 
cessible land at higher elevations was used to cultivate oats or was 



151 



Poland: A Country Study 

left as meadow and pastureland. In 1989 almost half of Poland's 
arable land was used for the cultivation of the four major grains; 
another 13 percent grew potatoes. All regions of Poland raised dairy 
cows, beef cattle, pigs, and poultry, and cultivated fruit, usually 
as an integral part of mixed farming. 

In 1989 Poland was the second largest producer of rye and pota- 
toes in the world. The latter were used as vegetables, fodder for 
pigs, and production of industrial starch and alcohol. The coun- 
try occupied sixth place in the world in sugar beet, milk, and pig 
production. The quantity and quality of agricultural land ensured 
self-sufficiency and considerable quantities of various agricultural 
products and processed foodstuffs available for export. In 1990 
Poland exported 26 percent of the bacon it produced, as well as 
63 percent of the ham, 16 percent of the tinned meat, 10 percent 
of the poultry, 17 percent of the sugar, and 67 percent of the frozen 
fruits and vegetables. 

Organization under State Planning 

Beginning with decollectivization in 1956, Poland was the only 
member of Comecon where the private sector predominated in 
agriculture. The state maintained indirect control, however, through 
the state agencies that distributed needed input materials and pur- 
chased agricultural produce. Compulsory delivery quotas were 
maintained for farms until the beginning of the 1970s. The state 
also retained significant influence on the process of cultivation, re- 
strictions on the size of farms, and limitations on the buying and 
selling of land. Until the beginning of the 1980s, the allocation sys- 
tem for fertilizers, machines, building materials, fuels, and other 
inputs discriminated severely against private farmers. As a result 
of these policies, private farms remained inefficiently small and 
labor-intensive. 

Private and State Farms 

In 1987 about 2.7 million private farms were in operation. About 
57 percent of them were smaller than five hectares. Of the remaining 
farms, 25 percent were between five and ten hectares and 11 per- 
cent were between ten and fifteen hectares. Only 7 percent of pri- 
vate farms were larger than fifteen hectares. Whereas the majority 
of the private farms were below optimum size, the majority of state 
farms were excessively large. Only 12 percent of the latter farms 
were below 200 hectares, and 60 percent were larger than 1,000 
hectares. 

In 1989 the private sector cultivated 76.2 percent of arable land 
and provided 79 percent of gross agricultural production. State 



152 



Construction at the 
Szczecin Shipyard 
Courtesy Polish Information 
Agency, Warsaw 




farms, the main institutional form in state ownership, cultivated 
18.8 percent of the total arable land and produced 17.0 percent 
of gross output. Cooperative farms, the dominant form of state 
agricultural organization in other East European economies, were 
not important in Poland. In 1989 they cultivated only 3.8 percent 
of arable land and contributed 3.9 percent of gross production. 

In the 1980s, grain yields and meat output per hectare were 
higher in the socialist sector than in the private sector. An impor- 
tant factor in this difference was the more intensive use of fertiliz- 
ers in state farms. On the other hand, the milk yield per cow was 
higher in the private sector. From the standpoint of overall per- 
formance, the private sector was less material- and capital-intensive, 
and gross production per hectare and the value of product per unit 
of cost were higher in that sector. Besides being more efficient, pri- 
vate farms were also more flexible in adjusting production to ob- 
tain a higher product value. 

Postcommunist Restructuring 

Because of the predominance of private farms in communist 
Poland, privatization of agriculture was not a major necessity during 
the reform period, as it was in the other postcommunist countries. 
Excessively large state farms were to be split into more efficient 
units and sold; some state farms would be converted into modern 
agrobusinesses operating as limited stock companies; and a certain 



153 



Poland: A Country Study 

number were to be retained as state experimental farms. In all cases, 
however, rapid modernization and improvement in agrotechnolo- 
gy were urgent requirements. 

The streamlining of agriculture faced serious obstacles in the early 
1990s, notably because of the existing agrarian structure. Private 
farm size had to increase to provide farmers a satisfactory level of 
income and investment. Drastic reduction in the agricultural labor 
force also was needed. Because unemployment outside agriculture 
rose in 1991 and 1992, however, only gradual reductions were pos- 
sible. A satisfactory social safety net and retraining programs for 
displaced agricultural workers were prerequisites for further reduc- 
tions in labor. Experts estimated that unemployment on former 
state farms would reach 70 to 80 percent, meaning about 400,000 
lost jobs, once the farms were privatized and streamlined. 

Considerable investment is needed to provide adequate agricul- 
tural infrastructure, including road improvement, telecommuni- 
cations, water supply, housing, and amenities. Especially important 
is establishment of a well-developed, competitive network of sup- 
pliers of materials and equipment necessary for modern agricul- 
tural production. Equally necessary are commercial firms to 
purchase agricultural products and provide transportation and 
storage facilities. In particular, expansion and modernization of 
the food-processing industry are necessary to strengthen and stabi- 
lize demand for agricultural products. The first postcommunist 
governments prepared agricultural modernization programs, and 
some financial help was obtained from the World Bank and Western 
governments for this purpose. Modernization was expected to re- 
quire several decades, however. 

By 1992 nearly all the 3,000 remaining state farms had substantial 
unpaid bank loans and other liabilities. For this reason, and be- 
cause the government had not devised usable privatization plans at 
that point, the Farm Ownership Agency of the State Treasury was 
authorized to take over all the state farms in 1992. The agency was 
authorized to lease state farm lands to either Polish or foreign rent- 
ers, as a temporary measure to ensure continued productivity. 

Fishing and Forestry 

The fishing and forestry industries were important producers 
for both domestic consumption and the export market during the 
communist era. For both industries, however, the resource base 
had begun to shrink noticeably by the end of the 1980s. 

Fishing 

The fresh-water fishing industry is concentrated in the numerous 



154 




- 3^— — ? s|*» 



Clean room at Unitra-Cemi Electronics Plant, Warsaw 
Courtesy Polish Information Agency, Warsaw 

lakes of northern Poland. Fishing fleets also operate along the 
528-kilometer Baltic coast and in the North Sea and the North At- 
lantic. The deep-sea fleet, developed in the 1970s to serve the new 
official emphasis on fish as a cheap source of protein, had grown 
to 101 trawler-factory ships and ten supply and service vessels by 
1982. Besides fishing in the North Atlantic, Polish fleets fished off 
Africa, South America, Alaska, Australia, and New Zealand. Ac- 
tivity in the more distant fisheries involved much higher expenses, 
however, especially for fuel. In the 1980s, the Baltic fishery, which 
provided about 25 percent of the total catch, was plagued by short- 
ages of supplies and storage facilities. At the same time, pollution 
in the lakes caused fresh- water catches to decline rapidly. In 1990 
Poland exported about 123,000 tons of fish and fish products. 

Forestry 

Large forested areas are located in the western, northeastern, 
and southeastern parts of Poland, but the only remaining stands 
of old forest are in the northeast. Conifers dominate in the far north, 
the northeast, and at higher elevations, and deciduous species 
dominate elsewhere. Under the communist regimes, 82 percent 
of forested land was state-owned, with the remainder held by in- 
dividual farmers or groups of farmers. The 8,679,000 hectares of 



155 



Poland: A Country Study 

forest supported total commercial lumber production of 22,675 cubic 
decameters in 1989. Already in the early 1980s, however, cutting 
rates exceeded replacement rates, and heavy demand for wood 
products prevented meaningful reduction of exploitation. A long- 
term afforestation program was initiated in the communist era to 
increase total forest cover to 30 percent of Poland's land surface. 
This increase would amount to slightly more than 1 percent more 
than the cover remaining in the 1980s. Poland's forests support 
the export of significant quantities of lumber, paper, and wood fur- 
niture. 

Transportation and Communications 

In 1989 Poland had 26,644 kilometers of railroads, including 
11,016 adapted for electric traction. The country also had 159,000 
kilometers of hard- surface public roads, 6,846 kilometers of oil and 
gas pipelines, and 3,997 kilometers of regulated inland waterways 
(see fig. 15). Polish State Railroads, a state monopoly, ran 1,920 
electric locomotives, 2,567 diesel locomotives, and 198 steam 
locomotives, 136,128 freight cars, and 5,530 passenger cars. The 
main intercity lines were well serviced, and trains generally ran 
on schedule. In the postcommunist reform era, fares and freight 
rates were gradually increased and subsidies reduced accordingly. 

In 1989 the Polish merchant fleet included 249 freight ships total- 
ing 4 million deadweight tons and nine ferries totaling 18,000 dead- 
weight tons. Regular international lines reached London, Asian 
ports, Australia, and some African and Latin American countries. 
The inland fleet included sixty-nine passenger ships, twenty-six tug- 
boats, 387 motor units, 325 motor barges, and 1,055 barges. The 
major Baltic ports are Szczecin, Gdansk, Gdynia, and Swin- 
oujscie, and the major inland ports are Gliwice on the Gliwice Canal 
(Kanal Gliwice), Wroclaw on the Oder River, and Warsaw on the 
Vistula River. 

The national airline, Polish Airlines (Polskie Linie Lotnicze, com- 
monly known as LOT), flew forty-six Soviet-made airplanes in 
1989. LOT purchased its first Boeing airliner in 1990 at the be- 
ginning of a modernization program that included replacement of 
a large part of the fleet, construction of a modern airport, Ok^cie 
International, in Warsaw by contract with a German firm, and 
updating kitchens and cargo facilities. By 1992 the airline's trans- 
atlantic lines were served by Western-made jets, although LOT 
did not expect to meet overall Western standards of air travel for 
several years. In 1989 only eighty of Poland's 140 operating air- 
ports had permanent- surface runways. Five airports offered runways 



156 




Figure 15. Transportation System, 1992 
158 



The Economy 



longer than 3,600 meters. The largest airports are at Warsaw, 
Rzeszow, Krakow, Koszalin, Shipsk, Zielona Gora, Gdansk, Kato- 
wice, Poznari, and Bydgoszcz. 

National telecommunications networks were neglected badly dur- 
ing the communist era. In 1989 Poland had only 5,039,000 tele- 
phones, of which 544,000 were in rural areas. Beginning in 1990, 
however, several major contracts with Western firms promised sub- 
stantial improvement. 

The national radio and television broadcast system was entirely 
state-owned and state-controlled until 1990. In the restructured 
telecommunications program developed in 1991 and 1992, part of 
the system remained under state control. But the new system also 
licensed private broadcast stations, whose programming received 
minimal state oversight. The first private television station began 
broadcasting in Wroclaw in 1990. At that time, the state-run Po- 
lish Radio and Television Network was broadcasting over four radio 
and two television channels. Color television was broadcast through 
the Secam system, and the Eutelsat satellite system provided a hook- 
up with Western Europe. About 10 million television sets and 11.1 
million radio receivers were registered in 1988, and 3,500 licenses 
for satellite television receivers were current. Some eighty-two tel- 
evision transmitters were in operation in 1990. Radio programs 
were broadcast in English, Russian, German, Lithuanian, Finnish, 
and French as well as Polish. 

Banking and Finance 

In the reform programs of the early 1990s, major restructuring 
of Poland's financial infrastructure was a top priority in order to 
achieve more efficient movement of money through the domestic 
economy and to provide a secure environment for the foreign in- 
vestment that was expected to carry Poland through its postcom- 
munist economic slump. 

The State Banking System 

A highly concentrated state banking monopoly was a typical fea- 
ture of East European economies in the communist period. In 
Poland the monopoly was composed of the National Bank of Poland 
(Narodowy Bank Polski — NBP), which had replaced the prewar 
Western-style Bank of Poland in 1945; the Commercial Bank (Bank 
Handlowy — BH), which had a monopoly in financing foreign trade; 
the Polish Savings Office, which controlled transactions with pri- 
vate international transfers; and about 1,600 small regional and 
specialized cooperative banks that jointly formed the Bank of Food 
Economy. To encourage private savings, a specialized savings bank, 



159 



SWEDEN 



(Ba(tic Sea 



GERMANY 



LITHUANIA 



RUSSIA 



/ BELARUS 



f / 



\ \ v. . 



CZECHOSLOVAKIA V 




t necessarily authoritative f 



s .r- ' i 
U. I. 

HUNGARY V. 



UKRAINE 



Figure 75. Transportation System, 1992 
158 



Poland: A Country Study 



the General Savings Office, was established in 1987 by detaching 
designated departments from the NBP. In 1988 nine state-owned 
commercial banks were formed from regional branches of the NBP, 
and a state Export Development Bank was established. 

Legislation was introduced in 1989 to allow private individuals, 
both Poles and foreigners, to form banks as limited stock compa- 
nies. Between 1989 and 1991, a total of seventy licenses was is- 
sued to private banks, including seven banks funded by foreign 
capital, two cooperative banks, and three branches of foreign banks. 
In October 1991, privatization of the Export Development Bank 
began, and the nine state commercial banks (which until that time 
still operated as they had under the old NBP) were transformed 
into limited stock companies. The State Treasury owned and oper- 
ated the banks for an intermediate period while they prepared for 
privatization. 

Banking Reform, 1990-92 

A fundamental reorganization of the banking sector took place 
between 1990 and 1992. The NBP lost all its central planning func- 
tions, including holding the accounts of state enterprises, making 
transfers among them, crediting their operations, and exercising 
financial control of their activities. The NBP thus became only a 
central bank, and state enterprises competed with other businesses 
for the scarce credits available from commercial banks. In its new 
form, the NBP exercised a considerable degree of autonomy in 
monetary policy and performed the same functions as the central 
banks in West European countries or the Federal Reserve System 
in the United States. 

Nevertheless, the entire Polish banking system remained ineffi- 
cient in the early 1990s because of backward banking technology 
and a very serious shortage of trained personnel in all branches. 
Considerable technical and financial aid from the World Bank, the 
IMF, and the central banks of Western countries was expected to 
improve the situation eventually. 

Insurance and Securities Reform 

In July 1990, the insurance system was reorganized. Abolished 
were the monopoly State Insurance Company, which had been 
responsible for all domestic insurance, and the Insurance and Re- 
insurance Company, which had been responsible for all foreign 
transactions. Domestic and foreign-owned private limited stock and 
mutual insurance companies were then allowed to begin operat- 
ing. At the same time, procedures were introduced to maintain 
adequate financial reserves and legal protection for people and assets 



160 




A Boeing 767 of LOT at Okecie International Airport, Warsaw 
Courtesy Polish Information Agency, Warsaw 

insured. At the end of 1991, twenty-two insurance companies were 
operating in Poland, six of which were foreign-owned. 

In early 1991, important legislation was introduced to regulate 
securities transactions and establish a stock exchange in Warsaw. 
At the same time, a securities commission was formed for consumer 
protection. A year later, the shares of eleven Polish companies were 
being traded weekly on the new exchange. Restructuring the finan- 
cial market not only was necessary for increasing the overall effi- 
ciency of the economy and accelerating privatization but also was 
a precondition for the rapid influx of Western capital critical to 
economic development. 

New Financial Institutions 

Several specialized financial institutions were established with 
direct or indirect help from the Polish government, international 
organizations, and foreign experts to facilitate economic restruc- 
turing. They include the Agency for Industrial Development, the 
Polish Development Bank, the Export Finance Insurance Corpora- 
tion, the Enterprise Consulting Foundation, the Employment Fund, 
and a growing number of consulting firms. These institutions are ex- 
pected to provide credit guarantees, help to establish new businesses, 



161 



Poland: A Country Study 



purchase a certain quantity of shares of the companies being con- 
verted to private enterprise, and facilitate leasing, financial restruc- 
turing, and bankruptcy processes. Some of the new institutions 
received designated funds from international financial organiza- 
tions. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD — see Glossary) established a Joint Investment Fund in 
cooperation with the Polish Development Bank. 

Foreign Loans and Money Supply 

In April 1991, representatives of the seventeen major West Eu- 
ropean creditor governments collectively known as the Paris Club 
(see Glossary) agreed to a two-phase, 50 percent reduction of 
Poland's debt on government loans. The United States made a simi- 
lar reduction of 70 percent. Terms for servicing of the debt were 
rearranged, with payments to escalate gradually from US$0.5 bil- 
lion in 1992-93 to US$1 .5 billion later in the decade. Negotiations 
with Western commercial banks, the so-called London Club (see 
Glossary), continued in 1992. The hard currency debt was reduced 
from US$48.5 billion at the end of 1990 to US$44.3 billion in Au- 
gust 1991, partly because of the debt relief of US$1.6 billion ef- 
fected by the United States and partly as the revaluation of the 
dollar against other Western currencies reduced the debt in those 
currencies. 

In 1991 the total money supply in Poland, counting both zlotys 
and convertible currency, increased by 83.9 trillion zlotys. Of this 
amount, over 90 percent belonged to private individuals or pri- 
vate enterprises, and about 6 percent belonged to state enterprises. 
The increase in the money supply came mainly from higher bank 
debts owed by economic units and the government. A midyear al- 
teration of the exchange rate between the zloty and the United States 
dollar also played a major role. Foreign currency held in Polish 
bank accounts increased by 13.2 percent in 1991 because more ac- 
counts were opened in 1991 . Although money in personal savings 
accounts grew by 250 percent in 1991, money held by enterprises 
in bank accounts grew by only 12.4 percent in the same period. 
Estimated total foreign currency resources declined by over 3 per- 
cent in 1991 to US$5.3 billion. 

Foreign Trade 

In the early 1990s, internal and external economic conditions 
forced a major reappraisal of Poland's export and import policies. 
The once-profitable export markets of the Soviet Union were a 
much less reliable source of income after that empire disintegrated 



162 



The Economy 



and hard currency became the predominant medium of exchange 
among its former members. In this situation, increased trade with 
much more demanding Western partners became the primary goal 
of Polish trade policy. 

The Foreign Trade Mechanism 

Centrally planned economies typically minimized trade with free- 
trade markets because their central bureaucratic systems could not 
adjust quickly to changing situations in foreign markets. The high 
degree of self-sufficiency that was a declared economic objective 
of Comecon made trade with the West a difficult undertaking for 
an economy such as Poland's. On the other hand, the basically 
bilateral barter agreements that characterized trade within Come- 
con often had made expansion of trade within the organization 
problematic. 

State monopoly of foreign trade was an integral part of centrally 
planned economic systems. Even after some decentralization of this 
field in Poland during the 1980s, the Ministry of Foreign Economic 
Relations maintained direct or indirect control of all foreign trade 
activities. Originally, trading activities in the communist system 
were conducted exclusively by the specialized foreign trade organi- 
zations (FTOs), which isolated domestic producers of exportables 
and domestic buyers of imported goods from the world market. 
Then, in the late 1980s, some state and cooperative production en- 
terprises received licenses from the Ministry of Foreign Economic 
Relations to become directly involved in foreign trade, and by 1988 
the number of economic units authorized to conduct foreign trade 
had nearly tripled. Nonetheless, many enterprises still preferred 
the risk-free, conventional approach to foreign trade through an 
FTO, relying on guaranteed Comecon markets and avoiding mar- 
keting efforts and quality control requirements. 

Prior to 1990, the Polish foreign trade system included the fol- 
lowing elements: a required license or concession to conduct any 
foreign transactions; allocation of quotas by planners for the im- 
port and export of most basic raw materials and intermediate goods; 
state allocation and control of exchange and transfer of most for- 
eign currencies; an arbitrary rate of currency exchange lacking all 
relation to real economic conditions; and artificial leveling of domes- 
tic and foreign prices by transfers within a special account of the 
state budget. Even among Comecon countries, Poland's foreign 
trade had particularly low value. Its share of total world exports, 
0.6 percent in 1985, dropped to 0.4 percent in 1989. The share 
of imports dropped even lower, from 0.5 to 0.3 percent, in the same 
period. 



163 



Poland: A Country Study 



In early 1990, Poland entered a painful process of massive trans- 
formation for which reintegration into the world economy was a 
primary objective. The first postcommunist government disman- 
tled the existing foreign trade mechanism and replaced it with a 
mechanism compatible with an open market economy. This change 
eliminated license and concession requirements for the conduct of 
foreign trade activities, eliminated quotas except in trade with the 
Soviet Union, introduced internal convertibility of the zloty and 
free exchange of foreign currencies, and accepted the rate of ex- 
change as the main instrument of adjustment of exports and im- 
ports, supported by a liberal tariff system. 

Postcommunist Policy Adjustments 

In early 1990, the Mazowiecki government planned to main- 
tain Poland's high export volume to the Soviet Union for an in- 
definite period. The goal of this plan was to ensure a long-term 
position for Poland in that important market and to protect domestic 
industry from a further decline in production and increased unem- 
ployment. Subsequently, however, an export limit became necessary 
to avoid accumulating an excessive surplus of useless transferable 
rubles. In 1992, after the Soviet Union split into a number of in- 
dependent states, the Polish government had no indication whether 
existing balances would ever be exchanged into convertible cur- 
rencies, or under what conditions that might happen. 

In December 1991, Poland reached agreement on associate mem- 
bership in the European Community (EC). Having taken this 
intermediate step, the Polish government set the goal of full EC 
membership by the year 2000. Among the provisions of associate 
membership were gradual removal of EC tariffs and quotas on Po- 
lish food exports; immediate removal of EC tariffs on most indus- 
trial goods imported from Poland and full membership for Poland 
in the EC free trade area for industrial goods in 1999; EC finan- 
cial aid to restructure the Polish economy; and agreements on labor 
transfer, rights of settlement, cultural cooperation, and other is- 
sues. The agreement, which required ratification by the Polish 
government, all twelve member nations of the EC, and the Euro- 
pean Parliament, went into interim operation as those bodies con- 
sidered its merits. Both houses of the Polish parliament ratified the 
agreement in July 1992. 

The End of the Soviet Era 

In 1990 Poland's trade balance with the Soviet Union was almost 
4.4 billion transferable rubles. At that point, some Polish export- 
ers took the risk of continuing their exports to traditional Soviet 



164 



Poland: A Country Study 



markets, hoping that they would eventually be paid either by the 
importers in the Soviet Union, who were very anxious to get Po- 
lish goods, or by the Polish government. In the first quarter of 1991 , 
the value of these exports was about US$130 million. Only about 
US$20 million was received, however, because the Soviet govern- 
ment was prepared to pay only for imported foodstuffs, which 
received highest priority in its import policy. The Soviet govern- 
ment refused to pay the bill for Soviet importers who had purchased 
machines, pharmaceuticals, electronics, textiles, and clothing from 
Poland. 

The sudden collapse of Comecon in 1990 increased short-term 
obstacles and accelerated changes in the geographic direction of 
trade. The share of Poland's trade occupied by the Comecon group 
declined to 22.3 percent in 1990 and 14.4 percent in 1991 . On the 
export side, its share declined to 21 .4 and 9.8 in the respective years. 

The Role of Currency Exchange 

In this situation, expanded exports to the West provided the only 
alternative for the many enterprises whose survival depended on 
foreign trade. The government's stabilization policy had an im- 
pact that promised expansion of exports to hard-currency markets. 
In 1991 drastic limitation of domestic demand, devaluation of the 
zloty by 32 percent, and liberalization of access to foreign trade 
by private entrepreneurs resulted in significant expansion of ex- 
port earnings in convertible currencies. In 1990 the volume of hard- 
currency exports increased by 40.9 percent to over US$12 billion, 
while hard-currency imports increased by 6.3 percent, securing a 
positive trade balance of US$2.6 billion. 

The level of exports earning hard currency in 1990 was particu- 
larly impressive in comparison with the generally sluggish growth 
of that category in the late 1980s. In the last years of the communist 
era, fuel exports declined steadily, and metallurgical exports de- 
creased in three of the last five communist years. Construction work 
in countries paying in hard currency declined in the first three years 
of the period, whereas exports from the wood and paper, engineer- 
ing, and chemical industries behaved unevenly. 

In 1990, by contrast, hard-currency exports increased in most 
sectors of the economy. The largest increases in that category were 
achieved in agricultural, metallurgical, and chemical products. In 
general, the share of manufactured products in Poland's export 
mix declined sharply with the sudden shift away from Comecon 
trade. In 1990 the largest major categories of manufactured ex- 
ports were, respectively, machines and transport equipment, mis- 
cellaneous manufactured goods, and chemicals; their share of total 



166 



The Economy 



exports was 42.4 percent, compared with 67.3 percent for the same 
categories in 1985. Growth in exports of food, raw materials, and 
fuels accounted for the difference. 

Although the share of engineering products among exports 
declined, that group was the most important single earner of hard 
currency in 1990, followed by metallurgical, chemical, and food 
products. In 1992 all those industries possessed considerable ca- 
pacity to expand their productivity, given appropriate investment 
in modernization and efficient marketing. However, both modern- 
ization and marketing depended heavily on cooperation with 
Western firms. Despite the remarkable increase in hard-currency 
exports in 1990, their overall impact on the national economy was 
limited by the strong effect of reduced transferable-ruble exports 
on the priority sectors. In 1990 Polish light industry led the gener- 
al decline in ruble exports. 

At the beginning of 1991, however, the growth rate of hard- 
currency exports declined, and imports increased very rapidly. In- 
flation remained high, and the advantage created by the 1990 
devaluation slowly eroded. Another devaluation, this time 17 per- 
cent, was effected in May 1991. At the same time, the zloty was 
pegged to a combination of hard currencies instead of to the dollar 
alone. In October the fixed exchange rate was replaced by an ad- 
justable rate that would be devalued automatically by 1.8 percent 
every month as a partial hedge against inflation. The final import 
figure for 1991 was 87.4 percent higher than that for 1990. In 1991 
exports in convertible currencies were a little over US$14.6 bil- 
lion and imports were nearly US$15.5 billion, creating a hard- 
currency trade deficit of about US$900 million. 

Figures for the first five months of 1992 showed a reversal of 
the previous year's imbalance. The hard-currency trade surplus 
of US$340 million reported for that period was attributed to a com- 
bination of commodity turnover and cancellation of interest pay- 
ments in Poland's debt reduction agreement with the Paris Club. 

For years under the old system, Poland dispersed small amounts 
of its export and import trade to a large number of non-Comecon 
countries on all continents. Experts considered such dispersion a 
policy weakness because marginal suppliers and buyers usually trade 
at less favorable terms than high- volume partners, making the for- 
mer expendable in hard times. This factor became even more 
important in the first postcommunist years; in 1990 Poland's fif- 
teen top import customers absorbed only 81.3 percent of exports, 
while the fifteen top suppliers contributed 86.2 percent of Polish im- 
ports. Poland's traditional partners in the former Soviet Union and 
Germany (before and after their respective realignments) retained 



167 



Poland: A Country Study 

disproportionately high shares in both categories in 1990 (see ta- 
ble 18, Appendix). 

Foreign Investment 

By the end of 1991, Poland had obtained US$2.5 billion from 
the World Bank and other international financial organizations and 
US$3.5 billion in bilateral credits and guarantees of credit from 
Western governments. In 1992, however, the limited absorptive 
capacity of the country still restricted the amounts of foreign cash 
and credit that could be used. Only US$428 million was utilized 
in 1990, about US$800 million in 1991 . A significant increase was 
expected in 1992. 

Poland's net balance of payments deficit, calculated as the differ- 
ence between credits used and the amount paid to service the nation- 
al debt, was more than US$1.3 billion in 1989, US$312 million 
in 1990, and US$449 million in 1991. In the long run, even in- 
vestment credits and continued growth of exports could not main- 
tain a balance of payments equilibrium without a substantial inflow 
of direct foreign investments. 

Cooperative enterprises with foreign firms also offered access to 
advanced technology, better export trade, improved management 
and training, and attractive job opportunities for younger mem- 
bers of the work force. The first year of postcommunist rule brought 
an initial surge of investment in which permits for formation of 
foreign companies more than doubled. A number of United States, 
British, French, Swiss, Swedish, Dutch, and Japanese firms start- 
ed Polish enterprises. Significantly, the share of permits issued to 
German firms dropped from 60 percent in 1989 to 40 percent in 

1990, and that figure was expected to remain at about 30 percent 
after 1991. 

Despite the adoption of very liberal investment legislation in the 
middle of 1991, however, the year did not bring the anticipated 
investment increases. In 1991 and 1992, major inhibiting factors 
were real and perceived political instability, conflicting and slow 
changes in economic policy, a faulty system for taxation of foreign 
enterprises, and a steep decline in the GNP. In spite of the increase 
in registered foreign direct investment projects between 1989 and 

1991, the registered foreign capital involved in these projects was 
only US$353 million in 1990 and US$670 million in 1991. The 
actual investment amounts were not more than 40 percent of those 
amounts. At the end of 1991, some 4,800 partnerships operated 
with foreign participation. Of these, 43 percent were in industry, 
24 percent in trade, and 6.6 percent in agriculture; about two-thirds 
of foreign ventures were concentrated in the economic centers of 



168 



The Economy 



Warsaw, Poznari, Gdansk, Szczecin, Katowice, and Lodz — meaning 
that foreign investment was not benefiting many of Poland's less 
prosperous regions. Altogether, the foreign partnerships generat- 
ed less than 1 percent of Poland's total national income in 1991. 

Economic Prospects 

Poland was the first of the East European Comecon nations to 
initiate a move from a centrally planned economy to a Western- 
type market economy. In many ways, however, the economic cri- 
sis that the postcommunist governments inherited in Poland was 
more severe than that in other countries undergoing the same tran- 
sition. The early stages of Poland's transformation proved more 
difficult, more painful, and took longer than expected. Never- 
theless, the first three postcommunist years brought a number of 
important achievements: elimination of shortages in the domestic 
consumers' market; considerable reduction in the rate of inflation; 
the quick dismantling of the mechanism of the command econo- 
my; marketization and liberalization of economic life; internal con- 
vertibility of currency; a very rapid "small privatization" and a 
more uneven "large privatization"; the creation of some of the legal 
and institutional framework fundamental to a market economy; 
and an impressive expansion in hard-currency exports. The banking 
system had moved decisively away from the previous state monopoly 
system, but the seventy commercial banks operating in 1992 still did 
not constitute a full Western-style commercial system. The stock 
market established in 1990 awaited the impetus of faster privati- 
zation to expand beyond its initial modest scale. Overall, by 1992 
these initial steps had built a rather sound base for further progress 
in the near term and provided reason for guarded optimism over 
the long term. 

Geographic location, the cause of many tragic events in Poland's 
history, provides a potentially major advantage in the new context 
of a united Europe. Good commercial relations with neighbors 
on both sides — Germany, Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia — promise 
rapid recovery from the end of the Comecon era. The political 
aspects of economic policy making have been problematic in the 
early reform years, as factionalism has hindered government imple- 
mentation of needed legislation. The impact of politics is especially 
noticeable in the privatization process, which was slowed dramati- 
cally by three changes in the privatization ministry between 1989 
and 1992 and by attendant bickering over methodology and pri- 
orities. Nevertheless, possessing relatively favorable human and 
natural resources, and having taken some of the basic steps to repair 
the distortions of centralized management, the Polish economy 



169 



Poland: A Country Study 

showed signs in 1992 of becoming an open modern industrial sys- 
tem that could ensure a reasonable standard of living for its popu- 
lation. 

* * * 

A number of English-language sources provide an overview of 
the Polish economy before and after the fall of the central plan- 
ning system. Doing Business with Eastern Europe: Poland, a publica- 
tion of Business International, outlines trade conditions in the 1980s 
from the viewpoint of Western business. Dariusz Rosati's Poland: 
Economic Reform and Policy in the 1980s and Poland: The Economy in 
the 1980s, edited by Roger Clarke, describe the reforms attempted 
by the last communist regimes in response to the failure of the sys- 
tem and the social upheavals that resulted. Poland: Politics, Economics, 
and Society by George Kolankiewicz and Paul G. Lewis describes 
economic conditions in the 1980s as they interacted with social and 
political changes. Several journal articles written by Zbigniew 
Fallenbuchl between 1 990 and 1 992 describe in detail the mechanics 
of Poland's postcommunist economic transition, including trade 
policy, banking and finance, and privatization issues. The statistical 
yearbook published annually by the Central Statistical Office in 
Warsaw is the fundamental source of economic statistics; an ab- 
breviated version is available in English. (For further information 
and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



170 



Chapter 4. Government and Politics 




Twelfth-century sword, the "Szczerbiec, " used in the coronation of Polish kings 



THE UNEXPECTED SPEED with which communist governance 
ended in Poland put the country's anticommunist opposition in 
charge of the search for appropriate new political institutions. The 
subsequent hectic experiment in democracy yielded mixed results 
between 1989 and 1992, when the restored Republic of Poland was 
still attempting to find its political bearings. In 1989 round table 
talks between the opposition and the communist government 
spawned a flurry of legislation and constitutional amendments that 
merged democratic reforms with institutions and laws inherited from 
four decades of communist rule. 

At that point, the young democracy's centers of power had not 
yet been able to define their span of control and their relationship 
to one another. Institutional ambiguity was exacerbated by the out- 
come of the long-awaited parliamentary elections of October 1991 , 
which seated twenty-nine political parties in the powerful lower 
house, the Sejm. To form a coalition government from such diverse 
parties, of which none held more than 14 percent of the total seats, 
was a daunting task in itself. The greater challenge, however, lay 
in creating a political culture of negotiation and compromise that 
would make stable democracy feasible over the long term. 

A key element in the development of any Western- style democra- 
cy is the unrestricted dissemination of accurate information and 
diverse opinion. In this respect, Poland underwent a less abrupt 
transition than other postcommunist states. A prolific, indepen- 
dent press had evolved from modest beginnings in the early 1970s, 
surviving the setback of martial law, and expanding its activities 
as government censorship diminished after the mid-1980s. Follow- 
ing the Round Table Agreement of early 1989, the press gave voice 
to an ever- widening spectrum of political and social opinion. But 
the end of generous state subsidies in favor of a profit- and com- 
petition-based system bankrupted hundreds of Polish publishing 
enterprises. Radio and television adjusted less rapidly to the changed 
political environment and remained under closer government con- 
trol than the print media. 

Despite a constantly changing constellation of political parties 
and coalitions that produced five prime ministers in three years, 
Warsaw maintained a consistent and successful foreign policy during 
the transition period. By mid- 1992, Poland had achieved many of 
its long-range policy goals, including sovereignty over its foreign 
affairs; a Russian commitment for complete withdrawal of Soviet/ 



173 



Poland: A Country Study 

Russian combat forces from Polish territory; bilateral friendship 
treaties with most of its neighbors; German recognition of the per- 
manent Oder-Neisse border; associate membership in the Euro- 
pean Community (EC); and observer status in the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO). At that point, Warsaw already had 
traveled a considerable distance on its "path back to Europe." The 
West responded to Poland's democratizing and marketizing reforms 
by granting trade concessions, debt relief, and a range of econom- 
ic and technical assistance. 

Political Setting 

In August 1980, faced with an increasingly severe economic crisis 
and social unrest that had been building throughout the 1970s, the 
communist government reluctantly conceded legal status to an in- 
dependent labor federation, Solidarity (Solidarnosc). After monopo- 
lizing power for thirty-five years without genuine sanction from 
Polish society, the communist Polish United Workers' Party (Polska 
Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza — PZPR) found itself in conten- 
tion with an alternative source of political power that had a valid 
claim to represent the country's working people. Under the threat 
of general strikes and facing economic and political chaos, the re- 
gime grudgingly reached a series of limited compromises with 
Solidarity in 1980 and early 1981. 

After the government's initial concessions, however, Solidarity 
militants insisted on substantially broader concessions. In response, 
PZPR hard-liners used the memories of the Soviet Union's vio- 
lent reaction to Czechoslovakia's moderate political reforms in 1968 
to justify the imposition of martial law in December 1981. Solidarity 
was declared illegal. General Wojciech Jaruzelski, earlier that year 
named prime minister and then first secretary of the PZPR, ap- 
pointed trusted military men to key government positions and de- 
emphasized communist ideology. Through the rest of the decade, 
the government sought in vain to recover a degree of legitimacy 
with the people and to overcome the country's severe economic 
problems. The overtures of the Jaruzelski government failed, 
however, to win the support of the Polish people. In a key 1987 
national referendum, voters refused to support the government's 
package of painful reforms needed to halt the economic slide. Even- 
tually, the government came to realize that improvement of the 
economic situation was not possible without the explicit support 
of the Solidarity opposition. At that point, the government had no 
choice but to enter into negotiations with Solidarity. 



174 



Government and Politics 

The Round Table Agreement 

When the government convened round table talks with the op- 
position in early 1989, it was prepared to make certain concessions, 
including the legalization of Solidarity. It had no intention, however, 
of granting Solidarity the status of an equal partner. The fifty- seven 
negotiators at the talks included representatives from the ruling 
PZPR, Solidarity, and various PZPR-sanctioned quasi-parties and 
mass organizations, such as the United Peasant Party, the Demo- 
cratic Party, the Christian Social Union, the Association of Polish 
Catholics, and the All-Polish Alliance of Trade Unions (see PZPR 
and Successor Parties, this ch.). The talks were organized into three 
working groups, which examined the economy, social policy, and 
the status of trade unions. A spirit of cooperation and compromise 
characterized the two-month negotiations. 

The document signed by the participants on April 6, 1989, laid 
the groundwork for a pluralistic society that in theory would enjoy 
freedom of association, freedom of speech, an independent 
judiciary, and independent trade unions. The Round Table Agree- 
ment legalized Solidarity as a labor union; restored the pre- World 
War II Senate as the upper house of parliament and granted it veto 
powers over the decisions of the Sejm; promised partially free Sejm 
elections; replaced the State Council with the new executive office 
of president of Poland; and called for the creation of an indepen- 
dent judiciary of tenured judges appointed by the president from 
a list submitted by the parliament (see Government Structure, this 
ch.). 

Although election to the Senate was to be completely free and 
open, the PZPR and its traditionally subservient partners, the Unit- 
ed Peasant Party and the Democratic Party, were assured of 60 
percent of the seats in the 460-member Sejm; and religious organi- 
zations long associated with the regime were promised 5 percent 
of the seats. The remaining 161 seats were open to opposition and 
independent candidates who had obtained at least 3,000 nominat- 
ing signatures. The agreement allowed a national slate of incum- 
bents, including Prime Minister Mieczyslaw Rakowski, to run 
unopposed and be reelected with a simple majority of the ballots 
cast. But because voters exercised their option not to endorse can- 
didates and crossed names off the ballot, only two of thirty-five 
unopposed national candidates received a majority. At the same 
time, only three of the government's candidates for contested seats 
received 50 percent of the votes cast. Consequently, a second round 
of voting was necessary to fill the seats originally reserved for the 
PZPR coalition. 



175 



Poland: A Country Study 

With only days to organize, Solidarity waged an intense and ef- 
fective national campaign. A network of ad hoc citizens' commit- 
tees posted lists of Solidarity candidates, mobilized supporters, and 
in June executed an electoral coup. Solidarity candidates won all 
161 Sejm seats open to them and ninety-nine of 100 seats in the 
Senate. This impressive electoral performance soon convinced the 
PZPR-allied parties in the Sejm to side with Solidarity and to form 
the first postcommunist coalition government in Eastern Europe. 

The erosion of the old PZPR-led coalition was evident in the 
July 19 parliamentary voting for the new office of president of 
Poland. Thirty-one members of the coalition refused to support 
General Jaruzelski, the unopposed candidate for the post. The 
Solidarity leadership, however, believed that Jaruzelski was the best 
candidate for the presidency. Seemingly, he could best ensure that 
the PZPR would honor the concessions it had made in the Round 
Table Agreement. Also, he was the candidate least likely to alarm 
Moscow. Through careful polling, Solidarity was able to engineer 
a one-vote margin of victory for Jaruzelski. 

The Mazowiecki Government 

Although Jaruzelski had won the presidency, Solidarity was not 
willing to concede the leadership of the new government to the 
PZPR. Jaruzelski' s choice for the position of prime minister, Gener- 
al Czeslaw Kiszczak, had won respect for his flexibility as the 
primary government representative during the round table talks. 
Kiszczak received the necessary simple majority of Sejm seats by 
the narrowest of margins. But repeated failures to form a coalition 
government forced the PZPR to face the reality of its diminished 
power. After consulting with Moscow, Jaruzelski nominated 
Tadeusz Mazowiecki, a respected intellectual and long-time Solidar- 
ity adviser, to become the first noncommunist Polish prime minister 
since 1944. 

The coalition government gave representation to all of the 
primary political forces extant in August 1989. To secure Mazo- 
wiecki' s nomination, Solidarity leader Lech Walesa had assured 
Jaruzelski that the PZPR would continue to control the key min- 
istries of national defense and internal affairs. While entrusting 
fourteen ministries to Solidarity, Mazowiecki allocated four min- 
istries to the United Peasant Party and three to the Democratic 
Party. A tone of reconciliation characterized the new adminis- 
tration. Determined not to engage in an anticommunist witch 
hunt, Mazowiecki pursued an evolutionary program of democratic 
reform. 



176 






Lech Walesa, Solidarity 
leader and first post- 
communist president 
Courtesy Committee 
in Support of Solidarity, 
New York 



General Wojciech Jaruzelski, 
last communist 
leader of Poland 
Courtesy United Press 
International 



Popular Election of a President 

Although Walesa had handpicked Mazowiecki to be prime min- 
ister and had played a key role in persuading the population to 
grant the young government a grace period, tensions between 
the two men emerged in early 1990. Perhaps regretting his deci- 
on not to seek the office of prime minister himself, Walesa began 
to criticize the Mazowiecki government. After the formal dissolu- 
tion of the PZPR in January 1990, Walesa argued that the time 
had come to discard the concessions from the Round Table Agree- 
ment that prolonged the influence of the old regime (see Political 
Parties, this ch.). Sensing the depth of public discontent over fall- 
ing living standards and rising unemployment, he leveled ever 
harsher criticism at Mazowiecki. In return, the Mazowiecki circle 
accused Walesa of destructive sloganeering. The acrimonious re- 
lations between the two camps led to the emergence of the first 



177 



Poland: A Country Study 



post-Solidarity political groupings. The pro- Walesa Center Alli- 
ance (Porozumienie Centrum) called for accelerating the pace of 
reform and purging former communist appointees as rapidly as 
possible. The Mazowiecki forces set up the Citizens' Movement 
for Democratic Action. 

The split grew more serious following President Jaruzelski's an- 
nouncement that he would retire before the expiration of his term 
in 1995. With the support of both noncommunist factions, parlia- 
ment enacted legislation to make possible the direct election of the 
president. Both Walesa and Mazowiecki ran for the office in the 
fall of 1990, together with four other candidates of widely varying 
political associations and experience. 

The campaign was bitter and divisive. Despite the heated rhetoric 
of the campaign, the candidates differed relatively little on sub- 
stantive issues. Their disagreements stemmed mostly from the 
different leadership styles of the men. Wounded by attacks on his 
intelligence, Walesa revealed a streak of anti-Semitism with remarks 
about the Jewish roots of the ruling clique in Warsaw (see Ethnic 
Groups, ch. 2). Meanwhile, falling living standards increased 
voters' disenchantment with the government's economic program. 
An uninspiring public speaker and a poor campaign organizer, 
Mazowiecki could not rally support during the short time remain- 
ing before the election. 

Many voters apathetic toward the two front runners were at- 
tracted to the iconoclastic Stanislaw Tyminski, a wealthy expatri- 
ate with no political experience. Tyminski 's campaign made 
effective use of his outsider status. His wild accusations against the 
leading candidates found a receptive audience. Tyminski asserted 
that given a chance, he could make all Poles rich. 

The election results were a stunning rejection of the Mazowiecki 
government. With only 18 percent of the total vote, Mazowiecki 
finished third behind Walesa (40 percent) and the maverick Tymin- 
ski (23 percent). The candidate of the Social Democracy of the 
Republic of Poland (SdRP), successor to the PZPR, received more 
than 9 percent of the vote, demonstrating the residual strength of 
the old party elite. 

A runoff election between Tyminski and Walesa was necessitat- 
ed by all candidates' failure to achieve a majority. Walesa sought 
the votes of Mazowiecki' s supporters, promising to continue the 
basic course of economic transformation initiated by Mazowiecki 's 
minister of finance, Leszek Balcerowicz (see Marketization and 
Stabilization, ch. 3). But the ad hominem attacks of the campaign 
made immediate reconciliation impossible. With the reluctant sup- 
port of the Mazowiecki faction and the implicit endorsement of 



178 



Government and Politics 



the Roman Catholic Church, Walesa won the runoff with almost 
75 percent of the vote to become Poland's first popularly elected 
president. Although Walesa had prevailed, the bitter campaign had 
badly tarnished his image and worsened the splits in the old Solidar- 
ity coalition. 

The Bielecki Government 

Upon taking office in December 1990, Walesa offered the post 
of prime minister to Jan Olszewski, a respected attorney who had 
defended prominent dissidents in the 1960s and 1970s and who 
had a long association with Solidarity. When Olszewski rejected 
the offer because of Walesa's insistence on controlling key cabinet 
positions, Walesa offered the position to Jan Bielecki, the leader 
of a small reformist party, the Liberal-Democratic Congress. Be- 
lieving that this would be a short-lived interim government, Bie- 
lecki accepted and conceded to Walesa the right to oversee cabinet 
selection. The new government retained several key members of 
the Mazowiecki cabinet. Leszek Balcerowicz continued to coor- 
dinate economic policy, and the widely respected Krzysztof Skubi- 
szewski remained in charge of foreign affairs. 

By his involvement in forming the Bielecki government, Walesa 
expanded the ill-defined powers of the presidency. His resolve to 
be an activist president caused alarm in the parliament, intellec- 
tual circles, and the press. Some people accused Walesa of har- 
boring ambitions to attain the powers of Jozef Pilsudski, the 
strong-willed leader in the interwar years (see Interwar Poland, 
ch. 1). Although he vigorously denied such charges, Walesa's 
popularity plunged in early 1991 as his prime minister failed to 
deliver the promised acceleration of economic reform and improve- 
ment of government services. During his tenure, Bielecki made 
little headway in privatizing large state enterprises and dismantling 
the managerial bureaucracy left by the communists. 

By the summer of 1991, factionalism and the obstructionism of 
remaining communist legislators prevented the Sejm from enact- 
ing major legislation sponsored by the Bielecki government. There- 
fore, with Walesa's support, Bielecki asked the Sejm to revise the 
constitution and grant the prime minister authority to issue eco- 
nomic decrees with the force of law. The proposal was defeated, 
and the gridlock between executive and legislative branches con- 
tinued. 

Walesa grew increasingly resentful of the political, institutional, 
and legal constraints placed on his office. He felt especially encum- 
bered by the composition of the Sejm, which opposed much of 
his economic agenda. Therefore, Walesa called for parliamentary 



179 



Poland: A Country Study 

elections in the spring of 1991 to install a fully democratic Sejm. 
Because his timetable could not be met, a long power struggle be- 
tween the Sejm and the president over parliamentary election legis- 
lation ensued, and Walesa sustained a major political defeat. The 
president had favored an election law that would end the fragmen- 
tation of the Sejm by fostering large parties and coalitions. However, 
the parties formerly allied with the communists joined other anti- 
Walesa factions in the Sejm in enacting a system that allocated seats 
in strict proportion to candidates' percentages of the total vote in 
thirty-seven multimember electoral districts. Such a system, Walesa 
rightly feared, would enable dozens of minor and regional parties to 
win seats in the parliament by receiving only a few thousand votes. 

The Parliamentary Elections of October 1991 

Over Walesa's veto, the Sejm version of the parliamentary elec- 
tion bill became law in mid- 1991. Elections were scheduled for the 
following October. During the months before the election, Walesa 
refused to endorse any of the numerous post-Solidarity parties and 
other parties that fielded slates of candidates. He remained non- 
committal, distancing himself even from the Center Alliance, which 
had been his core of support during the presidential election. In 
fact, Walesa defended the Bielecki government from attacks by the 
Center Alliance. The president participated in the parliamentary 
campaign only by urging voters to defeat former communist can- 
didates who had joined other parties after the dissolution of the 
PZPR. 

As Walesa had predicted, the first election held under the new 
election law produced a badly fragmented parliament. Only 43 per- 
cent of the electorate voted in the first totally free parliamentary 
elections since 1928. Twenty-nine parties won seats in the new Sejm, 
but none received more than 14 percent of the vote. Both extremes 
of the political spectrum fared well, while the moderate post- 
Solidarity parties failed to win the expected majority of seats. This 
outcome promised a Sejm no less obstructionist than the one it 
replaced, and prospects for a coalition agreeing on a new prime 
minister were dim. At least five parties were needed to form a coa- 
lition holding a majority of seats in the Sejm. The Social Democracy 
of the Republic of Poland was essentially an ineligible party be- 
cause of its roots in the PZPR. Meanwhile, the grave split of the 
two leading Solidarity factions made them incompatible in any coa- 
lition. This situation left a center-right coalition as the only prac- 
tical option. Walesa's initial nominee for prime minister failed, 
however, because he lacked support from the Center Alliance and 
Bielecki' s party, the Liberal-Democratic Congress. 



180 



Government and Politics 



The Olszewski Government 

After five weeks of struggle, Walesa reluctantly acceded to a Sejm 
coalition of five center-right parties by nominating Jan Olszewski 
of the Center Alliance as prime minister. Relations between the 
two men had been strained in early 1991 by Olszewski's initial 
refusal of the position of prime minister and by Walesa's fear that 
Olszewski would abandon the Balcerowicz economic reforms. At 
that point, Walesa had even threatened to assume the duties of 
prime minister himself. 

Although supported by a fragile, unlikely coalition that includ- 
ed the Confederation for an Independent Poland and the Liberal- 
Democratic Congress, Olszewski was confirmed as prime minister. 
Within days, however, the coalition began to disintegrate. Although 
the Liberal-Democratic Congress had been promised a decisive role 
in setting economic policy, the futility of that promise soon drove 
the party out of the coalition. Next to leave was the ultranation- 
alist Confederation for an Independent Poland, which was alienated 
when it was denied control of the Ministry of National Defense 
(see Confederation for an Independent Poland, this ch.). A frus- 
trated Olszewski submitted his resignation only two weeks after 
his nomination. 

The Sejm rejected Olszewski's resignation, sensing that no other 
nominee was likely to form a more viable government at that time. 
The prime minister survived mainly because of unexpected sup- 
port from a party outside the coalition, the Polish Peasant Party, 
which won several key ministerial appointments in the political bar- 
gain. Nevertheless, dissension within the coalition continued to 
weaken and isolate the prime minister at the same time that the 
two largest parties in the Sejm — Mazowiecki's Democratic Union 
and the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland, heir to the 
PZPR — openly opposed the government. 

Although condemning the previous two governments for the deep 
recession and budget crisis, Olszewski had very little room to 
maneuver and continued the austerity policies initiated by those 
governments. Far from easing the pain of economic transition, Ol- 
szewski was forced to impose steep energy and transportation price 
increases. Government spending could not be increased without 
jeopardizing crucial credit arrangements with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF — see Glossary). 

A critical vote in the Sejm in March 1992 rejected the govern- 
ment's economic program outline and revealed the untenable po- 
sition of the prime minister. The program, constructed by the head 
of the Office of Central Planning, Jerzy Eysymontt, called for 



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Poland: A Country Study 

continued sacrifice, reduced government spending, and higher 
prices for traditionally subsidized goods and services. This program 
clearly conflicted with the government's promises for a rapid break- 
through and a reversal of Balcerowicz's austerity policies (see Eco- 
nomic Policy Making in the 1990s, ch. 3). 

Efforts to bring the major opposition parties into the governing 
coalition began in 1992, but preliminary talks produced nothing 
and alienated coalition members who had not been consulted in 
advance. Some members objected to all compromises with the 
Liberal-Democratic Congress and the Democratic Union. One such 
member was the Christian National Union, a strong supporter of 
Olszewski, which dominated his cabinet and advanced a Roman 
Catholic agenda incompatible with the secular views of the two op- 
position parties. The most problematic issue upon which the par- 
ties disagreed was the state's position on abortion. 

The Sejm's rejection of his economic program convinced Ol- 
szewski to push harder for expansion of his coalition. In the days 
following the vote, Olszewski personally offered economic com- 
promise to Mazowiecki in exchange for support by the Democrat- 
ic Union. Mazowiecki insisted on a dominant role in economic 
policy and inclusion of his allied parties in a restructured govern- 
ment. Several weeks of amicable negotiations failed to enlarge Ol- 
szewski's coalition. 

Even as he sought potential coalition partners and proposed eco- 
nomic compromises, Olszewski alienated the opposition and, most 
importantly, President Walesa, by his partisan leadership style and 
personnel policies at all levels of administration. Two members of 
Olszewski's cabinet defied presidential prerogatives in highly pub- 
licized, politically destabilizing incidents. First, Minister of Na- 
tional Defense Jan Parys enraged Walesa by failing to consult him 
in making key personnel decisions, a failure that led to dismissal 
of Parys for making public accusations that members of the presi- 
dent' s circle planned a coup. Then the circulation of an unsub- 
stantiated list of sixty-two current and former government officials 
alleged to have collaborated with the communist secret police caused 
a major upheaval. Walesa charged that the list threatened the sta- 
bility of the state and required the dismissal of the Olszewski govern- 
ment. The Sejm then voted Olszewski out of office in June 1992 
by the substantial margin of 273 to 119 votes. 

Olszewski and his cabinet did not leave office quietly. The out- 
going government launched unprecedented personal attacks on 
Walesa, accusing him of presiding over the recommunization of 
Poland. Walesa replied that Olszewski had issued orders to place 



182 



Government and Politics 



on alert security forces in Warsaw, including the presidential guard, 
as a prelude to a coup d'etat. 

The Pawlak Interlude 

In June Walesa nominated Waldemar Pawlak, the thirty-two- 
year-old leader of the Polish Peasant Party, as Olszewski's replace- 
ment. The Sejm approved the nomination by a vote of 261 to 149. 
To calm the highly charged atmosphere in Warsaw and the per- 
sistent rumors of coup plots, the new prime minister immediately 
replaced ministers implicated in circulation of the controversial list. 
Despite Pawlak' s reputation as a reasonable and competent politi- 
cian, he could not surmount his membership in a party tainted 
by past accommodation to the communists; he was unable to as- 
semble a cabinet acceptable to the splintered Sejm. The first prime 
minister without Solidarity connections since the Round Table 
Agreement, Pawlak failed to win the support of any major party 
linked to Solidarity. When talks with the major opposition parties 
broke down a month after his appointment, Pawlak asked Walesa 
to relieve him of the mission of forming a new government. 

The Suchocka Government 

Once again frustrated by an uncooperative Sejm, Walesa threat- 
ened to assume the duties of prime minister and form his own cabi- 
net unless a governing coalition were assembled within twenty-four 
hours. In July two emerging coalitions in the Sejm (a four-party 
Christian and peasant block and the existing Little Coalition formed 
around the Democratic Union) surprised most observers by reach- 
ing agreement on the candidacy of Hanna Suchocka of the 
Democratic Union and on the allocation of cabinet positions. 
Despite misgivings, Walesa approved the cabinet with the warn- 
ing that if Suchocka failed, he would assume the duties of chief 
executive in a French-style presidential government. 

A relatively unknown political figure, Suchocka was acceptable 
to other parties that felt personal antipathy toward the more promi- 
nent leaders of the Democratic Union. To strengthen support for 
the new government, two deputy prime minister positions were 
created, one for economic affairs and one for politics. These posts 
went to members of the Christian National Union and the Party 
of Christian Democrats, respectively. Drawing heavily on the ex- 
perience of the first three Solidarity governments, Suchocka' s cabi- 
net included such well-known figures as Jacek Kurori and Janusz 
Onyszkiewicz (minister of national defense) of the Democratic 
Union, Bielecki of the Liberal-Democratic Congress, Eysymontt 
of the Polish Economic Program, and independent Krzysztof 



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Poland: A Country Study 



Skubiszewski (^minister of foreign affairs). Members of the Little 
Coalition received eleven ministerial posts, most of which were con- 
cerned with economic policv; the Christian National Union received 
five cabinet positions, ensuring it a prominent role in social policy 
issues such as abortion. Noticeably outside the coalition were the 
Center Alliance, the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland, 
and the Confederation for an Independent Poland, all of which 
found their political fortunes declining in mid- 1992. 

The Constitution 

Although significantly amended after the Round Table Agree- 
ment of April 1989. much of the constitution of 1952 remained 
in effect in mid- 1992 ( see The Round Table Agreement, this ch.). 
The symbolic target date of Mav 3. 1992. for adopting a new con- 
stitution proved unrealistic in light of Poland's political climate. 
That date would have commemorated the two-hundredth anniver- 
sary of the enactment of Poland's first written constitution, the 
Ustawa Rzadowa of Mav 3. 1791 — a widely hailed document intel- 
lectually rooted in the philosophy of the Enlightenment. But in 1990 
and 1991. a new constitution was impossible because the Round 
Table Agreement had allowed the communists continued predomi- 
nance in the Sejm and because of growing factionalism within 
Solidarity, the most powerful partv. Even after free parliamentary 
elections in October 1991. however, political instability precluded 
the adoption of a new constitution in the near term. 

The Constitution of 1952 

With the adoption of the 1952 document, which replicated much 
of the Soviet Union's 1936 constitution, the Republic of Poland 
was renamed the Polish People's Republic, and the crown sym- 
bolizing national independence was removed from the country's 
flag. The constitution declared that power derived from the work- 
ing people, who bv universal suffrage and the secret ballot elected 
their representatives in the Sejm and the regional and local peo- 
ple's councils. Like its Soviet counterpart, the 1952 Polish consti- 
tution listed in exhaustive detail the basic rights and responsibilities 
of the population. All citizens, regardless of nationality, race, 
religion, sex. level of education, or social status, were guaranteed 
work, leisure, education, and health care. The constitution promised 
freedom of religion, speech, the press, assembly, and association, 
and it guaranteed inviolability of the person, the home, and per- 
sonal correspondence. As in the Soviet Union, however, the idealis- 
tic Polish constitution did not deliver the promised individual rights 
and liberties. 



184 



Striking coal miners 
in Katowice District, 
November 1981 
Courtesy Committee 
in Support of Solidarity, 
New York 




Instead, the constitution of 1952 provided a facade of legitima- 
cy, behind which the PZPR concentrated real political power in 
its central party organs, particularly the Political Bureau, usually 
referred to as the Politburo, and the Secretariat. The document's 
ambiguous language concerning establishment of a state appara- 
tus enabled the PZPR to bend the constitution to suit its purposes. 
The traditional tripartite separation of powers among governmental 
branches was abandoned. The constitution allowed the PZPR to 
control the state apparatus "in the interests of the working peo- 
ple. " As a result, all levels of government were staffed with PZPR- 
approved personnel, and government in fact functioned as the 
party's administrative, subordinate partner. 

Between 1952 and 1973, the PZPR-dominated Sejm approved 
ten constitutional amendments concerning the organization and 
function of central and local government bodies. In 1976, after four 
years of work by a Sejm constitutional commission, roughly one- 
third of the original ninety-one articles were amended. The new 
version described Poland as a socialist state, presumably signify- 
ing advancement from its earlier status as a people's democracy. 
For the first time, the constitution specifically mentioned the PZPR, 
which was accorded special status as the "guiding political force 
of society in building socialism." The document also recognized 
the Soviet Union as the liberator of Poland from fascism and as 
the innovator of the socialist state. More importantly, the 1976 



185 



Poland: A Country Study 

amendments committed Poland to a foreign policy of friendly re- 
lations with the Soviet Union and its other socialist neighbors. These 
provisions, which in effect surrendered Polish national sovereignty, 
provoked such widespread protest by the intelligentsia and the Ro- 
man Catholic hierarchy that the government was forced to recast 
the amendments in less controversial terms (see The Intelligent- 
sia; Religion, ch. 2). 

In the decade preceding the Round Table Agreement, the PZPR 
endorsed a number of amendments to the 1952 constitution in a 
vain attempt to gain legitimacy with the disgruntled population. 
In the spirit of the Gdansk Agreement of August 1980, which recog- 
nized workers' rights to establish free trade unions, the constitu- 
tion was amended in October 1980. The amendments of that time 
promised to reduce PZPR influence over the Sejm. For that pur- 
pose, the Supreme Control Chamber (Najwyzsza Izba Kontroli — 
NIK — chief agency for oversight of the government's economic and 
administrative activities) was transferred from the Council of 
Ministers to the Sejm. In December 1981, the imposition of mar- 
tial law temporarily halted the erosion of the party's constitution- 
al authority. But in March 1982, the Jaruzelski regime resumed 
its effort to appease the public by again amending the constitution. 

The March 1982 amendments provided for the creation of two 
independent entities, the Constitutional Tribunal and the State 
Tribunal, which had the effect of reestablishing the traditional Polish 
constitutional principle of government by rule of law. The 1976 
amendments had placed adjudication of the constitutionality of sta- 
tutes with the Council of State (chief executive organ of the na- 
tion). Although the authority of the Constitutional Tribunal was 
strictly limited, beginning in 1982 that body issued a number of 
important decisions forcing the repeal of questionable regulations. 
The State Tribunal was established to adjudicate abuses of power 
by government officials. Although legally prevented from review- 
ing the activities of Sejm deputies, the State Tribunal represented 
yet another major step in the evolution of the democratic concept 
of government by the consent of the governed. 

Shortly before the official lifting of martial law in July 1983, the 
Sejm enacted additional constitutional changes that held the promise 
of political pluralism. For the first time, the United Peasant Party 
and the Democratic Party officially were recognized as legitimate 
political parties, existing independently from the PZPR. The 
amendments also tacitly sanctioned the political activities of church 
organizations by stressing that public good can derive from "so- 
cietal organizations." 



186 



Government and Politics 



Another important step toward meaningful constitutional guaran- 
tees in a civil society was the July 1987 decision to establish the 
Office of the Commissioner for Citizens' Rights as a people's om- 
budsman. The office provided a mechanism for citizens to file 
grievances against government organs for violations of constitu- 
tionally guaranteed civil rights. Receiving more than 50,000 peti- 
tions in its first year, the office immediately proved to be more than 
a symbolic concession. 

Constitutional Revisions after April 1989 

The Round Table Agreement brought a number of amendments 
that substantially altered the 1952 constitution. The so-called April 
Amendments resurrected the traditional Polish constitutional con- 
cept of separation of powers. The legislative branch would again 
be bicameral after four decades of a single, 460-member Sejm. The 
new body included a freely elected 100-member Senate and retained 
the 460-member Sejm as its lower chamber. Power would be dis- 
tributed among the houses of parliament and the newly established 
Office of the President, which was to assume many of the execu- 
tive powers previously held by the Council of State. The April 
Amendments provided for election of the president by the two 
houses of parliament. 

In December 1989, the new parliament made several addition- 
al, highly symbolic amendments to the 1952 constitution to rid the 
document of Marxist terminology. The PZPR lost its special sta- 
tus when its identification as the political guiding force in Polish 
society was deleted from the constitution. The hated words "peo- 
ple's republic" would be discarded and the state's official name 
would be restored to the prewar "Republic of Poland." Article 
2 was revised to read ' ' Supreme authority in the Republic of Poland 
is vested in the People," amending the Marxist phrase "the working 
people." The amendments of December 1989 also wrote into law 
the equality of all forms of property ownership, the essential first 
step in establishing a market economy. 

Aware that piecemeal revision of the Stalinist 1952 constitution 
would not meet the needs of a democratic Polish society, in De- 
cember 1989 the Sejm created a Constitutional Commission to write 
a fully democratic document untainted by association with Poland's 
communist era. The next year, the National Assembly (the com- 
bined Sejm and Senate) prescribed the procedure by which the draft 
would be enacted. The document would require approval by a two- 
thirds vote of both assembly houses in joint session, followed by 
a national referendum. Theoretically, this procedure would bolster 



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Poland: A Country Study 

the constitution's legitimacy against doubts created by the dubi- 
ous political credentials of some of its authors. 

Chaired by one of the Solidarity movement's most brilliant in- 
tellectuals, Bronislaw Geremek, the Sejm Constitutional Commis- 
sion faced serious obstacles from the outset. The legitimacy of the 
Sejm itself was at issue because the Round Table Agreement had 
allowed Solidarity to contest only 35 percent of the Sejm seats. 
Claiming that its open election in 1989 made it more representa- 
tive of the popular will, the Senate condemned the Sejm Constitu- 
tional Commission and began working on its own version of a new 
constitution. In reality, however the Senate was not an accurate 
cross section of Polish society because it lacked representatives from 
the peasants and the political left. Subsequent efforts to form a joint 
Sejm-Senate constitutional commission proved futile. 

After his victory in the December 1990 presidential election, 
Walesa cast further doubt on the commission's activity by challeng- 
ing the credentials of the existing Sejm. Nevertheless, the commis- 
sion continued its work and presented a fairly complete draft 
constitution by the spring of 1991 . The draft was based on the two 
series of amendments passed in 1989. It also borrowed heavily from 
various Western constitutions, most notably the constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). The draft was soon 
discarded, however, because of the Sejm's undemocratic constit- 
uency; for the same reason, the commission as such ceased to ex- 
ist in 1991. 

In the first half of 1992, attention shifted to the so-called Little 
Constitution, a document that used much of the 1991 draft in 
redefining the relationship between the legislative and executive 
branches of government and clarifying the division of power be- 
tween the president and the prime minister. The Little Constitu- 
tion was to be a compromise that would solidify as many democratic 
institutions as possible before all constitutional controversies could 
be resolved. Nevertheless, the new document would supersede all 
but a few provisions of the 1952 constitution and provide the basis 
for a full constitution when remaining points of dispute could be 
resolved. Its drafts retained the statement that Poland was a 
democratic state of law guided by principles of social justice. Agen- 
cies such as the Constitutional Tribunal, the State Tribunal, and 
the Office of the Commissioner for Citizens Rights were also re- 
tained (see Judicial System, this ch.). 

Government Structure 

The three years following the Round Table Agreement of 1989 
were a period of dramatic but uneven change in the governmental 



188 



Government and Politics 



structure of the Republic of Poland. The Round Table Agreement 
itself moved Poland decisively away from a Soviet-style unitary hi- 
erarchy in which the formal government was merely a bureaucra- 
cy to implement decisions made by the extraconstitutional organs 
of the PZPR. The Round Table Agreement created a tripartite 
structure in which power was distributed among the executive, legis- 
lative, and judicial branches. By mid- 1992, the Polish government 
had evolved into a presidential and parliamentary democracy with 
an increasingly independent judiciary. The adoption of the Little 
Constitution promised to resolve ambiguities in the executive powers 
of the president and the prime minister and to clarify the scope 
of control of the bicameral National Assembly (see Constitutional 
Revisions after April 1989, this ch.). 

Presidency 

The presidency was established by the Round Table Agreement 
to replace the communist-era Council of State as the primary ex- 
ecutive organ of government. According to the agreement, the presi- 
dent was to be elected by the National Assembly to a term of six 
years. Although not the head of government (that function was per- 
formed by the prime minister), the president was empowered to 
veto legislation and had control of the armed forces. The negotia- 
tors of the Round Table Agreement clearly crafted the presidency 
with the expectation that General Jaruzelski would be its first in- 
cumbent. A Jaruzelski presidency would have ensured PZPR com- 
pliance with the concessions the party had made in the agreement. 
Moreover, Jaruzelski was expected to be effective in protecting the 
new political arrangements from Soviet interference. After Solidarity 
succeeded in forming a noncommunist coalition government in 
mid-1989, however, Jaruzelski lost most of his powers, and the 
presidency became a largely ceremonial office. The office changed 
drastically when Walesa became Poland's first popularly elected 
president in late 1990 (see Political Setting, this chapter). 

A constitutional amendment in the spring of 1990 provided for 
direct popular election of the president to a five-year term with a 
limit of one reelection. Any Polish citizen at least thirty-five years 
of age was eligible to appear on the ballot after obtaining 100,000 
nominating signatures. 

If accused of violating the constitution and Polish law, the presi- 
dent could be indicted before the State Tribunal if two-thirds of 
the National Assembly so voted. Upon indictment, the president 
would be relieved temporarily of the duties of office. A guilty ver- 
dict from the State Tribunal would bring expulsion from office. 
The presidency also could be vacated because of physical unfitness 



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Poland: A Country Study 

to hold the office, as determined by the National Assembly. In 
such circumstances, the Sejm speaker would temporarily assume 
the duties of the presidency until a new president could be sworn 
in. 

The president's duties include protecting the constitution; safe- 
guarding the sovereignty, security, and territorial inviolability of 
the Polish state; and overseeing adherence to international agree- 
ments and treaties. The constitution authorizes the president to 
call for elections to the Sejm, Senate, and county councils (see 
Regional and Local Government, this ch.). The president also ap- 
points diplomatic representatives and officially receives foreign 
diplomats; acts as commander in chief of the armed forces; calls 
and presides over emergency sessions of the Council of Ministers; 
and performs other duties assigned the chief of state by the consti- 
tution or by law. 

A critical duty of the president is naming the head of govern- 
ment, the prime minister. The Little Constitution amends the 
procedure prescribed for this function. Originally, the president 
nominated the prime minister, but the Sejm had to approve both 
that nomination and the prime minister's cabinet choices that fol- 
lowed. The Little Constitution specifies that the president desig- 
nate the prime minister and appoint the cabinet upon consultation 
with the prime minister. Within two weeks, however, the new 
government must receive the Sejm's confirmation (by a simple 
majority of the deputies present voting in favor). If the govern- 
ment is not confirmed, the Sejm then has the responsibility to 
nominate and confirm its own candidate, again by a majority vote. 
If the Sejm fails in this attempt, the president has another chance, 
this time with the lesser requirement that more votes be cast for 
approval than for nonapproval. Finally, if the president's choice 
again fails, the Sejm would attempt to confirm its own candidate 
by the lesser vote. If no candidate can be confirmed, the president 
has the option of dissolving parliament or appointing a six-month 
interim government. During the interim period, if the Sejm does 
not confirm the government, or one of its own choosing, parlia- 
ment automatically would be dissolved. 

The constitution grants the president certain legislative preroga- 
tives, including the right to propose legislation; to veto acts of the 
National Assembly (the Sejm could overrule such a veto with a 
two-thirds majority); to ask the Constitutional Tribunal to judge 
the constitutionality of legislation; and to issue decrees and instruc- 
tions on the implementation of laws. The president ratifies or ter- 
minates international agreements but needs prior approval from 



190 



Government and Politics 



the Sejm to ratify agreements involving sizable financial liability 
on the state or changes in legislation. 

If national security were threatened, the president could declare 
martial law and announce a partial or full mobilization. He or she 
could also introduce a state of emergency for a period of up to three 
months in case of a threat to domestic tranquility or natural dis- 
aster. A one-time extension of a state of emergency, not to exceed 
three months, could be declared with the approval of both houses 
of the National Assembly. 

Sejm 

The lower house of the bicameral National Assembly, the Sejm, 
is the more powerful of the two chambers. The Sejm has the con- 
stitutional responsibility of initiating and enacting laws that "set 
the basic direction of the state's activity" and of overseeing "other 
organs of power and state administration." The constitution speci- 
fies election of the 460 Sejm deputies to a term of four years. The 
1991 election was conducted by a system that awarded seats in the 
Sejm in strict proportion to the number of votes each party or coa- 
lition garnered nationally (see table 20, Appendix). This system 
was blamed for the extreme fragmentation that plagued Polish pol- 
lutes in 1991-92. The new Sejm is required to convene within one 
month after national parliamentary elections. 

Upon taking the oath of office, the Sejm deputies immediately 
elect a permanent marshal, who serves as Sejm speaker. The mar- 
shal and three vice marshals constitute the Presidium of the Sejm, 
the chief duties of which are to oversee accomplishment of the Sejm 
agenda, to coordinate the activities of the parliamentary commis- 
sions, and to represent the Sejm in external affairs. The marshal, 
vice marshals, and leaders of parliamentary caucuses (called 
"clubs") form an advisory organ to the Sejm Presidium known 
as the Council of Elders (Konwent Seniorow), which assists in 
scheduling. 

The constitution empowers the president to declare a three-month 
state of emergency in the event of parliamentary paralysis. Dur- 
ing this period, the president may perform the duties of the prime 
minister, but the Sejm cannot be dismissed, and changes cannot 
be made to the constitution or electoral law. 

Among the most important agencies of the Sejm in mid- 1992 
were twenty-one permanent committees, which enjoyed consider- 
able autonomy in deliberating issues and in referring their find- 
ings to the entire Sejm for action. The committees set their own 
agendas in analyzing the performance of individual sectors of the 
economy or units of state administration. The Sejm could also create 



191 



Poland: A Country Study 

special committees to study specific issues. Committee appointments 
were highly partisan and reflected the numerical representation of 
the various parties and factions within the Sejm. 

The National Assembly has exclusive responsibility to pass a cen- 
tral state budget and to finance the entire range of state activities, 
including foreign monetary payments, and to approve a domestic 
credit plan and balance sheet of incomes and expenditures. The 
budget bill and financial plans passed by the Sejm are sent to the 
Senate, which may propose changes. The Little Constitution speci- 
fies that the Sejm can overturn the Senate's changes with an ab- 
solute majority vote. Previously, overriding Senate changes had 
required a two-thirds majority, with a quorum of at least 50 per- 
cent of the Sejm deputies. The president can dismiss parliament 
for failing to pass a budget within three months. 

Senate 

The upper house of the National Assembly, the Senate, was 
reestablished by the Round Table Agreement more than four de- 
cades after being abolished by the communist government. The 
Round Table Agreement provides for the direct popular election 
of all 100 senators — two from each of the forty-nine districts 
(wojewodztwa; sing., wojewodztwo, sometimes seen in English as 
voivodship) with the exception of Warsaw and Katowice, which 
elect three senators each. The senators' four-year terms of office 
coincide with those of Sejm deputies. 

The Senate sets its own agenda and committee structure. As in 
the Sejm, committee appointments are dictated by the numerical 
strength of the parties and factions represented in the chamber. 
Besides its budget review function, the Senate also reviews Sejm 
legislation and may approve, amend, or reject within thirty days. 
The Senate also confirms key appointments, including the com- 
missioner for citizens' rights and the chairperson of the Supreme 
Control Chamber, both of whom are nominated by the Sejm. 

Within one month after parliamentary elections, the president 
is required to call the first session of the new Senate. The Senate 
Presidium consists of the permanent marshal and six other promi- 
nent senators. The Sejm and Senate presidia occasionally meet to 
coordinate agendas and create joint committees as required. 

Supreme Control Chamber 

The Supreme Control Chamber, often referred to as the NIK, was 
established during the communist period to monitor the economic, 
financial, and administrative activities of state organs, their subor- 
dinate enterprises, and other organizational units. The chairperson 



192 



Government and Politics 



of the NIK was appointed or recalled by the Sejm with the con- 
currence of the Senate. The chamber gained a reputation for in- 
corruptability in the communist era, exerting some control over 
inefficiency and budgetary excesses. The office has retained its 
watchdog role in the democratic system. Among other activities, 
the NIK submits reports on the performance, abuses, and failures 
of enterprise funds, customs offices, and currency exchanges. 

Council of Ministers 

The highest administrative organ of state authority, the Coun- 
cil of Ministers (commonly called the cabinet), and its chairper- 
son, the prime minister, constitute the acting government. The 
Council of Ministers answers to the Sejm or, between Sejm ses- 
sions, to the president. Prior to the adoption of the Little Consti- 
tution, the Sejm could dismiss individual ministers or the entire 
Council of Ministers on its own initiative. The Little Constitution 
restricts this prerogative by requiring the Sejm to nominate an al- 
ternative candidate supported by an absolute majority of Sejm 
deputies. If the Sejm produces no such candidate, no vote for dis- 
missal may be taken. The Little Constitution also eliminates the 
president's power to move for the government's dismissal. 

The authority of the Council of Ministers is quite broad. The 
council coordinates the activities of the ministries and their subor- 
dinate entities. Among its other legally specified functions is com- 
piling an annual state budget and presenting it to the Sejm and 
the Senate for approval. The Council of Ministers also presents 
an annual report on the previous year's budgetary implementa- 
tion. Other constitutional functions include ensuring public order; 
protecting the interests of the state and the rights of individual 
citizens; guiding foreign policy and national defense; and organizing 
the armed forces and setting induction quotas. In running the Coun- 
cil of Ministers, the prime minister is assisted by one or more deputy 
prime ministers and a director of the Office of the Council of 
Ministers. In mid- 1992, the government consisted of seventeen 
ministries, the Office of Central Planning, and three ministers 
without portfolio (see The Suchocka Government, this ch.). 

The jurisdiction of the ministries is defined by statute, on the 
basis of which the ministries issue decrees and regulations. Under 
secretaries of state and vice ministers provide managerial support 
to the ministers. For certain ministries with exceptionally broad 
responsibilities, the position of secretary of state was established. 
The prime minister has authority to appoint and dismiss secretar- 
ies and under secretaries of state. 



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Poland: A Country Study 

Regional and Local Government 

The territory of Poland is administered through a system of forty- 
nine districts established in 1975 to replace the previous system 
of twenty- two districts. In addition, three city councils — Warsaw, 
Lodz, and Krakow — enjoy special administrative status. Each dis- 
trict is managed by a government-appointed wojewoda (typically 
a professional administrator) and a district assembly whose mem- 
bers are chosen by the popularly elected local government units, 
the community (gmina; pi., gminy) councils. Both the district and 
community levels of government enjoy far greater autonomy than 
they did under the highly centralized communist system of adminis- 
tration. 

According to the amended constitution in use in mid- 1992, lo- 
cal self-rule is the basic organizational form of public life in the 
community. The community possesses legal status and acts on be- 
half of the public interest in accordance with the law. The resi- 
dents of the community directly elect a standing council of their 
peers to a four-year term by universal secret ballot. A community 
or town of fewer than 40,000 residents elects council members in 
single-seat districts on a simple majority basis. Cities with more 
than 40,000 people use multiseat districts, and seats are allocated 
on a proportional basis. The executive organ of the community 
is the municipal government (zarzad), which consists of a "chief 
officer" (wojt; pi., wojtowie) or mayor, his or her deputies, and other 
members. Communities may form intercommunity unions to coor- 
dinate projects of mutual interest. 

Community councils in a given district elect delegates from their 
membership to a self-governing regional council (sejmik samo- 
rzadowy), which approves formation of intercommunity unions and 
works closely with district authorities through mandatory reports 
moving in both directions. The prime minister and district authori- 
ties monitor community activity, but they may interfere only in 
instances of obvious incompetence or violation of law. 

Judicial System 

The constitution of 1952 reflected the communists' disdain for 
the concept of judicial independence. As in the Soviet system, the 
Polish judiciary was viewed as an integral part of the coercive state 
apparatus. The courts were not allowed to adjudicate the constitu- 
tionality of statutes. Instead, the function of constitutional review 
was within the purview of the legislative branch until 1976, when 
it passed to the Council of State. A key provision of the Round 



194 



Government and Politics 



Table Agreement was the reemergence of an independent judiciary, 
a concept rooted in the Ustawa Rzadowa, the constitution of 1791 . 
By 1992 most of the communist political appointees had left the 
Supreme Court, and at all levels new judges had been recruited 
from among qualified academic and courtroom barristers. On the 
other hand, in 1992 Poland's body of laws still contained a motley 
assortment of Soviet-style statutes full of vague language aimed at 
protecting the communist monopoly of power rather than the rule 
of law itself. A complete overhaul of the legal system was a univer- 
sally recognized need. 

National Judicial Council 

A critical step in establishing the autonomy of the judicial branch 
was the Sejm's vote in December 1989 to create the National Ju- 
dicial Council. The twenty-four member council, consisting of 
judges from the national, district, and local levels, serves a four- 
year term and has the primary function of recommending judge- 
ship candidates to the president. Another basic function of the body 
is to oversee the entire judiciary and establish professional stan- 
dards. 

Supreme Court 

Reform of the appointment mechanism for justices was a neces- 
sity to ensure an independent judiciary. In the communist era, the 
Council of State appointed Supreme Court justices to five-year 
terms, making selections on purely political grounds. Because the 
Supreme Court had jurisdiction over all other courts in the land, 
the political reliability of its members was an important consider- 
ation in appointment decisions. Judicial reform after the Round 
Table Agreement provided that the president appoint Supreme 
Court justices from a list prepared by an independent National Ju- 
dicial Council, and that justices be appointed for life terms. The 
presiding officer of the Supreme Court, called the first chairman, 
is appointed from among the Supreme Court justices by the Na- 
tional Assembly upon the recommendation of the president. Dis- 
missal from the chairmanship follows the same procedure. 

The Supreme Court reviews the decisions of all lower courts; 
hears appeals of decisions made by the district courts, along with 
appeals brought by the minister of justice (who simultaneously 
serves as the prosecutor general) and the first chairman of the 
Supreme Court; and adopts legal interpretations and clarifications. 
The court is organized into four chambers: criminal, civil, labor 
and social insurance, and military. Because of its heavy case load, 



195 



Poland: A Country Study 

the Supreme Court is a large body, employing 117 judges and a 
staff of 140 persons in late 1990. 

Lower Courts 

In 1990 the system of lower courts included forty-four district 
and 282 local courts. These numbers were scheduled to be increased 
to forty-nine and 300, respectively, in 1991. Thereafter the local 
courts were to concentrate on minor, routine offenses, and the dis- 
trict courts were to take on more serious cases and consider ap- 
peals of local court verdicts. Misdemeanors generally are handled 
by panels of "social adjudicators," who are elected by local govern- 
ment councils. In 1991 these panels heard about 600,000 cases, 
of which about 80 percent were traffic violations. To relieve the 
heavy appeals case load of the Supreme Court, ten regional ap- 
peals courts were set up in late 1990 to review verdicts of the dis- 
trict courts. 

Supreme Administrative Court 

The Supreme Administrative Court was established in 1980 to 
review and standardize administrative regulations enforced by 
government agencies and to hear citizens' complaints concerning 
the legality of administrative decisions. In 1991 the court heard 
some 15,600 cases, mostly dealing with taxes, social welfare issues, 
and local government decisions. As of late 1990, the court employed 
105 judges and 163 staff members. 

Constitutional Tribunal 

The Constitutional Tribunal was established by the Jaruzelski 
regime in early 1982 to adjudicate the constitutionality of laws and 
regulations. The Sejm appoints the tribunal's members to four- 
year terms. Initially, the body did not have authority to review 
laws and statutes enacted before 1982. Findings of unconstitution- 
ality could be overruled by the Sejm with a two-thirds majority 
vote. Selected by the Sejm for their superior legal expertise, the 
members of the Constitutional Tribunal are independent and bound 
only by the constitution (see The Constitution of 1952, this ch.). 
In 1992 the tribunal made controversial findings that government 
plans to control wages and pensions retroactively violated rights 
constitutionally guaranteed to citizens. 

State Tribunal 

The Jaruzelski regime created the State Tribunal in 1982, by 
the same law that formed the Constitutional Tribunal, in response 
to instances of high official corruption in 1980. The State Tribunal 



196 



Government and Politics 



passes judgment on the guilt or innocence of the highest office 
holders in the land accused of violating the constitution and laws. 
The body's twenty-seven members are appointed by the Sejm from 
outside its membership for a term coinciding with that of the Sejm. 
Judges in the State Tribunal are independent and bound only by 
the law. The chairperson of the State Tribunal is the president of 
the Supreme Court. As of mid- 1992, the State Tribunal had never 
heard a case. 

Prosecutor General 

The communist-era Office of the Chief Prosecutor was abolished 
following the Round Table Agreement. Thereafter, the minister 
of justice has served as the prosecutor general. The mission of the 
prosecutor general is to safeguard law and order and ensure prose- 
cution of crimes. Since 1990 the prosecutors on the district and 
local levels have been given autonomy from the police and are 
subordinated to the minister of justice, who has assumed the role 
of the defunct prosecutor general. In 1992 many prosecutors re- 
mained from the rubber-stamp judicial system of the communist 
era, however. Because they had no understanding of democratic 
judicial practice, these officials seriously inhibited the new legal 
system in dealing with the wave of crime that accompanied the tran- 
sition to a market economy. 

Commissioner for Citizens' Rights 

The concept of a people's ombudsman to safeguard individual 
civil rights and liberties was first proposed by the Patriotic Move- 
ment for National Rebirth (Patriotyczny Ruch Odrodzenia Na- 
rodowego — PRON) in 1983. Four years later, the Sejm enacted 
legislation establishing the Office of the Commissioner for Citizens' 
Rights. Appointed to a four-year term by the Sejm with Senate 
approval, the commissioner is independent of other state agencies 
and answers only to the Sejm. The commissioner's mandate is to 
investigate on behalf of individual citizens or organizations possi- 
ble infractions of Polish law or basic principles of justice by public 
officials, institutions, or organizations. Although the commission- 
er may review the administration of the courts, he or she may in- 
tercede only in matters such as scheduling of cases. In military or 
internal security matters, the commissioner does not investigate 
evidence but channels cases to the appropriate jurisdiction. As a 
public ombudsman, the commissioner confronts the accused party 
and conveys official displeasure at a given action or policy. The 
commissioner also may request the initiation of civil, criminal, 
or administrative proceedings and appeal to the Constitutional 



197 



Poland: A Country Study 

Tribunal to review a law's constitutionality or consistency with a 
higher statute. 

The public greeted the creation of the Office of the Commis- 
sioner for Citizens' Rights with enthusiasm. Lacking an established 
screening mechanism, the new office received more than 55,000 
complaints in 1988 alone. The commissioner also conducts sys- 
tematic inspections of prisons in response to inmates' complaints. 
Following the inspections, the commissioner issues a comprehen- 
sive report. This practice has resulted in a more humane, less con- 
gested prison system. In 1990 a national opinion poll revealed that 
at that point the ombudsman enjoyed the highest popularity of any 
Polish politician. 

Political Parties 

For four decades before the historic Round Table Agreement, 
Poland had three legal political parties: the ruling communist PZPR 
and its two subservient coalition partners, the United Peasant Party 
and the Democratic Party. The first communist regime to gain pow- 
er had outlawed the major pre-World War II parties — National 
Democracy, the Labor Party, and the Polish Peasant Party (see 
Consolidation of Communist Power, ch. 1). The PZPR was formed 
in 1948 with the merger of the Polish United Workers' Party and 
the Polish Socialist Party. Realizing the lack of popular support 
for communism and public fears of Soviet domination, the Polish 
communists eschewed the term communist in their official name. 

In return for acknowledging the leading role of the PZPR, the 
two major coalition partners and three smaller Catholic associa- 
tions received a fixed number of seats in the Sejm. Although one 
of the latter category, Znak, was technically an independent party, 
its allotment of five seats gave it very limited influence. Typically, 
the United Peasant Party held 20 to 25 percent of the Sejm seats 
and the Democratic Party received about 10 percent. Despite the 
nominal diversity of the Sejm, the noncommunist parties had lit- 
tle impact, and the Sejm was essentially a rubber-stamp body that 
enacted legislation approved by the central decision-making organs 
of the PZPR. Following the Soviet model, political parties and re- 
ligious associations, as well as all other mass organizations, labor 
unions, and the press only transmitted policy and programs from 
the central PZPR hierarchy to Polish society. 

The years 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976, and 1980 were turning points 
in the evolution of organized political opposition in Poland. With 
the death of the Stalinist Boleslaw Bierut in 1956, Poland entered 
a brief period of de-Stalinization. The PZPR relaxed its intimida- 
tion of the intelligentsia, artists, and the church (see The Polish 



198 



Government and Politics 



Catholic Church and the State, ch. 2). The Znak group emerged 
and experimented as a semiautonomous vehicle of dialog between 
the PZPR and society. But with the Soviet-organized invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968, the PZPR again suppressed dissent and 
expelled outspoken Znak delegates from the Sejm. The 1970 ship- 
yard strikes, which claimed hundreds of victims, brought down the 
regime of Wladyslaw Gomulka (1956-70) and demonstrated the 
potential of workers to oppose unpopular PZPR policies (see The 
Gathering Crisis of People's Poland, 1956-80, ch. 1). In 1976 the 
arrest of striking workers convinced a group of intellectuals, led 
by Jacek Kurori and Adam Michnik, to form the Committee for 
Defense of Workers (Komitet Obrony Robotnikow — KOR), the 
most successful opposition group until Solidarity. 

Solidarity 

The breakthrough in ending the political monopoly of the PZPR 
came in 1980 with the emergence of the Interfactory Strike Com- 
mittee, which rapidly evolved into the Solidarity mass movement 
of some 10 million Poles (see The Birth of Solidarity, ch. 1). Guided 
by Lech Walesa, the Interfactory Strike Committee won historic 
concessions from the communists in the Gdansk Agreement of Au- 
gust 31, 1980. The PZPR granted recognition of the basic right 
of workers to establish free trade unions, but in return the strike 
committee agreed not to function as a political party. The workers 
promised to abide by the constitution and conceded the leading 
role in state affairs to the PZPR. 

Despite the pledges of the Gdansk Agreement, Solidarity did not 
remain simply a trade union movement. It rapidly changed into 
an umbrella organization under which a broad range of political 
and social groups united in opposition to the communist regime. 
At Solidarity's first national congress in the fall of 1981 , the politi- 
cal nature of the movement became explicit. The congress adopt- 
ed a program calling for an active Solidarity role in reforming 
Poland's political and economic systems. In the following months, 
outspoken radicals urged their leaders to confront the communist 
authorities, to demand free elections, and to call for a national 
referendum to replace the communist government. The radical 
challenge precipitated the imposition of martial law on December 
13, 1981 . Solidarity, now illegal, was forced underground until the 
late 1980s (see The Jaruzelski Interlude, ch. 1). Within six months 
after the start of the Round Table talks in February 1989, Solidarity 
not only had regained its legal status as a trade union, but also 
had become an effective political movement that installed Eastern 
Europe's first postcommunist government. 



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Poland: A Country Study 

During its underground phase, Solidarity lost much of its origi- 
nal cohesion as tactical and philosophical disagreements split the 
movement into factions. The radical elements, convinced that an 
evolutionary approach to democratization was impossible, creat- 
ed the organization Fighting Solidarity in 1982. Ultimately, 
however, Walesa's moderate faction prevailed. 

Favoring negotiation and compromise with the PZPR, the mod- 
erates created the Citizens' Committee, which represented Solidar- 
ity at the talks in 1989 and engineered the overwhelming election 
triumph of June 1989. Led by Bronislaw Geremek, a prominent 
intellectual, the newly elected Solidarity deputies in parliament 
formed the Citizens' Parliamentary Club to coordinate legislative 
efforts and advance the Solidarity agenda. 

The stunning defeat of the PZPR in the June 1989 parliamen- 
tary elections removed Solidarity's most important unifying force — 
the common enemy. By the time of the local elections of May 1990, 
Solidarity had splintered, and a remarkable number of small par- 
ties had appeared. Because any individual with fifteen nominat- 
ing signatures could be placed on the ballot, an astounding 1,140 
groups and "parties" registered for the elections. In the local elec- 
tions, the new groups' lack of organization and national experience 
caused them to fare poorly against the Solidarity-backed citizens' 
committees that sponsored about one-third of the candidates run- 
ning for local office. 

Despite the success of the Solidarity candidates in the local elec- 
tions, serious divisions soon emerged within the Citizens' Parlia- 
mentary Club concerning the appropriateness of political parties 
at so early a stage in Poland's democratic experiment. The intellec- 
tuals who dominated the parliamentary club insisted that the 
proliferation of political parties would derail efforts to build a 
Western-style civil society. But deputies on the right of the politi- 
cal spectrum, feeling excluded from important policy decisions by 
the intellectuals, advocated rapid formation of strong alternative 
parties. 

Center Alliance 

An outspoken Walesa supporter determined to end the political 
dominance of the intellectual elite in the Citizens' Parliamentary 
Club, Jaroslaw Kaczynski formed the Center Alliance in May 1990. 
The Center Alliance supported a strong political center embody- 
ing the ideals of Solidarity and Christian ethics. With the election 
of its candidate for president, Walesa, and the appointment of Ka- 
czynski as the president's chief of staff, the Center Alliance became 
one of the most influential political organizations in the country. 



200 



Government and Politics 



The Center Alliance platform for the parliamentary elections of 
October 1991 called for accelerated economic reform, privatiza- 
tion, rapid decommunization, and a strongly pro-Western foreign 
policy, including full membership in NATO. Considering its promi- 
nent position in the government and media and its large national 
membership, the party fared rather poorly in the 1991 elections. 
Its popular vote total yielded forty-four Sejm and nine Senate seats. 
The Center Alliance made its last show of political power in en- 
gineering the selection of its candidate, Jan Olszewski, to lead the 
coalition government in December 1991. By mid- 1992, however, 
the influence of the party had waned because of a bitter personal 
rift between Kaczynski and Walesa, the demise of the Olszewski 
government, and the party's decision not to participate in the rul- 
ing coalition of Hanna Suchocka. 

Democratic Union 

The Democratic Union (Unia Demokratyczna — UD) held its 
unification congress in May 1991 to integrate three Solidarity 
splinter groups and to adopt a platform for the parliamentary elec- 
tions. The UD counted among its members such luminaries of the 
Solidarity movement as Jacek Kurori, Adam Michnik, Bronislaw 
Geremek, and Tadeusz Mazowiecki. The party sought political and 
economic reform through the rule of law. Rejecting extremism of 
any stripe, it pursued policies of economic pragmatism. Although 
its registered membership ranked only fifth numerically among po- 
litical parties, the UD was a well-organized national party with 
branches in all forty-nine districts. 

In October 1991 , with the UD expected to win more than a quart- 
er of the Sejm seats in the parliamentary election, party chairman 
Mazowiecki indicated his availability to reassume the duties of prime 
minister. But the UD took only sixty-two Sejm and twenty-one 
Senate seats, paying dearly for its refusal to renounce the Bal- 
cerowicz Plan of economic shock therapy and for opposing the Ro- 
man Catholic Church on the issue of abortion. 

During the first half of 1992, relations between the UD and 
Walesa improved considerably. Walesa offered to appoint the two 
former prime ministers, Mazowiecki and Bielecki, as his senior ad- 
visers. He repeatedly urged the inclusion of the UD in an expand- 
ed governing coalition, but negotiations toward that end failed. 
Instead, the UD joined forces with two other economic reformist 
parties outside the Olszewski government to form the Little Coa- 
lition. After the collapse of the Olszewski government, the coali- 
tion failed to reach an agreement with the new prime minister, 
Waldemar Pawlak, on the composition of a new cabinet. According 



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Poland: A Country Study 

to Pawlak, the coalition insisted on total control over the economy, 
a concession he was not willing to make. With the election of Hanna 
Suchocka as the new prime minister in mid- 1992, the Democratic 
Union regained the leadership of the government and held four 
of the key cabinet positions, including director of the Office of the 
Council of Ministers and the ministries of finance, defense, and 
labor and social affairs. 

Liberal-Democratic Congress 

The Liberal-Democratic Congress (Kongres Liberalno-Demo- 
kratyczny — KLD) arose in 1983 as a loose organization of busi- 
nessmen dedicated to a philosophy of small government and free 
enterprise. The KLD was registered as a party in October 1990 
and supported the presidential candidacy of Walesa, who selected 
KLD leader Jan Krzysztof Bielecki as his nominee to be prime 
minister. Another prominent party member, Janusz Lewandowski, 
headed the Ministry of Ownership Transformation in the Bielecki 
cabinet. Donald Tusk, chairman of the KLD executive board, led 
an unsuccessful attempt to form a broad coalition to support can- 
didates in the 1991 Senate race. The party foreswore ideological 
sloganeering and backed rational, pragmatic policies. In the parlia- 
mentary elections, the KLD finished seventh in popular vote, win- 
ning thirty-seven Sejm and six Senate seats. 

Beer-Lovers' Party 

Registered as a political party in December 1990, the Polish Beer- 
Lovers' Party (Polska Partia Przyjaciol Piwa — PPPP) may have 
started as a prank. But with time, its members developed a seri- 
ous platform, for which the humorous stated goals of the party — 
lively political discussion in pubs serving excellent beer — were a 
symbol of freedom of association and expression, intellectual toler- 
ance, and a higher standard of living. Its humorous name proba- 
bly helped the party win votes from a politically disenchanted 
populace in the 1991 parliamentary elections, in which the PPPP 
captured sixteen Sejm seats. In early 1992, following a split within 
the PPPP into the Big Beer and Little Beer parties, the former as- 
sumed the name Polish Economic Program. Losing its image of 
quirkiness, the Polish Economic Program became associated with 
the UD and KLD in the Little Coalition of liberal promarket par- 
ties and supported the candidacy of Hanna Suchocka as prime 
minister. 

Peasant Alliance 

In mid- 1992, the party of the Rural Solidarity farmers' union, 



202 



Cardinal Jozef Glemp, 
leader of the Polish 
Roman Catholic Church 
Courtesy Reverend 
Edward Mroczynski, S. Ch. 




the Peasant Alliance (Porozumienie Ludowe — PL) held two promi- 
nent positions in the Suchocka government, the Ministry of Agricul- 
ture and the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural 
Resources. The party also controlled the post of minister without 
portfolio for parliamentary liaison. In mid- 1992 the Peasant Alli- 
ance and the Polish Peasant Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe — 
PSL) were still divided by their political backgrounds although they 
both represented Poland's large rural sector (see Polish Peasant 
Party, this ch.). The PL, still distrusting the PSL for its past ac- 
commodation with the communists, opposed the selection of PSL 
leader Waldemar Pawlak as prime minister. The PL supported im- 
port tariffs to protect domestic farmers, state subsidies to main- 
tain farm commodity prices, and easy credit for farmers. 

Christian National Union 

Socially conservative but economically to the left, the Christian 
National Union (Zjednoczenie Chrzescijansko-Narodowe — ZChN) 
was the dominant member of a short-lived electoral alliance known 
as Catholic Action. The alliance finished third in the 1991 parlia- 
mentary elections and earned ZChN forty-nine Sejm and nine 
Senate seats. The ZChN supported the involvement of the Roman 
Catholic Church in politics and government, religious instruction 
in the schools, a generous social welfare program, and trade pro- 
tectionism. The party played a large role in both the Olszewski 



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Poland: A Country Study 

and Suchocka governments. Under Suchocka, the ZChN held five 
cabinet positions and the post of deputy prime minister for eco- 
nomic affairs. 

Party of Christian Democrats 

Founded in December 1990, the small Party of Christian 
Democrats (Partia Chrzescijanskich Demokratow — PChD) used 
the political experience of its membership to gain success dispropor- 
tionate to its size. Its most prominent member, Pawel Laczkowski, 
became deputy prime minister for political affairs in the Suchocka 
government. On social issues, the PChD supported a more prag- 
matic, centrist brand of Christian democracy than that advocated 
by the larger ZChN. On economic issues, the PChD supported 
rapid economic transformation and privatization. 

Confederation for an Independent Poland 

Founded in 1979 by military historian Leszek Moczulski, the 
Confederation for an Independent Poland (Konfederacja Polski 
Niepodleglej — KPN) claimed with some justification to be the first 
true opposition party of the communist era. Years before the emer- 
gence of Solidarity, Moczulski was defying the authorities with calls 
for the restoration of Polish sovereignty and the replacement of the 
communist system; he was imprisoned repeatedly from the late 
1970s through the mid-1980s. The KPN did not participate in the 
talks leading to the Round Table Agreement and refused to com- 
promise with the PZPR. 

Because of its reputation for radicalism and violence, the KPN 
fared poorly in its first electoral tests: the parliamentary elections 
of 1989, the local elections of May 1990, and the presidential elec- 
tion in the autumn of 1990. But by 1991 Polish voters had grown 
disenchanted with the seeming impotence of the postcommunist 
political establishment in the face of the country's worsening eco- 
nomic problems. As a result, the KPN was among the extremist 
groups and individuals that fared well in the 1991 parliamentary 
elections. The KPN won forty-six seats in the Sejm, two more than 
the mainstream Center Alliance. 

Following its success in the parliamentary elections, the KPN 
sought to moderate its image by joining four center-right parties 
in a coalition supporting the candidacy of Jan Olszewski as prime 
minister. Moczulski took the KPN out of the short-lived coalition, 
however, when Olszewski failed to name him minister of national 
defense. Outraged at the government's charges that Moczulski had 
been a collaborator with the communist secret service, the KPN vot- 
ed for Olszewski's removal in June 1992. The KPN then withdrew 



204 



Government and Politics 



its initial support of Pawlak as Olszewski's replacement. The seven- 
party alliance in support of Suchocka in mid- 1992 seemingly end- 
ed the KPN's participation in coalition politics and returned it to 
the role of the uncompromising outsider. 

PZPR and Successor Parties 

During the 1980s, the Marxist underpinnings of the PZPR stead- 
ily eroded, and, long before the round table talks, the ruling party 
had lost its ideological fervor. Official PZPR documents compiled 
in May 1987 revealed that only about 25 percent of the member- 
ship were politically active, more than 60 percent paid their dues 
but were inactive, and 15 percent did not even pay their dues. By 
that time, protecting the national interest had replaced Marxist doc- 
trine as the guiding principle of the government's actions. For ex- 
ample, the Jaruzelski regime characterized its imposition of martial 
law in 1981 not as an attempt to restore Marxist purity but as a 
preemptive measure to avoid Soviet military intervention in Poland. 
The PZPR had accepted the necessity of economic decentraliza- 
tion, privatization, and price liberalization, realizing that to regain 
political legitimacy it had to win the cooperation of the opposition. 

Despite its enormous advantage in institutional and monetary 
resources, control of the electronic media and most print media, 
and a slate of reformist, nonideological candidates, the PZPR 
suffered an overwhelming defeat in the parliamentary elections of 
June 1989. Once the parties that were its traditional allies had 
repositioned themselves with Solidarity to install a noncommunist 
government, the PZPR had become a political relic. In January 
1990, at its final congress (the eleventh), the PZPR patterned it- 
self after Western social democratic parties and adopted the name 
Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland (Socjaldemokracja 
Rzeczypospolitej Polski — SdRP). 

The SdRP, which inherited the assets and infrastructure of the 
PZPR, was a political force that could not be ignored in the re- 
form era. During the 1990 presidential elections, for example, the 
SdRP candidate received 9 percent of the vote. At its first nation- 
al convention in May 1991 , the party adopted a platform support- 
ing pluralistic democracy, a parliamentary form of government, 
strict separation of church and state, women's rights, environmental 
protection, the right to work, a generous social safety net, and good 
relations with all of Poland's neighbors. In July 1991, preparing 
for the October parliamentary elections, the SdRP invited other 
groups with a communist lineage to join it in a broad coalition, 
the Alliance of the Democratic Left (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycz- 
nej — SLD). The most important of these groups was the All-Polish 



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Poland: A Country Study 



Alliance of Trade Unions (Ogolnopolskie Porozumienie Zwiazkow 
Zawodowych — OPZZ), which Jaruzelski had created in 1984 to 
co-opt Solidarity's influence among the working people. By the time 
of the 1991 elections, the OPZZ had a larger membership than 
Solidarity. Of the 390 SLD candidates for the parliamentary elec- 
tions of October 1991, 45 percent were members of the SdRP and 
about one-third belonged to the OPZZ. The SLD surprised most 
political observers by finishing a close second to the Democratic 
Union and winning sixty Sejm and four Senate seats. Its failure 
to expand its membership, however, made the SLD a political out- 
cast in the coalition-building efforts that followed the 1991 election. 

Polish Peasant Party 

The rebirth of the moderate interwar Polish Peasant Party (PSL) 
began in the summer of 1989, when the United Peasant Party (Zjed- 
noczone Stronnictwo Ludowe — ZSL) joined forces with Solidari- 
ty and Democratic Party deputies in the new Sejm to usher in a 
noncommunist government. The ZSL adopted the name Polish 
Peasant Party "Renewal" to distance itself from its past in the com- 
munist coalition; then it united with the largest existing opposi- 
tion peasant party and resumed its original name. In the May 1990 
local elections, the PSL garnered 20 percent of the rural vote. In 
September 1990, the PSL withdrew support for the Mazowiecki 
government, citing its disapproval of current agricultural policy 
and Mazowiecki 's failure to appoint a PSL member as the minister 
of agriculture. As it continued to seek legislative relief for farm- 
ers, the PSL also became a vocal critic of the Bielecki government 
that followed Mazowiecki. 

As of mid- 1992, the PSL was the third-largest single-party bloc 
in the Sejm. In 1992 the party's 180,000 dues-paying members 
made it the largest political party in the country. It showed con- 
siderable strength even in such heavily industrialized areas as Up- 
per Silesia. Although not a member of the five-party coalition that 
installed Olszewski as prime minister in December 1991, the PSL 
provided critical support in securing Sejm approval for Olszewski's 
cabinet at a time when that coalition was already beginning to col- 
lapse. Despite its initial support for Olszewski, however, the party 
became disenchanted with the prime minister's agricultural pro- 
gram and voted for his removal in 1992. 

Politics and the Media 

Prior to the return of democracy in 1989, Poland's independent 
press defied state censorship and flourished to an extent unknown 
in other East European communist states. Active publication by 



206 



Government and Politics 



opposition groups in the 1970s formed a tradition for the well- 
organized distribution of censored materials that flowered in the 
contentious decade that followed. 

The Early Opposition Press 

As early as 1970, underground groups had begun issuing oppo- 
sition literature that included short-lived periodicals, strike an- 
nouncements, and brochures. By 1976 opposition groups were 
better organized and began issuing influential carbon-copied and 
mimeographed serials. In the autumn of that year, KOR began 
producing its Biuletyn Informacyjny (Information Bulletin). During 
the period between 1976 and 1980, about 500 uncensored serial 
titles were recorded, some with circulations of more than 20,000 
copies. At the same time, underground book publishing flourished 
as over thirty-five independent presses issued hundreds of uncen- 
sored monographs. 

Following the Gdansk Agreement of August 1980, Poland saw 
a new explosion of independent publishing. In addition to Tygod- 
nik Solidarnosc (Solidarity Weekly), whose circulation was limited 
to 500,000 copies supplemented by ten regional weeklies, Solidar- 
ity and its rural affiliate published hundreds of new periodicals. 
Assisted by donations of printing equipment from the West, about 
200 publishing houses had emerged by December 1981, when mar- 
tial law abruptly curtailed independent publishing. 

During Solidarity's first period of legal activity, reprints of op- 
position literature from abroad, particularly the influential emigre 
journals Kultura (Culture) and Zeszyty Historyczne (Historical Note- 
books), were especially popular. 

Liberalization in the 1980s 

The imposition of martial law in December 1981 was a major 
setback for independent publishing. But, despite the confiscation 
of printing equipment and the arrest of opposition leaders, the clan- 
destine press quickly resumed issuing bulletins. By the end of 1982, 
some forty publishing houses were producing a great variety of 
books, brochures, and serials. Not only did the Jaruzelski regime 
fail to infiltrate and shut down such publishing operations, it al- 
lowed considerable freedom of expression in the "legitimate" press. 
For example, the influential Catholic periodical, Tygodnik Powszechny 
(Universal Weekly), founded in 1945, provided an independent 
voice defending the rights of the Polish citizenry. 

After the formal suspension of martial law in July 1983, the re- 
gime grew increasingly tolerant toward independent publishing. 
The underground press diversified to reflect the widening spectrum 



207 



Poland: A Country Study 

of opposition points of view. By 1986 only about half of the known 
independent serial titles were organs of Solidarity. 

As the independent press grew more diverse, the state press in- 
creasingly cited articles published in underground periodicals and 
even began to publish "illegal" books. In 1986 the regime grant- 
ed legal status to Res Publica, a scholarly underground journal 
representing a moderate social and political philosophy. Meanwhile, 
the Catholic press grew ever more prominent when dozens of church 
publications were resurrected after long being banned. 

The Jaruzelski regime's increasingly liberal attitude toward the 
print media was motivated not only by a desire to achieve nation- 
al reconciliation, but also by the realization that the state could 
not suppress three highly prolific publishing networks — the under- 
ground press, the church-sponsored press, and the emigre press 
in the West. After the mid-1980s, the nonstate publishing houses 
averaged 500 to 600 new titles annually. 

The End of Press Censorship 

A key element of the Round Table Agreement was the end of 
the communist monopoly of the news media. In April 1990, state 
censorship was abolished. The PZPR publishing and distribution 
monopoly, the Workers' Publication Cooperative Press-Book- 
Movement began to break up, and numerous communist-era peri- 
odicals were privatized. Some periodical titles, such as the daily 
Rzeczpospolita (Republic) and the weekly Polityka (Politics), were re- 
cast and gained respect for the quality of their journalism. Others, 
most notably the official party organ Try buna Ludu (People's Trib- 
une), changed their names but continued to represent a leftist po- 
litical viewpoint (Try buna Ludu became simply Trybuna). Many 
familiar communist ideological publications were discontinued, 
however. After mid- 1989, hundreds of new periodicals appeared, 
failed, reappeared, and failed again. These failures were the result 
of the high cost of newsprint, ignorance of free-market business 
principles, and the unpredictable demand created by a newly liber- 
ated reading public. 

As of mid- 1992, nearly 1 ,000 Polish periodicals were being pub- 
lished. Among these were seventy-five daily and 164 weekly news- 
papers. The left-of-center Gazeta Wyborcza (Election Gazette), with 
a circulation of 550,000 weekday copies and more than 850,000 
weekend copies, was the most widely read newspaper. Gazeta Wybor- 
cza, issued in thirteen local editions, resembled Western papers in 
its layout and extensive commercial advertising. Rzeczpospolita 
claimed roughly 250,000 readers, followed closely by Zycie Warszawy 
(Warsaw Life). Of the national political weeklies, Polityka and Wprost 



208 



Government and Politics 



(Straightforward) enjoyed the greatest success, with circulations 
of 350,000 and 250,000, respectively. 

In the years following the Round Table Agreement, the Polish 
press presented a range of opinion that reflected the increasingly 
fractured political landscape. Following the schism between Mazo- 
wiecki and Walesa forces in 1990, Tygodnik Solidarnosc became the 
mouthpiece of the pro- Walesa Center Alliance, while Michnik's 
Gazeta Wyborcza and the Catholic church's Tygodnik Powszechny sup- 
ported the Mazowiecki faction. 

Book Publishing 

After the Round Table Agreement, book publishing, distribu- 
tion, and marketing entered a period of unprecedented upheaval. 
Together with the welcome lifting of censorship came the end of 
generous state subsidies for publishers. Thus, publishers of eso- 
teric scholarly and literary works with limited market appeal suffered 
severe losses. At the same time, however, the newfound opportu- 
nity to gain profits by satisfying the reading tastes of the Polish 
public caused a dramatic proliferation of publishing houses. In 
mid- 1992, between 1,200 and 2,000 publishing houses, most of 
them small enterprises, were in operation. Only about 100 of that 
number had all the trappings of full-scale publishing firms: cata- 
logs, international standard book numbers, and observance of the 
copyright deposit law. 

Radio and Television 

To a significant extent, electronic news and information sources 
defied government control in the 1980s. Millions of Poles received 
uncensored radio broadcasts from Radio Free Europe, the Voice 
of America, the British Broadcasting Corporation, and other 
Western sources. Solidarity units also occasionally broadcast news 
programs from mobile radio stations. And hundreds of thousands 
of VCRs allowed the Polish population to view taboo films by 
prominent domestic and foreign directors. 

Unlike periodicals, the electronic media adjusted slowly to the 
changed political environment following the Round Table Agree- 
ment. As of mid- 1992, the Sejm had yet to enact legislation to regu- 
late radio and television broadcasting. Decades of communist 
manipulation of the electronic media had taught politicians the pow- 
er of those media in shaping public attitudes. In mid- 1992, Walesa 
indicated his continuing distrust of broadcast journalism by stat- 
ing that television should represent the government's views and 
that state television was not the place for contrary political opin- 
ions. The membership of the Committee for Radio and Television, 



209 



Poland: A Country Study 

a communist-era holdover agency regulating all broadcasting, was 
determined by the Council of Ministers, and appointment of the 
committee chairman became highly politicized. 

In mid- 1992 Poland continued to have only two national televi- 
sion channels, and by Western standards the program offerings 
were limited. Besides daily news broadcasts, the most popular pro- 
gram was a political satire, "Polish Zoo," a weekly puppet show 
that lampooned leading political figures and institutions, includ- 
ing the church. To supplement the meager offerings of domestic 
television, many Poles received foreign broadcasts. Small satellite 
antenna dishes were common throughout the country. Impatient 
with the government's inaction, private television stations in War- 
saw, Lublin, Poznari, and Szczecin began to broadcast without 
licenses in the early 1990s. 

The government interfered less with radio than with television 
broadcasting. In addition to the four national stations broadcast- 
ing to nearly 1 1 million Polish receivers, thirteen unlicensed radio 
stations had come into existence by mid- 1992. Nearly 600 appli- 
cations for broadcasting licenses awaited evaluation. Radio broad- 
casts were dominated by Western popular music, just as the 
publishing and film industries were overwhelmingly Western in 
orientation. 

The continuing dominance of Western culture in the 1990s ap- 
peared to be assured, as unauthorized reproduction of films, liter- 
ature, and music made inexpensive, high-quality copies easily 
accessible to the average citizen. In the postcommunist era, intellec- 
tual piracy in Poland emerged as one of the troublesome issues be- 
tween Warsaw and the United States. In early 1992, it was 
estimated that the United States lost US$140 million dollars an- 
nually to Polish audio, video, and computer program piracy. 

Foreign Relations 

In mid- 1992, Poland was enjoying the fruits of three years of 
skillful statesmanship by its foreign minister, Krzysztof Skubi- 
szewski, who had directed foreign policy in five governments be- 
ginning with Mazowiecki in August 1989. Skubiszewski guided 
Poland through a tumultuous period during which Warsaw 
reclaimed full sovereignty in foreign affairs for the first time since 
World War II and moved resolutely to "rejoin Europe." 

The Soviet-dominated Warsaw Treaty Organization (known as 
the Warsaw Pact — see Glossary) and its economic counterpart, the 
Council of Mutual Economic Cooperation (Comecon — see Glos- 
sary), which had set the parameters of Polish foreign policy for de- 
cades, no longer existed after mid- 1991 . By year's end, the Soviet 



210 



Anti-Soviet graffiti 
covering World War II 
monument in Warsaw 
Courtesy Ronald D. Bachman 




Union itself had disappeared, and by late 1992 Moscow was to com- 
plete the withdrawal of combat troops from Poland. Meanwhile, 
Warsaw pursued forward-looking bilateral relations with the many 
newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. Only in the 
case of Lithuania could relations with eastern neighbors be described 
as less than cordial. 

To replace the old Soviet-dominated military and trade struc- 
tures, Poland sought collective security with its southern neigh- 
bors, the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic (see Glossary), 
and Hungary, with which it formed the so-called Visegrad Trian- 
gle. This arrangement envisioned a bilateral free trade zone be- 
tween Budapest and Warsaw, which both the Czechs and the 
Slovaks were invited to join. The Visegrad partners would also coor- 
dinate their strategies to join West European economic and mili- 
tary organizations. 

In mid- 1992, Poland's relationship with its other traditional ene- 
my, Germany, also was forward-looking. Acquiescing in German 
reunification, Warsaw won assurances that Bonn would recognize 
the Oder-Neisse Line as the official, permanent frontier between 
Germany and Poland, ratifying the postwar transfer of German 
lands to Poland. Germany offered economic assistance, investment, 
and support for Polish membership in the European Community 
(EC — see Glossary). 



211 



Poland: A Country Study 

Relations with other Western nations in mid- 1992 were gener- 
ally excellent. Warsaw was frustrated, however, by its inability to 
gain full membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), the Western European Union (WEU — see Glossary), and 
the EC and by the reluctance of the West to lower import tariffs 
on Polish goods (see Postcommunist Policy Adjustments, ch. 3). 
Traditionally warm ties with the United States returned to nor- 
mal after the difficult 1980s, and Poland regained most-favored- 
nation trade status and benefited from a range of United States 
economic and technical assistance. 

Soviet Union and Russia 

The geopolitical realities of postwar Europe allowed Poland lit- 
tle room to maneuver in foreign policy. Until the late 1980s, the 
ever present threat of Soviet intervention kept Poland a compliant 
member of the Warsaw Pact. In fact, Jaruzelski maintained that 
the decision to impose martial law in December 1981 was taken 
to preempt a Soviet invasion. Such an invasion would have been 
consistent with the Brezhnev Doctrine, which justified military in- 
tervention in any Warsaw Pact member where socialism was threat- 
ened. In early 1992, Jaruzelski 's claim received corroboration when 
a high official in the former Soviet Army revealed the Soviet 
Union's plan to invade Poland at the end of 1981 under precisely 
that pretext. 

In the late 1980s, the Brezhnev Doctrine was suspended when 
Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev enunciated a new world view, 
which he called "new thinking." For the first time in the postwar 
era, the Soviet Union acknowledged the right of its East European 
neighbors to pursue their own paths of social and economic devel- 
opment. Thus, Moscow reluctantly accepted Poland's 1989 Round 
Table Agreement, the defeat of the communists in Poland's first 
open parliamentary elections, and the ensuing installation of a non- 
communist government as beyond its legitimate concern. 

As the first postcommunist leadership of Poland, the Mazowiecki 
government approached its relationship with the Soviet Union with 
cautious resolve, reassuring Moscow that Poland would fulfill its 
obligations as a member of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon. 
Nevertheless, Poland soon demonstrated its determination to trans- 
form these Soviet-dominated military and economic alliances into 
consultative bodies respecting the sovereignty of all member coun- 
tries. Foreign Minister Skubiszewski guided foreign affairs skill- 
fully through this delicate period, as the Warsaw Pact, Comecon, 
and the Soviet Union itself disintegrated. 



212 



Government and Politics 



Among the difficult issues the new government confronted in 
redefining its relationship with the Soviet Union were the presence 
of some 58,000 Soviet troops on Polish territory; the future role 
of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon; new terms of bilateral trade; 
the plight of more than 1 million ethnic Poles living on Soviet ter- 
ritory; clarification of the "blank spots" in the history of Soviet- 
Polish relations; and the Polish relationship to Soviet republics seek- 
ing independence. 

Skubiszewski handled the issue of Soviet troop withdrawal deli- 
cately. In negotiating with Moscow, the government faced accu- 
sations of timidity from presidential candidate Walesa on the one 
hand and the risk of antagonizing Moscow and strengthening the 
position of Kremlin hardliners on the other. Walesa and some of 
the center-right parties believed the Mazowiecki government was 
moving too cautiously on the issue. But Mazowiecki viewed War- 
saw Pact forces as a counterbalance to a reunited, possibly ex- 
pansionist Germany. In September 1990, Mazowiecki yielded to 
domestic pressure by demanding negotiations on the withdrawal 
of Soviet forces and cleanup of the extensive environmental damage 
they had caused (see Environmental Conditions and Crises, ch. 
2). By the end of 1990, the Polish side was pushing Moscow to 
remove all its forces within one year. 

Postcommunist Poland's trade relationship with the Soviet Un- 
ion also presented a complex problem. Moscow was Poland's most 
important trading partner, the source of nearly all its imported oil 
and gas, and the market for 70 percent of its industrial exports. 
Poland had benefited from the comfortable if inefficient Comecon 
trading arrangements of administered prices denominated in trans- 
ferable rubles. Although the impending end of Comecon clearly 
signaled the need for drastic reorientation of trade policy, in 1990 
no source could replace rapidly the fundamental supplies availa- 
ble from the old system. Thus, Moscow retained its economic in- 
fluence on Polish foreign policy despite Gorbachev's pledges to 
respect Polish sovereignty. 

Yet another obstacle to normalized relations was the legacy of 
Stalin's crimes against the Polish people in World War II and the 
plight of Polish nationals who remained in Soviet territory after 
the war. In April 1990, Gorbachev finally acknowledged Soviet 
culpability in the massacre of thousands of Polish officers in the 
Katyh Forest, which until that time the Soviets had attributed to 
the German army despite widespread knowledge of the true situa- 
tion (see World War II, ch. 1). Indeed, early in 1989 the Jaruzel- 
ski government had declared that Stalin's secret police, not the 
German army, had committed the atrocities. Gorbachev's action 



213 



Poland: A Country Study 



in 1990 did not placate Poland. The Polish government continued 
to demand information on critical "blank spots" in the history of 
the World War II era, notably the fate of Poles whom Stalin ex- 
iled to Siberia and Central Asia. 

In 1990 and 1991, the Bielecki government continued Mazo- 
wiecki's policy toward Moscow. The withdrawal of Soviet forces, 
the interruption of oil and gas deliveries, and the collapse of the 
Soviet market for Polish exports dominated bilateral relations during 
Bielecki' s tenure. Moscow's decision to shift to hard-currency trade 
at world prices as of January 1, 1992 had painful consequences 
for Poland. In response to severe disruption of its export market, 
fuel delivery, and domestic employment, Warsaw established ad 
hoc barter arrangements with the Soviet Union and individual 
neighboring republics. 

Meanwhile, on the security front, the Soviets pressured Poland 
and other members of the dying Warsaw Pact to sign new bilateral 
treaties giving Moscow the right to veto entry into alliances inimical 
to Soviet interests. Among the East European nations formerly in 
the Soviet sphere, however, only Romania yielded to Moscow's 
pressure. Poland refused to surrender its sovereign right to choose 
allies. After a failed attempt by hardliners to take over the Soviet 
government in August 1991, Moscow dropped its demand, and 
bilateral negotiations proceeded more smoothly. 

The coup attempt in the Soviet Union placed Warsaw in a precar- 
ious situation and emphasized the real possibility that Soviet he- 
gemony would return to Eastern Europe if reactionaries overthrew 
Gorbachev. For Warsaw such a scenario was quite plausible be- 
cause substantial Soviet forces remained in Poland and the former 
German Democratic Republic (East Germany) at the time of the 
coup, and no bilateral treaty guaranteed withdrawal. Although 
Walesa's official statements during the crisis affirmed Poland's 
sovereignty and commitment to democracy, later rumors suggest- 
ed that he had considered recognizing the Moscow junta. 

Galvanized by the coup events, Poland pressed the Soviet 
Union for a withdrawal timetable. In October 1991, the countries 
initialed a treaty providing for the removal of all combat troops 
by November 15, 1992, leaving only 6,000 support personnel by 
the beginning of 1993. Signature of a final treaty, however, was 
delayed by disagreement on compensation details. Moscow claimed 
compensation for fixed assets left in Poland, while Warsaw demand- 
ed compensation for damage done to its environment and infras- 
tructure by the basing and transport of Soviet troops and 
equipment. Walesa and Russian president Boris Yeltsin signed the 
final accords in May 1992. 



214 



Government and Politics 



The presidents also signed several other bilateral agreements on 
that occasion. The most important was a new cooperation treaty 
to replace the Polish-Soviet friendship treaty of 1965. The break- 
through on the new treaty had come soon after the failed August 
coup, which dramatically changed the relationship among the 
republics of the Soviet Union. Moscow conceded to Poland the right 
to pursue its own security relationships and to deal directly with 
individual republics. During his Moscow visit, Walesa announced 
the beginning of a new chapter in Polish-Russian relations; in 
return, Yeltsin expressed hope for mutual understanding and part- 
nership in future relations. 

Walesa's visit to Moscow also yielded a Polish-Russian consu- 
lar convention; a declaration on cultural, scientific, and educational 
cooperation; a provisional settlement of the issue of double taxa- 
tion; and an agreement on border crossing points. The presidents 
issued a joint statement condemning the crimes of Stalinism against 
both the Polish and Russian peoples and pledging to base bilateral 
relations on the principles of international law, democracy, and 
the observance of human rights. 

Other Former Soviet Republics 

From the outset, Foreign Minister Skubiszewski pursued a dual- 
track policy toward Poland's eastern neighbors, Russia, Belarus, 
Lithuania, and Ukraine. This approach enabled Warsaw to negoti- 
ate for Polish interests with the central political authority that 
remained in Moscow as the Soviet Union dissolved, while simul- 
taneously developing bilateral ties with the individual republics that 
would emerge from that process as independent neighbors. The 
failure of the August coup signaled to Warsaw the end of the high- 
ly centralized Soviet state and the feasibility of officially recogniz- 
ing independence-minded republics. Accordingly, immediately after 
the coup Poland became the first East European country to ex- 
tend diplomatic recognition to the Baltic republics of Lithuania, 
Latvia, and Estonia. On the day following the formal dissolution 
of the Soviet Union, Poland announced that it was prepared to 
open normal diplomatic relations with all the members of the Com- 
monwealth of Independent States (CIS — see Glossary). 

Although it supported national self-determination, Warsaw feared 
that the breakup of the Soviet Union might bring regional in- 
stability, armed conflict fueled by rival territorial claims, and 
perhaps millions of displaced persons crossing into Poland. Still 
struggling with its own economic and political transition, Poland 
could not have borne the burden of resettling huge numbers of 
refugees. These concerns moved President Walesa to declare his 



215 



Poland: A Country Study 

support for Gorbachev's last-ditch effort in December 1991 to recon- 
stitute the Soviet Union as a loose confederation. Then, after the 
formal demise of the Soviet Union, Walesa called for massive 
Western aid for the newly created CIS to avoid what he called a 
"mass exodus of hungry refugees." 

Baltic States 

On numerous occasions after mid- 1989, the Polish government 
demonstrated sympathy for the increasingly vocal Lithuanian in- 
dependence movement. After the Lithuanian declaration of in- 
dependence in March 1990, a Polish senator was the first foreign 
government representative to address the Lithuanian parliament. 
Poland provided important moral support during the economic 
blockade imposed by the Kremlin, and after the Soviet military 
crackdown in Vilnius in January 1991 , Poland joined Scandinavi- 
an nations, the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic, and Hun- 
gary in calling for a discussion of the action by the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE — see Glossary). 

Despite Warsaw's sympathetic actions, Vilnius grew impatient 
at the Poles' unwillingness to grant diplomatic recognition. At that 
time, however, such an action would have jeopardized negotiations 
on withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland — especially because 
no major Western power had recognized Lithuania. Skubiszewski 
noted that although good relations with the Baltics were impor- 
tant to Poland, relations with the Soviet Union had immediate stra- 
tegic significance. 

The demise of the Soviet Union transformed Poland's relation- 
ship with Lithuania. As the threat of repression from Moscow 
diminished, Vilnius began to perceive Warsaw as a likely source 
of external pressure. The Lithuanian government grew suspicious 
that Warsaw coveted lost territories in Lithuania, where ethnic Poles 
still resided in heavy concentrations. From Poland's perspective, 
the respect of minority rights for roughly 260,000 ethnic Poles resid- 
ing in Lithuania emerged as the most important iss.^e in the bilateral 
relationship. 

In 1988 and 1989, relations of the Polish minority in Lithuania 
with the Lithuanian government deteriorated with the enactment 
of language laws that discriminated against non-Lithuanian speak- 
ers. The laws provoked leaders of the Polish minority to declare 
an autonomous Polish national territorial district. In response, Vil- 
nius dismissed numerous ethnic Polish local officials and placed 
districts with large Polish populations under direct parliamentary 
administration. Further contributing to the worsening relations be- 
tween the two communities was a citizenship law requiring a loyalty 



216 



Government and Politics 



oath that the Polish community viewed as oppressive. Relations 
reached their nadir in late 1991 when the Lithuanian defense 
minister called Poland his country's greatest threat. The follow- 
ing March, Skubiszewski charged Lithuania with delaying elec- 
tions to local councils in districts with large concentrations of ethnic 
Poles. 

Early 1992 also brought hopeful developments, however. The 
foreign ministers of the two nations signed a wide-ranging ten-point 
declaration of friendship and neighborly relations and a consular 
convention. In the declaration, each country renounced all territorial 
claims against the other and pledged to adhere to European stan- 
dards in respecting the rights of its minorities, including native- 
language education rights. 

Polish relations with the other two Baltic states were less com- 
plicated. In mid- 1992, Skubiszewski visited Latvia to sign the first 
Polish bilateral treaty with any of the newly independent Baltic 
states. He also signed important accords on trade, travel, and 
minority rights. Skubiszewski praised Latvia's treatment of its siz- 
able Polish population, which in mid- 1992 was estimated at 
between 60,000 and 100,000. Skubiszewski then signed a similar 
treaty in Tallinn, where the Estonian foreign minister described 
relations with Warsaw as excellent. Both Estonia and Latvia viewed 
Poland as a benign neighbor whose experience in economic and 
political reform could facilitate their own transition and could pro- 
mote their integration into Western Europe. 

Belarus 

For several reasons, Polish relations with Belarus were slow to 
develop. Belarus, which had never existed as an independent state, 
had been so firmly incorporated into the Soviet Union that it lacked 
the intense sense of nationhood found in the Baltic states and in 
Ukraine. Prior to the August coup attempt, Polish overtures were 
frustrated because the Belorussian Republic (as it was known be- 
fore independence) hesitated to pursue foreign policy initiatives 
without the Kremlin's blessing. Most notably, in late 1990 the 
Belorussians refused to sign a declaration of friendship and cooper- 
ation, although Russia and Ukraine had already signed similar 
agreements. Minsk specifically objected to wording about its borders 
with Poland and to the treatment of the approximately 300,000 
ethnic Belorussians in Poland (see Ethnic Groups, ch. 2). 

After August 1991, relations evolved rapidly once Belarus had 
declared its independence. In a declaration of friendship and cooper- 
ation, signed in October 1991, each party renounced territorial 
claims against the other and promised to respect minority rights. 



217 



Poland: A Country Study 



In December 1991, Poland extended diplomatic recognition to Be- 
larus. Commercial ties between the two countries flourished in 1991 
and 1992, and several important transportation and economic agree- 
ments took effect. A bilateral treaty of wide-ranging cooperation 
in security, environmental, economic, and other matters was pre- 
pared for signing in mid- 1992. 

Ukraine 

Despite a centuries-old legacy of conflict, relations between 
Poland and Ukraine steadily improved after 1989, particularly af- 
ter Ukraine gained its independence in late 1991 . In the fall of 1990, 
the countries signed a declaration of friendship and cooperation, 
renouncing all territorial claims against one another and guaran- 
teeing the rights of national minorities on their territories. Ground- 
breaking bilateral economic and cultural agreements followed in 
1991 , as Ukraine emerged from Moscow's domination and reorient- 
ed itself toward Central Europe and Western Europe. 

Both countries had much to gain from improved ties. Kiev sought 
Polish intercession to gain acceptance in European economic and 
security organizations; Warsaw welcomed the prospect of a non- 
threatening buffer state on its eastern border. 

Hours after the results of a referendum on Ukrainian indepen- 
dence were announced in December 1991, Poland was the first 
country to grant diplomatic recognition to the new nation. A bi- 
lateral cooperation treaty ensuring minority rights on each side of 
the border was signed during the May 1992 visit to Warsaw of 
Ukraine's president, Leonid M. Kravchuk. The treaty called for 
annual consultations between the countries' foreign ministers and 
cooperation in economic, cultural, scientific, and environmental 
affairs. During Walesa's visit to Moscow (also in May 1992) to 
sign long-awaited troop withdrawal and bilateral cooperation 
treaties, Walesa noted the rapid progress in bilateral relations since 
1989 and hailed the countries' new emphasis on future goals rather 
than past conflicts. Walesa also noted that the concept of a Warsaw- 
Moscow-Kiev alliance, raised in his talks with Yeltsin, would de- 
pend most heavily on peaceful relations between Russia and 
Ukraine. This observation reaffirmed Poland's neutrality in on- 
going Russian-Ukrainian disagreements over the ownership of the 
Black Sea Fleet, Crimea, and other territories. 

Southern Neighbors and the Visegr^d Triangle 

With the demise of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon, the so-called 
upper-tier nations of Eastern Europe (Poland, Hungary, and Czech- 
oslovakia, which in 1990 became the Czech and Slovak Federative 



218 



Government and Politics 



Republic) found themselves in a security vacuum with both mili- 
tary and economic dimensions. But by late 1991, all three had 
gained associate status with NATO and the EC and were pursu- 
ing full membership in those organizations. 

Poland, the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic, and Hun- 
gary all supported an enhanced peacekeeping role for the CSCE, 
and all joined emerging regional integration associations such as 
the Central European Initiative. Originally called the Pentagonale 
and including Italy, Yugoslavia, Austria, Hungary, and Czecho- 
slovakia, this grouping aimed to strengthen economic, cultural, and 
ecological cooperation in the region. The organization became 
known as the Hexagonale when Poland joined in July 1991, only 
to be renamed the Central European Initiative a few months later 
when Yugoslavia's breakup brought the withdrawal of that nation. 

Already in 1990, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia had be- 
gun to coordinate efforts toward shared goals, including the end 
of the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact and Comecon and entry into 
Western institutions. A milestone in trilateral cooperation was the 
February 1991 summit meeting of Hungary's Prime Minister Jozsef 
Antall, President Vaclav Havel of the Czech and Slovak Federa- 
tive Republic, and Lech Walesa at Visegrad, Hungary. An earli- 
er summit at Bratislava had initiated a series of meetings and 
exchanges among the leaders of the three potential partners, lead- 
ing to the formation of a consultative committee to coordinate policy 
on regional problems. The following January, the foreign ministers 
met in Budapest and issued a joint communique criticizing the 
Kremlin's military crackdown in the Baltics. The foreign ministers 
also issued a statement of support for the United States-led coali- 
tion in the Kuwait crisis. 

The outcome of the Visegrad summit was the Declaration on 
the Cooperation of the Hungarian Republic, the Czech and Slo- 
vak Federative Republic, and the Republic of Poland on the Road 
to European Integration. The document committed the signato- 
ries to eliminate the vestiges of totalitarianism, build democracy, 
ensure human rights, and totally integrate themselves into the "Eu- 
ropean political, economic, security, and legislative order." The 
triangle was not intended to become a military alliance, as For- 
eign Minister Skubiszewski carefully emphasized to allay fears in 
Moscow. Poland subsequently signed bilateral military accords with 
the other triangle partners, again insisting that the agreements were 
designed to promote communication and understanding and posed 
no threat to any specific country. 

During the August coup attempt in Moscow, triangle political 
and military leaders were in frequent contact, agreeing to adopt 



219 



Poland: A Country Study 

a common position toward the crisis and the refugee and border 
security problems that might result from it. In October 1991, a 
second summit in Krakow formalized the Visegrad declaration, 
accelerated efforts to gain NATO and EC membership, and ad- 
vocated an expanded role for the CSCE. The eight-point Krakow 
declaration also chastised Serbia as the aggressor in the Yugoslav 
conflict and called for national self-determination and the preser- 
vation of the previously existing republic boundaries in that country. 

In the months following the Krakow summit, several key events 
strengthened ties among the triangle members and with the West. 
The triangle supported a proposal by the United States and Ger- 
many to establish a North Atlantic Cooperation Council that would 
promote stability and communication between NATO and the na- 
tions of Central Europe and the former Soviet Union. And in De- 
cember, the triangle countries were accorded associate membership 
in the EC . This step established routine political contacts with the 
EC and set the course toward eventual full membership. Also in 
December, the triangle members agreed to coordinate their policy 
on recognition of the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, which 
they granted in January 1992. In April 1992, they jointly recog- 
nized the independence of Bosnia and Hercegovina. 

By early autumn 1992, the future of the triangle was clouded 
by the impending division of the Czech and Slovak Federative 
Republic and by tensions between Hungary and Slovakia over a 
series of issues. After meeting Czech prime minister Vaclav Klaus 
in September, Polish prime minister Suchocka stated that Poland 
viewed the split as a settled matter and would treat the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia on equal terms. Klaus stressed that trilateral 
relations would become less important, and that closer bilateral ties 
among the members would be the way of the future. Polish for- 
eign minister Skubiszewski, however, favored continuing the 
Visegrad Triangle, stating that there were problems that could be 
resolved better through regional cooperation than by unilateral or 
bilateral action. 

Germany 

Together with securing the removal of Soviet troops from Po- 
lish territory, the reemergence of a united, economically powerful 
Germany presented Warsaw's greatest foreign policy challenge after 
1989. Fear of a resurgent Germany motivated Skubiszewski' s ini- 
tial desire to preserve the Warsaw Pact as a political alliance guaran- 
teeing the Oder-Neisse Line as Poland's western border. Warsaw 
also welcomed the continued presence of United States forces in 
Europe as a check on potential German expansionism. At the 



220 



Government and Politics 



same time, however, Germany represented the largest potential 
source of economic assistance and investment for Poland, account- 
ing in 1990 for one-fifth of Warsaw's imports and one-quarter of 
its exports. 

Throughout the postwar period, relations between Warsaw and 
the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) had ranged from 
cool to hostile. In 1981 Poland's international isolation following 
the imposition of martial law further set back bilateral relations. 
Despite the overall expansion of economic ties in the postwar period, 
intractable differences remained over such issues as treatment of 
the 300,000 ethnic Germans in Poland, German territorial claims 
on Poland, compensation for Polish victims of Nazi persecution, 
and the permanence of the Oder-Neisse border. Warsaw consis- 
tently and energetically opposed all movement toward German re- 
unification and revanchism. On the other hand, bilateral relations 
between Poland and East Germany were never warm, in spite of 
their official alliance in the Warsaw Pact. Poles resented East Ger- 
many's general enthusiasm for communist orthodoxy and its sup- 
port of Jaruzelski's martial law decree in 1981. 

West German chancellor Helmut Kohl visited Warsaw in No- 
vember 1989 to accelerate the recent improvement of relations 
between the traditional enemies. Kohl hoped to gain Polish guaran- 
tees for German minority rights and to quiet fears about German 
revanchism that had escalated with impending reunification. West 
Germany extended some US$2 billion in economic assistance to 
Warsaw and acknowledged Germany's guilt for attacking Poland 
in World War II. Kohl also reaffirmed a 1970 bilateral treaty 
promising to respect existing borders. After Kohl subsequently 
caused an international stir by hedging on that commitment, the 
border issue was buried when Germany officially renounced all 
claims on Polish territory and recognized the permanence of the 
existing border in May 1990. 

December 1991 marked a milestone in Polish-German relations 
when the parliaments of both countries ratified a treaty of friend- 
ship and cooperation. On that occasion, Prime Minister Bielecki 
stated that the common strategic goal of a united Europe had in- 
spired Poland and unified Germany to a level of mutual trust un- 
precedented in the long history of their coexistence. Bielecki and 
his successors viewed Germany as Poland's key to integration into 
the West. In turn, Germany considered Warsaw the gateway to 
vast economic opportunities in the East. A central element of the 
treaty was strict adherence to international standards in the treat- 
ment of ethnic minorities. 



221 



Poland: A Country Study 

In 1992 bilateral relations continued to improve. On an official 
visit in the spring, Walesa praised Germany as a democratic, liberal, 
and modern state and urged greater investment in Poland. In July 
the new German foreign minister, Klaus Kinkel, visited Warsaw 
to sign routine customs and border agreements. Kinkel praised 
Poland's treatment of its German minority, which had gained seven 
representatives in the Sejm and one in the Senate in the October 
1991 parliamentary elections. 

Despite the many positive signs of a lasting rapprochement be- 
tween Germany and Poland, however, in 1992 Poles remained sus- 
picious of their powerful western neighbor. European economic 
instability during the late summer brought into question the feasi- 
bility of the EC goal of monetary and political union and rekin- 
dled fears of German economic domination. Widespread vandalism 
and violence by xenophobic extremists in Germany also contributed 
to Polish unease. 

The United States 

Over the years, a special relationship evolved between the peo- 
ples of Poland and the United States. Poles and persons of Polish 
ancestry made enormous contributions at every stage in the de- 
velopment of the United States. For Poles, family ties and genuine 
admiration for the United States negated decades of official anti- 
American propaganda. As official relations between Washington 
and Warsaw deteriorated after the December 1981 imposition of 
martial law, the United States maintained communication with the 
centers of Polish opposition, including leaders of labor, the intel- 
ligentsia, and the Roman Catholic Church. During the 1980s, Unit- 
ed States policies of economic sanctions against the regime and 
support for the opposition contributed to the ultimate fall of the 
communist government. 

Immediately after Jaruzelski imposed martial law in 1981, the 
United States invoked economic sanctions against Poland. In 1982 
the United States suspended most-favored-nation trade status and 
vetoed Poland's application for membership in the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF — see Glossary). In the following years, War- 
saw repeatedly blamed such United States policies for Poland's eco- 
nomic distress (see Reform Failure in the 1980s, ch. 3). For the 
period 1981 to 1985, the Polish government claimed that United 
States-inspired sanctions and Western refusal to reschedule debts 
and extend additional credit had cost the Polish economy US$15 
billion in export income and other losses. 

Despite the end of martial law and limited amnesty for political 
prisoners in 1983, relations with the United States did not improve. 



222 



President Lech Walesa meets with President George H. W. 

Bush on an official visit to Washington, 1991. 
Courtesy David Valdez, White House Photo Office 

In the mid-1980s, Warsaw's determined efforts to prove its loyalty 
to the Soviet Union made rapprochement with Washington im- 
possible. Poland supported the Soviet version of events surround- 
ing the shooting down of a Korean Airlines passenger plane in 1983, 
an incident that greatly heightened Soviet Union-United States ten- 
sions. In 1984 Warsaw joined the Soviet boycott of the Los An- 
geles Olympic Games in reprisal for the United States boycott of 
the previous games in Moscow. Jaruzelski delivered a scathing at- 
tack against United States sanctions policy in a 1985 speech at the 
United Nations. And in 1986 the Polish government condemned 
a United States air strike against Libya. 

Official relations between Washington and Warsaw began to im- 
prove after the Jaruzelski government's 1986 general amnesty 
released all political prisoners. By early 1987, the administration 
of Ronald W. Reagan lifted all economic sanctions and restored 
Poland's most-favored-nation trading status. Vice President George 
H.W. Bush visited Warsaw the following October and promised 
United States support for debt rescheduling in return for the Po- 
lish government's pledge to respect human rights. In 1988, however, 
the United States decided to withhold economic aid until Poland 
reestablished political pluralism. 



223 



Poland: A Country Study 



After the Round Table Agreement of mid- 1989, the United States 
moved quickly to encourage democratic processes and assist eco- 
nomic reform in Poland. Toward this goal, President Bush initial- 
ly promised some US$100 million in economic assistance, and a 
three-year package totaling US$1 billion was proposed later in the 
year. In November Walesa visited Washington and addressed a 
joint session of the United States Congress, which greeted his un- 
precedented speech with promises of additional economic assistance. 
The Congress enacted the Support for Eastern European Democra- 
cy Act (SEED) to streamline the delivery of humanitarian aid and 
assistance for the development of democracy and free-market in- 
stitutions in postcommunist Eastern Europe. An interagency coor- 
dinating council led by the Department of State was established 
to direct assistance to Eastern Europe. The privately managed 
Polish- American Enterprise Fund (PAEF) was created in May 1990 
to provide credit for Polish entrepreneurs to start businesses. Con- 
tingent on the level of congressional funding, the PAEF estimated 
that it would make US$130 million in loans in 1991 . Another non- 
governmental organization, the Overseas Private Investment Cor- 
poration, began providing loans, loan guarantees, insurance, and 
advice to facilitate United States private investment in Poland and 
other East European countries. In 1990 the United States led an 
international effort to create the US$200 million Polish Stabiliza- 
tion Fund, which was instrumental in making the zloty converti- 
ble with Western currencies (for value of the zloty — see Glossary). 

As a major player in such international financial institutions as 
the World Bank (see Glossary), the IMF, the Organisation for Eco- 
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD — see Glossary), the 
Paris Club (see Glossary), and the European Bank for Reconstruc- 
tion and Development (EBRD — see Glossary), the United States 
led the effort to provide debt relief and other economic assistance 
to Poland. In early 1991, the United States pledged a further 20 
percent reduction of Warsaw's debt to Washington. In a mid- 1992 
visit to Warsaw, President Bush praised Poland's political and eco- 
nomic reforms and proposed using the currency-stabilization fund 
to spur private-sector growth. 

Other Western Countries 

After December 1981 , Polish relations with the West were gener- 
ally unfriendly for several years. Few high-ranking Western delega- 
tions travelled to Warsaw, and the Polish government failed to end 
West European support of economic sanctions in response to martial 
law. In 1985 a brief meeting between Jaruzelski and French presi- 
dent Francois Mitterrand yielded no concrete results. Jaruzelski 's 



224 



Government and Politics 



first full-fledged official visit to the West was his 1987 trip to Italy, 
during which he signed an important agreement for automobile 
production with the Fiat Corporation. 

British and French policy toward Poland throughout the 1980s 
was consistent with that of Washington. Both United States allies 
imposed sanctions against Warsaw after December 1 98 1 . Both cul- 
tivated contacts with nongovernment circles and assisted the de- 
velopment of pluralism. And both welcomed the round table talks 
of 1989 and supported economic assistance to the new government. 

The visit of the British prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, to 
Warsaw in November 1988 sent a clear signal of Britain's support 
for pluralism and economic reform in Poland. Thatcher met with 
Solidarity leaders and made a symbolic visit to the grave of Father 
Jerzy Popieluszko, a dissident killed by the Polish secret service 
in 1984. In June 1989, Mitterrand visited Poland. In March 1992, 
Prime Minister Olszewski traveled to Paris and received Mitter- 
rand's assurances of support for Polish membership in the EC. 

Relations with Israel improved dramatically after 1988, when 
Poland hosted an international conference to honor the victims of 
the Holocaust and to observe the forty-fifth anniversary of the War- 
saw Ghetto uprising. Full diplomatic relations were reestablished 
in 1990. 

International Organizations 

Poland was a founding member of the United Nations (UN) and 
takes an active role in numerous UN agencies, including the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the 
World Health Organization; the United Nations Children's Fund; 
the Food and Agriculture Organization; the United Nations In- 
dustrial Development Organization; and the United Nations Con- 
ference on Trade and Development. In the postcommunist era, 
Warsaw has consistently supported Western-led UN initiatives such 
as Operation Desert Storm and the condemnation of Serbian poli- 
cies toward other republics of the former Yugoslavia. In 1992 Poland 
belonged to roughly 1,500 international governmental and private 
organizations. 

After the change of government in mid- 1989, Poland assigned 
the highest priority to obtaining full membership status in NATO 
and the EC as soon as possible. The West supported the concept 
of Poland's integration into Europe; however, only associate sta- 
tus in the EC and NATO had been achieved as of mid- 1992. Mean- 
while, in 1990 Warsaw had gained associate status in the Council 
of Europe, an organization including all West European nations 
and devoted to promoting democracy and the economic health of 



225 



Poland: A Country Study 

its members. The council granted Poland full membership after 
the free parliamentary elections in the autumn of 1991. In Novem- 
ber 1991, the EC approved ten-year associate status for Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic (see 
Southern Neighbors and the Visegrad Triangle, this ch.). The 
agreement provided certain trade concessions and generally was 
viewed as a first step toward eventual full membership. Long and 
spirited debate preceded the Sejm's ratification of membership in 
mid- 1992. Political factions voiced various objections to the terms 
of the agreement. One minister expressed reservations about the 
excessive length of the ten-year adjustment period for Poland to 
reach the general economic development level of EC members. Na- 
tionalist elements, including the KPN considered the agreement 
a threat to Polish sovereignty (see Political Parties, this ch.). 

Poland also had serious disagreements with the IMF, which sus- 
pended credits in 1991 because Warsaw had failed to control its 
budget deficit. In March 1992, however, the IMF expressed general 
support for the Polish economic program. By terms of a subsequent 
agreement with the IMF, Poland came back into compliance with 
IMF deficit guidelines in exchange for access to US$1.5 billion in 
IMF loans. 

Like its partners in the Visegrad Triangle, Poland remained frus- 
trated in 1992 because the West was responding slowly to its at- 
tempts to obtain full membership in European international 
organizations. Nevertheless, Poland continued its full support of 
NATO and the European security role of the CSCE and left little 
doubt in mid- 1992 of its long-term strategic goal, "to rejoin 
Europe. " 

* * * 

Because of the ongoing transformation of Poland's system of 
governance, current political analyses and reports are an impor- 
tant source of information. The most useful of these are the RFE/RL 
Research Report and the Foreign Broadcast Information Service's 
Daily Report: East Europe. Arthur R. Rachwald's excellent summaries 
of Polish matters in the Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 
chronicle political events from the imposition of martial law in 1981 
through the elections of 1991. Informator Polska '91, available only 
in Polish, is the best source on government structure at all levels 
after 1989. The communist government system of the 1980s is sum- 
marized in Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe by Richard Staar. 
Jane Leftwich Curry's Poland's Journalists: Professionalism and Poli- 
tics is among useful sources on censorship and the print media. 



226 



Government and Politics 



Among many discussions of Poland's foreign policy, those merit- 
ing special attention are "Poland and the Soviet Union" by Roger 
E. Kanet and Brian V. Souders; The Bloc That Failed: Soviet East 
European Relations in Transition by Charles Gati; "From Visegrad 
to Krakow: Cooperation, Competition, and Coexistence in Cen- 
tral Europe" by Rudolf L. Tokes, and "Polish-Lithuanian Rela- 
tions: Past, Present, and Future" by Stephen R. Burant. (For 
further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



227 



Chapter 5. National Security 




Syrena, mermaid of Warsaw, legendary protector of the city 



IN THE EARLY 1990s, Poland addressed its national security 
issues as an independent state for the first time in more than fifty 
years. The loss and restoration of independence, and the fluctua- 
tions of national security that accompany such trauma, were not 
unusual in Polish history, however. When it was included in the 
Soviet Union's new empire after World War II, Poland lost con- 
trol of its national security for the second time in two centuries. 
After functioning as two separate entities during the war, the Po- 
lish military was consolidated after the war as a subordinate com- 
ponent of a multinational military organization devoted primarily 
to defense of the Soviet Union. Following the Soviet model, the 
Polish communist government also established strong military- style 
internal security forces to protect the regime from internal and ex- 
ternal threats. 

In 1989 Poland's communist government fell unexpectedly af- 
ter several decades of civil unrest that periodically had brought the 
threat of punitive intervention by the Soviet Union. The ensuing 
political chaos forced Poland to develop a new doctrine of national 
defense emphasizing cooperation with Western military and secu- 
rity organizations and friendly relations with previously hostile 
neighbor states. By 1991 the Warsaw Treaty Organization, better 
known as the Warsaw Pact, the multinational military structure 
created by the Soviet Union to dominate its East European em- 
pire, also had crumbled. 

Poland's new doctrine developed slowly and fitfully in the first 
years of the 1990s. The country's economic need to trim its defense 
establishment clashed with perceptions of possible new threats and 
alliances in postcommunist Europe. After emerging from the War- 
saw Pact, Poland found itself without military alliances at the same 
time as its military infrastructure was rapidly decaying. In this set- 
ting, harsh budget restrictions caused alarm that national security 
again might be compromised before restructuring and rearmament 
could take place. 

Poland's location between two powerful neighbors, Germany and 
Russia, had influenced the country's national security for centu- 
ries. By the early 1990s, however, the changing political circum- 
stances of the region had mitigated Polish concerns about German 
or Russian aggression for the foreseeable future. Beginning in 1990, 
Germany's attention was largely absorbed by the massive problems 
of reunification. The disintegration of the Soviet Union at the end 



231 



Poland: A Country Study 

of 1991 enabled the nations of Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine 
to emerge as newly independent states on Poland's eastern bor- 
der. Thus, in less than three years the number of countries on 
Poland's borders increased from three to six. Under those circum- 
stances, Poland was concerned about a security vacuum that might 
promote internal instability, border disputes, or even an armed 
regional conflict close to Polish territory. Poland's national secu- 
rity depended not only on the stability of neighboring states but 
also on domestic political and economic stability. 

A healthy military was important for two reasons. Historically, 
the army had represented Polish self-esteem and the survival of 
the Polish state. National leaders were anxious to recapture that 
tradition to boost domestic morale. Also, a capable military estab- 
lishment would help Poland present itself to the world as a viable, 
independent state. To achieve these goals, Polish leaders sought 
a complete restructuring of the defense establishment in the early 
1990s. A new national military doctrine was formulated to reflect 
the end of the Warsaw Pact and the end of the political and mili- 
tary division of Europe into rival camps, as well as Poland's possi- 
ble inclusion in existing Western security structures. The reform 
program was intended to streamline the Ministry of National 
Defense and military administration and to include civilians more 
closely in the process of defense decision making. The reform pro- 
gram sought to extricate the Polish Army from the constraints of 
Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact military doctrine and training stan- 
dards. Reform leaders also sought to reestablish the prestige of the 
armed forces as a national institution separate from and above pol- 
itics. The quasimilitary forces that the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
had used to quell civil unrest during the communist era were 
abolished or redirected against genuine threats to the welfare of 
society. 

Development of the Armed Forces 

The Polish people possess remarkably strong military traditions. 
Throughout their history, they have demonstrated their will to resist 
foreign invasion and occupation. Military men who fought for na- 
tional independence were viewed among the country's greatest 
patriots. In periods of national travail, the people sought leader- 
ship from their military heroes — Jan Sobieski, Tadeusz Kosciusz- 
ko, Jozef Poniatowski, the young officers who led the 1830 uprising, 
Jozef Pilsudski, and Wladyslaw Sikorski. 

From Medieval Times to World War I 

From the days of the earliest kings, the defense of Polish soil 



232 



Old fortress at Cieszyn, Silesian stronghold ceded by Piast 
rulers to Bohemia in twelfth century 
Courtesy Sam and Sarah Stulberg 

demanded constant vigilance against Mongol, Tatar, and, later, 
German encroachment. In the 1400s, the first century of Poland's 
union with Lithuania, Polish soldiers often battled the Teutonic 
Knights (see Glossary), who threatened the union from their strong- 
hold along the Baltic seacoast (see The Polish-Lithuanian Union, 
ch. 1). Poland was regarded as the outer bastion of Western Eu- 
rope, and the Poles, led by an aristocratic military caste, accepted 
the mission to defend Western civilization against Eastern intru- 
sions. Jan Sobieski's defeat of the Turks at Vienna in 1683, the 
last great military victory of the Polish- Lithuanian Commonwealth, 
was a turning point in the centuries-long struggle against westward 
expansion of the Ottoman Empire. 

By 1725, however, Peter the Great had established a strong, uni- 
fied Russian Empire that began to compete with the Ottoman Turks 
for dominance of the Slavic lands between them. At the same time, 
internal political decay weakened the Polish- Lithuanian Common- 
wealth, and Poland fell permanently behind Russia as a military 
power (see Decay of the Commonwealth, ch. 1). In the eighteenth 
century, Russia assumed the role of protector of Poland, first against 
Sweden and then against Prussia. In this period, the national army 
serving the Polish king degenerated from its previously honored 



233 



Poland: A Country Study 

position. Manpower and royal prestige dwindled as local landlords 
raised their own private armies. Under these conditions, Poland 
lacked the military strength to resist the three partitions imposed 
by Austria, Prussia, and Russia between 1772 and 1795. The cou- 
rageous but hopeless campaign of Tadeusz Kosciuszko's insurgent 
army against the Russian Army in 1794 marked the final chapter 
in that era of Polish independence. By 1795, Poland had been erased 
from the map (see Partition of Poland, 1764-95, ch. 1). 

Although the army could not prevent the final partition of the 
country, its veterans and graduates of the military college fought 
alongside the armies of Napoleon in his campaigns against Aus- 
tria, Prussia, and Russia. Many Poles also served in the army of 
Congress Poland after 1815 (see The Napoleonic Period, ch. 1). 
Jozef Poniatowski, nephew of the last Polish king, distinguished 
himself in Napoleon's 1809 campaign against Austria. The Polish 
Legion participated in Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812. 

In the nineteenth century, Polish soldiers and officers served in 
the armies of Russia, Prussia (Germany), or Austria, depending 
on which power occupied their region. In this period, the prac- 
tices of the partitioning powers exerted great influence on Polish 
military thought. Poles rose to high command positions, particu- 
larly in Austrian service. Poles fought on both sides during World 
War I, and all three occupying powers exerted great efforts to main- 
tain the loyalty of the Poles in their jurisdictions. A Polish army 
was formed in France to help protect that country from the Cen- 
tral Powers, whereas Jozef Pilsudski raised his Polish Legion to 
fight against Russia (and, more incidentally, for Austria) in the 
hope of eventually regaining Poland's independence from Russia. 
Much of the fighting on the eastern front in World War I took 
place on the territory of the former Polish Republic. Some 2 mil- 
lion Polish soldiers fought with the armies of the three occupying 
powers, and 450,000 Poles died in the war. 

The Interwar Years 

In 1918, after 123 years of partition, Poland regained its indepen- 
dence. The immediate military task was forming a new national 
army from soldiers and officers who had fought on both sides — 
although officers who had served on the side of the Central Pow- 
ers dominated the new army. In the territorial uncertainty that fol- 
lowed the war, the Red Army pushed westward, aiming to use 
Poland as a bridge over which to spread socialism into postwar Ger- 
many. Pilsudski blocked this advance in 1919; then in 1920 he 
advanced eastward with the goal of including Ukrainian and Belo- 
russian territory in a new Slavic state. Polish forces were thrown 



234 




Tadeusz Kosciuszko, 
leader of the Polish 
insurrection of 1 794 
Courtesy National Portrait 
Gallery, Smithsonian 
Institution, Washington 



back nearly to Warsaw, where Pilsudski defeated the Soviets and 
began an effective counterattack that preserved Poland's indepen- 
dence from Soviet domination in the interwar period. 

Pilsudski's military and political prominence ensured that the 
armed forces became an important national institution in the new 
government. Many Poles saw the army as both the symbol and 
the guarantor of their country's independence and unity. In 1926, 
after Poland had experienced several years of political uncertainty 
and weak leadership, Piisudski took over the state in a military coup, 
assuming the posts of minister of defense and general inspector of 
the army. In the interwar period, military officers held prominent 
positions in the national government, and their elevated status 
fostered intense political and personal rivalries as well as high-level 
corruption. After Pilsudski's death in 1935, Poland was ruled in- 
effectually by a group of his former subordinates, who remained 
in power until 1939. 

After World War I, Polish national security rested on a military 
alliance with France, which guaranteed Poland's independence and 
territorial integrity. Poland was unsuccessful in joining the Little 
Entente, a French- sponsored alliance of Czechoslovakia, Romania, 
and Yugoslavia, because Czechoslovakia suspected Polish territorial 
ambitions along their mutual border. In protecting its sovereignty 
during this period, Poland had as its primary concerns maintain- 
ing a balance between its two powerful neighbors, Germany and 



235 



Poland: A Country Study 

the Soviet Union, and avoiding a situation where the two would 
take concerted action against Poland and divide it once again. 

World War II 

The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact between Nazi Germany and the 
Soviet Union realized Poland's worst fear. In September 1939, 
within one month of the signing of the treaty, Poland's two neigh- 
bors again attacked and divided the country. In the twenty years 
following World War I, Poland had been unable to modernize its 
armed forces or devise strategic and operational plans for defense 
against a Soviet or German attack. Hence in 1939 Poland was stra- 
tegically isolated, unable to mobilize its troops, and technologically 
inferior. Although the Franco-Polish Alliance and Military Con- 
vention of 1921 required that a German attack on Poland trigger 
a French offensive against Germany in the West (terms that had 
been confirmed as recently as May 1939), the French did not come 
to Poland's aid when Adolf Hitier staged a border incident that 
brought Nazi forces storming onto Polish territory. 

The large but underequipped Polish Army soon capitulated, and 
most of the force spent the war in prisoner-of-war camps. Under- 
ground resistance against German occupation began almost im- 
mediately, however, and resistance activity continued on Polish 
soil throughout the war. At its peak, the so-called Home Army (Ar- 
mia Krajowa), directed by the London government-in-exile, in- 
cluded as many as 400,000 resistance fighters. Polish forces also 
fought under British and Soviet commands on the western and 
eastern fronts respectively. Poles fought with distinction with the 
Allies in Africa and Italy; the number of Polish soldiers on the 
Western Front reached 200,000 by the end of the war. 

A separate Polish army, recruited by order of Joseph V. Stalin 
from among Polish prisoners of war on Soviet soil in 1943, initial- 
ly lacked officers and expertise. As a result, by the war's end about 
40 percent of the officers in that force had come directly from the 
Red Army. In July 1944, on the strength of occupation by this 
Soviet-Polish army, a Soviet-backed provisional government was 
established at Lublin in eastern Poland. At the same time, the 
Eastern Front force, augmented by Soviet conscription in liberat- 
ed territory, reformed as the Polish First Army under command 
of General Zygmunt Berling, who had been a Polish officer before 
the war. The Polish First Army later joined the Lublin-based com- 
munist resistance command to form the Polish Armed Forces (Woj- 
ska Polskie). In late 1944, two additional armies were added to 
this umbrella command; all the Polish Eastern Front armies, which 
ultimately totaled about 400,000 troops, fought with distinction as 



236 



National Security 



the Soviet forces drove westward toward Germany in 1944-45 (see 
World War II, ch. 1). 

The Polish armies on the eastern and western fronts remained 
under separate commands throughout the war, reflecting the po- 
litical split that would substantively alter Poland's military doc- 
trine after the war. The Soviet officer corps of the Eastern Front 
armies wielded a heavy political influence on their troops. Before 
the end of hostilities, an estimated 5,000 to 6,000 political officers 
were charged with indoctrinating military personnel in the 
philosophy of the new communist political order that the Soviets 
planned for postwar Poland. By mid- 1945, the Polish Army had 
adopted Red Army equipment, organization, regulations, and 
strategy, as well as the Soviet- type political apparatus that would 
become standard for all the armies of postwar Eastern Europe. 

The Communist Era 

For forty-five years following World War II, the Polish military 
subordinated its organization and its doctrine to the larger geo- 
political and military aims of the Soviet Union. Until 1981, how- 
ever, Polish society largely retained the traditional notion that the 
first mission of its army was to represent and defend the Polish 
people, regardless of political conditions. The final eight years of 
communist rule marked an unnatural combination of military and 
political doctrines, triggering a reorganization process that con- 
tinued into the noncommunist 1990s. 

Postwar Consolidation 

The noncommunist Home Army officially disbanded in Janu- 
ary 1945, and the course of the war left the Eastern Front armies 
in control of all Polish territory. In the immediate postwar era, the 
army took second place to Poland's new internal security forces 
in purging political opponents and consolidating communist pow- 
er. This purging process lasted until the formation of the Polish 
United Workers' Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza — 
PZPR) in 1948 (see Consolidation of Communist Power, ch. 1). 

Unlike other important institutions, the army did not suffer 
wholesale purges of its noncommunist elements in the immediate 
postwar period. Communists controlled the top ranks and leader- 
ship positions, however, and political commissars installed in mili- 
tary units taught communist party principles to regular soldiers 
and ensured their loyalty to the party. Many wartime political 
officers played a significant role in the indoctrination process and 
based glittering civilian careers on their contributions to the building 
of the communist state. 



237 



Poland: A Country Study 

In the late 1940s, the main roles of the military were resettle- 
ment of Poland's newly acquired western territory, helping in eco- 
nomic reconstruction, and waging a three-year civil war against 
former Home Army supporters, Ukrainian nationalists, and vari- 
ous outlaw bands in the foothills of the Carpathian Mountains. 
Some 70,000 people were arrested by internal security and mili- 
tary authorities in the repression of civil uprisings between 1945 
and 1948. In 1981 General Wojciech Jaruzelski, who later would 
head the last communist government, cited the threat that such 
uprisings would recur in his rationale for imposing martial law in 
Poland. 

The sociological composition of Poland's army changed dramat- 
ically after World War II. The interwar officer corps had come 
mostly from the gentry and professional classes. By 1949, however, 
only 29 percent of Polish officers had begun service before the war, 
and peasants and workers were favored highly in postwar officer 
training programs. From 1948 through 1953, in keeping with Sta- 
lin's intrusive totalitarian influence throughout Eastern Europe, 
the PZPR and the Soviet Army exercised increasing influence in 
Polish military affairs. Soviet officers headed the Polish General 
Staff, all service branches, and all military districts during this peri- 
od. A Soviet general, Konstantin Rokossovskii, served as minister 
of defense of Poland between 1949 and 1956. His first assignment 
was to purge the Polish armed forces of remaining prewar person- 
nel who were considered ideologically unreliable. Accordingly, be- 
tween 1950 and 1955, many faithful communist officers were 
imprisoned or executed. In 1949, as the Cold War set in, the Po- 
lish People's Army (as it was renamed after World War II) went 
on a war footing, conscription was reinstituted, and preparations 
were made to operate as part of the Soviet army in a future Euro- 
pean land war. 

The ravages of World War II somewhat eroded society's faith 
in the Polish military's ability to defend the country. Postwar politi- 
cization caused a further decline in the military's stature and a 
parallel decline in military morale and organization. Soviet army 
officers in close cooperation with the Committee for State Securi- 
ty (Komitet gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti — KGB) occupied all key 
commands until 1956. This command structure bypassed Polish 
communist authorities often and openly in making military policy. 

Defining the Military's Postwar Role 

In June 1956, major failures of communist state economic policy 
brought a large-scale uprising of workers in Poznari demanding 
"bread and freedom." Polish troops refused to fire on the workers, 



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National Security 



heralding a political upheaval that ended the Stalinist era in Poland. 
The uprisings of 1956 greatly alarmed the Soviet Union and ulti- 
mately reduced Soviet control over the Polish military and internal 
security agencies. Poland's Security Service (Shizba Bezpieczeri- 
stwa — SB), which had crushed the Poznari workers ruthlessly, was 
revamped in 1956. The widely unpopular Rokossovskii and thirty- 
two Soviet generals were recalled to the Soviet Union in spite of 
intense Soviet diplomatic pressure. At this critical point, Polish units 
went on alert in response to a massing of Soviet troops and tanks 
on the eastern border. Incoming party chief Wladyslaw Gomulka 
skillfully negotiated Poland's position with the Soviets; backed by 
Poland's demonstrated willingness to defend itself, Gomulka was 
able to avert an invasion. Just two weeks later, in October 1956, 
Soviet tanks would roll into Hungary. The Moscow Declaration 
and the Treaty of December 17, 1956 then stipulated the sovereignty 
of the Polish communist elite over the Polish military and estab- 
lished limitations on the stationing and maneuver of Soviet forces 
in Poland. 

Many of Gomulka' s reforms proved short-lived, however, and 
no full offensive was mounted against Soviet control of the mili- 
tary. In his campaign against "revisionism," which began in 1957, 
Gomulka gradually returned pro-Moscow officers to key positions. 
Moscow continued to station troops in Poland, train Polish officers 
in the Soviet Union, supply Soviet-made weapons, and include 
Poland in regional defense plans. And in 1957, Gomulka formed 
the Military Counterintelligence Service to continue supplying the 
party information about political attitudes in the military. At the 
same time, he refined and professionalized the Internal Security 
Corps, which had been discredited in 1956. Political officers received 
training to give them a higher level of professional military compe- 
tence and credibility with the troops and their professional counter- 
parts. Nevertheless, experts consider the events of 1956 a watershed 
in Polish military history. Because Polish forces had helped the 
Polish communist government to a new autonomy, the military 
regained some of its prestige and influence in society. 

Gomulka' s government sought to consolidate PZPR control of 
military policy, which in the Stalinist years had been a tangled com- 
bination of informal Polish and Soviet lines of authority. Gomulka 
replaced departing Soviet commanders with Polish officers who had 
served with him in the wartime communist underground (as op- 
posed to the Soviet-controlled Polish First Army) and with com- 
manders who had prepared their troops to resist the threatened 
Soviet invasion in 1956. Nominal control of military affairs rested 
with the Council of Ministers and its National Defense Committee 



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Poland: A Country Study 



(Komitet Obrony Kraju — KOK; see The Communist Tradition, 
this ch.). As in all other national policy matters, however, the Po- 
litical Bureau (Politburo) of the PZPR had the final word in all 
important policy questions. Personalities and factions continued 
to dominate policy. Under Gomulka's trusted minister of national 
defense, General Marian Spychalski, the top grades of the officer 
corps were riven by political conflict. A conservative nationalist 
group known as the Partisans became a major force opposing mili- 
tary and political reform. Their leader, internal security chief 
Mieczystaw Moczar, gained substantial power in the 1960s by play- 
ing factions against one another and purging reformist rivals. In 
1967-68, using the June 1967 War between Israel and its Arab 
neighbors as a pretext, Moczar and his faction instigated the purge 
of the remaining 200 Jewish officers in the Polish People's Army 
and the ouster of Spychalski. Moczar' s methodology did not yield 
him complete control, however, because most of the purged officers 
were replaced by young professionals uninterested in the ideologi- 
cal infighting of the military establishment. 

One such figure was Wojciech Jaruzelski, the lieutenant general 
who capped a rapid rise through the ranks by replacing Spychalski 
as minister of national defense in 1968. Jaruzelski 's appointment 
began the retreat of the Partisans' influence. In 1970 the military 
again was ordered to quell worker riots, this time in the Baltic ports 
of Gdansk and Gdynia. Jaruzelski refused to transmit the order, 
and the army generally refrained from action. Although army units 
inflicted some civilian casualties, the Internal Security Corps again 
was the main force brought against Polish demonstrators. The ar- 
my's reaction reinforced the message of 1956 that the Polish mili- 
tary could not be expected to defend a communist regime from 
the people by suppressing political unrest. 

In the 1970s, the prestige of the military continued to grow while 
that of the PZPR plummeted because of the economic failures and 
corruption associated with the regime of Gomulka's successor, 
Edward Gierek. Through the 1970s and the 1980s, the military 
took a noncommittal attitude toward major episodes of civil un- 
rest. In 1976 Minister of National Defense Jaruzelski informed 
Gierek that Polish soldiers could not be expected to fire on strik- 
ing Polish workers. The army remained strictly loyal to the com- 
munist system, but it showed much less loyalty to particular regimes 
when they came under attack from the Polish population. In 1980, 
when the Solidarity (Solidarnosc) union set off a series of large- 
scale strikes in the Baltic ports, the government apparently did not 
consider using the military to quell unrest. A 1981 poll showed 



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National Security 



the military behind only the church and Solidarity in the level of 
respect afforded by Poles to their national institutions. 

While the Polish military remained neutral in internal affairs, 
it fulfilled completely the foreign duties expected of a Warsaw Pact 
member. Two Polish divisions took part in the 1968 invasion of 
Czechoslovakia that was precipitated by Soviet alarm at that coun- 
try's experimentation with economic and political reform. In keeping 
with the Soviet Union's decision to distribute defense responsibili- 
ties more widely among Warsaw Pact members, the Polish defense 
industry grew rapidly in the 1970s and early 1980s. Poland reached 
fifth place in world arms exports in 1987. 

Martial Law 

Although the military was taking a low public profile, Jaruzel- 
ski played a major behind-the-scenes role in unseating the discredit- 
ed Gierek in 1980. The following year, Jaruzelski himself became 
prime minister as a compromise candidate acceptable to all fac- 
tions of the PZPR's divided leadership. By 1981 military officers 
occupied fourteen seats in the PZPR Central Committee (three had 
been the norm during the Gierek regime). Until late 1981 , Jaruzel- 
ski represented a moderate wing of the PZPR willing to negotiate 
with the ever-more powerful Solidarity movement. The restraint 
Jaruzelski had shown in using military force in 1970, 1976, and 
1980 sustained his public prestige and that of the armed forces 
through 1980. 

In 1981 , however, the near-collapse of the PZPR caused civilian 
party leaders to tie the army, by way of Jaruzelski, closer to the 
role of defending the regime against popular dissent. Party lead- 
ers named Jaruzelski prime minister and then first secretary of the 
PZPR, making the general the most powerful political figure in 
Poland and completely closing the gap between military and polit- 
ical authority. In December 1981, the party's continued collapse, 
the country's economic decay, and Solidarity's increasingly radi- 
cal demands and fear of a Soviet Army invasion triggered by those 
conditions caused Jaruzelski to declare martial law, in effect ex- 
ecuting a military coup. 

The military was mobilized but did not confront activists and 
demonstrators directly. The army staffed checkpoints and protected 
communications and transportation facilities while the specialized 
Motorized Units of the Citizens' Militia (Zmotoryzowane Oddzialy 
Milicji Obywatelskiej — ZOMO) performed riot control functions 
on the streets (see Internal Security, this ch.). Nevertheless, martial 
law associated the military directly with the severe curtailment of 
civil liberties and the imprisonment of thousands of antigovernment 



241 



Poland: A Country Study 

activists. The use of the military to keep a Polish regime in power 
again tarnished the public perception of the armed forces. The 
prospect of facing fellow Poles in life-threatening confrontations 
fragmented and demoralized the army as well. Once the public 
regained its voice in government policy in 1989, the memory of 
martial law prompted strong insistence that control of the armed 
forces henceforth be distinctly lodged with responsible civilian offi- 
cials and totally separate from any political party. 

The state of emergency ended officially in mid- 1983, but Jaruzel- 
ski and his military subordinates remained in control of top party 
and government offices for the next six years. Jaruzelski support- 
ers replaced the discredited upper echelon of civilian PZPR offi- 
cials, and during this period political officers remained in place 
at all levels of the military. Especially in the early and mid-1980s, 
the special police forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs remained 
a potent arm of the government in suppressing dissident activity 
by surveillance and physical intimidation. The public's negative 
image of the military regime was reinforced in 1984 when Jaruzel- 
ski 's government was implicated in the murder of dissident priest 
Jerzy Popiehiszko by internal security agents. After a unique public 
trial, the security service was reorganized, but dissidents still were 
harassed in the years that followed. During this period, military 
recruitment became increasingly difficult because the declaration 
of martial law had reduced the prestige of a military career. 

By 1985 Mikhail S. Gorbachev's highly visible reforms in the 
Soviet Union removed the rationale that political reform in Poland 
might incite an invasion from the East, and Jaruzelski moved cau- 
tiously in the same direction as Gorbachev. Shortly thereafter, the 
Soviet Union also orchestrated changes in Poland's international 
military position by restructuring the Warsaw Pact and revising 
the military doctrine that justified the alliance. When the Soviet 
Union began streamlining military planning and increasing doc- 
trinal reliance on reserve forces throughout the alliance in 1987, 
Poland was able to begin sorely-needed reductions in its military 
budget. In 1988 military personnel were reduced by 15,000 per- 
sons, and another 33,000 were cut in 1989 (see Military Manpower, 
this ch.). The military budget for 1989 was 4 percent less than that 
for 1988 (see Military Budget, this ch.). 

Transition and Reform 

In 1989 the peaceful transition from the Jaruzelski regime to the 
popularly elected Solidarity-led government had little immediate 
impact on the organization of the Polish military. General Florian 
Siwicki, who had been Jaruzelski' s minister of national defense, 



242 



National Security 



served in the first cabinet of noncommunist Prime Minister Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki, even though Siwicki had been closely involved in the 
1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia and the imposition of martial law. 
Under Mazowiecki, Siwicki directed a first phase of military reforms 
until he was replaced in mid- 1990. General Czeslaw Kiszczak, 
Jaruzelski's minister of internal affairs throughout the martial law 
period, also was held over in Mazowiecki' s first cabinet. Kisz- 
czak began redirecting the charter of the infamous special police ser- 
vices away from their traditional communist role of support for 
the government in power and toward protection of society as a 
whole. 

In 1989, for the first time since the interwar period, the military 
came under open scrutiny by the Polish media and parliament. 
Public resentment of the armed forces as a tool of communist repres- 
sion was increased by exposures of brutality and corruption under 
Jaruzelski. The military responded with a campaign of openness 
and humanization that finally led to substantial reform and reduced 
hostility between the military and Solidarity. Reform measures 
taken by the end of 1990 included removal of all political organi- 
zations from the military, further budget and manpower reduc- 
tions, conversion of thirty military installations to civilian use, 
shortened terms of service for draftees, and freedom of religious 
practice in the military (see The Military and Society, this ch.). 
Shortages of personnel already had forced passage of an alterna- 
tive service law in 1988. Lech Walesa, the first popularly elected 
president, who came to power in December 1990, became com- 
mander in chief of the armed forces, and the Ministry of National 
Defense began a transition from a basically military body into a 
civilian agency of the government in which military authority would 
be distinctly subordinate (see Evolution and Restructuring, this ch.). 

Externally, Poland's chief military goal in the first postcommunist 
years was ending the Warsaw Pact obligations that still placed Soviet 
troops on Polish soil in the early 1990s, then moving as quickly 
as possible to a new set of national security agreements. In 1990 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland began urging the dissolu- 
tion of the Warsaw Pact, citing new geopolitical conditions that 
made such an arrangement superfluous for the security of both the 
Soviet Union and the East European member nations. 

In late 1990, the Poles then entered long and difficult bilateral 
negotiations on the Soviet troop issue, including the timing for with- 
drawal from Poland and the method by which Soviet troops leaving 
Germany would cross Polish territory. Soviet negotiators resisted an 
early timetable (Walesa's initial bargaining position required com- 
plete withdrawal by the end of 1991) and demanded compensation 



243 



Poland: A Country Study 



for installations that Soviet forces had built. The Soviet position 
on Poland was determined by existing agreements for complete 
Soviet withdrawal from Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and by the 
recent reunification of Germany. After those events, Poland was 
perceived as the last pillar of the Soviet Union's European securi- 
ty structure. The issue was finally resolved in late 1991 with Soviet 
agreement to remove all combat troops from Poland by the end 
of 1992 and all support troops by the end of 1993. A separate agree- 
ment defined terms for transit of Soviet troops from Germany 
through Poland (see Threat Perception, this ch.). 

National Security Policy 

In mid- 1991, the Warsaw Pact ceased to function as a military 
alliance, ending the dominating role of that organization in Polish 
national defense. Poland's approach to national security changed 
drastically, but the change really was a return to the geopolitical 
fundamentals that had formed the nation's long-term threat per- 
ception and military doctrine. Poland sought a new balance among 
its immediate neighbors (including Russia and Germany) and new 
security arrangements with other states, such as Hungary and the 
Czech and Slovak Federative Republic (CSFR — see Glossary), that 
were also emerging from Soviet domination. Like Poland, those 
nations now felt exposed on all sides. They were free to determine 
their own future, but they were also solely responsible for the results 
of their political and national security choices. 

Threat Perception 

Throughout the communist era, official threat perception by the 
Polish military was identical to that of the Soviet Union: the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO — see Glossary) would con- 
front the forces of the socialist nations on the plains of Northern 
Europe in a massive conventional war. Until 1990 Poland had the 
special threat perception of renewed invasion from Germany; 
although the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) was 
itself no longer a military power, it was the ostensible staging area 
for large numbers of NATO troops against the Warsaw Pact. On 
the other hand, the Soviet invasions of Czechoslovakia and Hun- 
gary exemplified the eastern threat perceived by both communist 
and noncommunist Poles with nationalist loyalties. That threat was 
also a convenient tool for the Jaruzelski government in justifying 
oppression of reform activity. 

By 1987 the inefficient centralized industrial systems of the War- 
saw Pact countries were increasingly unable to produce high- 
technology weaponry, and their national economies had become 



244 



National Security 



severely distorted by the priority given military production. Ac- 
cordingly, Gorbachev's "new thinking" on Soviet security prompt- 
ed a redesign of Warsaw Pact strategy based on sober reassessment 
of Warsaw Pact resources and on the belief that political means 
could replace military strategy in protecting the security of the al- 
liance. The new strategy included reducing defense spending and 
emphasizing a pan-European security plan that might split NATO 
into American and European factions. Although the new structure 
continued to regard Poland as a central player in the coalition 
defense system, Poland was able to reduce and streamline key mili- 
tary units beginning in 1987. Thus, before the revolutions of 1989, 
the Warsaw Pact's combined threat perception had changed prag- 
matically, and member nations had the opportunity to relieve some- 
what the onus of mandatory support of the alliance's military 
structure. For Poland, this change triggered the search for a more 
realistic and independent threat perception that continued into the 
early 1990s. 

The postcommunist era complicated Poland's threat perception. 
The new outlook began with the recognition that Poland was not 
and could not be militarily comparable to its traditionally danger- 
ous neighbors. To the east, the Soviet Union had fractured into 
numerous republics, abolishing any remaining threat of an attack 
launched from the east to keep Poland within ideological limits. 
The uneasy relations among the former Soviet republics, especial- 
ly between Russia and Ukraine over issues such as jurisdiction over 
nuclear weapons and control of the Black Sea, caused alarm in 
Poland. So did the possibility that reform would fail in Russia, al- 
lowing an ultranationalist, hard-line regime to come to power, reas- 
sert Soviet or imperialist prerogatives, and renege on troop 
withdrawal schedules. Another threat was the rejection by the newly 
independent republics of arms control agreements signed by the 
Soviet Union. Such a move could lead to uncontrolled prolifera- 
tion of nuclear weapons and the failure of limits on conventional 
forces in the region. In another scenario, central authority might 
fail entirely in former republics, causing conflicts among former 
Soviet forces to spill over onto adjacent Polish territory. In 1991 
three events — the Soviet crackdown in Lithuania in January, the 
attempted reactionary coup in the Soviet Union in August, and 
the chaos of the Serbian-Croatian struggle in the last half of the 
year — lent urgency to the formation of Poland's new European secu- 
rity policy. 

Polish concerns were magnified by the strength and disposition of 
forces in the former Soviet Union. Russian troops withdrawn from 
Germany and Poland went to Kaliningrad, the isolated Russian 



245 



Poland: A Country Study 



province on Poland's northern border, and often remained there 
because the surrounding republics, Belarus and Lithuania, would 
not permit Russian troops to pass through their territory. The con- 
tinued concentration of Russian armored, artillery, and infantry 
forces in Kaliningrad was a source of alarm for Poland in 1992. 
(Poland did not seek a change in the political status of Kalinin- 
grad, however.) To the east, the armed forces in Ukraine's Car- 
pathian Military District adjoining Poland exceeded Poland's entire 
combat strength in 1992 (although bilateral relations with Ukraine 
were quite friendly). Many Polish storage depots were located close 
to the borders of both Kaliningrad and Ukraine, making them vul- 
nerable in case of attack from either direction. 

Past territorial and military conflicts with Belarus, Lithuania, 
and Ukraine were confined increasingly to the memories of the older 
generations on all sides. Nevertheless, Belarus, remembering that 
the Treaty of Riga had divided that republic between Poland and 
Soviet Russia in 1921, still claimed the Bialystok region of eastern 
Poland, which was home to a substantial Belarusian population. 
And Ukrainian nationalists remembered the role of the Polish Peo- 
ple's Army in helping the Soviet Union crush the anticommunist 
Ukrainian Resistance Army in 1947, as well as the interwar Po- 
lish hegemony in western Ukraine. The most divisive issue in 
Polish- Lithuanian relations was treatment of the Polish minority 
in Lithuania, estimated at 300,000 people in 1990. In 1991 and 
1992, that well-organized minority pressed for autonomy, putting 
the Polish government in a difficult diplomatic position and blocking 
Poland's efforts to secure its eastern and northern borders from 
ethnic turmoil (see Other Former Soviet Republics, ch. 4). 

Poland's evaluation of Germany's position was more reassur- 
ing. In the early 1990s, Polish policy makers saw the newly reuni- 
fied Germany's strong commitments to NATO and the European 
Community (EC — see Glossary), the German national oudook, and 
continued deemphasis of the German military as indicators that 
Germany would remain a benign neighbor through the 1990s. Poles 
increasingly perceived the threat from Germany as one of economic 
rather than military domination. Accordingly, Poland's best defense 
appeared to lie in forming closer ties with the traditionally robust 
German economy and reinvigorating the Polish political system 
rather than in strategic military planning. Doubts about Germa- 
ny's long-term territorial goals were revived briefly in 1990 when 
Germany hesitated in accepting the Oder-Neisse Line as a per- 
manent border between the two countries, but tensions were eased 
by the signing of a border treaty in mid- 1990 and a Polish-Ger- 
man friendship and cooperation treaty in late 1991 (see fig. 12; 



246 



Armor crew checking terrain on maneuvers 
Courtesy Polish Information Agency, Warsaw 

Germany, ch. 4). In pursuing closer German ties, however, Poland 
cautiously soothed Russian perceptions that a new alliance might 
be forming to its west. 

Military Doctrine 

Throughout the existence of the Warsaw Pact, Poland was a key 
element in the security system of the Soviet Union. The Polish 
armed forces were the largest non-Soviet national component of 
the alliance. Located in the "northern tier" between NATO coun- 
tries and the Soviet Union, Poland was expected to play a major 
role in any major conventional conflict with West European forces. 
Polish force structure gave priority to armor in expectation of a 
blitzkrieg-style theater offensive across Europe. In joint offensive 
warfare training exercises in the early 1980s, Poland had the mis- 
sion of attacking northern West Germany and Denmark. Poland 
was also the major corridor for supply and communications be- 
tween the Soviet Union and the large Soviet force in place in the 
German Democratic Republic (East Germany). These factors were 
the rationale for the assignment of approximately 30,000 Soviet 
ground and air troops on Polish soil from the late 1940s until 1992. 

After essentially following Soviet military doctrine for forty-five 
years, in 1990 Poland began formulating independent doctrine 



247 



Poland: A Country Study 



taking into account a vastly different European strategic situation. 
The first public declaration of a new approach came in February 
1990, when Poland was still a member of the Warsaw Pact. The 
guidelines issued by Jaruzelski's national security agency, the KOK 
(which at that point still included some communists), were clearly 
labeled as transitional, and the statement included a one-sentence 
reiteration of loyalty to Warsaw Pact obligations. Nevertheless, 
some independent positions were taken. Poland now categorically 
rejected initiation of military action against another state and par- 
ticipation in a war unless its allies were attacked. Maintenance of 
Polish troops beyond national borders was described as contradic- 
tory to national interests. In case of an attack on a Warsaw Pact 
member, only Polish authorities would determine the appropriate 
response of Poland, Polish commanders would retain full control 
of Polish troops, and Polish forces would remain discrete units rather 
than being integrated with Soviet troops. As an extension of the 
Warsaw Pact doctrinal revision that began in 1987, the guidelines 
assigned the highest priority to defending against attack by air, ar- 
mored, and amphibious forces. 

In 1990 the Commission on National Defense of the Sejm, the 
lower house of Parliament, strongly criticized the initial KOK re- 
form program as insufficient for full military reform and as retaining 
too much of Poland's past subservience to the Warsaw Pact. The 
total collapse of the pact in the following year required more com- 
plete revision of military doctrine. A new program called Armed 
Forces '90 represented a second, truly postcommunist, phase of 
military reform. It was a long-term plan of steps to be completed 
by the year 2000. Already in mid- 1990, the military began im- 
plementing plans to apportion defensive forces more evenly between 
Poland's eastern and western borders. 

From mid- 1990 to mid- 1992, the topic of appropriate doctrine 
for Poland received extensive treatment in general and specialized 
forums, but doctrinal reform was stymied by internal political con- 
flicts. All agreed that henceforth the basic mission of the Polish 
defense system should be protecting the sovereignty, independence, 
and territorial integrity of the Polish nation. The means to that 
end were more problematic, however. In mid- 1991 a deputy to 
the chief of the General Staff proposed that the new Polish Army 
(the word people's having been dropped from the title in 1990) be 
built around assault-landing brigades, helicopter regiments, ar- 
mored and motorized units, and special forces such as mountain 
infantry, to achieve optimal flexibility and mobility in the defen- 
sive posture. Poland would also begin manufacturing sophisticated 
modern weapons and purchase medium-class warships. The chief 



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National Security 



obstacle to this plan, however, was a military budget that in 1991 
barely sustained routine maintenance. 

A comprehensive doctrinal reform first proposed in mid- 1991 
was never approved because of disagreement between President 
Lech Walesa, on one side, and Prime Minister Jan Olszewski and 
Minister of National Defense Jan Parys, on the other, over the ques- 
tion of which office should control military policy. In mid- 1992, 
after the Olszewski government fell, a new draft doctrine was pre- 
pared by the president's National Security Bureau (Biuro Bezpie- 
czenstwa Narodowego — BBN) and officials of the ministries of for- 
eign affairs and national defense. 

The basic assumption of the new doctrine was that Poland was 
not threatened with any form of attack from outside, excepting pos- 
sible spillover from ethnic or border conflicts in the former Soviet 
republics. Instead, the chief threats to Polish national security would 
be serious civil unrest or strikes, a massive influx of refugees from 
the east, or the failure of other countries to fulfill economic obliga- 
tions. In early 1992, Russia provided a prime example of the third 
type of risk by unexpectedly demanding a revision of the terms 
of a crucial barter agreement to supply natural gas to Poland. With- 
in Poland conversion from a centrally planned economy to free en- 
terprise would cause social strains, leading to mass emigration, 
crime, and relaxation of social rules. The new doctrine therefore 
recommended completing social reconstruction as quickly as pos- 
sible to minimize disruptions that might threaten national securi- 
ty. Given budgetary constraints, planners estimated that national 
security requirements could be met with a total force of about 
200,000, or 60 percent of the force level in the 1980s, together with 
a National Guard force of unspecified size. 

In the spirit of cooperation with all neighbors, the doctrine re- 
fused membership in any military alliance directed against any 
neighbor. It also rejected deployment of Polish forces abroad ex- 
cept in accordance with international agreements; a United Na- 
tions (UN) peacekeeping mission, for example, would be permitted. 
Specifically mentioned were close and friendly relations with Rus- 
sia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Lithuania. Regional cooperation was 
described as the foundation of a general international security sys- 
tem that included North America. An important element of this 
general concept was membership in NATO and close cooperation 
with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE — see Glossary); (see Military Cooperation and Exchanges, 
this ch.). 



249 



Poland: A Country Study 

Strategy and Tactics 

Until 1 990 Polish strategic missions were determined by the coun- 
try 's assigned role in the Warsaw Pact. The overall theme was 
prevention of war in peacetime and defense of the Soviet Union 
and its allies in wartime. Through the mid-1980s, the alliance em- 
phasized strategic offense over strategic defense, with a single stra- 
tegic plan integrating the two aspects. The plan heavily emphasized 
overlap and cooperation of strategic missions in a combined arms 
format. The Soviet Union initially used the Warsaw Pact primar- 
ily to retain military and political control of its East European 
allies beneath a facade of collective decision making. Soviet domi- 
nance began to diminish in the 1960s, however, and by the 1980s 
the alliance had become a forum for debate and bargaining over 
issues of national independence and autonomous decision making. 
Until 1989, Poland's military leaders remained cautious in express- 
ing independent views on questions of strategy. 

By mid- 1990, international events fully revealed the obsolescence 
of Poland's Warsaw Pact membership. The anti-West German ra- 
tionale behind the alliance seemed especially dated in view of Soviet 
approval of German reunification and Germany's approval of the 
Oder-Neisse Line as the permanent border with Poland. In the 
summer of 1990, Czechoslovak and Polish proposals for substan- 
tial reform in the alliance structure brought no constructive response 
from the Soviet Union. Shortly thereafter, the Polish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs began making public reference to Poland's with- 
drawal from the Warsaw Pact and the pact's impending disintegra- 
tion. Meanwhile, internal strife in the Soviet Union weakened the 
argument that deviation from Warsaw Pact strategic planning would 
provoke Soviet retaliation (an argument that in reality had been 
hollow at least since Gorbachev's reform programs began in the 
mid-1980s). 

Beginning in 1990, Polish military strategists and tacticians shift- 
ed toward defensive techniques over offensive operations. Their 
theories promoted a mobile, nonlinear defense based on enhanced 
force maneuverability. The new strategic defense plan included 
creating conditions favorable to a war of maneuver, constructing 
tactical and permanent fortifications, protecting the military com- 
munications network in wartime, and preparing to destroy key ob- 
jectives to prevent their use by the enemy. The context of this 
program was defensive battle against superior forces, using terrain 
features to channel the enemy into areas vulnerable to a Polish coun- 
terattack. If this goal were not possible, the mission would be to 
extend the engagement long enough to raise the political cost to 



250 



Trainees moving in camouflage on field exercise 
Courtesy Polish Information Agency, Warsaw 

the aggressor by making the conflict a threat to general European 
security. Partisan resistance after defeat of Poland's conventional 
forces was rejected because of projected human and material loss- 
es. New strategies featured defensive combat in the forested and 
flooded areas that predominate in the eastern border region — a strong 
indication of Poland's new threat perception. Air defense, although 
labeled a top priority by Polish planners, remained very poorly de- 
fined and equipped in mid- 1992 (see Armed Services, this ch.). 

Strategic writings in the early 1990s contemplated no action out- 
side Poland. In keeping with Poland's shifting threat perceptions 
involving Kaliningrad and Ukraine, the military establishment 
agreed on a shift of force concentration to the eastern borders. Mili- 
tary districts were redesignated accordingly in 1991. Budget con- 
straints and the lack of military basing infrastructure limited 
implementation of this policy by preventing large-scale force shifts, 
however. In 1992 about 65 percent of Polish forces remained west 
of the Vistula River (compared with 75 percent in the Warsaw Pact 
alignment), and Polish defensive lines remained static, deep, and 
echeloned, in keeping with standard Soviet practice. 

Military Cooperation and Exchanges 

Poland's pattern of military cooperation changed as drastically 



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Poland: A Country Study 



as its political climate in 1989. Participation in Warsaw Pact joint 
exercises ended in 1988, and the Polish military establishment ended 
its close working relationship with its Soviet counterparts. The April 
1990 appointment of Solidarity intellectual Janusz Onyszkiewicz 
as deputy minister of national defense for foreign military relations 
signaled a new orientation in the defense establishment. Once the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union altered the geopolitics of all 
Eastern Europe, however, Poland sought new, equal military part- 
nerships with Russia and other former Soviet republics. A com- 
prehensive cooperation treaty completed in late 1991 replaced the 
Polish-Soviet friendship treaty of 1965, which had legitimized Soviet 
domination of Polish military policy. The new pact, given urgen- 
cy on the Soviet side by the failed coup attempt of August 1991, 
rejects all interference in Polish affairs by the current Soviet state 
or by any state that might succeed it. 

With the goal of eventual close military relations that would 
guarantee military protection by the West, Poland took steps to 
prove itself a worthy military partner in the early 1990s. In the 
early 1990s, the Polish defense establishment was divided over the 
need for NATO membership because some officials believed that 
move would sacrifice Polish national integrity. Nevertheless, long- 
term military planning aimed at compatibility of Polish weaponry 
and doctrine with that of the West. In 1991 Minister of National 
Defense Piotr Kolodziejczyk visited NATO headquarters to pro- 
mote Polish cooperation with the alliance and to establish infor- 
mation exchanges on doctrine and military exercises. Two months 
later, Chief of the General Staff General Zdzisiaw Stelmaszuk 
presented Poland's plans for reorganization of its armed forces to 
the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General John 
Galvin. Poland gained further concessions during Olszewski's visit 
to the United States in early 1992, and during NATO Secretary 
General Manfred Woerner's visit to Poland. 

In the Persian Gulf War, Poland provided a hospital ship, a res- 
cue ship, and a ground field hospital to U.N. forces. Polish troops 
were among U.N. peacekeeping forces in Croatia and Bosnia and 
Hercegovina in 1991-92. In 1992 the Polish navy was scheduled 
to participate with the Russian navy in a joint NATO exercise in 
the Baltic Sea. Beginning in 1990, Polish officers and civilian offi- 
cials of the Ministry of National Defense attended Western mili- 
tary academies. The aim was to gain familiarity with Western 
military practice and to identify the defensive systems most ap- 
propriate for Poland's new international position. 

Before the collapse of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 , security specialists 
from the Visegrad Triangle member nations (the CSFR, Hungary, 



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and Poland) discussed military cooperation to supplement the eco- 
nomic and political programs already underway (see Southern Neigh- 
bors and the Visegrad Triangle, ch. 4). National security cooperation 
within the grouping had already included decades of Warsaw Pact 
joint military exercises, use of standardized Soviet weapons, organi- 
zation, and tactics, negotiation as a bloc for favorable arms pur- 
chase prices and joint licensing agreements for their arms industries, 
and collaboration in 1988-89 in demanding a restructured Warsaw 
Pact. Beginning in 1991, the Visegrad Triangle nations arranged 
group purchases of equipment from Western suppliers to reduce 
per-unit cost. The defense industries of Poland and the CSFR also 
began coproduction of specific armaments in 1991. 

The common objective that emerged in the Visegrad talks was 
regional stability based on links with existing European security 
systems and complete abolition of neutral buffer zones and oppos- 
ing security sectors. The Visegrad Triangle nations extended their 
economic rationale to strategic doctrine, seeking integration into 
West European groupings by presenting a united security position 
to organizations such as NATO and the CSCE. According to that 
position, security depended on the broadest possible European in- 
tegration, eliminating formal bilateral and multilateral military al- 
liances that excluded parts of the continent (see Foreign Relations, 
ch. 4). 

Defense Organization 

The overall reassessment of Poland's military position brought 
fundamental change in the structure of the military establishment, 
beginning with the separation of the military branches from the 
civilian administration. Ultimate command was firmly assigned 
to civilian officials. Such a change from the simplicity of the Jaruzel- 
ski government, where the military had occupied top government 
positions, caused considerable friction and confusion in the early 
1990s. 

The Communist Tradition 

Under Poland's communist regimes, the Politburo of the PZPR 
was ultimately responsible for major military policy decisions, with 
nominal responsibility lodged with the Council of Ministers. The 
Administration Department of the PZPR's Central Committee 
closely supervised military affairs, monitoring such items as pro- 
motions and budgets. The minister of national defense, who was 
always a general officer and usually a full member of the Polit- 
buro, was supreme commander of the army and chief of opera- 
tions. Beginning in 1982, however, Jaruzelski delegated this 



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responsibility (which he nominally retained after becoming head 
of state) to General Siwicki. The Polish People's Army included 
all branches — ground forces, navy, air force, and air defense — 
but lines of command differed among the services. Commanders 
of the naval and air forces reported directly to the minister of na- 
tional defense. The ground forces, on the other hand, reported to 
the minister of national defense through the General Staff. In prac- 
tice, the minister of national defense often commanded all aspects 
of a military exercise, and the General Staff, which nominally 
commanded only the ground forces, made policy binding on all 
branches. 

The armed forces were divided into the operational army and 
the National Territorial Defense Forces (Obrona Terytorium 
Kraju — OTK). The former was organized as an integral part of 
Warsaw Pact forces, whereas the latter was limited to service in 
Poland and had no role in Warsaw Pact activities. The operation- 
al army forces were administered in three military districts — 
Wroclaw, Bydgoszcz, and Warsaw — each of which had a two- 
division corps and a rapid-reaction corps. 

Evolution and Restructuring 

The accommodation of the Polish Army's command structure 
to the domestic and foreign conditions of post-Warsaw Pact Eu- 
rope was a fitful and controversial process. The transfer of mili- 
tary policy making to civilian authority, in itself a widely accepted 
goal, brought intragovernmental power struggles. Together with 
severe budgetary limitations, those struggles caused great uncer- 
tainty in the military community about future directions. 

Civilian Command Structure 

In mid- 1991 an Interministerial Commission for the Reorgani- 
zation of National Defense submitted its structural reform recom- 
mendations to the Council of Ministers, citing the need to amend 
the constitution and the law on military service. The Ministry of 
National Defense was to be converted into a civilian organ of state 
administration with a separate, subordinate armed forces section. 
Appointment of a civilian minister of national defense would 
improve the ministry's communications and joint activity with 
Parliament, state agencies, and the national economy, ensure 
depolitization of the military, and relieve the military of responsi- 
bility for budgets, administration, supply, social issues, and other 
matters judged more appropriate for a civilian agency. The mili- 
tary section would prepare concepts for national defense, forecast 
international situations that might bear on national security, plan 



254 



National Security 



long-term projects of the arms industry, and assist in export and 
import policy making. 

Passage of the Little Constitution in the fall of 1992 was expect- 
ed to define the previously hazy lines of national security authori- 
ty. However, Walesa expressed open dissatisfaction with the control 
allotted the presidency, heralding possible future clashes with Parlia- 
ment and the Council of Ministers over individual aspects of security 
policy. The Little Constitution specifies that peacetime command 
of the Polish Army be exercised by the president of the republic 
and by the prime minister and the Council of Ministers (see Con- 
stitutional Revisions after April 1989; Presidency; Council of 
Ministers, ch. 4). All levels of central and local government are 
charged with managing aspects of the national defense assigned 
them by the constitution and by legislation. The president over- 
sees the activities of all such agencies. The president determines 
the composition of military advisory bodies in peacetime and the 
composition of a war staff in wartime. After consultation with the 
prime minister, the president appoints a minister of national 
defense, and after consultation with the minister of national defense, 
he appoints the chief of the General Staff. In turn, the minister 
is to consult with the president on appointment of commanders 
of military districts and the individual services. 

The Sejm is responsible for assigning appropriate levels of an- 
nual funding and for passing laws regulating defense. The Sejm's 
Commission on National Defense was revamped and empowered 
to call a defense official to testify under oath on general questions 
of national defense policy. The wartime national defense system 
gives the president and the Council of Ministers supreme decision- 
making power; in wartime the Sejm is to appoint the chief com- 
mander of the Polish Army, who would have strategic command 
of all armed forces for the duration of wartime and who would be 
directly responsible to the president. If the Sejm were not in ses- 
sion when war began, the president would appoint the commander. 
The Council of Ministers has specific wartime responsibility for 
organizing supply and other support services from the civilian sector 
to the armed forces, and for protecting the civilian population from 
the effects of war. District governors have decision-making power 
for all administrative and economic units within their jurisdiction. 

The minister of national defense is responsible for shaping and 
implementing national defense policy. The minister administers 
the development, education, and training of the armed forces; 
resolves issues of international cooperation; and oversees defense 
tasks assigned to outside agencies. The civilian component of the 
Ministry of National Defense includes vice ministers for social 



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Poland: A Country Study 

relations and education, defense policy, and armament. The 
Viceministry for Social Relations and Education includes veterans' 
affairs, public information, physical education, and departments 
of education and social policy. The Viceministry for Defense Policy 
includes strategic planning, foreign relations, legal affairs, mobili- 
zation policy, and the National Defense Academy (Akademia Obro- 
ny Narodowej — AON). And the Viceministry for Armament 
includes procurement, research and development, military tech- 
nical inspection, and military and transportation infrastructure. 
The minister of national defense also is supported by offices or 
departments for intelligence (the so-called Department Two), con- 
trol and supervision, personnel, and finances, as well as the office 
of the chief military prosecutor. 

Military Command Structure 

In peacetime the direct commander of the armed forces is the 
chief of the General Staff, who also carries the title general inspec- 
tor of the armed forces. The General Staff is responsible for all 
phases of command, including training, strategic and organizational 
planning, mobilization, and logistics — activities previously divided 
among several departments in the Ministry of National Defense. 
The chief of the General Staff has three deputies: the chief of the 
training inspectorate, the chief of armed forces strategic planning 
and organization, and the chief inspector of logistics. Those officers 
in turn head the three main support commands of the military 
branch. The chief commands directly the four military districts, 
together with unified air and air defense, navy, and higher mili- 
tary education commands. Directorates for personnel, medicine, 
education, finances, and military police are commanded by the 
General Staff as a whole. 

Throughout the 1980s, Poland's armed forces were administered 
through three military districts. In 1991 , in keeping with the east- 
ward shift of threat perception, plans were made to split the War- 
saw Military District, which had covered all of eastern Poland, to 
form a fourth military district centered in Krakow. Although this 
step nominally gave Poland the strength of two districts facing east- 
ward, the actual formation of the Krakow Military District was 
delayed in 1992 because funding was unavailable to make the neces- 
sary shifts of personnel and equipment. 

The Military Prosecutor 

Although the chief military prosecutor remains structurally subor- 
dinate to the Ministry of National Defense, since 1990 the scope of 
the military prosecutor's activities has been defined by the Ministry 



256 



National Security 



of Justice. This change adds another dimension of civilian control 
over the military. In the communist era, the military prosecutor's 
office acted as a specialized military command staffed by political 
officers, charged with maintaining party control in the armed forces, 
and given authority to interfere in civilian life to enforce "respect 
for the law." 

The reform and integration of the military prosecutor's office 
into the general justice system was a high priority of the first 
Solidarity-led government in 1989. As part of the general over- 
haul of the justice system embodied in the 1990 Law on the Prose- 
cution Office, the chief military prosecutor became a deputy of the 
minister of justice (who also served as prosecutor general), appointed 
by the prime minister in consultation with the ministers of justice 
and national defense. In his role as prosecutor general, the minister 
of justice makes all top military justice appointments in consulta- 
tion with the minister of national defense; the minister of justice 
is also consulted on all special assignments given military prosecu- 
tors. The Office of the Chief Military Prosecutor also is assigned 
oversight of decisions by military bodies that might controvert 
civilian law. 

Lines of Authority 

Many proposals for restructuring the armed forces commands 
suffered the same fate as those for reforming military doctrine. In 
1992 no clear apportionment of military and civilian policy-making 
powers existed in practice, and many civilian and military offices 
and directorates performed redundant functions. For example, the 
military Directorate of Logistics Planning and the civilian Depart- 
ment of Procurement performed similar tasks. The relative authori- 
ty of officials at comparable levels of the two organizations (such 
as military chiefs of staff and viceministers of defense) also remained 
undefined. 

The locus of ultimate military command remains a hot issue; 
Jan Parys, minister of national defense in the Olszewski govern- 
ment (and the first civilian to hold that position), was dismissed 
by President Walesa because Parys complained that his ministry 
was a powerless bureaucracy under Walesa's complete control. In 
mid- 1992 Walesa ceded nominal approval of high military appoint- 
ments to Janusz Onyszkiewicz, minister of national defense in the 
newly formed government of Hanna Suchocka. Although Walesa's 
move was presented as a concession to the stature of Onyszkie- 
wicz, many observers believed that peacetime command of the 
Polish Army would remain an issue of contention between the 
presidency and the Council of Ministers. 



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Establishing civilian control over the Ministry of National 
Defense was a necessary move toward Western-style democratic 
rule. However, in the early 1990s high civilian officials often were 
named because of political influence rather than expertise, espe- 
cially in the newly redesigned Department of Education (see Mili- 
tary Training and Education, this ch.). In fact, few civilians brought 
any military policy experience with them into Poland's postcom- 
munist governments. This was mainly because Solidarity had avoid- 
ed involvement with military and internal security policy in the 
contentious 1980s, fearing that opposition on those fronts might 
be a pretext for harsher government repression. Even after the fall 
of Jaruzelski, the first Solidarity government replaced communist 
officials in the defense and internal affairs establishments very cau- 
tiously to avoid antagonizing the PZPR in its last two government 
strongholds. Once the PZPR collapsed in 1990, however, the pace 
of reform increased. 

National Security Agencies 

In January 1991, Walesa began forming a National Security 
Council (Rada Bezpieczeristwa Narodowego — RBN) that would 
take the place of the KOK as the chief security policy advisory 
body to the executive branch. The KOK had been established by 
Gomuika for administration of wartime efforts (it also implemented 
communist party decisions during the martial law period). The 
RBN would have the broader task of determining appropriate 
defense measures against military, economic, and ecological threats 
to national security. It would be directed by the Bureau of Na- 
tional Security (BBN) and headed by a representative of Walesa. 
It would include experts in military, legal, foreign affairs, and 
domestic security matters. Because of this broad mission and RBN's 
direct subordination to the president, Walesa's plan immediately 
ran afoul of the Sejm, which refused to pass legislation making the 
RBN an official government body. The RBN then existed in 1991 
and 1992 as an unofficial adjunct to the president's office, but the 
Sejm had no legal obligation to follow the RBN's policy recom- 
mendations. 

By mid- 1992 the RBN was taking an active and controversial 
role in defense planning, largely because the responsibility for na- 
tional security planning had not been firmly assigned to any agency. 
Walesa's enemies attacked the RBN because the agency's bimonthly 
meetings allowed interested parties to attend unofficially and, un- 
der that stipulation, some of Walesa's cronies seemed to have ac- 
cess to classified information. Jan Parys, an advocate of higher force 
strength as a prerequisite for national security, engaged in polemics 



258 



National Security 



with RBN officials over budget cuts and restructuring during 1992 
when he was minister of national defense. 

In the meantime, the KOK had continued to exist as the offi- 
cial maker of national defense policy. Control of national security 
was a key issue of Olszewski's term as prime minister; after Ol- 
szewski's ouster, the atmosphere of defense policy making calmed, 
and the KOK recovered some of its stature. However, it was the 
BBN that issued a new defense doctrine, including potential threats 
and recommended responses, in July 1992. The doctrine, produced 
by a task force representing the General Staff and the ministries 
of national defense, foreign affairs, and internal affairs, became 
official when ratified by the KOK in the fall of 1992. The Little 
Constitution, ratified in October 1992, officially renamed the KOK 
as the RBN and prescribed changes in the structure and control 
of the existing agency. 

Armed Services 

In 1992 the Polish Army consisted of the ground forces, the navy, 
and the air force and air defense forces. The air force and air defense 
forces formally merged in 1991 when full command of the air force 
reverted to Poland from the Warsaw Pact and the strategic require- 
ment for air combat outside Polish territory ended. The size of the 
Polish Army began to decrease dramatically in 1988, but changes 
in force structure were more gradual in the early 1990s. Between 
1988 and 1992, the total number of armed forces personnel dropped 
from 897,000 (406,000 active, 491,000 reserves) to 731,500 (296,500 
active, 435,000 reserves). Plans called for further reduction in the 
mid-1990s to a total active force of slightly over 200,000. 

The armed forces model proposed in 1991 for the next ten years 
called for increased mobility of forces, principally provided by 
helicopters; improved equipment quality, especially in command, 
air defense, and radio-electronic systems; completion of force 
redeployment with operational and strategic supply support in place; 
increased staff professionalism; and a stronger position in the world 
market for selected military products such as helicopters, radio- 
electronic equipment, and tanks (see Arms Procurement, this ch.). 
The short-term model called for air traffic control and air defense 
system cooperation with partners in the Visegrad Triangle; reac- 
tivation of several mechanized divisions to balance reduction of the 
combat readiness of the two western military districts; and com- 
plete activation of the Krakow Military District, all within the next 
two to three years. 

In 1989 some sixty-eight military units were disbanded, and 
another 147 units were reorganized. According to reports, this 



259 



Poland: A Country Study 

meant the retirement of 400 tanks, 700 artillery pieces, 600 armored 
personnel carriers, and eighty aircraft, as well as a cut of 30,000 
active-duty personnel. The 1990 schedule called for elimination of 
fifty-seven more units and reorganization of seventy units, retir- 
ing 450 tanks, 200 artillery pieces, and 100 armored personnel 
carriers. 

After completion of the restructuring program, planners envi- 
sioned ground forces of nine streamlined divisions, one airborne 
brigade, and one coastal defense brigade. The air and air defense 
forces would include one fighter division, two fighter-bomber 
divisions, an air reconnaissance regiment, two combat helicopter 
regiments, and one transport helicopter regiment. Five training 
regiments would serve the remaining active forces. The structure 
of the navy would remain essentially unchanged, featuring three 
flotillas and one coastal defense brigade. 

Ground Forces 

The ground forces underwent the most dramatic change in the 
Polish Army in the postcommunist era. They are administered in 
four military districts (the fourth of which, the Krakow Military 
District, was being established in 1992). The districts defend the 
northeast, southeast, northwest, and southwest quadrants of the 
country, respectively. Once forces were redeployed to balance 
defenses of the eastern and western borders, Poland would have 
a truly omnidirectional ground defense in which two districts would 
engage the aggressor and the other two would serve as reserves, 
depending on the direction of the attack. In 1992 the Pomeranian 
Military District (formerly the Bydgoszcz Military District) in the 
northwest included three mechanized divisions (formerly designated 
as motorized rifle divisions), one coastal defense unit, one artillery 
unit, one Scud missile installation, one engineer brigade, and one 
SA-6 missile installation. Between 1989 and 1992, a fourth mecha- 
nized division in the district had been converted into a supply base, 
and a tank division had been disbanded. 

In the Silesian Military District (formerly the Wroclaw Military 
District), two tank divisions were converted to mechanized divi- 
sions between 1990 and 1992, and one mechanized division was 
converted to a supply base in 1990. In 1992 those changes left the 
district with four mechanized divisions, two artillery units, one Scud 
missile installation, two engineer brigades, two SA-4 missile 
brigades, two antitank brigades, and one SA-6 missile regiment. 
Between 1990 and 1992, the Warsaw Military District, which cov- 
ered all of eastern Poland pending organization of the Krakow 
Military District, went from one mechanized division to two 



260 



Chemical-biological-radiation warfare training 
Courtesy Polish Information Agency, Warsaw 

mechanized divisions, plus one engineer brigade, three ceremo- 
nial guard units, one artillery battery, and one SA-6 missile reg- 
iment. Once completed, the Krakow district was to have two 
mechanized divisions, one air assault unit, and one mountain in- 
fantry brigade. One mobile mechanized division was held in reserve 
in 1992. 

In addition, Poland contributes small components to UN peace- 
keeping forces in several countries. In 1992 Polish forces abroad 
included 176 soldiers in Cambodia, one battalion (899 troops) in 
Croatia, seven soldiers in Kuwait, eighty-four soldiers in Leba- 
non, 159 logistical support personnel in Syria, and two observers 
in Western Sahara. Poland also contributed staff to the Neutral 
Nations Supervisory Commission for Korea (NNSC Korea). 

Restructuring of the ground forces centers on eventual creation 
of a single type of multipurpose division emphasizing mobility and 
featuring limited offensive capability. Four active tank-heavy di- 
visions, suitable for the Warsaw Pact era but not for Poland's new 
defensive doctrine, would be retired or redistributed (see Military 
Doctrine, this ch.). Equipment from two divisions would go into 
storage while equipment from the other two divisions would go for 
replacement in divisions remaining active. Two additional divi- 
sions were scheduled for reductions in personnel. 



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Poland: A Country Study 

By 1992 the ground forces were reduced by nearly 40,000, to 
194,200 troops, including 109,800 conscripts. Logistical units num- 
bered 28,100; training personnel, 25,900; and centrally controlled 
staff, 2,900. The chief small arm of the Polish ground forces, the 
Kalashnikov rifle, is rated at the top of its class. The Radom Lucznik 
Works, a sewing-machine plant, is the domestic manufacturer. In 
1992 main battle tanks totaled 2,850, of which 2,065 were T-55 
and 785 were T-72. The Soviet-designed T-55 tanks, introduced 
in the 1950s, were considered extremely limited against much more 
sophisticated Western tanks. Although the Soviet-licensed and 
Polish-produced T-72 is comparable to top Western tanks in 
maneuverability and traction, its effective range is less than that 
of the best German and United States tanks, and night vision is 
inferior. Poland's last fifty-eight light amphibious PT-76 tanks were 
eliminated as obsolete in 1992. 

Some 685 amphibious reconnaissance vehicles were in use in 
1992. Two types, the Hungarian-designed FUG and the Soviet-de- 
signed BRDM-2, were included in that inventory; Poland began 
using the FUG in 1966 and the BRDM-2 around 1981. In 1991 
Poland had 1,409 fully amphibious BMP-1 armored personnel car- 
riers and sixty-two BMP-2 carriers. The BMPs were considered 
the only world-class armored vehicles in the Polish Army (although 
the BMP-1 had been in service since the early 1960s). Some 928 
SKOT wheeled armored personnel carriers, a joint Polish and 
Czechoslovak design of 1959, remained in use in 1992. Many of 
these vehicles had been refitted as specialized command and com- 
munications vehicles, although the class was considered obsolete. 

In 1992 the Polish ground forces had a total of 2,316 artillery 
pieces. Of that number, 883 were towed, including 715 M-1938 
howitzers (122mm), 166 D-20 gun-howitzers (152mm), and two 
D-l howitzers (152 mm). Another 617 artillery pieces were self- 
propelled, including 498 of the 2S1 model (122mm), 111 of the 
Dana (M-77, 152 mm), and eight of the 2S7 (203-mm) variety. 
The Soviet-built M-1938 howitzer had been upgraded and replaced 
several times in the Soviet arsenal since its introduction in 1938. 
The D-20 was designed shortly after World War II, and the D-l 
was first used in 1943. The Dana (M-77) was the most modern 
self-propelled gun in use in 1992. 

The artillery arsenal in 1992 also included 262 multiple rocket 
launchers, of which 232 were BM-21 and thirty RM-70 (both 
models 122mm). The BM-21 had been in Warsaw Pact arsenals 
since at least 1964; the RM-70 was added in the late 1980s to replace 
the older BM-14. Some 554 Soviet-designed 120mm mortars were 
also in service in 1992. In the surface-to-surface missile category, 



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National Security 



Poland had forty FROG and twenty-five Scud B launchers. Four 
types of antitank guided weapons were in use in 1992. There were 
271 AT-3s, 115 AT-4 Spigots, eighteen AT-5 Spandrels, and seven 
AT-6 Spirals. In the 85mm antitank gun class, Poland had 722 
D-44 guns, which were of World War II vintage. 

In 1992 Poland had 945 antiaircraft guns in the 23mm and 57mm 
classes. The former were ZU-23-2 and ZSU-23-4 SP, the latter 
S-60, which were introduced in 1950. Some 260 surface-to-air mis- 
sile launchers were of the SA-6, SA-7, SA-8, SA-9, and SA-13 
types. 

Navy 

During both the communist and postcommunist eras, the Po- 
lish navy received less emphasis and funding than other combat 
branches. Because the Polish navy had usually purchased the sim- 
plest and cheapest equipment offered by the Soviet Union, all other 
navies on the Baltic Sea were considered superior to Poland's. The 
assigned role of the Polish navy in the Warsaw Pact was to pro- 
vide amphibious landing and mine warfare capability in the Bal- 
tic Sea; postcommunist restructuring deemphasized amphibious 
operations in favor of the navy's fast attack and patrol craft com- 
ponents. In 1992 the only short-term change envisioned for the 
navy, however, was retirement of antiquated equipment, much of 
which would not be replaced. To enhance coastal security, in 1989 
military planners proposed Polish participation in a regional Bal- 
tic defense fleet. 

Naval personnel in 1992 totaled 19,300 (including naval avia- 
tion forces), of which 10,600 were conscripts. Total naval person- 
nel had dropped from 22,000 since 1981 (see table 21 , Appendix). 
Another 1,800 individuals served in the coast guard, which oper- 
ated forty small coastal craft; in wartime that component would 
be integrated into naval operations. Naval bases were located at 
Gdynia, Hel (just west of Gdynia), and Swinoujscie, with a coast 
guard and border station at Kolobrzeg. 

The origin and sophistication of Polish naval craft varies wide- 
ly. Of the three Polish submarines existing in 1992, all built in the 
Soviet Union, the one Orzel (corresponding to the Soviet Kilo 
model) vessel is the most advanced; two Wilk-class (Soviet Fox- 
trot) submarines are older and noisier. All three vessels feature 
533mm torpedo tubes. Because they were designed for ocean com- 
bat, the three submarines maneuver clumsily in the Baltic Sea in 
comparison with the smaller submarines of the other Baltic nations. 
One Polish submarine was retired between 1989 and 1992. 



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Poland: A Country Study 

In 1992 Poland had two principal surface combatants. The de- 
stroyer Warszawa, in the Soviet Kotlin class, was designed in the 
1950s and transferred to Poland from the Soviet navy in 1970. The 
Warszawa displaces 2,850 tons (3,600 with a full load), is 127.5 
meters long, has a top speed of thirty-six knots, and carries the 
following armaments: two twin SA-N-1 Goa surface-to-air mis- 
sile launchers with twenty missiles each; four SS-N-2C Styx 
surface-to-surface missile launchers; two antisubmarine rocket 
launchers; five 533mm torpedo tubes, twin 130mm guns; four 
45mm guns; and eight 30mm guns. The frigate Kaszub features 
two antisubmarine rocket launchers, four 533mm torpedo tubes, 
and a 76mm gun. The Kaszub, manufactured in cooperation with 
East Germany, was completed by the Poles after being left incom- 
plete when German reunification occurred. 

The twenty patrol and coastal combatants active in 1992 included 
missile corvettes, missile craft, and patrol boats. Four Gornik-type 
(Soviet Tarantul I) corvettes feature two twin SS-N-2C Styx 
surface-to-surface missile launchers. Designed in the Soviet Union 
in the late 1970s, the corvettes are among the most modern ele- 
ments of the Polish navy. Displacement is 580 tons with a full load; 
length is fifty-six meters, maximum speed thirty-six knots. Eight 
Soviet Osa-1 fast patrol craft have four SS-N-2A surface-to-surface 
missile launchers. Full-load displacement is 210 tons; length is thirty- 
nine meters, maximum speed thirty-five knots. The Osa class, de- 
veloped by the Soviet Union in the early 1960s, was considered 
outmoded by 1990. Poland's eight Obluze large inshore patrol craft 
were built domestically at the Oksywie Shipyard in Gdynia using 
a German design of the early 1960s. 

The Polish navy has no specifically designed minelaying ships, 
but its Lublin- type landing ships, its submarines, and its Krogulec- 
type minesweepers can perform this function. Minesweeping ships 
total twenty-four, in three classes. The eight Krogulec coastal 
minesweepers were built in the 1960s at the Gdynia Shipyard; some 
vessels in this class had already been taken out of service by 1991 . 
Notec inshore minesweepers, a newer design featuring fiberglass 
hulls, were still being built in Poland in 1992; fourteen were oper- 
ational that year. Two Leniwka inshore minesweepers complete 
Poland's mine countermeasure capability. 

Six amphibious landing craft were in service in 1992. All had 
been built in Poland; the Polnocny was a Soviet design. Five Lublin- 
type craft have a capacity of 130 troops and eight tanks, and the 
single Polnocny craft could transport 180 troops and six tanks. The 
Lublins, introduced in 1989, were the last major upgrade of the 
Polish amphibious capability under the Warsaw Pact. The Polnocny 



264 



ZU-23-2 antiaircraft gun and crew on maneuvers 
Courtesy Polish Information Agency, Warsaw 

was used as a command ship in 1992. Three Deba-type utility land- 
ing craft are used, but not for amphibious operations. Ten craft 
serve in support of naval operations. These include two intelligence 
collection vessels, four support tankers, two survey ships, and two 
training ships. 

The one naval aviation division has received special attention 
because its role in coastal reconnaissance, patrol, and search-and- 
rescue was considered an important element of the new national 
defense doctrine. In 1992 this division included 2,300 personnel, 
thirty-eight MiG-21 fighters, and four armed helicopters. Although 
the MiG-21 was considered inappropriate for action over the sea, 
in 1992 experts had little hope for modernization of the naval air 
fighter capability. The division's one search-and-rescue liaison 
squadron has three W-3 Sokol, three Mi-8, and nine Mi-2 helicop- 
ters, two AN-2 single-engine and two AN-28 two-engine trans- 
port planes, and four TS-11 jet trainers. In 1991 Poland ordered 
three W-3RM Anakonda helicopters, improved versions of the 
Soviet Sokol; one was delivered in 1992. All Poland's MiG-15 
reconnaissance aircraft were withdrawn as obsolete in 1992; no 
replacement aircraft were available at that time. In 1992 the spe- 
cial naval air regiment included twelve Polish-built TS-1 Is and ten 
AN-2s; several of the former were revised TS-1 IRs with upgraded 



265 



Poland: A Country Study 



radar and navigation systems. Another naval air regiment, desig- 
nated for antisubmarine warfare and search-and-rescue, had eight 
Mi-2, one Mi-8, and fifteen Mi- 14 helicopters. The coastal defense 
forces included 4,200 personnel manning six artillery batteries with 
M-1937 guns (152mm) and three surface-to-surface missile bat- 
teries with SS-C-2B launchers. 

Air and Air Defense Forces 

In 1992 a high military priority was establishing an air defense 
system based on existing assets of the air and air defense forces. 
Within that context, early warning and force integration were the 
most immediate problems. Resistance to enemy fire and maneu- 
verability were rated as poor by Polish military experts. Restruc- 
turing plans called for one air defense corps in each of the four 
military districts, each corps having air intercept and rocket forces. 
Combined manpower was projected at 50,000. 

In 1992 some 83,000 personnel, including 47,000 conscripts, 
served in the Polish air and air defense forces. Active combat air- 
craft numbered 423, with an additional eighty-six in storage await- 
ing sale, and thirty-one attack helicopters. The forces were divided 
into two air divisions. The four regiments of ground-attack fight- 
ers totaled twenty Su-20 and 104 Su-22 fighters supplied by the 
Soviet Union in the 1970s. For reconnaissance, the ground-attack 
regiments had twenty-four MiG-17 and eight Su-20 airplanes. Air 
combat forces were divided into eight regiments equipped with 221 
MiG-21/U fighters, whose equivalents were long ago withdrawn 
from service in the West; thirty-seven more advanced variable wing- 
geometry MiG-23MF fighters; and nine MiG-29 fighters top-of- 
the-line Soviet aircraft whose delivery was curtailed in late 1990. 
Air combat forces utilized twenty- four MiG-21RU reconnaissance 
aircraft. 

In 1992 the air force had two transport regiments equipped with 
ten AN-2 single-engine transports, one AN- 12 four-turboprop 
general transport, eleven AN-26 two-turboprop short-haul trans- 
ports, ten Yak-40 short-haul, three-turbofan jet transports, one 
Tu-154 long-range three-turbofan jet transport, three 11-14 piston- 
engine light transports, four Mi-8 helicopters, and one Bell 412 
helicopter. 

Polish helicopter attack forces were organized in three regiments 
in 1992. Altogether the regiments had thirty Mi-24, 130 Mi-2, and 
twenty-one Mi-8 assault helicopters. Of that component, the Mi-2 
and Mi-8 were designed in the 1960s and the Mi-24 in the early 
1970s. Eighteen Su-22 fighters were used for training. The Polish 
armed forces stored a large number of redundant or outmoded 



266 



National Security 



fighter airplanes and began selling them to Western collectors in 
the early 1990s. In storage in 1992 were forty MiG-21s and vari- 
ants of that model, twenty-four MiG-17s, and twenty-two MiG-15 
U7s. 

Territorial Defense Forces 

The National Territorial Defense Forces (OTK) were founded 
in 1965 to help defend Polish territory when the Polish People's 
Army was engaged under Warsaw Pact obligations outside the 
country. Although their primary mission was defending the 
homeland, the OTK also had the Warsaw Pact mission of trans- 
porting Soviet forces and supplies across Poland in wartime. Formed 
mainly from units shifted from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
the OTK went under a new Inspectorate for National Territorial 
Defense in the Ministry of National Defense. The OTK included 
the Internal Defense Forces (Wojska Obrony Wewn^trznej — 
WOW, the largest unit) and several smaller territorial defense units. 
Immediately after World War II, the WOW had suppressed the 
Home Army, which had been loyal to the London government- 
in-exile; the WOW had also played a large part in suppressing the 
Poznari workers in 1956 (see The Communist Era, this ch.). 

The WOW, which totaled 65,000 troops in 1982, were equipped 
as mechanized infantry units, including tanks. The component 
units, which were organized at district level, had the missions of 
engaging hostile troops on Polish territory and eliminating local 
underground elements. The units were to receive the same individu- 
al training as regular ground forces, although they did not partici- 
pate in large-scale coordinated exercises. 

By 1990 the OTK was not a credible military force. The organi- 
zation included many nonmilitary patriotic and social groups, such 
as the boy scouts, and many military retirees found soft assign- 
ments in OTK units. Although the force had a military commander, 
it was not under direct control of the Ministry of National Defense. 
By 1991 budget cuts were reducing personnel significantly, and 
plans called for transforming many OTK units into civil defense 
formations that would support production and service in the civilian 
economy. The OTK units remaining armed and attached to dis- 
tricts as regional defense forces would count as part of the ground 
forces' planned mid-1990s allotment of about 150,000 troops. They 
would function as cadre units reinforcing operational ground forces 
within their territorial boundaries. 

Military Manpower 

In 1992 several factors affected the supply and demand of 



267 



Poland: A Country Study 



manpower for the Polish Army. Given reduced force levels, fewer 
individuals were needed; however, reduced terms of active duty 
created faster turnover. At the same time, reliance on sophisticated 
electronics, especially in the air force, made recruitment, training, 
and retention of highly qualified individuals more important. And 
the availability of qualified personnel was influenced by society's 
general attitude toward the military and by availability of employ- 
ment in the civilian economy. 

The Military and Society 

The declaration of martial law in 1981 and the repression in the 
years that followed greatly harmed the image of the military in Po- 
lish society and within the military itself. Until that time, the Po- 
lish People's Army had consciously maintained an apolitical posture 
that was bolstered by its abstention from action against mass demon- 
strations in Polish cities in 1956 and 1970. At the same time, how- 
ever, PZPR membership was strongly encouraged among military 
personnel and was practically a prerequisite for advancement to 
the senior officer grades. Party membership among military officers 
increased from about 50 percent in the mid-1950s to about 85 per- 
cent by 1980. Almost all senior officers were party members. 

In the year 1981, however, the military became identified fully 
with the communist state for the first time when General Wojciech 
Jaruzelski became party leader and prime minister. Throughout 
the 1980s, the army was viewed with distrust and antagonism. With 
the fall of the Jaruzelski government in early 1989, the Polish mili- 
tary began an active campaign to separate itself from all political 
parties, to work with the former opposition leaders, and to "hu- 
manize" its image. In early 1990, Jaruzelski' s announcement of 
his resignation from the PZPR precipitated the mass return of party 
cards by Polish officers, and at the last PZPR congress in 1990 
the military delegation sat apart. Such symbolic acts were stimu- 
lated by the political reality that the military's symbiotic relation- 
ship with the PZPR had ended and that the military had no 
relationship whatever with Solidarity, the now-dominant political 
force that had enormous public support. And public support ac- 
quired a direct strategic value for planners in the post- Warsaw Pact 
world. In 1992 Professor Kazimierz Nozko of the National Defense 
Academy stated that the new Polish defense system must be based 
on "the stable foundation of psychological and patriotic prepara- 
tion of all society and the armed forces to repel aggression deter- 
minedly. " 

In 1990 officials of the ministries of national defense and inter- 
nal affairs approached officials of the Roman Catholic Church with 



268 



National Security 



proposals to upgrade and increase chaplain positions in the mili- 
tary and security forces. In 1991 the Field Ordinariate was reestab- 
lished as the church's arm to minister to the armed services. A field 
bishop was appointed for the first time since World War II. Be- 
tween 1989 and mid- 1992, the number of military chaplains had 
risen from twenty-nine to sixty-two. 

Participation of military personnel in religious services, long dis- 
couraged under the communist regimes, increased dramatically in 
1990 and became an important element of the campaign by the 
Ministry of National Defense to refurbish the military's image. To 
reinforce the patriotic image of the armed forces, the military es- 
tablishment revived historical traditions such as appointing officers 
by a sword stroke and playing the fife and drum at the changing 
of the guard at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. 

All political organizations were banned from the military in 1989, 
and military personnel were forbidden from participating in polit- 
ical parties or trade unions during their term of active duty. 
Depolitization of the Polish military proceeded rapidly in the ear- 
ly 1990s, and outward manifestations of loyalty to the military in 
society increased accordingly. One survey showed that 80 percent 
of Poles had a positive view of the military as early as 1991, and 
a 1992 survey showed that the military had surpassed the Roman 
Catholic Church as the most trusted institution in Poland. Some 
experts believed that such results were premature and unrealistic, 
however, contending that the memory of the military's role in mar- 
tial law would linger in Polish society, and that attitudes among 
career military personnel remaining from the Warsaw Pact era 
would lag behind organizational reform. 

In 1990 the government called in army transport equipment and 
personnel during a rail workers' strike in Pomerania to prevent 
a collapse of the national transport system. Comparisons were made 
between that military intervention and the role of the military in 
suppressing the demonstrations of 1981 . However, Deputy Minister 
of National Defense Onyszkiewicz, whose role in Solidarity gave 
him public credibility, cited this application of the military as an 
example of a justifiable, nonpolitical use of military assets to serve 
society in a national emergency, without the use of force toward 
strikers — in contrast to the repressive activities of the martial law 
period. In mid- 1992 Walesa's power struggle with the Ministry 
of National Defense again aroused public fears that the military 
would be used to reach political goals. Again Onyszkiewicz, now 
acting minister of national defense, reassured Poles that compet- 
ing political factions would use instruments of civilian government 
to resolve their differences. 



269 



Poland: A Country Study 



A controversial issue after 1989 was the status of communist 
civilian officials and military officers who had been responsible for 
quashing civilian uprisings and labor strikes. Many individuals who 
had served during that era remained in command positions in 1 992 . 
According to a 1991 survey by the antiestablishment reformist Viri- 
tim officers' group, 40 percent of officers had ' 'conservative" views, 
45 percent were "indifferent" to reform, and only 5 percent were 
willing to speak openly for institutional reform. A second activist 
group, the illegal Association of Junior Officers for Promoting 
Change in the Army, sought purges of officers whose military poli- 
cies did not conform to their philosophy. Their attempt to under- 
mine the authority of the Ministry of National Defense became 
part of the ongoing public dispute between Walesa and the minis- 
try over control of military policy making (see Evolution and Re- 
structuring, this ch.). 

The Polish public was not reluctant to express opinions on the 
military. Because of public pressure, Jaruzelski himself was called 
to testify about the killing of striking coal miners in 1981 . Czeslaw 
Kiszczak, who had been minister of internal affairs in 1981, was 
scheduled for indictment in the fall of 1992 for issuing orders to 
shoot strikers. Some Poles demanded the large-scale trial of for- 
mer communist authorities, but by mid- 1992 none had gone to 
jail. Especially controversial was the case of Colonel Ryszard Kuk- 
linski, a Jaruzelski aide who defected in 1981 and revealed War- 
saw Pact military secrets to the United States. Some Poles demanded 
that Kuklinski be pardoned; others, including many military per- 
sonnel, felt that because he had betrayed Poland as well as the 
Jaruzelski regime, Kuklinski should remain in exile or return to 
serve the sentence given him in absentia. 

Recruitment and Service Obligations 

In 1949 Polish law stipulated universal, obligatory military service 
for males. The Military Service Law of 1967 and its amendments 
set the age of mandatory service at nineteen and the age for volun- 
teering for service at seventeen. Failure to register and failure to 
report after being drafted were punishable by fine or imprisonment. 
The basic term of service was two years, except in highly technical 
positions, where the term was three years. The Council of Ministers 
could add one year to the term in case of national need. Soldiers 
entered the reserves after completing active duty. For enlisted per- 
sonnel, reserve status continues until age fifty. For noncommis- 
sioned officers (NCOs) and officers, reserve status continues until 
age sixty. With permission of the recruitment command, a con- 
script could perform alternative service in a civilian social service 



270 



National Security 



organization, a civil defense unit, or the civilian police force. The 
term of service, housing, and discipline of such individuals are simi- 
lar to those for active-duty personnel. The rank and grade struc- 
ture of the Polish army is similar to that of other armed forces 
organizations. There are some variations, however, in the num- 
ber and titles of authorized enlisted, warrant officer and officer 
grades (see fig 16; fig. 17; fig. 18). 

In 1960 mandatory military training programs were instituted 
in civilian colleges; upon completion, a student was eligible to enter 
reserve status as an NCO or to secure a reserve commission in a 
short officer training program. In 1980 social resentment of this 
privilege and the inadequacy of such a training program led to a 
nominally mandatory one-year term of active duty upon comple- 
tion of university studies. In practice, however, the training and 
assignments of graduating college students usually were not ardu- 
ous, and many evaded the obligation entirely. 

The first postcommunist regime immediately shortened the terms 
of active duty. Terms in the ground forces dropped from twenty- 
four months to eighteen months, and terms in the navy and air 
forces dropped from thirty-six months to twenty-four months. Plan- 
ners projected an eventual twelve-month term for ground forces 
inductees. An alternative service option was continued from the 
policy established by the Jaruzelski regime in 1988. 

In the early 1990s, an average of 250,000 individuals were exam- 
ined yearly by recruiting commissions; fewer than half entered active 
duty. Inductions were scheduled for spring and fall of each year, 
but the fall 1991 and spring 1992 calls were either limited or elimi- 
nated entirely. Experts speculated that the change in schedule was 
caused by a combination of low budgeting and the lack of eligible 
individuals; at the 1992 induction rate, Poland's active-duty forces 
would fall below the limitations of the 1990 Conventional Forces 
in Europe (CFE) Treaty (see Glossary) that cut the forces of all 
NATO and Warsaw Pact nations (see table 22, Appendix). In 
mid- 1992, some 220,000 billets were listed as filled, compared with 
the force level of 300,000 prescribed for that stage of force reduc- 
tion. Of the 220,000 billets, about 100,000 were career military 
and more than half were in rear-echelon rather than combat units. 

In the early 1990s, cities provided the majority of recruits, and 
students normally received deferments. In 1991 the armed forces 
showed about a 20 percent shortage of officers, warrant officers, 
and junior officers, although interest in attending military schools 
had increased after military reform began. In 1992 policy makers 
discussed offering qualified individuals five-year contracts as a 



271 



Poland: A Country Study 



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273 



Poland: A Country Study 



means of augmenting skilled military specialties outside CFE limi- 
tations. 

In 1990 the government enacted measures to improve military 
housing, living conditions of dependents, pay, and leave. By 1990 
specialized personnel such as jet pilots had begun leaving the serv- 
ice in large numbers, partly because of personnel cutbacks but also 
because low pay, low prestige, and outdated equipment were not 
commensurate with the rigorous entrance and training requirements 
for their specialties. Because the military doctrine of the 1990s would 
rely heavily on sophisticated equipment and skilled personnel, im- 
proving service conditions for such individuals was an important 
planning goal in the early 1990s. 

Military Training and Education 

Under communist leadership, Poland's programs for military 
training and education received generous funding and formed a 
large network of institutions, all of which included political indoc- 
trination as well as technical training. The doctrinal reorientation 
that began in 1987 and intensified in 1989 reduced the training 
load and made efficient use of training institutions an economic 
imperative. The new emphasis on public approval of the military 
brought civilian and military education programs closer together. 
And the political officers that had preserved party loyalty and taught 
communist doctrine in the Polish Army since 1944 were removed 
in favor of establishing a general education agency. 

Conscript Training 

Prior to 1990, individual and unit training followed the Soviet 
model because of Poland's regular participation in joint Warsaw 
Pact exercises with the Soviet Union and northern-tier allies 
Czechoslovakia and East Germany. Most conscripts served their 
entire term of active duty as privates or privates first class. Out- 
standing individuals were identified early for specialized school- 
ing as NCO candidates. NCOs were required to commit to four 
years of additional service after completing their schooling. Thir- 
teen warrant officer candidate schools operated in 1981, offering 
specialized technical programs of between one and three years that 
included more political indoctrination than did programs for NCOs. 

The Main Political Administration (Glowne Biuro Administracji, 
known in the West by its English-language acronym, MPA) was 
headed by a deputy in the Ministry of National Defense. But the 
MPA also exercised independent authority as a department of the 
PZPR Central Committee; ultimate responsibility was to the PZPR, 
and the head of the MPA was appointed by the PZPR Secretariat. 



274 



National Security 



The MPA conducted political indoctrination in the armed forces 
and counseled the army in personnel policy making and appoint- 
ments. Political officers in Polish People's Army units supervised 
party organizations and communist youth groups for conscripts. 
The most significant youth group was the Union of Military Youth, 
which sought to improve both the moral and ideological outlook 
of service personnel, at the same time reinforcing party control of 
society. In the 1980s, about half of Polish conscripts were mem- 
bers of the union. 

In 1989 the first noncommunist government pressed hard to 
reform or replace the MPA. In late 1989, the organization was 
replaced by the Main Education Board (Gtowny Zarzad Wy- 
chowawczy — GZW), and party posts in the military were abolished. 
Party influence on military training continued, however, until late 
1990, when the collapse of the PZPR and of the old state security 
system (together with strong pressure from Parliament), made clear 
to the military establishment that meaningful reform was neces- 
sary to garner crucial public support. 

In the postcommunist years, conscript training has been limit- 
ed by the budget. As of mid- 1992, no division-scale exercises had 
been held since the Warsaw Pact era. Total exercise time for trainees 
was significantly reduced, and items such as projectile allotments 
were limited. Cruises by navy personnel and training flights for 
pilots, both very expensive phases of training, were curtailed; in 
1992 Polish pilots averaged between forty and fifty flying hours 
annually, compared with an average of 200 hours for NATO pilots. 

Officer Education 

In the communist era, officer education began with the precepts 
of Marxism-Leninism and their importance in defending the so- 
cialist system. The MPA directed the officers' indoctrination in 
these precepts. By contrast, in training both officers and enlisted 
personnel the postcommunist military education system empha- 
sized the individual's role in maintaining Poland's military heritage 
and traditions rather than in preserving a particular ideology. The 
Education Officers Corps was abolished, as was the post of deputy 
commanding officer in military units, which had been obligatory 
billets for political officers. In 1990, public skepticism toward the 
initial reshuffling of the military education program led to a sec- 
ond stage of reform. The GZW was then reconstituted as the 
Department of Education and given a broad educational mission. 
These moves were seen as a clean break with political indoctrina- 
tion of the military and an opportunity to improve the profession- 
al level of military personnel. 



275 



Poland: A Country Study 




276 



National Security 



Higher officer candidate schools had been the major source of 
career officers in the Polish People's Army, although a few gradu- 
ates of civilian schools switched to a military career after complet- 
ing their active-duty obligation. Of the fourteen higher officer 
candidate schools in the 1980s, only the Technical Military Acade- 
my and the Medical Military Academy received sufficient quali- 
fied applicants. In the communist era, all schools offered programs 
for political officers as well. Graduation from a higher officer can- 
didate school yielded a bachelors degree and a commission as a 
second lieutenant. 

From 1949 to 1989, all instruction at Polish military schools was 
heavily politicized. At the higher officer schools and military gradu- 
ate schools, mandatory courses included Marxist philosophy, po- 
litical economy, and scientific socialism. The stated goal of such 
courses was "to instill the socialist outlook among soldiers." 

Officer training reform in the early 1990s stressed defensive tech- 
niques and sought to blend military training with education to 
produce well-rounded officers who could be integrated more fully 
into Polish society. Low attendance and low budgets required clos- 
ing some specialized schools, and several other specialized schools 
were merged. In some cases, joint programs were established with 
universities. 

In another effort to depoliticize Polish military training, a sin- 
gle senior military school, the National Defense Academy (Akade- 
mia Obrony Narodowej — AON) was established in 1990. The AON 
merged the General Staff and military-political academies, which 
had been criticized as bastions of cronyism that provided nonfunc- 
tional instructor positions for senior officers. The AON's mission 
is to train commanders and senior staff officers as well as to pre- 
pare civilians for service in the upper echelons of the defense 
bureaucracy. Graduate programs have been established offering 
masters and doctoral degrees. The AON also develops policy recom- 
mendations for national defense, and its faculty often participates 
in intragovernmental working groups assembled to define future 
national security policy. 

Reserves and Mobilization 

In the communist era, reserve training programs were inade- 
quate to maintain large numbers of personnel in service-ready 
condition. In fact, some reservists completed their twenty-year ob- 
ligation without ever attending training. Regulations limited both 
total training time and total call-up time of reserve personnel to 
twenty-four months or less. In 1982 this system had produced 



277 



Poland: A Country Study 

605,000 reservists whose training was labeled as adequate. In the 
early 1990s, reserve training remained quite spotty. 

The new Polish defense system places special emphasis on the 
mobilization preparation of reserves because of drastic decreases 
in active-duty forces. In case of military threat or war, an estimat- 
ed 5 to 6 percent of overall combat forces would come from reserve 
units. In this context, the training of reserve personnel, especially 
command, staff, and specialist positions, is much more important 
than it was under the communist system. According to 1992 poli- 
cy, which did not vary greatly from communist-era doctrine on 
the subject, 400,000 to 500,000 reservists would be available for 
call-up. Reserve units are formed according to geographical loca- 
tion to achieve cohesiveness. In wartime their mission is to delay 
an enemy force in their area long enough for the regular army to 
engage. One difficulty with this system is the requirement that in- 
dividual reservists maintain weapons at home specifically for emer- 
gency use, a practice at variance with Polish culture and criticized 
as introducing firearms into civilian society. 

Defense and the National Economy 

In the early 1990s, military planners recognized the crucial con- 
nection between the health of the national economy and the degree 
to which the Polish Army could be transformed into a lean and 
efficient defensive force. Given a stringent budget, key decisions 
were needed in arms procurement policy, particularly regarding 
foreign versus domestic manufacture and the degree of technolog- 
ical sophistication. The practicality and advisability of converting 
the Polish arms industry to civilian manufacture and budgetary 
allocations to defense were also major concerns. 

Military Budget 

The Polish military budget had begun to shrink somewhat by 
1988, but major cuts occurred between 1989 and 1991. In 1991, 
for example, the Ministry of National Defense proposed to the Sejm 
a defense budget of 29 trillion zloty (for the value of the zloty — see 
Glossary); the Sejm approved a budget of 23 trillion zloty, but sub- 
sequent cuts lowered the total to 16 trillion zloty. Some 22.5 per- 
cent of the 1990 defense budget was allotted to purchase of arms 
and equipment, and 61 .5 percent went to maintaining manpower 
levels. Military experts considered the former figure too low to even 
maintain Polish equipment in status quo condition, leaving no funds 
for modernization. At the same time, the manpower figure was 
inflated by the communist legacy of redundant bureaucracy filled 
with senior officers. The 1991 budget made a nominal allotment 



278 



National Security 



of 10 percent for procurement of new equipment. Although cuts 
in senior military staff were expected to remedy the chronic im- 
balance between personnel and equipment allocations, in the first 
part of 1992 some 80 percent of the military budget went to main- 
taining personnel. 

The Sejm cut another 1 1 percent from the budget for 1992, caus- 
ing planners again to reassess the structure and equipment of the 
armed forces. At that point, the Ministry of National Defense owed 
a debt of about US$70 million to Polish defense industries. 

Arms Procurement 

When communism fell, Poland's military equipment and arms 
supply changed as dramatically as its strategic position. In the War- 
saw Pact era, the Soviet Union had been Poland's main supplier 
at prices far below world standards. Once the political advantage 
of offering such bargains disappeared, however, the Soviet/Rus- 
sian arms industry ended preferential treatment. In the late 1980s, 
for example, the top-of-the-line MiG-29 fighter was offered to Soviet 
allies for US$2 million each; in 1991 the same aircraft was offered 
to the same customers at the approximate world market value of 
US$18 million. Given severe cuts in its military budget and the 
impending obsolescence of many of its existing armaments, Poland 
faces critical procurement choices that have generated heated de- 
bate in the military establishment in the early 1990s. Those choices 
are also conditioned by the technical requirements of Poland's new 
strategic defense doctrine of high mobility and flexibility — qualities 
lacking in many critical systems remaining from the Soviet supply 
line. 

The debate centered on how much Poland should rely on sup- 
plies from its own arms industry (thrown into crisis by the cut- 
backs that began in the late 1980s), how much on purchases from 
Western suppliers, and how much on previous connections with 
Soviet/Russian suppliers. Production at home offered two signifi- 
cant advantages: technological continuity and lower cost. In 1990 
some 64 percent of the equipment used by the Polish armed forces 
was domestically produced, and most Polish-produced armaments 
were compatible with existing Soviet-supplied products. (In 1991 
the cost of an M-l-Al Abrams tank from the United States was 
nearly ten times that of a Polish-made tank in the T-72 line.) Also 
a major planning factor were the arms reductions that would be 
required of former Warsaw Pact nations in nearly every category 
by the terms of the CFE Treaty. 

According to statistics often cited in the arms-policy debates of 
the early 1990s, the ratio of equipment to personnel in the Polish 



279 



Poland: A Country Study 

Army was significantly smaller than comparable ratios in former 
Warsaw Pact allies Bulgaria, the CSFR, East Germany, and Roma- 
nia and much smaller than those of NATO countries. Planned per- 
sonnel cuts in the Polish Army would improve the overall ratio, 
but significant technical modernization was needed to bring the 
percentage of state-of-the-art equipment to the desired 35 to 40 per- 
cent. In 1991 Chief of Staff General Zdzislaw Stelmaszuk rated 
less than 25 percent of the Polish Army's equipment in this category, 
and over 40 percent of towed artillery and naval vessels were clas- 
sified as obsolete. According to a General Staff analysis in 1991, 
about 500 trillion zloty of armaments purchases would be needed 
by the year 2000 to reach the desired level of modernity. This figure 
dwarfed the 1991 Ministry of National Defense budget allotment 
of 16 trillion zloty passed by Parliament. 

In 1991 Stelmaszuk, who was also chairman of the Group for 
Restructuring the Polish Armed Forces, projected the following ar- 
mament goals for the mid-1990s after restructuring and reductions 
to meet CFE requirements: 1,730 tanks; 2,150 armored vehicles, 
of which 1,700 would be infantry combat vehicles; 1,610 artillery 
systems over 100mm; 1,430 antitank systems; 3,175 antiaircraft 
systems (including 1 ,455 missile systems); 130 combat assault heli- 
copters; and eighty naval vessels (including forty combat vessels). 

In the early 1990s, the uncertainty of available annual funding 
complicated procurement. Although some specific long-range 
procurement goals had been determined by 1991, in 1992 civilian 
and military leaders had not yet reached a consensus about the best 
way to achieve those goals. 

Arms Imports 

Beginning in 1989, long-term defense contracts with the Soviet 
Union and East Germany were broken unexpectedly, resulting in 
shortages of crucial components and materials. From 1990 onwards, 
the Soviet Union simply refused to supply some spare parts and 
lubricants not available in Poland, while raising the price of others 
to world market levels. The withdrawal of Soviet forces removed 
nuclear warheads from Scud and other Warsaw Pact missile bat- 
teries, leaving the Poles to locate conventional warheads elsewhere 
to fit their disarmed missiles and launchers. Naval coproduction 
contracts with East Germany ended with German reunification in 
1990, leaving Poland with empty hulls and ships lacking armaments. 

Such situations caused planners to consider importing Western 
military equipment. This solution would move the Polish Army 
toward its long-range goal of compatibility with NATO doctrine 
and armaments. Three major obstacles confronted such a policy, 



280 



Sokol helicopter, manufactured at Swidnik Transport Factory 
Courtesy Polish Information Agency, Warsaw 

however. The introduction of Western technology would create a 
confused, hybrid system; sale of advanced technology by Western 
nations to a former Warsaw Pact member often was blocked by 
export restrictions of the Coordinating Committee for Multilater- 
al Export Controls (CoCom — see Glossary); and the Polish defense 
budget simply lacked sufficient funds to buy advanced Western 
hardware. 

Domestic Arms Production 

Under the communist system, the Ministry of National Defense 
ran nineteen manufacturing and repair plants, but about eighty 
plants were designated as defense industry enterprises under 
branches of the Ministry of Industry. In the late 1980s, the largest 
military goods producers were the Stalowa Wola Steel Works, the 
Kasprzak Radio Works, the Krasnik Bail-Bearing Plant, the Wifama 
Textile Machinery Combine, the Stomil Tire Plant, the Polish Avi- 
ation Combine, the Pronit firm, the Northern and Wisla shipyards 
in Gdansk, the Lucznik Works, the Starachowice Truck Factory, 
the Polish Optical Works, the Bumar-Lab^dy Engineering Equip- 
ment Combine, and the Olkusz Enamel Plant. In most cases, over 
85 percent of a plant's production went to nondefense customers; 
the shipyards, the Bumar-tab^dy combine, and the Stalowa Wola 



281 



Poland: A Country Study 



Steel Works were among the few producers whose output went 
mostly to the military. In 1988 military goods producers employed 
about 260,000 people and accounted for about 3 percent of total 
output of enterprises under the Ministry of Industry. At the same 
time, over 6 percent of Poland's total exports were military products. 
Of military output, 49 percent went to the Polish military, 46 per- 
cent was exported, and 5 percent went to the ministries of justice 
and internal affairs. By 1992 military goods had dropped from 3 
percent to 1 percent of total industrial output. 

Polish military industries began planning for conversion to 
civilian production in 1987, when the Warsaw Pact was develop- 
ing its new defensive posture. Some twenty of the eighty designat- 
ed defense industry enterprises were considered for closure or 
conversion to civilian functions. Meanwhile, all defense industries 
made long-term plans for greatly reduced orders between 1991 and 
1995. By 1990 military contracts had dropped by 30 to 80 percent, 
depending on the plant. Spending on weaponry had dropped by 
84 percent. These reductions in demand led to unemployment and 
unused industrial capacity. Defense industries also lost the privileged 
position they had enjoyed in the communist economy. Gone in 1990 
were supply priority, low-interest credit, state subsidies, and tax 
exemptions. Industry pessimism increased in 1990 and 1991 when 
military planners considered replacing Soviet- and Polish-made 
equipment with Western equipment. 

Conversion of defense industry plants to civilian production faced 
serious obstacles. Deep cuts in the defense budget left little money 
for a centrally administered program or for the massive investment 
required to convert heavy industry. Because long-range military 
needs remained undefined in 1992, the degree of conversion would 
require guesswork. Finally, some plants simply could not be con- 
verted at any reasonable cost. 

In 1992 the Ministry of Industry proposed a program to restruc- 
ture the defense industry. The program would create three classes 
of linked holding companies, classified according to the degree of 
competition in which they engaged. One group, including producers 
of munitions and electronics, would be fully controlled by the State 
Treasury. The second group, including producers of aircraft, ar- 
mored vehicles, and the Northern Shipyard at Gdansk, would have 
the State Treasury as controlling shareholder. The third group, 
including private firms supplying specialized production, would 
operate as market-economy enterprises. This structure was designed 
to focus production on critical military items and efficiently con- 
vert remaining capacity to free-market production. 



282 



National Security 



By 1992 budgetary uncertainty and the high cost of Western 
equipment caused planners to rely more on domestic production 
of high-technology equipment and on joint production projects be- 
tween Polish and Western firms. Projects considered in 1992 in- 
cluded an improved T-72 tank, new armored combat vehicles, a 
new ground attack helicopter, and a light attack aircraft. Many 
new products were suggested to replace Soviet equipment. Among 
the new products developed by the Polish industry were the 1-22 
Iryda combat training jet, the first such airplane completely 
designed in Poland, and the PW light military vehicle. In its test- 
ing stage, the 1-22 Iryda jet trainer was evaluated as a very well- 
made airplane lacking a first-class engine. In 1992 Polish manufac- 
turers sought joint ventures with Western firms to supply appropri- 
ate Western components to upgrade the Iryda and the PW. 

In the Warsaw Pact decades, Polish production of sophisticated 
guidance and communications equipment was generally dis- 
couraged. As a result, in 1990 Polish industry was unable to sup- 
ply the armed forces with modern avionics, electronics, and 
guidance systems that would make up some of the ground lost by 
relying on Soviet technology. The greatest manufacturing capa- 
bilities were in airframe design, small weapons design, and am- 
munition manufacturing. 

A top procurement priority was electronic friend-or-foe aircraft 
identification units to upgrade the primitive air defense system. 
In the late 1980s, the Soviet Union had refused to complete a con- 
tract to supply such equipment — a fortunate development in light 
of ensuing changes in Polish threat perception and the advantages 
design familiarity would have given Russian attack planes. In 1992 
Polish planners were considering both domestic design of an iden- 
tification system and coproduction with a Western firm. 

The Bumar-Lab^dy combine manufactured the T-72 tank by 
license with the Soviet Union, using Polish manufacturing tech- 
nology. Until 1988 a seller of tanks to many countries of the world, 
Bumar-Lab^dy suffered from reduced world and domestic demand, 
and by 1989 its plants were working at half capacity. Like many 
other defense-oriented heavy industries, Bumar-Lab^dy found con- 
version to civilian production difficult. Meanwhile, the firm's finan- 
cial condition deteriorated because of the high cost of maintaining 
a spare-parts inventory and serious payment lapses by the Minis- 
try of National Defense. 

Arms Exports 

A possible solution to the critical condition of Poland's arms in- 
dustry is increased exports. A 1992 study rated Poland twentieth 



283 



Poland: A Country Study 

in world arms exports in the period 1985-91, with an estimated 
total export value of more than US$1.6 billion. Between 60 and 
70 percent of Poland's arms exports involved servicing and spare 
parts. At that point, three large companies — Bumar-Lab^dy, Cen- 
zin, and Cenrex — had government licenses for arms export, as did 
fifty small firms. In the transition period, regulations governing 
arms export were often murky, leading to a series of scandals when 
the extralegal activities of Polish exporters were disclosed. In 1991 
high-ranking defense officials were arrested for selling US$96 mil- 
lion worth of arms to Iraq, and a number of smaller export deals 
were uncovered. 

Law and Order 

After 1989 the state's role in maintaining law and order changed, 
as did the definition of internal threats to national security. In ac- 
cordance with Poland's commitment to representative democratic 
governance, the complex and sinister system of internal security 
organizations that had been established to eliminate opposition to 
communist regimes gave way to an apolitical and professional police 
force. Like most other reforms of the transition period, practical 
changes came slowly because of resistance from incumbent officials. 

Internal Security 

Until 1990 the internal security forces of the Ministry of Inter- 
nal Affairs, which included the Security Service (Shizba Bezpie- 
czehstwa — SB), the regular police (Milicja Obywatelska — MO), 
the riot police, and a large Citizens' Militia Voluntary Reserve 
(Ochotnicza Rezerwa Milicji Obywatelskiej — ORMO), were 
charged with preserving public order and protecting the regime 
and the PZPR. These forces were especially active during the mar- 
tial law period of the early 1980s because the Jaruzelski govern- 
ment sought to separate regular military forces from unpopular 
civilian control actions. All departments of the internal security 
forces came under intense public pressure for abolition or reform 
when the first noncommunist government was formed in 1989. 

The first stage of reform in the Ministry of Internal Affairs was 
Kiszczak's reorganization program of 1989, which was designed 
to satisfy public demands for government rather than party con- 
trol of the ministry. The reorganization sought to avoid the kind 
of frontal assault, advocated by radical reformers, that would bring 
confrontation with entrenched bureaucrats. Kiszczak was suspected 
of seeking to change his ministry's image without substantially 
reducing its power. Although the scope of the initial reform was 
quite broad and nominally separated the Ministry of Internal Affairs 



284 



National Security 



from PZPR control, the ministry also remained beyond the con- 
trol of other branches of government. Kiszczak, who remained 
minister, refused to replace any of his deputies with Solidarity 
representatives. After the initial reform, internal affairs departments 
continued covert surveillance activity, although now with the nomi- 
nal requirement of court approval. 

Security Service 

Kiszczak' s reforms primarily affected the security service. The 
SB had been a plainclothes force of the Ministry of Internal Af- 
fairs, charged with seeking out subversive elements at home and 
abroad and investigating sabotage. Established in 1944 and con- 
trolled by the Soviet Union through the early 1950s, the SB faded 
during the Gomulka reform period, then revived as a totally secret 
force that stood over Polish society throughout the rest of the com- 
munist era. 

The 1990 reform cut about 70 percent of SB personnel and most 
of the departments that had been most active in protecting the com- 
munist regimes from internal dangers. Department Three, which 
had monitored the activities of social, cultural, and political or- 
ganizations and the press, was abolished. So was Department Four, 
which had monitored religious organizations and was assumed 
to be responsible for the murder of dissident leader Father Jerzy 
Popiehiszko in 1984. Three new, nominally apolitical departments 
were established in place of those abolished, and the name was 
changed from SB to the Office of State Protection (Urzad Ochro- 
ny Panstwa — UOP). In mid- 1990 an independent screening 
commission was established for former employees of abolished de- 
partments seeking jobs in remaining agencies of the ministry. All 
applicants over fifty-five years of age were rejected in an attempt 
to remove as many as possible of the communist-era SB adminis- 
trators. 

In 1992 the reputation of the new UOP was clouded by the dis- 
covery that many records from the communist era had been de- 
stroyed before the reform took place. An air of scandal surrounded 
the ministry as many top government figures, including Walesa, 
were implicated as collaborators in SB activities. Some Poles 
demanded that all SB records be opened to the public. However, 
the remaining files could not be relied upon to identify accurately 
the remaining government officials guilty of SB collaboration. In 
1992 accusation of SB collaboration was a frequently used weapon 
in Poland's fractious political system. 



285 



Poland: A Country Study 



Militia Forces 

The ZOMO motorized riot troops, which played the most visi- 
ble role in quelling demonstrations in 1980 and 1981 , were reduced 
in size somewhat by the early 1990s and renamed Preventive Units 
of the Citizens' Militia (Oddziaty Prewencji Milicji Obywatelskiej — 
OPMO). OPMO forces are restricted to roles such as crowd con- 
trol at sporting events, ensuring safety in natural disasters, and 
assisting the regular police. In theory, higher government authority 
would be required for large OPMO contingents to be used. 

From the 1960s through the 1980s, ORMO forces, which at one 
time numbered as many as 600,000 civilian volunteers, were used 
to augment regular police personnel at key trouble spots. In the 
early 1980s, ORMO harassed Solidarity members and prevented 
independent groups from organizing. Largely staffed by industri- 
al workers who gained substantial privileges by monitoring their 
peers in the workplace, ORMO was the object of extreme resent- 
ment throughout the 1980s. Kiszczak attempted to promote ORMO 
as a valuable auxiliary police force, but the organization was abol- 
ished by the Sejm in 1990. 

The Kiszczak reforms failed to reassure the public that the secu- 
rity agencies now were acting in the public interest. However, the 
collapse of the PZPR in 1990 made possible the ouster of Kiszczak 
and faster reduction of the autonomy of the security agencies. Kisz- 
czak's successor, a journalist, put the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
under a civilian for the first time since martial law was declared. 

Border Troops 

Under the communist regimes, the Border Guard Troops (Woj- 
ska Ochrony Pogranicza — WOP) was an agency of the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs, which was responsible for tight border security 
as well as a variety of less specific missions. In 1991 the military- 
style WOP was disbanded and replaced by the Border Guard (Straz- 
nik Graniczny — SG), whose commander was appointed by and 
reported directly to the prime minister. The force was reduced from 
20,000 to 13,500 troops, with the top-heavy officer corps absorb- 
ing the largest cuts. 

The newly configured force retrained the large numbers of lower- 
and mid-level cadre that remained in service and switched its oper- 
ational strategy from tight border patrols to border reconnaissance. 
SG activity is now aimed at preventing illegal border crossings, 
smuggling, and the entry of environmentally harmful materials into 
Poland from adjoining countries. Between 1990 and 1991, border 
crossings into Poland increased from 2 million to 10 million. In 



286 



National Security 



1991 and 1992, the major refugee movements from Eastern Eu- 
rope and Southern Europe put great stress on Poland's reduced 
border force, which was responsible for customs and visa inspec- 
tions at border crossings. A 1991 study showed alarming signs that 
Poland's borders were very porous. For example, 70 percent of 
goods declared as transiting Poland remained within the country 
once they entered (thus having avoided taxes and duties), and only 
30 percent of automobiles going into the Soviet Union had proper 
transport documents. 

Crime 

In 1989 and 1990, the crime rate in Poland rose substantially. 
The increase was attributed to several factors: social stresses from 
the uncertainties of the transition period; the institutional inade- 
quacy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to deal with social unrest 
without wielding unlimited authority; and widespread skepticism 
that prevented public cooperation with police investigations. Pub- 
lic confidence had been destroyed by numerous incidents of ar- 
bitrary and unpunished police violence against civilians. In Warsaw, 
where robberies increased by 50 percent between 1988 and 1989, 
police solved only 16 percent of reported crimes in 1990. Police 
budgets were slashed, and recruitment became very difficult be- 
cause police work now carried low prestige and offered few benefits. 
For personnel remaining from the communist era, the drop in in- 
stitutional support was especially demoralizing. 

By 1990 these conditions led to citizen complaints about being 
defenseless against crime and to complaints by the police that they 
could not do their work properly because of poor cooperation from 
citizens and insufficient budgetary support. Between 1990 and 1991, 
the police budget was cut by 13 percent and distance limitations 
were put on the use of patrol cars. Already in early 1990, however, 
legislation had been drafted to put the police under a separate chief 
appointed by and directly responsible to the prime minister. Such 
a shift meant that the Ministry of Internal Affairs could not issue 
direct orders on the conduct of police business. Local jurisdictions 
also could establish their own police forces as counterweights to 
the national police system; political qualifications could not be con- 
sidered in hiring at any level. The new law also placed extensive 
limitations on police powers that interfered with citizen rights. 

In 1991 the Citizens' Militia changed its name to simply the 
Police (Policja). Personnel were retrained, and a strong public rela- 
tions campaign was established to gain public trust. Uniforms and 
operational methods were changed, and by 1992 police had begun 
to flush pockets of crime from the inner cities. In 1992 the aura of 



287 



Poland: A Country Study 

fear had dissipated, and a large part of the public came to believe 
the police were performing as well as possible under strict budget 
limitations. A major newspaper poll in early 1992 showed the police 
second to the military (and above the Roman Catholic Church) 
in respect afforded Polish institutions. 

By 1991 large increases had occurred in white-collar crime and 
economic scandals connected with privatization, liberalization of 
foreign trade, and decentralization of economic policy making. The 
unsealing of Poland's borders also made the country vulnerable 
to foreign organized crime. Accordingly, the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs set up a special police unit to combat corruption and eco- 
nomic fraud. In 1991, with a total detail of 600, the special unit 
set up special departments at existing police stations in seventeen 
districts. 

New international conditions fostered new types of crime in the 
early 1990s. By 1992 the large number of refugees entering Poland, 
many without legal status and without employment, had become 
a serious source of crime. And explosives and arms left behind by 
the Soviet armed forces combined with social unrest to contribute 
to a significant increase in terrorist bombings. In addition to actu- 
al bombings, police frequently had to cope with false reports. As 
many as 90 percent of false alarms involved Poles between eleven 
and sixteen years old. 

By 1992 narcotics had also became a problem. Bands of Polish 
amphetamine producers and distributors had developed a complex 
underground organization that produced very pure amphetamine 
narcotics, laundered money, and smuggled large amounts of their 
products into Western Europe (see Health Issues, ch. 2). The "Po- 
lish pipeline" of agents abroad moved hashish, heroin, and cocaine 
into Western markets with increasing frequency. In the early 1990s, 
the entry of international traffickers into the indigenous Polish sys- 
tem threatened to raise the sophistication of local operations and 
make Poland a central distribution point for the world narcotics 
industry. Asian, Latin American, and African traffickers found Po- 
lish operatives useful because customs agents had not yet learned 
to identify East Europeans as potential smugglers. In 1991 some 
20 percent of amphetamines captured in Western Europe origi- 
nated in Poland. 

Prevention of drug-related crime was hampered by policies re- 
maining from the communist era and by budget limitations. Drug 
laws remained very lax in 1992; because drug trading was regard- 
ed as a minor offense, no Pole was convicted for amphetamine ac- 
tivities between 1985 and 1992. The nation's police force included 



288 



National Security 



only thirty full-time drug enforcement officers in 1992, with an an- 
nual operating budget of between US$100,000 and US$200,000. 

Penal System 

Under both communist and postcommunist governments, the 
Polish penal system operated under national authority. Beginning 
in 1956, the system was under jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice 
through its Main Bureau of Penal Institutions. Institutions were 
categorized by the criminal records of the inmates and the severi- 
ty of their crimes. Each institution had a prison commission that 
classified inmates and adjusted their treatment according to be- 
havior. 

Adopted in 1969, the Penal Code of the Polish People's Repub- 
lic was one of the most punitive in Europe in actual practice — 
although the code's rhetoric was quite liberal. Nominally, mem- 
bers of the judiciary had free access to prisons to investigate prisoner 
grievances, examine documents, and assess prison conditions. In 
actuality, the Polish judiciary was completely controlled by the 
PZPR and therefore had no capacity for remedial action. Like- 
wise, codified prisoner privileges such as medical treatment and 
access to libraries seldom existed in practice. In 1981 Western ex- 
perts estimated that the penal system managed between 130,000 
and 200,000 prisoners — a rate of imprisonment per 100,000 citizens 
of 350 to 580, compared with 212 in the United States and twenty- 
five in the Netherlands. 

At its inception in 1980, Solidarity began distributing previous- 
ly unseen information about Polish prison conditions. Patronat, 
an organization lobbying for liberalized prison policies, emerged 
in 1981 but was repressed in 1982. The political tensions of the 
early 1980s triggered a wave of prison strikes affecting two of ev- 
ery three penal institutions in Poland between 1980 and 1982. Press 
reports on the riots revealed chronic deficiencies in the system. Food 
standards did not meet human biological needs. Prisoners were rou- 
tinely beaten, tortured, and denied medical treatment. Large 
prison populations caused overcrowding, and sanitation and recrea- 
tional facilities were inadequate. Hard labor — the standard method 
of inmate rehabilitation — featured dangerous working conditions, 
and refusal to work led to solitary confinement and other harsh 
penalties. An uncodified set of prison regulations introduced in 1974 
had given prison guards arbitrary power to inflict a wide range 
of punishments. Those punishments were a key motivation of in- 
mate strikes in the early 1980s. Prisoners could complain only as 
individuals, never as a group, and until the riots the workings of 
the prison system were completely hidden from the Polish public. 



289 



Poland: A Country Study 



Under Communism 

In the communist era, the Polish penal system basically adapt- 
ed the penal practices of the Soviet Union to suit local conditions. 
In both systems, cheap and disciplined prison labor played an im- 
portant role in supporting the economy. Forced, uncompensated 
labor on private projects of prison officials was a source of partic- 
ular resentment among inmates. 

The civil upheavals of 1980 and 1981 expanded the political role 
of the penal system. Among the thousands of arrests made during 
that time, typical crimes were possession of underground leaf- 
lets, display of Solidarity symbols, organization of meetings and 
marches, and refusal to work in militarized enterprises. Solidarity 
activists generally were imprisoned in groups. The PZPR applied 
great pressure to civil and military judges trying such cases; un- 
der martial law, a military commissar monitored every court as 
well. Loyalty oaths were required of judges, and many who were 
deemed unreliable lost their positions. 

When martial law ended in mid- 1983, thousands of political 
prisoners who had been held without charges were conscripted into 
the army and sent to hard labor camps, where they were subject 
to military rather than civil law. In this period, military courts re- 
tained jurisdiction over all cases involving "public safety, order, 
or national security." The tougher sentences of the martial law 
period remained in force and the right to appeal remained void. 

Postcommunist Reform 

Beginning in 1989, former opposition groups (who during the 
1980s had become quite familiar with the Polish prison system) 
achieved a government ban on violence in prisons and restoration 
of prisoner civil rights. In 1989 Parliament passed an amnesty law 
that released political prisoners but continued to confme recidivists. 
In late 1989, the disappointed hard-core prison population staged 
some 500 riots. In 1990 Pawel Moczydlowski, director of the Cen- 
tral Prison Administration, succeeded in ending the violence and 
corruption typical of the communist administration. About one- 
third of prison guards and three-quarters of prison governors were 
dismissed between 1990 and 1992. By mid- 1992, nearly 50 per- 
cent of prison personnel had been in service less than three years. 

Wherever possible, the physical structure of prisons was opened 
to give inmates greater contact; harassment and arbitrary punish- 
ment were eliminated, and visitation and appeal rights were ex- 
tended. Patronat and Alcoholics Anonymous became active among 



290 



National Security 



prisoners, and clergymen had unlimited access. Increased public 
access eased tensions between inmates and guards. In 1992, 
however, a Helsinki Watch report noted poor material and sani- 
tation conditions and overcrowding in many Polish prisons. Only 
fifteen prisons had their own hospitals, many of them with primi- 
tive facilities. The opportunity to work, an arduous but often wel- 
come respite from prison tedium, was reduced significantly in the 
postcommunist economic decline; in mid- 1992 only about 25 per- 
cent of prisoners held jobs, and only about 4 percent of prisoners 
worked for civilian companies. 

In mid- 1992 the Central Prison Administration had debts of 
US$8.3 million. The decline of prison enterprises meant that pris- 
ons no longer contributed to the budget of the Ministry of Justice. 
Prison budgets were consumed by the cost of housing prisoners 
(3 million zloty monthly per prisoner). Most Polish prisons were 
at least 100 years old, and several facilities had been condemned 
by 1992. In 1992 the prison population was 61,329. Although sig- 
nificantly lower than in the communist era, that figure climbed 
by 1,000 to 1 ,500 per month between 1989 (when the post-amnesty 
population was 40,000) and 1992 (when experts declared that the 
system had reached its capacity). Sentences still averaged two years, 
compared with six to eight months in the West. In most cases, courts 
still tended to impose maximum sentences even for trivial crimes. 
Lesser punishments, such as fines and restricted freedom, were rare- 
ly imposed as alternatives to imprisonment. 

In the early 1990s, most aspects of internal security in Poland 
followed the same irregular pattern of reform as that which occurred 
in national security policy in the same years. By 1992 the mission 
of state security agencies had changed dramatically toward pro- 
tection of all citizens rather than protection of the state, but the 
public retained from the communist era considerable suspicion of 
such agencies. The open society of the early 1990s fostered new 
types of crime, which were met with uncertain reform measures 
in police and border protection and in prison policy. Obtaining 
public support for internal security institutions was a difficult part 
of governance in the early postcommunist era, as all of Polish so- 
ciety adjusted to quite new internal and external conditions. 

* * * 

Background on Poland's military history is available in studies 
such as M.K. Dziewanowski's Poland in the Twentieth Century and 
Norman Davies's God's Playground: A History of Poland. A. Ross John- 
son covers the development and organization of the Polish People's 



291 



Poland: A Country Study 



Army in East European Military Establishments: The Warsaw Pact North- 
ern Tier; he covers the role of the military in government in Poland 
in Crisis. Several valuable recent studies of Polish military doctrine 
and the international security position of Poland have been pub- 
lished by the Soviet Studies Research Center of the Royal Mili- 
tary Academy at Sandhurst and the Foreign Military Studies Office 
at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The RFE/RL Research Institute's 
RFE/RL Research Report series published between 1989 and 1992 
contains comprehensive reports on the Polish prison system, re- 
form of internal security agencies, and Poland's postcommunist 
military doctrine and strategy. The annual volumes of The Mili- 
tary Balance, published by the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies (London), provide detailed information on force and ar- 
mament strength. The Daily Report: East Europe, a publication of 
the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, is an invaluable source 
of translations of up-to-date periodical articles on the Polish mili- 
tary and the political background of military policy. (For further 
information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



292 



Appendix 



Table 

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

2 Level of Education of Females Aged Fifteen and Over, 1990 

3 Marital and Family Position of Females Aged Eighteen to 

Fifty-Nine, 1987 and 1991 

4 Housing Capacity, 1981-90 

5 Religious Instruction in Primary and Secondary Schools, 1991 

6 Schools, Students, and Teachers by Level of Education, 1981, 

1986, and 1991 

7 Foreign-Language Instruction in Primary and Secondary 

Schools, 1991 

8 Incidence of Selected Diseases and Disability Days Caused, 

1980, 1985, and 1989 

9 Medical Personnel, 1980, 1985, and 1990 

10 Medical Facilities, 1980, 1985, and 1990 

11 Births, Marriages, and Deaths, 1984-90 

12 Civilian Labor Force by Type of Occupation, 1987, 1988, and 

1989 

13 Selected Balance of Payments Data in Transferable Rubles, 

Selected Years, 1985-91 

14 Selected Balance of Payments Data in Convertible Curren- 

cies, Selected Years, 1985-91 

15 Industrial Output and Consumer Price Index, July 1990 to 

November 1991 

16 Unemployment Rate by Age-Group and Sex, Summer 1992 

17 Output of Selected Engineering Products, Selected Years, 

1980-91 

18 Principal Agricultural Products, 1988, 1989, and 1990 

19 Principal Trading Partners, 1988, 1989, and 1990 

20 Election Results for Sejm and Senate, 1991 

21 Naval Craft and Personnel, Selected Years, 1970-95 

22 Declared Holdings of the Polish Army and Arms Limitations 

According to the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, 
1991 



293 



Appendix 



Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 



When you know Multiply by To find 



Millimeters 0.04 inches 

Centimeters 0.39 inches 

Meters 3.3 feet 

Kilometers 0.62 miles 

Hectares (10,000 m 2 ) 2.47 acres 

Square kilometers 0.39 square miles 

Cubic meters 35.3 cubic feet 

Liters 0.26 gallons 

Kilograms 2.2 pounds 

Metric tons 0.98 long tons 

1.1 short tons 

2,204 pounds 

Degrees Celsius 1.8 degrees Fahrenheit 

(Centigrade) and add 32 



Table 2. Level of Education of Females Aged 
Fifteen and Over, 1990 





Per 100 






Highest Level Completed 


Males 


Percentage of 


All Females 






Urban 


Rural 




89 


8.3 


1.8 


Secondary education 


, , 150 


36.0 


15.8 




56 


16.1 


16.8 


Primary school 


126 


35.9 


51.5 


Did not complete primary school .... 


181 


3.7 


14.1 



Source: Based on information from Poland, Glowny Urzad Statystyczny, Sytuacja spoleczno- 
zawodowa kobiet w 1990 r., Warsaw, 1990, 18. 



295 



Poland: A Country Study 



Table 3. Marital and Family Position of Females Aged Eighteen 
to Fifty -Nine, 1987 and 1991 
(in percentages of age range) 



Year 


Children 


Total 


Single 


Married 


Divorced 


Widowed 


Separated 


1987 


None 


37.4 


93.6 


25.8 


29.2 


64.7 


27.7 


1991 


None 


37.5 


94.6 


25.8 


32.3 


68.8 


18.3 


1987 


One 


23.4 


6.1 


25.7 


40.2 


18.0 


40.4 


1991 


One 


22.4 


4.7 


24.2 


40.4 


16.2 


40.9 


1987 


Two 


25.3 


0.3 


31.0 


22.7 


12.0 


29.9 


1991 


Two 


26.8 


0.7 


32.9 


22.6 


9.9 


32.4 


1987 


Three 
















or more 


13.9 


0.0 


17.5 


7.9 


5.3 


2.0 


1991 


Three 
















or more 


13.3 


0.0 


17.1 


4.7 


5.1 


8.4 


All 
















females 
















1987 * . . 


n.a. 


n.a. 


13.6 


75.2 


4.5 


5.1 


1.0 


1991 * . . 


n.a. 


n.a. 


12.1 


69.6 


4.5 


5.1 


1.6 



* Totals may not add to 100 because of rounding, 
n.a. — not applicable. 



Source: Based on information from Poland, Giowny Urzad Statystyczny, Sytuacja spoleczno- 
zawodowa kobiet w 1991 r., Warsaw, 1991, 7. 



296 



Appendix 



Table 4. Housing Capacity, 1981-90 



Category 


1981-85 * 


1986-90 * 


1990 


Dwellings completed 








(in thousands) 


190.9 


170.0 


134.2 




144.8 


124.5 


98.8 


Rural 


46.1 


45.5 


35.4 




99.3 


79.8 


68.4 




54.2 


56.9 


47.4 




2.8 


5.2 


3.0 


Other 


34.6 


28.1 


15.4 


Rooms completed (in thousands) 


740.4 


698.6 


567.3 




535.5 


486.6 


396.3 


Rural 


204.9 


212.0 


171.0 


Housing cooperatives 


344.8 


292.0 


254.6 




266.1 


291.6 


248.0 




9.1 


17.1 


10.0 


Other 


130.4 


97.9 


54.7 


Average useful floor space per dwelling 








(in square meters) 


67.1 


74.1 


77.2 




60.4 


66.8 


69.6 


Rural 


88.0 


93.9 


98.4 


Housing cooperatives 


53.4 


57.9 


59.4 




99.9 


106.5 


109.9 




52.2 


54.0 


56.8 



* Annual averages 



Source: Based on information from Poland, Glowny Urzad Statystyczny, Concise Statistical 
Yearbook of Poland, 1991, Warsaw, 1991, 114-15. 



Table 5. Religious Instruction in Primary 
and Secondary Schools, 1991 

Non-Roman 
Percentage Catholic 



of Total Students 
Receiving Receiving 
Level of Education Instruction Instruction Total 



Primary 

Urban 97.9 26,600 5,161,200 

Rural 99.3 15,800 1,868,300 

All primary 95.8 42,400 7,029,500 

Secondary 

College preparatory 92.2 1,900 409,300 

Vocational 88.5 2,600 551,100 

All secondary 90.1 4,500 960,400 



Source: Based on information from Poland, Glowny Urzad Statystyczny, Concise Statistical 
Yearbook of Poland, 1991, Warsaw, 1991, 128. 



297 



Poland: A Country Study 



Table 6. Schools, Students, and Teachers by Level 
of Education, 1981, 1986, and 1991 



Level of Education 


1981 


1986 


1991 


Schools 








Primary 1 


13,524 


17,013 


18,501 


College preparatory secondary 2 


1,230 


1,131 


1,334 




5,977 


4,801 


5,190 


Postsecondary 


1,272 


960 


893 


Students 










4,259,800 


4,897,600 


5,276,400 


College preparatory secondary 2 


415,000 


382,900 


493,600 


Vocational secondary 


909,000 


634,800 


795,000 


Postsecondary 


589,200 


435,700 


502,600 


Graduates 










A f\ A C\ f\f\ 


503,200 


590,400 


College preparatory secondary 


105,300 


85,800 


99,900 




207,100 


127,500 


150,600 




141,600 


97,000 


91,800 


Teachers 








Primary 


204,300 


277,900 


328,900 


College preparatory secondary 


22,900 


22,300 


25,100 




77,400 


80,200 


85,700 




54,700 


57,300 


62,100 



1 In 1991 eighty-six nonpublic primary schools enrolled 4,800 students. 

2 In 1991 ninety-three nonpublic college preparatory secondary schools enrolled 6,700 students 



Source: Based on information from Poland, Glowny Urzad Statystyczny, Concise Statistical 
Yearbook of Poland, 1991, Warsaw, 1991, 128. 



298 



Appendix 

Table 7. Foreign- Language Instruction in Primary 
and Secondary Schools, 1991 1 



Secondary 2 





College 






Language Primary 2 


Preparatory 


Vocational 


Total 


Required 










52.6 


17.5 


627,600 


French 0.8 


16.2 


5.0 


147,400 




A.A. 1 


3 1 7 
3 1.1 


ozo,zuu 




85.6 


73.0 


3,648,300 


Other 0.0 


8.9 


4.5 


68,800 


Elective 








English 5.8 


0.5 


5.7 


339,500 


French 0.7 


0.1 


1.3 


44,600 


German 3.8 


0.3 


10.0 


263,900 


Other 0.7 


6.6 


1.5 


81,900 


1 Excludes special schools. 








2 In percentages 








Source: Based on information from Poland, Glowny Urzad Statystyczny, Concise Statistical 


Yearbook of Poland, 1991, Warsaw, 


1991, 128. 






Table 8. Incidence of Selected Diseases and Disability 




Days Caused, 1980, 1985, and 1989 




Category 


1980 


1985 


1989 


Incidence of selected diseases 










25,807 


21,650 


16,185 




42,370 


14,973 


10,399 




1,410,357 


2,309,875 


1,642,126 


Cancer 


64,959 


76,938 


82,494 




155,317 


150,596 


145,756 


Disability days caused 








by disease (per 100 employees) 










350.7 


382.4 


420.1 




207.2 


196.1 


215.2 


Nervous system 


163.4 


186.5 


230.4 


Bone, muscle, or connective tissue . . . 


158.3 


168.9 


203.0 


Source: Based on information from Poland, Glowny Urzad Statystyczny, Concise Statistical 


Yearbook of Poland, 1991, Warsaw, 1991, 121. 







299 



Poland: A Country Study 

Table 9. Medical Personnel, 1980, 1985, and 1990 



Category 1980 1985 1990 



Physicians 63,550 73,172 81,674 

Dentists 16,834 17,440 18,219 

Hospital attendants 3,747 3,244 2,708 

Nurses 156,975 179,727 207,654 

Midwives 15,092 19,850 23,868 



Source: Based on information from Poland, Glowny Urzad Statystyczny, Concise Statistical 
Yearbook of Poland, 1991, Warsaw, 1991, 117. 



Table 10. Medical Facilities, 1980, 1985, and 1990 



Category 


1980 


1985 


1990 


Dispensaries 












2,322 


2,410 


Industrial 


2,481 


2,469 


2,450 




418 


377 


316 


Other 


3,019 


1,237 


1,383 


Total dispensaries 


5,918 


6,405 


6,559 




3,218 


3,283 


3,328 


Beds 








General hospitals 


200,752 


210,611 


217,717 


Mental hospitals 


36,535 


34,381 


33,135 


Delivery rooms 


1,968 


1,487 


811 


Tuberculosis sanitoriums 


8,850 


8,850 


5,977 


Alcoholism treatment 










755 


946 


750 


Drug addiction treatment 








centers 


. . . n.a. 


44 


504 




248,860 


256,319 


258,894 




397 


404 


412 


Emergency stations 


49 


53 


61 


Ambulances 


4,784 


4,635 


4,814 




75 


78 


69 



n.a. — not available. 



Source: Based on information from Poland, Glowny Urzad Statystyczny, Concise Statistical 
Yearbook of Poland, 1991, Warsaw, 1991, 118-19. 



300 



Appendix 



Table 11. Births, Marriages, and Deaths, 1984-90 



Live Births Deaths 







Per 1,000 






Per 1,000 


Year 


Number 


Population 


Marriages 


Number 


Population 


1984 


699,041 


18.9 


285,258 


364,862 


9.9 


1985 


677,576 


18.2 


266,816 


381,457 


10.3 


1986 


634,748 


17.0 


257,887 


376,316 


10.1 


1987 


605,492 


16.1 


252,819 


378,365 


10.1 


1988 


587,741 


15.5 


246,791 


370,821 


9.8 


1989 


562,530 


14.8 


255,643 


381,173 


10.0 


1990 


545,800 


14.3 


255,369 


388,440 


10.2 



Source: Based on information from The Europe World Year Book, 1992, 2, London, 1992, 2252. 



Table 12. Civilian Labor Force by Type of Occupation, 
1987, 1988, and 1989 



Type of Occupation 


1987 


1988 


1989 


Agriculture, forestry, and 








fishing 


5,059,000 


4,923,900 


4,729,500 




612,900 


609,800 


614,700 




4,710,800 


4,684,900 


4,630,600 




1,457,600 


1,471,400 


1,418,300 


Trade, restaurants, and 










1,816,300 


1,808,600 


1,787,000 


Transportation, storage, 










1,378,500 


1,367,600 


1,303,200 


Community, social, and 










2,860,900 


2,917,200 


3,066,600 


Other 


700,200 


690,700 


814,100 


TOTAL 


18,596,200 


18,474,100 


18,364,000 



Source: Based on information from The Europa World Year Book, 1992, 2, London, 1992, 2252. 



301 



Poland: A Country Study 



Table 13. Selected Balance of Payments Data in 
Transferable Rubles, Selected Years, 1985-91 
(in millions) 





1985 


1987 


1989 


1991 * 


Merchandise exports 


9,073 


10,665 


11,320 


1,236 


Merchandise imports 


-10,303 


- 11,219 


- 10,342 


-816 


Balance of trade 


-1,230 


-554 


978 


420 


Balance of services 


319 


373 


427 


n.a. 


Interest payments 


-1,097 


-424 


- 1,104 


n.a. 



n.a. — not available. 

* Through November 1991. 



Source: Based on information from Poland, downy Urzad Statystyczny, Rocznik statystyczny 
handlu zagranicznego, Warsaw, 1989, 88; Poland, Glowny Urzad Statystyczny, Rocznik 
statystyczny handlu zagranicznego, Warsaw, 1991, 92; and Zycie gospodarcze, No. 14, 
1992, 12. 



Table 14. Selected Balance of Payments Data in 
Convertible Currencies, Selected Years, 1985-91 
(in millions) 

1985 1987 1989 1991 



Merchandise exports 5,768 6,920 8,113 12,760 

Merchandise imports -4,594 -5,878 - 7,987 - 12,709 

Balance of trade 1,174 1,042 126 51 

Balance of services - 17 - 37 - 211 236 

Cost of credits - 2,444 - 2,804 -3,069 -2,863 

Current account 

balance -523 - 392 - 1,922 - 1,359 



Source: Based on information from Poland, Glowny Urzad Statystyczny, Rocznik statystyczny 
handlu zagranicznego, Warsaw, 1989, 88; Poland, Glowny Urzad Statystyczny, Rocznik 
statystyczny handlu zagranicznego, Warsaw, 1991, 92; and Zycie gospodarcze, No. 14, 
1992, 12. 



302 



Appendix 



Table 15. Industrial Output and Consumer Price Index, 
July 1990 to November 1991 



Month 


Output * 


Consumer 
Price Index 


July 1990 


87.8 


103.4 


August 1990 


107.6 


103.6 


September 1990 


108.0 


104.6 


October 1990 


100.4 


105.7 


November 1990 


100.0 


104.9 


December 1990 


103.2 


105.9 




82.4 


112.7 


February 1991 


100.8 


106.7 


March 1991 


100.1 


104.5 


April 1991 


91.7 


102.7 


May 1991 


98.4 


102.7 


June 1991 


102.2 


104.9 


July 1991 


87.9 


100.1 


August 1991 


105.9 


100.6 


September 1991 


103.5 


104.3 


October 1991 


101.5 


103.2 


November 1991 


105.9 


103.2 



* The figure for each month is the percentage of the previous month. 



Source: Based on information from Jan Winiecki, "The Polish Transition Programme: 
Underpinnings, Results, Interpretations," Soviet Studies [Glasgow], 44, No. 5, 1992, 
814. 



Table 16. Unemployment Rate by Age-Group 
and Sex, Summer 1992 
(in percentages) 



Age-Group Males Females Total 



18 and under 12.0 14.0 13.0 

18-19 32.0 37.5 34.0 

20-24 25.0 28.0 26.0 

25-29 14.5 18.0 16.0 

30-34 9.5 17.0 13.0 

35-44 9.5 12.0 10.5 

45 and over 7.0 7.0 7.0 



Source: Based on information from Antoni Kowalik, " 'Bluebirds' or Voluntarily Unem- 
ployed?" Rzeczpospolita [Warsaw], September 4, 1992, Joint Publications Research 
Service, JPRS Report: East Europe (JPRS-EER-92- 146.), October 16, 1992, 29. 



303 



Poland: A Country Study 



Table 1 7. Output of Selected Engineering Products, 
Selected Years, 1980-91 



Product 


1980 


1985 


1989 


1991 


Automobiles (in thousands of units) 


351 


283 


285 


167 




61 


54 


51 


n.a. 


Tractors (in thousands of units) 


58 


59 


48 


18 


Train passenger cars (single units) 


328 


350 


230 


n.a. 


Television sets (in thousands of units) 


900 


610 


772 


443 




2,695 


2,690 


2,523 


n.a. 




809 


739 


811 


335 


Metallurgical machines (in thousands of tons) . . 


60 


28 


30 


n.a. 


Agricultural machines (in thousands of tons) . . . 


343 


460 


381 


n.a. 



n.a. — not available. 



Source: Based on information from Poland, downy Urzad Statystyczny, Rocznik slaty styczny, 
1990, Warsaw, 1990, 267-69. 



Table 18. Principal Agricultural Products, 1988, 1989, and 1990 
(in thousands of tons) 



Crop 


1988 


1989 


1990 




34,707 


34,390 


36,313 




14,069 


14,374 


16,721 


Wheat 


7,582 


8,462 


9,026 


Rye 


5,501 


6,216 


6,044 




3,804 


3,909 


4,217 


Mixed grains 


3,387 


3,466 


3,554 


Oats 


2,222 


2,185 


2,119 


Cabbages 


1,574 


1,617 


1,749 


Apples 


1,393 


1,312 


812 


Rapeseed 


1,199 


1,586 


1,206 



Source: Based on information from The Europa World Year Book, 1992, 2, London, 1992, 2253. 



304 



Appendix 



Table 19. Principal Trading Partners, 1988, 1989, and 1990 
(in millions of zloty) 1 



Country 1988 1989 1990 



Imports 

Soviet Union 1,228,447 2,608,802 15,369,501 

West Germany 687,142 2,337,781 15,586,565 2 

Czechoslovakia 335,978 846,166 2,761,817 

East Germany 264,990 662,884 

Switzerland 239,866 782,392 4,988,089 

Austria 230,123 886,892 4,403,499 

Britain 221,728 663,918 4,382,049 

Other 2,064,039 6,075,340 30,028,335 

Total imports 5,272,313 14,864,175 77,519,855 

Exports 

Soviet Union 1,474,580 4,048,255 19,767,703 

West Germany 747,156 2,757,736 32,502,840 2 

Czechoslovakia 359,139 1,075,301 5,282,084 

Britain 301,766 1,262,563 9,227,183 

East Germany 264,251 815,520 

Austria 183,865 690,865 4,988,514 

Switzerland 153,738 504,375 6,078,434 

Other 2,527,250 8,321,559 51,608,189 

Total exports 6,011,745 19,476,174 129,454,947 



1 For value of the zloty — see Glossary. 

2 1990 figures combine West Germany and East Germany. 

Source: Based on information from The Europa World Year Book, 1992, 2, London, 1992, 2256. 



Table 20. Election Results for Sejm and Senate, 1991 





Percentage of 


Number of 


Party or Coalition 


Sejm Seats 


Senate Seats 




13.0 


4 


Center Alliance 


9.6 


9 






1 




10.7 


9 


Confederation for an Independent Poland 


10.9 


4 




13.5 


21 




1.5 


1 




8.0 


6 


Party of Christian Democrats , 


0.9 


3 




6.1 


7 


Polish Peasant Party 


10.4 


8 




5.9 


11 




2.4 


16 


Parties with no seats in Senate 


6.1 





TOTAL 


100.0 * 


100 



* Figures do not add to total because of rounding. 



Source: Based on information from Louisa Vinton, "Poland's New Election Law: Fewer 
Parties, Same Impasse?" RFE/RL Research Report [Munich], 2, No. 28, July 9, 1993, 10. 



305 



Poland: A Country Study 



Table 21. Naval Craft and Personnel, Selected 
Years, 1970-95 



Category 1970 1980 1985 1990 1995 * 



Destroyers and frigates 3 1 1 2 2 

Submarines 6 4 3 3 3 

Missile craft 12 29 20 11 

Corvettes 2 4 5 

Patrol boats 64 25 8 8 8 

Mine countermeasures 51 44 49 32 26 

Amphibious craft 16 23 23 26 5 

Personnel 20,000 25,000 19,100 19,300 10,000 



* Projected 

Source: Based on information from John L. Green, "The Baltic: A Sea in Transition," 
Monterey, California, 1991, 80. 



Table 22. Declared Holdings of the Polish Army and Arms 
Limitations According to the Conventional 
Forces in Europe Treaty, 1991 







Arms 


Category 


Holdings 


Limitations 




2,850 


1,730 




2,377 


2,150 




2,300 


1,610 




551 


460 


Attack helicopters 


29 


130 



Source: Based on information from Jane's Defence Weekly [Coulsdon, United Kingdom], 16, 
No. 1, July 6, 1991, 18-19. 



306 



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327 



Glossary 



Bolsheviks — Members of the radical political faction that, under 
the leadership of Vladimir I. Lenin, staged the Bolshevik Revo- 
lution and in 1918 formed the Russian Communist Party 
(Bolshevik), precursor of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union (CPSU). 

Byzantine — Medieval Christian civilization that combined Euro- 
pean and Asian cultures on an ancient Greco-Roman founda- 
tion. Centered at Byzantium (known as Constantinople 
330-1930, and later called Istanbul), the Byzantine Empire oc- 
cupied western Turkey and the Balkans and, as the center of 
Orthodox Christianity, exerted strong influence on many of 
the Slavic peoples of Eastern Europe. 

CoCom (Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Con- 
trols) — Loose arrangement of Western governments formed in 
1949 to prevent the transfer of military-useful (dual-use) tech- 
nology from the West to the Soviet Union and Eastern Eu- 
rope; the group (whose membership was almost identical to 
that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, q. v. ) operated 
on the basis of informal agreements covering items having mili- 
tary or nuclear applications. 

Comecon (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) — A multilater- 
al economic alliance headquartered in Moscow; it existed from 
1949-91. Members in 1990 included Bulgaria, Cuba, Czecho- 
slovakia, the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), 
Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, and 
Vietnam. Also referred to as CMEA and CEMA. 

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) — Official designation 
of the former republics that remained loosely federated in eco- 
nomic and security matters of common concern, after the Soviet 
Union disbanded as a unified state in 1991. Members in 1993 
were Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uz- 
bekistan. 

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) — 
Originating at the meeting that produced the Helsinki Accords 
(q. v.) in 1975, a grouping of all European nations (the lone 
exception, Albania, joined in 1991) that subsequently spon- 
sored joint sessions and consultations on political issues vital 
to European security. 



329 



Poland: A Country Study 

Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty — An agreement 
signed in 1990 by the members of the Warsaw Pact (q. v.) and 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (q. v. ) to establish parity 
in conventional weapons between the two organizations from 
the Atlantic to the Urals. Included a strict system of inspec- 
tions and information exchange. 

Czech and Slovak Federative Republic (CSFR) — Official name of 
the former Czechoslovakia, adopted in December 1990 to recog- 
nize the two ethnic components of that country. (Czechoslovakia 
was still used as the short form designation after that date.) 
In January 1993, divided into two independent states, the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia, which retained some economic and 
security ties. 

Enlightenment — Philosophical and spiritual movement in Europe 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, concerned with 
the relationship of God, nature, reason, and man, often chal- 
lenging the tenets of conventional Christianity. 

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) — 
A bank founded under sponsorship of the European Community 
(q.v.) in 1990, to provide loans to East European countries (Bul- 
garia, the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia) to es- 
tablish independent, market-driven economies and democratic 
political institutions. Some fifty-eight countries were share- 
holders in 1993. 

European Community (EC) — A group of primarily economic com- 
munities of Western European countries, including the Euro- 
pean Atomic Energy Community (Euratom or EAEC) and the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Executive pow- 
er rests with the European Commission, which implements and 
defends the community treaties in the interests of the EC as 
a whole. Members in 1993 were Belgium, Britain, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Name changed to Europe- 
an Union (EU), December 1993. 

Gdansk Agreement — The first of several major concessions made 
by the Polish communist government in late 1980 to the rising 
Solidarity movement. The agreement granted public expres- 
sion to many groups in Polish society hitherto restricted, 
promised new economic concessions, removed discredited com- 
munist officials, and recognized workers' right to establish free 
trade unions. 

glasnost' — Russian term, literally meaning "openness," applied 
in the Soviet Union beginning in the mid-1980s to official 



330 



Glossary 



permission for public discussion of issues and public access to 
information. Identified with the tenure of Mikhail S. Gorbachev 
as leader of the Soviet Union. 

gross domestic product (GDP) — The total value of goods and ser- 
vices produced exclusively within a nation's domestic econo- 
my, in contrast to gross national product (q.v.), usually 
computed over one year. 

gross national product (GNP) — The total value of goods and ser- 
vices produced within a country's borders and the income 
received from abroad by residents, minus payments remitted 
abroad by nonresidents. Normally computed over one year. 

Habsburg Empire — Also known as the House of Austria, one of 
the principal European dynasties between the fifteenth and 
twentieth centuries. Controlled a variety of separate monar- 
chies, reaching its most powerful stage in the sixteenth centu- 
ry under Emperor Charles V of the Holy Roman Empire (q. v.). 
After 1867 what remained of the empire was commonly known 
as Austria-Hungary. 

Helsinki Accords — Signed in 1975 by all countries of Europe ex- 
cept Albania (which signed in 1991), plus Canada and the Unit- 
ed States, at the initial Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (q. v.). The pact outlined general principles of inter- 
national behavior and security and addressed some economic, 
environmental, and humanitarian issues. 

Holy Roman Empire — Enduring from A.D. 800 to 1806, official 
successor under papal authority to the Roman Empire. The 
title king of the Romans, first given to Charlemagne, was borne 
by a long succession of German kings. Centered in Germany, 
the empire at its peak (thirteenth century to sixteenth centu- 
ry) extended from the Low Countries to Czechoslovakia and 
southward into Italy. Weakened by struggles with the Roman 
Catholic Church and the Reformation, then scattered by the 
results of the Thirty Years' War (q.v.), 1648. 

International Monetary Fund (IMF) — Established with the World 
Bank (q. v. ) in 1945, a specialized agency affiliated with the Unit- 
ed Nations and responsible for stabilizing international ex- 
change rates and payments. Its main business is providing loans 
to its members when they experience balance of payments dif- 
ficulties. 

Jacobinism — Political philosophy of the leaders of the French revolu- 
tionary government. After reaching power in the revolution- 
ary dictatorship of 1793, the Jacobins set about safeguarding 
the values of the revolution and public virtue by a Reign of 
Terror against opposing views. 



331 



Poland: A Country Study 



London Club — A group of 500 major international commercial 
banks lending money under auspices of the International Mone- 
tary Fund (q.v.) to Poland for economic development, under 
conditions of continued economic reform. 

net material product (NMP) — In countries having centrally planned 
economies, the official measure of the value of goods and ser- 
vices produced within the country. Roughly equivalent to the 
Western gross national product (q.v.), NMP is based on con- 
stant prices and does not account for depreciation. 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) — An alliance founded 
in 1949 by the United States, Canada, and their postwar Eu- 
ropean allies to oppose Soviet military presence in Europe. Until 
the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact (q.v.) in 1991, NATO was 
the primary collective defense agreement of the Western pow- 
ers. Its military and administrative structure remained intact 
after the threat of Soviet expansionism had subsided. 

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) — Founded in 1961 to replace the all-European Or- 
ganisation for European Economic Cooperation, assists member 
governments to form and coordinate economic and social aid 
policies in developing countries. In 1993, twenty-four nations 
had full membership, including Australia, Canada, New Zea- 
land, and the United States. 

Ottoman Empire — A Muslim empire that controlled southeastern 
Europe, the Middle East, and most of North Africa between 
the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, and lesser territories 
from 1300 until 1913. Ottoman occupation was a major in- 
fluence on all civilizations of southeastern Europe and caused 
ethnic animosities that remained after the disintegration of the 
empire. 

Paris Club — A group of seventeen Western countries lending money 
under auspices of the International Monetary Fund (q.v.) to 
Poland for economic development, under conditions of con- 
tinued economic reform. 

perestroika — Russian word meaning ' 'restructuring," applied in the 
late 1980s to an official Soviet program of revitalization of the 
communist party, economy, and society, by adjusting econom- 
ic, social, and political mechanisms. Identified with the tenure 
of Mikhail S. Gorbachev as leader of the Soviet Union 
(1985-1991). 

Prague Spring — Period of attempts to institute political and eco- 
nomic reforms in Czechoslovakia, led by communist party First 
Secretary Alexander Dubcek, in 1968. The Soviet Union and 



332 



Glossary 



four Warsaw Pact (q. v.) allies responded by invading Czecho- 
slovakia and forcing Dubcek out of power. 

Reformation — Sixteenth-century movement against dogma of the 
Roman Catholic Church, in favor of grace through faith, the 
authority of the Scriptures, and the direct relationship of be- 
lievers with God. Met with resounding force by the established 
church, the Reformation influenced Christian practice to vary- 
ing degrees in all European countries, resulting in a schism 
between the Roman Catholic church and Protestant reformers. 

Teutonic Knights — In full, Knights of the Teutonic Order, an or- 
ganization of German crusaders founded in Palestine in 1 190. 
From their base in Prussia, consolidated the Eastern Baltic into 
a powerful feudal state in the fourteenth century, nominally 
as agents of the Roman Catholic Church. Expansion aroused 
hostility and revolts, which with Polish and Lithuanian sup- 
port defeated the knights decisively at Grunwald in 1410. Af- 
ter rapid decline of military power and influence in the fifteenth 
century, disbanded in 1525. 

Thirty Years' War — Conventional name for a fifty-year struggle 
(1610-60) of various factions including Protestant nobles and 
French kings against the Holy Roman Empire (q. v.) and its 
ruling Habsburg Dynasty for control of parts of Europe, in- 
cluding the Baltic coast. The fiercest period of the war was 
1618-48, hence the misnomer Thirty Years 3 War. 

Treaty of Versailles — Signed at the Paris Peace Conference, June 
1919, dictating peace terms ending World War I. Harsh terms 
imposed by the Allies on Germany were cited as a major fac- 
tor in the rise of Adolf Hitler and genesis of World War II. 

Warsaw Pact — Informal name for Warsaw Treaty Organization, 
a mutual defense organization founded in 1955, including the 
Soviet Union, Albania (which withdrew in 1961), Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic (East Ger- 
many), Hungary, Poland, and Romania. The Warsaw Pact 
enabled the Soviet Union to station troops in the countries to 
its west to oppose the forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Or- 
ganization {q.v.). The pact was the basis of the invasions of 
Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968). Disbanded in July 
1991. 

Western European Union (WEU) — Signed in 1948 by Western 
European states as a regional defense, cultural, and economic 
pact, became inactive in 1954 but was revived in 1984 to im- 
prove European military preparedness and activity in the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (q.v.). Subsequently issued state- 
ments on European security and other international issues. 



333 



Poland: A Country Study 

Members in 1993 were Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and 
Spain. 

World Bank — Informal name for a group of four affiliated inter- 
national institutions: the International Bank for Reconstruc- 
tion and Development (IBRD), the International Development 
Association (IDA), the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC), and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA). The IBRD, established in 1945, has as its primary 
purpose making loans to developing countries for specific 
projects. The IDA, legally separate but administered by the 
IBRD, furnishes credits to the poorest developing countries on 
terms easier than those of the IBRD. The IFC supplements 
IBRD activity through loans to stimulate private enterprise in 
the less developed countries. The MIGA was founded in 1988 
to insure private foreign investment in developing countries 
against noncommercial risks. The four institutions are owned 
by the governments of the countries that subscribed their cap- 
ital. For a state to participate in the World Bank group, prior 
membership in the International Monetary Fund (IMF — q. v. ) 
is required. 

zloty — Polish national currency (Polish spelling, zloty) nominally 
divided into 100 groszy. Became convertible with Western cur- 
rencies January 1, 1990. In March 1990, US$1 equaled 9,824 
zloty; in March 1991, the exchange rate was US$1 = 9,520 zlo- 
ty; in March 1993, it was US$1 = 16,330 zloty. 



334 



Index 



abortion: church influence over, xxxi, 
xxxv, xliii, 96; controversy over, xxxiv, 
182; demand for, 85, 86; outlawed, 
xxxi, xliii; restricted, 96 

acquired immune deficiency syndrome 
(AIDS), 109-10; prevention efforts in, 
109-10; victims of, 109 

Adam Mickiewicz University (Poznari), 
106 

Agency for Industrial Development, 161 

agricultural workers, 77, 78-81; living 
conditions of, 78; moving to industry, 
81; as percentage of population, 78, 80 

agriculture, 151-54; collectivization of, 
42, 78, 152;decollectivizationof, 126; 
export crops, 10; incomes in, 135; in- 
frastructure for, 154; modernization of, 
154; neglect of, 124; in Poland- 
Lithuania, 11; political problems in, 
135; population working in, 68; privati- 
zation in, 43, 77; production of, 134, 
151-52; resources for, 117, 120; state 
influence on, 117, 152; streamlining of, 
154; subsidies for, xxxvii, xlviii; work 
force in, 120 

AIDS. See acquired immune deficiency 
syndrome 

air defense force, 266-67; lines of com- 
mand in, 254; service terms in, 271 

air force, 266-67; aircraft of, 266-67; di- 
visions, 266; lines of command in, 254; 
number of personnel, 266; restructur- 
ing of, 266; service terms in, 271 

airports, 159 

Akademia Obrony Narodowej. See Na- 
tional Defense Academy 
Alcoholics Anonymous, 290 
alcoholism, 107, 109, 111 
Aleksei (Alexis) (tsar), 16 
Alexander II, 26 

Alliance of the Democratic Left (Sojusz 
Lewicy Demokratycznej — SLD), xlvi, 
205 

All-Polish Alliance of Trade Unions 
(Ogolnopolskie Porozumienie Zwiaz- 
kow Zawodowych — OPZZ), 175, 
205-6 

Andrusovo, Truce of (1667), 16 



Antall, Joszef, 219 

antisemitism, 28, 32, 71-72 

AON. See National Defense Academy 

Armament, Viceministry for, 256 

armed forces, 259-67; service ages, 270; 
alternative service for, 270-71; attrition 
in, 274; chaplains in, 269; civilian com- 
mand structure, 254-56; under com- 
munist rule, 237-44; conscripts in, 274; 
deployment of, 249, 261; education, 
274-78; history of, 232-34; induction 
rate, 271; in interwar period, 234-36; 
lines of authority, 357-58; living con- 
ditions for, 274; military command 
structure, 255-56; military prosecutor, 
256-57; missions of, 278; mobilization 
of, 277-78; modernization of, 280; po- 
litical indoctrination in, 237, 274, 275; 
proposed model for, 259; public percep- 
tions of, 240, 241, 242, 243, 268; 
purged, 238; recruitment for, 270-74; 
reform in, 243, 248, 257; reserves, 270, 
277-78; restructuring of, 232, 254-58, 
259-60; roles of, 238-39; service obli- 
gations of, 270-74; size of, 259, 277; 
and society, 268-70; term of service in, 
270; training, 271, 274-78; in Warsaw 
Pact, 243 

Armed Forces '90, 248 

Armia Krajowa. See Home Army 

Armia Ludowa. See People's Army 

army. See ground forces 

Association of Junior Officers for Promot- 
ing Change in the Army, 270 

Association of Polish Catholics, 175 

Augustus II of Saxony, 17 

Augustus III, 17 

Auschwitz: concentration camp, 36 

Austria, 29; in Central European Initia- 
tive, xxxvii, 219; domination by, xxix, 
19, 234 

Austria-Hungary, 27 

Autocephalous Orthodox Church, 89 

balance of payments, 128, 130; deficit, 
168 

balance of trade, 164-66 



335 



Poland: A Country Study 



Balcerowicz, Leszek, 131, 178, 179 

Balcerowicz Plan (1990), 118, 131-33; 
goals of, xxxvii-xxxviii; initial results, 
132; long-term requirements, 132-33; 
public reaction to, 139-40; social ser- 
vices under, 107 

Baltic Council, xxxv 

Baltic Sea: coastal plains, 60; oil fields in, 
119; pollution in, 62 

Bank Handlowy. See Commercial Bank 

banking system, 159-60, 169; aid for, 
160; inefficiencies in, 160; loans for- 
given by, xl; modernization of, 131; 
privatization of, 160; reform of, 160; 
state, 159-60 

Bank of Food Economy, 159 

Bank of Poland, 159 

banks: commercial, 132, 160; private, 160 

Baptist Church, 100 

Bar, Confederation of, 18 

Batory, Stefan, 15 

Battle of Grunwald (Tannenberg), 10 
Battle of Mohacs, 10 
BBN. See National Security Bureau 
Beck, Jozef, 33 

Belarus, 231; military conflicts with, 246; 
relations with, xxxv, 215, 217-28, 249; 
trade with, 137-38 

Belarusians, 71, 74-75, 217; assimilation 
of, 75; number of, 74-75 

Belarusian Social and Cultural Society, 75 

Belorussia (see also Belarus), 234; divid- 
ed, 31; nationalist movement in, 14 

Berling, Zygmunt, 236 

BH. See Commercial Bank 

Bialystok: Belarusians in, 75; ghetto up- 
rising in, 38 

Bielecki, Jan, 183, 202, 221 

Bielecki government, 139, 179-80, 214; 
industry under, 148; mining under, 143 

Bielsko-Biata automotive plant, 149 

Bierut, Boleslaw, 42-43, 93; death of, 198 

Big Economic Organizations, 127 

birth control, 96 

Bismarck, Otto von, 27 

Biuletyn Informacyjny (Information Bulle- 
tin), 207 

Biuro Bezpieczenstwa Narodowego. See 

National Security Bureau 
Black Madonna, 98 
Bohemia: occupation by, 6 
Boleslaw I (the Brave), 4-5; conquests of, 

4-5 



Bonaparte, Napoleon, 22-23, 234 
Border Guard (Strazik Graniczny — SG), 
286-87 

Border Guard Troops (Wojska Ochrony 

Pogranicza— WOP), 286 
border security, 286 
Bosnia and Hercegovina, 220 
Brest-Litovsk, Union of (1596), 99 
Brezhnev Doctrine, 49, 212 
Britain: investment from, 168; relations 

with, 225 

British Broadcasting Corporation, 209 

British Eighth Army: Poles in, 37 

budget, military, 242, 249 

budget deficit, xxxviii, xlviii, 132, 226; 
as percentage of gross domestic prod- 
uct, 140 

Bug River, 60 

Bumar-Labedy Engineering Equipment 

Combine, 281, 283, 284 
Bush, George H. W., 223, 224 
Bydgoszcz: airport, 159; military district, 

254, 260 



capital: imported in the 1970s, 127; out- 
flow, 130; shortages of, 122 

capitalism: emergence of, 27 

Carpathian Mountains, 57; oil fields in, 
119 

Carpathians Euro region, xxxvi 

Catherine the Great: partition of Poland 
under, 18, 234 

Catholic Action, 203 

Catholic Church, Roman (see also church- 
state relations): campaigns against, 27; 
candidates for priesthood in, 97; under 
communist rule, xxx, xxxi, 45, 92-93; 
communists excommunicated from, 42; 
conflict of, with other churches, 99; 
criticism of, xliii; in democracy, xxxi- 
xxxii; and education, xxxi, xxxv, xliii, 
96, 102, 103, 106; losses by, in World 
War II, 92-93; importance of, to na- 
tional identity, 4, 7, 89; opposition of, 
to communist rule, 45, 186; persecu- 
tion by, of Protestants, 12; persecution 
of, 42, 92, 93, 198; in politics, xlii-xliii, 
xlvii, 95; publishing program of, 94, 
207, 208; relationship of, with govern- 
ment, 43, 92-97; relationship of, with 
other sects, 89; in rural areas, 97; 



336 



Index 



social activism by, 94, 96-97; support 
of, for Solidarity, xxxi, 46; support for, 
xxxi, 97-98 

Catholics, Roman: as percentage of popu- 
lation, 89, 97; uprising by, 18 

Catholic University of Lublin, 94, 99 

CEI. See Central European Initiative 

Cenrex, 284 

censorship, 94; abolished, 208-9; loosen- 
ing of, 43 

Center Alliance (Porozumienie Cen- 
trum), 178, 181, 200-201; formed, 200; 
platform of, 201; support for, 200 

Central Cooperatives Association, 88 

Central European Initiative (CEI), 
xxxvii; members of, xxxvii, 219 

Central Powers, 29 

Central Prison Administration, 290, 291 
Central Statistical Office, 135 
Cenzin, 284 

CFE Treaty. See Conventional Forces in 

Europe (CFE) Treaty 
Charles X, 16 

Chief Military Prosecutor, Office of the, 
257 

Chief Prosecutor, Office of the, 197 

children, 84; daycare for, 86 

Chopin, Frederic, 24 

Christianity (see also under individual denomi- 
nations): celebration of millenium of, 93; 
conversion to, 3, 4 

Christian National Union (Zjednoczenie 
Chrzescijarisko-Narodowe — ZChN), 
xxxiv, 182, 184, 203-4 

Christian Social Union, 175 

Churchill, Winston, 40 

church-state relations, 92-97; contro- 
versy over, xxxii, xxxv, xliii, 95; law 
on, 95 

CIS. See Commonwealth of Independent 
States 

Citizens' Committee, 200 

Citizens' Militia Voluntary Reserve 
(Ochotnicza Reserwa Milicji Oby- 
watelskiej— ORMO), 284 

Citizens' Movement for Democratic Ac- 
tion, 178 

Citizens' Parliamentary Club, 200 

civil liberties: restricted, 48 

civil war, 238 

classes: mobility among, 56, 76; structure, 
68 

clergy, 291 



climate, 60-61, 120; precipitation, 60, 61, 
120; seasons, 61; temperature, 61, 120 

Clinton, William J., xlix 

coal, 127, 142-43; demand for, 142; de- 
pendence on, 141; deposits, 57, 
118-19, 143; mining, 124, 141, 142; 
supplies of, xlii, 117 

CoCom. See Coordinating Committee for 
Multilateral Export Controls 

Comecon. See Council for Mutual Eco- 
nomic Assistance 

Commercial Bank (Bank Handlowy — 
BH), 159 

Commissioner for Citizens' Rights, Office 
of the, 187, 188, 197-98; public 
response to, 198; role of, 197-98 

Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS), 215-16 

communications, 159; modernization of, 
131; work force in, 120 

communist rule: armed forces under, 
237-44, 253; consolidation of, 39-41; 
economy under, 121-29; effects of, 55; 
elite under, 68, 71; end of, 49, 130; eth- 
nic groups under, 71; features of, 42; 
judiciary under, 194; labor allocation 
in, 121; opposition to, 45; social en- 
gineering under, 41-42, 55 

community councils, 194 

concentration camps (Nazi), 29; Poles do- 
ing forced labor in, 36; Poles extermi- 
nated in, xxxi, 34, 36 

Confederation for an Independent Poland 
(Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglej — 
KPN), 181, 184, 204-5; founded, 204 

Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (CSCE), 216, 249 

Congress Kingdom of Poland, 25, 26 

Constitutional Commission, 187-88; 
draft by, 187-88 

Constitutional Tribunal, 186, 188, 196 

constitution of May 3 (1791), 19, 184, 
195; abrogated, 21 

constitution of 1921, 31 

constitution of 1952, xxxii, 184-87; 
amendments to, 185, 186, 187; execu- 
tion of, 185; ideals of, 184 

constitution of 1992 ("Little Constitu- 
tion"), xxxii-xxxiii, 188; approved, 
xxxiii; Council of Ministers under, 193; 
issues resolved by, xxxiii; military un- 
der, 255, 259; National Assembly un- 
der, 189; president under, 189, 193; 



337 



Poland: A Country Study 



prime minister under, 189; religion un- 
der, 95; Sejm under, 192; special pow- 
ers under, xxxiii 

construction: export of, 166; private- 
sector, 139; work force in, 120 

consumer goods, 118, 127; neglect of, 
124; shortage of, 128 

consumers: protection of, 133 

consumption, 134 

Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) 
Treaty (1990), 271, 279 

cooperation, military, 251-53 

Coordinating Committee for Multilater- 
al Export Controls (CoCom), 281 

Copernicus, Nicolaus, 13 

copper, 119; mining, 124 

Cossacks: uprising by, 16 

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(Comecon): collapse of, 136, 137, 138, 
166, 210; membership in, xxix, 45; ob- 
ligations to, 117, 123, 129, 130 

Council of Elders (Konwent Seniorow), 
191 

Council of Europe, xxxvi; membership 

in, 225-26 
Council of Ministers, 193; military affairs 

under, 239, 253, 254 
Council of State, 186; replaced, 189 
coups d'etat: of 1926, 31, 235; of 1981, 

47, 241 

courts, 194-98; administrative, 196; 

lower, 196; supreme, 195-96; tribunal, 

196-97 
credits: caps on, 132 
crime, 287-89; drug-related, 110-11, 

288-89; increase in, 287; organized, 

288; rate, 287; white-collar, 288 
Croatia, 220 

CSCE. See Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe 

Cultural Struggle (Kulturkampf), 27 

currency: deficits, 130; devaluation of, 
xxxviii, 167; exchange, 166-68; for- 
eign, reserves of, 162; for trade, 137 

current accounts deficit, 130 

Czarniecki, Stefan, 16 

Czartoryski, Adam, 25 

Czech and Slovak Federated Republic: in 
European Community, 226; exports to, 
xxxix-xl; relations with, 211, 218; secu- 
rity arrangements with, 244; in Vise- 
grad Triangle, xxxvii, 211 

Czechoslovakia (see also Czech Republic; 



Slovak Republic): border disputes with, 
31; in Central European Initiative, 
xxxvii, 219; in Little Entente, 235; Nazi 
occupation of, 33-34; relations with, 
218; Warsaw Pact invasion of, 44, 199, 
241, 243; withdrawal of Soviet troops 
from, 244 

Czech Republic (see also Czechoslovakia): 
in Visegrad Group, xxxvii 

Cz^stochowa, 119 



Danzig: as free city, 31 
daycare, 86 

debt: under communist rule, 44, 128; for- 
giveness of, 118; foreign, 162; to Lon- 
don Club, xlix; to Paris Club, xli 

Declaration on the Cooperation of the 
Hungarian Republic, the Czech and 
Slovak Federative Republic, and the 
Republic of Poland on the Road to Eu- 
ropean Integration, 219 

defense industry: domestic, 279, 281-83; 
aircraft produced by, 283; conversion 
to civilian production, 282; reductions 
in, 282; restructuring of, 282 

Defense of Workers, Committee for 
(Komitet Obrony Robotnikow — KOR), 
45, 199 

defense organization, 253-67; under com- 
munist rule, 253-54 

Defense Policy, Viceministry for, 256 

defense spending, 278-79; budget cuts, 
278-79 

Democratic Bloc, 41 

Democratic Party, 175, 176, 186, 198, 
206 

Democratic Union (Unia Demokratyczna — 
UD), xlvi, 181, 182, 201-2; relations 
of, with Walesa, 201 

demonstrations. See political demonstra- 
tions 

Department of Education, 258 
Department of Procurement, 257 
de-Stalinization, 42, 198-99 
development, economic, 123-24 
Development of Education Systems, Law 

on (1961), 103 
diet, 107 

Directorate of Logistics Planning, 257 
Dmowski, Roman, 28 
doctrine, military, 237, 242-49 



338 



Index 



dojscie (connections), 82-83 
drainage, 60 

drug addiction, 109, 110-11; treatments 
for, 110, 111 

drug trafficking, 110-11, 288-89; mea- 
sures to combat, 110-11 

Druzhba Pipeline, 143 

Eastern Orthodox Church, 13, 100; dis- 
sension in, 18 

East Germany. See German Democratic 
Republic 

EBRD. See European Bank for Recon- 
struction and Development 
EC. See European Community 
Ecofund, xliv 

economic growth, xxx; indicators, 

133-37; stabilization, 130-33 
Economic Reform, Commission for, 129 
economy, centrally planned, 42, 117, 
121-29; agriculture under, 152; causes 
of decline in, 135-^37; development of, 
124-29; formula for, 124-26; inefficien- 
cies in, 122, 126; plans for, 126; statisti- 
cal distortions of, 134-35; structure of, 
121-23 

education {see also schools), 100-107; com- 
mission on (1989), 104; language in, 
73; levels of, 56; new laws on, 104; re- 
form of, 19, 102, 103-4; religious, xxxi, 
xxxv, xliii, 96, 102; repression of, 
101-3; restructuring of, 101; role of, 
100-101; structure of, 104-7; tradition, 
101; underground, 102; vocational, 
102; of workers, 81, 120 

Education Officers Corps, 275 

EFTA. See European Free Trade Agree- 
ment 

election law, 180 

elections: called by Walesa, 179-80; of 
1989, 50, 130, 200, 204, 205; of 1990, 
139, 178-89, 200, 204; of 1991, 139, 
173, 180, 204; of 1993, xlv-xlvi, xlvii; 
presidential, 177-79; under Round Ta- 
ble Agreement, 175 

electric power: generation, 119, 141, 
144-47; conservation of, 144; hydro, 
147; industry, 144; modernization of, 
144; nuclear, 147; reorganization of, 
147 

emigration, 66; causes of, 67; to Germa- 
ny, 75; to North America, 28 



Employment Fund, 161 
energy: resources, 141-47; subsidies, 141 
Enigma code machine, 37 
Enlightenment, 19 

Enterprise Consulting Foundation, 161 

environment: conditions in, 62-63; crises 
in, 62-63; groups concerned with, 
63-64; protection systems for, 133 

environmental policy, 64-65 

environmental pollution, xxx, xliv, 
61-65; caused by coal, xlii, 119, 127, 
142; economic losses from, 63; health 
effects of, 107; public attitudes toward, 
64 

Environmental Protection and Natural 
Resources, Ministry of: ecodevelop- 
ment policy of, 65; established, 64 

Estonia: recognition of, 215; relations 
with, 217 

ethnic characteristics: xxxi, 55-56, 68, 
71-75 

ethnic tensions, xlvii-xlviii 
Europe: orientation toward, 7 
European Bank for Reconstruction and 

Development (EBRD), 162, 224 
European Community (EC): financial aid 

from, 164; membership in, 174, 211, 

219, 225, 226; trade with, xxxix-xl, 

129, 164 

European Free Trade Agreement 
(EFTA), xlviii 

European Union, xlix 

Euro regions (see also Nysa Euroregion; 
Pomerania Euroregion), xxxvi 

Evangelical Church of the Augsburg Con- 
fession, 99-100 

exchanges, military, 251-53 

Export Development Bank, 160 

Export Finance Insurance Corporation, 
161 

exports (see also under individual products): 
under communist rule, 44, 128; for 
hard currency, xxxix-xl, 166; of mili- 
tary products, 282, 283-84; of miner- 
als, 119; share of world, 163; to Soviet 
Union, 123, 138, 164 

Eysymontt, Jerzy, 181, 183 



families: social role of, 82-83 
farmers: demonstrations by, 135 
Farm Ownership Agency, 154 



339 



Poland: A Country Study 



farms: number of, 152; private, 152-53; 

restructuring of, 153-54; size of, 80, 

152; state, 152-53; women on, 85-86; 

yields, 153 
Fiat Corporation, 149 
Field Ordinariate, 269 
finance, 160-62; securities reform, 160- 

61 

fishing, 154-55; exports, 155; work force 
in, 120 

food, 117; prices, 45, 94; processing, 167; 
shortages, 83; subsidies for, xxxvii 

foreign investment, 168-69; in Polish en- 
terprises, 168 

foreign policy, 173; under Pilsudski, 33 

foreign trade organizations (FTOs), 163 

forestry, 155-56; production, 156; work 
force in, 120 

forests: location of, 155; primeval, 60, 
155; size of, 155 

France: alliance with, 23, 235; investment 
from, 168; problems with, 33; relations 
with, 225 

Franco-Polish Alliance and Military Con- 
vention (1921), 236 

Frederick the Great, 18 

FTOs. See foreign trade organizations 

fuel {see also coal; gas; oil), 141-47; con- 
sumption, 141-42; supplies, xlii 



Galvin, John, 252 

gas, natural, 119, 144; consumption of, 
119; import of, 144, 213, 214; pipe- 
lines, 156; production, 119, 144; refin- 
ing, 141; reserves, 60; supplies, xlii, 
124 

Gazeta Wyborcza (Election Gazette), 208 
Gdansk, 10; airport, 159; port of, 156; 

riots in, 240 
Gdansk Agreement (1980), 46, 186, 199 
GDP. See gross domestic product 
Gdynia: naval base, 263; port of, 156; 

riots in, 240 
Gdynia Shipyard, 150-51, 264 
General Savings Office, 160 
General Staff, 256 
Geremek, Bronislaw, 188, 200, 201 
German Democratic Republic (East Ger- 
many), 247 
German Empire (Holy Roman Empire), 
4 



Germans, 71, 72-73, 221, 222; discrimi- 
nation against, 72-73; geographic dis- 
tribution of, 72, 73; language of, 72; 
number of, 72; percentage of, in popu- 
lation, xxxi; religion of, 99 

Germany: compensation by, 221; domi- 
nation by, xxix, 29, 233; emigration to, 
75; fear of, 220, 222, 231, 236, 244; 
policy toward, xxxvii; as potential 
source of assistance, 221, 246; recog- 
nition by, of Oder-Neisse Line, 174, 
211, 221, 246; refugees to, xxxvi; re- 
lations with, xxxvii, xlvii, 211, 220-22; 
trade with, 144, 167; treaty with, 221, 
246 

Germany, Nazi: invasion of Poland by, 
34, 68; Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, 34, 
236; occupation of Czechoslovakia by, 
33-34; occupation by, 36, 68, 93, 102, 
221, 236; resistance to, 37-38, 236; ter- 
ritorial demands by, 34 

Gierek, Edward, 44 

Gierek government, 93-95; education un- 
der, 103 

glasnost', 49 

Glemp, Jozef, 94 

Gliwice, port of, 156 

Giowne Biuro Administracji. See Main 
Political Administration 

Glowny Zarzad Wychowawczy. See Main 
Education Board 

Gomulka, Wladyslaw, 43-44, 239, 258; 
as first secretary, 43 

Gomulka government, 43-44, 126; edu- 
cation under, 102; end of, 199 

Gorbachev, Mikhail S., 49; new thinking 
of, 212 

government: changes of, xxix; environ- 
mental policies of, 64; influence over 
agriculture, 117; special powers of, 
xxxiii; structure of, 188-98 

government, local, 194 

government, regional, 194 

government-in-exile, 37 

Greek Catholic Church, 74, 99; conflict 
of, with other churches, 99 

Greek Orthodox Church, 74; conflict of, 
with other churches, 99; members of, 
89 

Green Solidarity, 63 

gross domestic product (GDP): budget 
deficit as percentage of, 140; decline in, 
134, 135, 139; growth of, xlviii 



340 



Index 



ground forces, 260-63; lines of command 
in, 254; materiel of, 262-63; purges in, 
237, 240; reductions in, 626; restruc- 
turing of, 248; roles of, 269; service 
terms in, 271; vehicles of, 262 

Group for Restructuring the Polish 
Armed Forces, 280 

Gulf of Gdansk, 60 

Gypsies, 75 

GZW. See Main Education Board 



Hangman of Wilno. See Muravev, 

Mikhail 
Havel, Vaclav, 219 

health, 107-11; conditions, 107; issues, 
109-11 

Health and Social Welfare, Ministry of, 
111-12 

health care: access to, 108, 121; under 
Balcerowicz Plan, 140; problems in, 
107; system, 107-9 

health care professionals, 108 

health facilities, 108 

health problems, xliv, 109; caused by 
coal, xlii 

Hel: naval base, 263 

Helsinki Accords (1975), 45 

Helsinki Watch, 291 

Hexagonale. See Central European In- 
itiative 

history, early, 3-7; starting date of, 4 

history, medieval, 5-7 

Hitler, Adolf: expansionist policies of, 33 

Home Army (Armia Krajowa), 37, 236; 
disbanded, 237; rebellion by, 39, 238 

housing, 86-89; benefits program, 88; 
construction, 87; cooperative, 87; 
modernization of, 131; neglect of, 124; 
ownership of, 89; persons per dwelling, 
88; policy, under communist rule, 86- 
87; private, 88, 89; quality of, 87-88; 
reform, 88-89; rents for, 87, 88; short- 
age, 86-87 

Hungary: in Central European Initiative, 
xxxvii, 219; in European Community, 
226; exports to, xxxix-xl; relations 
with, 211, 218; security arrangements 
with, 244; Soviet invasion of, 239; in 
Visegrad Group, xxxvii; in Visegrad 
Triangle, xxxvii, 211; withdrawal of 
Soviet troops from, 244 



IMF. See International Monetary Fund 

imports, 167; of capital, 127; decline in, 
xl; of materiel, 280-81; reform of poli- 
cy on, 132; share of world, 163; from 
Soviet Union, 119; from Sweden, 119; 
of technology, 128 

income policy, 132 

indicators, economic, 133-37 

industrial associations, 123 

industrialization, 126 

industrial output, 134, 135, 139, 147; 
decline in, 148 

Industrial Revolution, 19 

industrial workers, 77, 78, 81-82; from 
agriculture, 81; education of, 81; 
moonlighting by, 82; prestige of, 81 

industry, 136-37; automotive, 149-50; 
chemical, 147, 148, 166, 167; construc- 
tion machinery, 150; debt in, xlii; de- 
velopment of, 42; engineering, 147, 
148, 166, 167; government influence 
over, 117; growth in, 124; licensing 
agreements in, 150; light, 148-49; 
privatization of, 77, 149; restructuring 
of, xxxviii, 127, 150; shipbuilding, 
150-51; steel, 148 

inflation, xxxix, 129, 134, 136, 167 

infrastructure, 127; improvement of, 131; 
neglect of, 124 

Innovation and Independent Schools, 
Office of, 104 

Inspectorate for National Territorial 
Defense, 267 

Insurance and Reinsurance Company: 
abolished, 160 

insurance services, 160-61; reform of, 
160-61 

intelligentsia, 56, 68, 75-77; Catholic, 94, 
96; intimidation of, 198; members of, 
75, 76; opposition of, to communist 
rule, 45, 77, 96, 186; role of, 75-76; 
values of, 76, 77 

interest rates, 132 

Interfactory Strike Committee {see also 
Solidarity), 199 

Interministerial Commission for the Re- 
organization of National Defense, 
254 

Internal Affairs, Ministry of, xlviii, 95; 
quasi-military force of, 232, 242; re- 
form in, 284-85 

Internal Defense Fortes (Wojska Obrony 
Wewnetrznej— WOW), 267 



341 



Poland: A Country Study 



internal security, 1, 284-87 
Internal Security Corps, 239, 240 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
131, 224; aid from, 140, 226; applica- 
tion for membership in, 222; credit ar- 
rangements with, 181 
investment, 127; decrease in, 134; drive, 
127-28; effects of, 128; from Germa- 
ny, 221; outlays, 122; rate of, 122 
iron, 119; supplies, 124 
Israel, 225 

Italy, 225; in Central European Initiative, 
xxxvii, 219; as source of artistic inspi- 
ration, 13 



Jadwiga, 8 

Jagiello, Wladyslaw (see also Wladystaw 
II), 8 

Jagiellon dynasty, 7-15 

Jagiellon Era, 7-15; golden age of, 10-15 

Jan II Kaziemierz, 16 

January Insurrection (1863), 26 

Japan: investment from, 168 

Jaruzelski, Wojciech, 212, 240; as party 
leader, 47, 48; as president, 176, 189, 
268; as prime minister, 241, 268; resig- 
nation of, from party, 268; retirement 
of, 178; talks by, with Solidarity, 49 

Jaruzelski government, 47-50, 129, 174, 
205; Catholic Church under, 94; end 
of, 130; freedom of expression under, 
207-8; military under, 284; resistance 
to, 48 

Jasna Gora Monastery, 98 

Jews, 71-72; emigration of, xxxi; killed 
in concentration camps, xxxi, 34, 36, 
56, 65, 71; population of, 71, 89; per- 
centage of, in population, xxxi; purged, 
44, 240; sentiment against, 28, 32 

Jogaila. See Jagiello 

John Paul II, 45; support of, for Solidar- 
ity, 46; visits to Poland by, 94, 95 

Joint Episcopal and Government Com- 
mission, 94 

Joint Investment Fund, 162 

judges: appointment of, 195 

judiciary, 194-98; under communism, 
194; under Round Table Agreement, 
175, 194-98 

Justice, Ministry of, xlviii, 257 



Kaczyriski, Jaroslaw, xxxiv, 200 
Kaliningrad, xxxvi, 246 
Kania, Stanistaw, 47 
Kania government, 129 
Karkonosze Mountains, 57 
Karlowicz, Treaty of (1699), 16 
Kasprzak Radio Works, 281 
Kaszub, 264 
Katowice: airport, 159 
Katowice District, 68 
Katowice Steel Mill, 138 
Katyri Massacre, 36, 213-14 
Kazimierz III (the Great), 6-7, 101 ; con- 
quests of, 6 
KGB. See Committee for State Security 
Khrushchev, Nikita S., 42 
Kinkel, Klaus, 222 

Kiszczak, Czesiaw, 176, 243, 270, 284, 
286 

Klaus, Vaclav, 220 

KLD. See Liberal-Democratic Con- 
gress 

Kochanowski, Jan, 13 

Kohl, Helmut, 221 

Kolobrzeg naval base, 263 

Kolodziejczyk, Piotr, 252 

Komitet Obrony Robotnikow. See Com- 
mittee for Defense of Workers 

Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglej. See 
Confederation for an Independent Po- 
land 

Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny. See 

Liberal-Democratic Congress 
Konwent Seniorow. ^Council of Elders 
Kopernik, Mikolaj. See Copernicus, 
Nicolaus 

KOR. See Committee for Defense of Work- 
ers 

Kosciuszko, Tadeusz, 22, 234 

Koszalin airport, 159 

KPN. See Confederation for an Indepen- 
dent Poland 

Krakow: airport, 159; military district in, 
256, 259, 260-61 

Krakow, Congress of (1364), 6 

Krakow University, 101 

Krasnik Bail-Bearing Plant, 281 

Kravchuk, Leonid, 218 

Krewo, Union of (1385), 8 

Kuklinski, Ryszard, 270 

Kultura (Culture), 207 

Kurori, Jacek, 183, 199, 201 

Kwasniewski, Aleksander, xlvi 



342 



Index 



labor: allocation, 121; shortages of, 122; 

transfers, 122 
Labor and Social Policy, Ministry of, 112 
Labor Party: outlawed, 198 
labor unions, 47, 121; participation in, by 

soldiers, 269 
Laczkowski, Pawel, 204 
Lake District, 56; forests in, 60 
lakes: pollution in, 63 
land: area, 56-57; distribution, 78; 

privatization of, 43 
Latvia: recognition of, 215; relations with, 

217 
lead, 119 

Lenin, Vladimir I., 31 

Lenin Iron and Steel Plant, 148 

Lenin Shipyard: strikes in, 44, 46 

L^towska, Ewa, 84 

Lewandowski, Janusz, 202 

Liberal-Democratic Congress (Kongres 

Liberalno-Demokratyczny — KLD), 

179, 181, 182, 202 
literacy rate, 56, 102 
literature, 13, 24 

Lithuania {see also Poland-Lithuania), 7, 
232; ethnic Poles in, 216, 246; military 
conflicts with, 246; nationalist move- 
ment in, 14; recognition of, 215; rela- 
tions with, xlix, 211, 215, 216-17, 249; 
and Teutonic Knights, 8-10 

Little Coalition, 184, 201-2 

Little Entente: attempt to join, 33, 235 

livestock, 152 

living standards, 124 

Locarno Pact (1926), 33 

Lodz, 138; population density in, 68 

Lokietek, Wladyslaw (the Short), 6 

London Club, xlix 

LOT. See Polish Airlines, 156 

Lublin: coal deposits in, 118 

Lublin, Union of (1569), 15 

Lucznik Works, 281 

Lutheran Church, 100 



Main Bureau of Penal Institutions, 289 
Main Education Board (Glowny Zarzad 

Wychowawczy— GZW), 275 
Main Political Administration (Glowne 

Biuro Administracji — MPA), 274-75 
Majdanek concentration camp, 36 
manufacturing: work force in, 120 



Mariavite Catholic Church of Poland, 100 

Marie Curie-Sklodowska University 
(Lublin), 106 

marketization, 130-33 

martial law, 191, 205, 241-42; declared, 
47, 129, 186, 199, 212, 238, 243; lift- 
ed, 48, 242; publishing under, 207 

Masuria, 60 

materiel, 248; domestic, 279, 281-83; ex- 
ports of, 282, 283-84; goals, 280; im- 
ports, 280; modernization of, 280; 
procurement of, 279-84; reductions in, 
279; retirement of, 260; from the Soviet 
Union, 279 

Mazowiecki, Tadeusz, 178, 201; as prime 
minister, 50, 63, 130, 243 

Mazowiecki government, 176, 178, 212; 
criticism of, 177, 178 

media: censorship of, 208; and politics, 
206-10 

Medical Military Academy, 277 
merchant marine, 156 
Methodist Church, 100 
Michnik, Adam, 199, 201 
Mickiewicz, Adam, 24 
Mieszko (prince), 4 

Milicja Obywatelska. See police, regular 
Military Counterintelligence Service, 239 
military districts, 254, 256, 260 
military officers: candidate schools, 277; 

education of, 275-77; nobles as, 238; 

as party members, 268; political, 237, 

274, 275, 275; shortage of, 271-74 
military personnel, 267-78; needs, 268; 

political involvement of, 268, 269; 

reductions in, 242, 260, 261; service re- 
quirements for, 243 
Military Service Law (1967), 270 
military strategy, 250-51, 253; air 

defense, 251; force concentration, 251; 

nonlinear defense, 250-51 
military training, 274-78; of conscripts, 

274-75; limits on, 275; reform of, 277 
mines: closed, 142; inefficiencies in, 142; 

subsidies for, 142 
mining: restructuring of, xlii, 142; work 

force in, 120 
Mitterrand, Francois, 224, 225 
MO. See police, regular 
Moczar, Mieczyslaw, 240 
Moczulski, Leszek, 204 
Moczydlowski, Pawel, 290 



343 



Poland: A Country Study 



Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, 236 
MONAR. See Young People's Movement 

to Combat Drug Addiction 
monarch: election of, 11, 15; foreign, 15; 

loss of power by, 17 
money supply, 162 
Mongol invasions, 6, 233 
monopolies, 137 
Moscow Declaration, 239 
Motorized Units of the Citizens' Militia 

(Zmotoryzowane Oddialy Milicji Oby- 

watelskiej— ZOMO), 241, 286 
mountains, 57-60 
Mount Rysy, 57 

MP A. See Main Political Administration 
Muravev, Mikhail, 26 

Najwyzsza Izba Kontroli. See Supreme 

Control Chamber 
Narodowy Bank Polski. ^National Bank 

of Poland 
National Assembly, xxxii 
National Bank of Poland (Narodowy 

Bank Polski— NBP), 84, 136, 159, 160 
national cleansing (sanacja), 32 
National Coalition of Labor Unions, 121 
National Defense, Commission on, 248, 

255 

National Defense, Ministry of, xlviii, 256, 
267, 270; civilian control over, 258; re- 
form of, 232, 243, 254 

National Defense Academy (Akademia 
Obrony Narodowej— AON), 256, 277 

National Defense Committee, xlvii, 248; 
military affairs under, 239 

National Democracy, 28; outlawed, 198 

National Drug Bureau, 110 

National Economic Plan, 126 

National Education, Commission on, 101 

National Education, Ministry of, 103, 104 

national income. See net material product 

nationalism, 23-25 

National Judicial Council, 195 

national origins, 3-5 

national security, 244-53; agencies, 
258-59; influences on, 231; threat per- 
ception in, 244-47; threats to, 232 

National Security Bureau (Biuro Bezpie- 
czenstwa Narodowego — BBN), 249, 
258; defense doctrine, 259 

National Security Council, xlvii; formed, 
258; tasks of, 258 



National Territorial Defense Forces 
(Obrona Terytorium Kraju — OTK), 
254, 267 

NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Or- 
ganization 
natural resources, 117, 118-21; fuels, 

118-20; minerals, 118-20 
naval aviation, 265-66; equipment of, 

265-66; personnel, 265 
navy, 263-66; bases, 263; fleet of, 
263-65; lines of command in, 254; 
number of personnel in, 263; service 
terms in, 271 
NBP. See National Bank of Poland 
Netherlands: investment from, 168 
net material product (NMP): growth rate 

of, 121, 129 
Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission 

for Korea (NNSC Korea), 261 
NIK. See Supreme Control Chamber 
1967 Arab-Israeli War, 240 
NMP. See net material product 
NNSC Korea. See Neutral Nations Super- 
visory Commission for Korea 
nobility, 11, 14; end of, 55; expansion of, 
15; revolts against, 26; rights of, 11; in 
rural areas, 10; solidarity of, 11 
North Atlantic Cooperation Council, 220 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO): membership in, xlix, 174, 
201, 212, 219, 225, 249, 252; role of, 
244 

Northern Shipyards, 281, 282 
Norway: trade with, 143 
Notec River, 60 
November Revolt, 25 
Nozko, Kazimierz, 268 
Nysa Euro region, xxxvi 

Obrona Terytorium Kraju. See National 

Territorial Defense Forces 
Ochotnicza Reserwa Milicji Obywatel- 

skiej. See Citizens' Militia Voluntary 

Reserve 

Oddzialy Prewencji Milicji Obywatel- 
skiej. See Preventive Units of the Citi- 
zens' Militia 

Oder-Neisse Line, 41; German recogni- 
tion of, 174, 211, 221, 246, 250 

Oder (Odra) River, 57, 60 

OECD. See Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development 



344 



Index 



Ogolnopolskie Porozumienie Zwiazkow 
Zawodowych. See All-Polish Alliance of 
Trade Unions 

oil, 143-44; fields, 119; imports, 143-44, 
213, 214; pipelines, 143, 156; produc- 
tion, 143; refining, 141, 143; reserves, 
119; supplies of, xliii, 124, 143 

Ok^cie International airport, 156 

Old Lutheran Church, 99-100 

Olkusz Enamel Plant, 281 

Olszewski, Jan, 179, 201, 204; econom- 
ic plan of, xxxviii-xxxix; as prime 
minister, xxxii, 249, 259; voted out, 
182 

Olszewski government, 181-83; coalition 
in, 181, 182; economic reform under, 
140; scandals in, 182 

Olsztyn District, 73 

Onyszkiewicz, Janusz, 183, 252, 257, 269 
OPEC. See Organization of Petroleum 

Exporting Countries 
Operation Desert Storm, 225 
OPMO. See Preventive Units of the 

Citizens' Militia 
OPZZ. See All-Polish Alliance of Trade 

Unions 
Organic Work, 26-27 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation 

and Development (OECD), 224 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting 

Countries (OPEC): imports from, 144 
ORMO. See Citizens' Militia Voluntary 

Reserve 
Oswi^cim Basin, 60 
OTK. See National Territorial Defense 

Forces 
Otto I, 4 

Ottoman Empire, 16; conquest by, 10; 
peace concluded with, (1533), 10; wars 
with, 16, 233 

Overseas Private Investment Corpora- 
tion, 224 

Ownership Transformation, Ministry of, 
xli 



Paris Club, xli, 167, 224 

parliament. See Sejm 

Partia Chrescijanskich Demokratow. See 
Party of Christian Democrats 

partitions, 17-22, 234; first, 17-19; sec- 
ond, 21; third, 22 



Partnership for Peace, xlix 
Partisans, 240 

Party of Christian Democrats (Partia 
Chrescijanskich Demokratow — 
PChD), 204 

Parys, Jan, 182, 249, 257, 258 

Passenger Car Plant, 149 

Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth 
(Patriotyczny Ruch Odrodzenia 
Narodowego— PRON), 197 

Patriotyczny Ruch Odrodzenia Naro- 
dowego. See Patriotic Movement for 
National Rebirth 

Patronat, 290 

Pawlak, Waldemar, 205; as prime 
minister, xlvi, 183, 201, 203 

PC. See Center Alliance 

PChD. See Party of the Christian Demo- 
crats 

Peasant Alliance (Porozumienie Lu- 
dowe— PL), 202-3 

peasants: conditions for, 11, 14; educa- 
tion of, 76; emancipated, 19; resistance 
by, to collectivization, 42, 78; revolts 
by, 26; social welfare for, 80-81 

Penal Code of the Polish People's Repub- 
lic (1969), 289 

penal system, 289-91; under com- 
munism, 290; political role of, 290; re- 
form of, 290-91 

Pentagonale. See Central European In- 
itiative 

People's Army (Armia Ludowa), 39 

perestroika, 49 

Permanent Council, 19 

Persian Gulf War, 252 

Piast Dynasty, 4; end of, 6 

Pilsudski, Jozef, 28, 29, 235; jailed, 30; 
as military leader, 31, 234; as head of 
state, 30, 31-33, 235 

Pius XII (pope), 99 

PL. See Peasant Alliance 

planning, economic, xxix, xxxvii, 123-24, 
127, 131 

Planning Commission, 112 

Plock oil refinery, 143 

Poland-Lithuania, xxix, 7-15, 233; 
decline of, 16-17; as a European Pow- 
er, 10; government of, 11; during the 
Reformation, 12-13 

Polanie (Poliane), 4 

police, 287; budget for, 287; changes in, 
287-88; public view of, 288 



345 



Poland: A Country Study 



police, regular (Milicja Obywatelska — 

MO), 1 
police, riot, 284 

police, secret: collaboration with. 285; un- 
der Gomulka. 43 
Policja, 287 

Polish Academy of Learning, 102 
Polish Airlines (Polskie Linie Lotnicze — 

LOT). 156 
Polish-American Enterprise Fund 

(PAEF), 224 
Polish Armed Forces (Wojska Polskie). See 

armed forces 
Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church, 

74 

Polish Aviation Combine, 281 

Polish Beer-Lovers' Party (Polska Partia 

PrzyjacicM Piwa— PPPP), 202 
Polish Catholic Bishops' Conference. 100 
Polish Committee of National Liberation 

{see also Lublin Committee), 39 
Polish Democratic Society: revolt by, 

25-26 

Polish Development Bank, 161, 162 
Polish Economic Program, 202 
Polish Economic Society, 129 
Polish Ecumenical Council, 98, 100 
Polish Episcopate, 95 
Polish First Army, 236 
Polish General Staff. 238 
Polish language, 65-66; dialects of, 66; 

and national identity, 65; restrictions 

on. 27, 92 
Polish Legion, 234 

Polish National Catholic Church, 100 

Polish National Committee: formed, 29 

Polish October, 43 

Polish Optical Works, 281 

Polish Peasant Party (Polskie Stronnict- 

wo Ludowe— PSL), xlvi, 41 . 181 . 203, 

206; outlawed, 198 
Polish Peasant Party "Renewal," 206 
Polish People's Army. See army 
Polish Radio and Television Network, 

159 

Polish Republic. Second. 30-31 
Polish Savings Office, 159 
Polish Socialist Party, 28 
Polish Stabilization Fund, 224 
Polish State Railroads, 156 
Polish Teachers' Association, 102 
Polish United Workers' Party (Polska 
Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza — 



PZPR), xxxii, 41, 126, 205-6; con- 
gresses of, 50; under constitution of 
1952, 185; as elite class, 68, 71, 76; 
formed, 198, 237; loss of power by, 
174, 200, 205, 268; members, 47, 205, 
241, 268; military policy under, 253; 
split in, 42 

Polish Workers' Party (Polska Partia 
Robotnicza), 39 

political parties {see also under individual par- 
ties), 198-206; participation in, by sol- 
diers, 269 

political reform, 242; following revolution 

of 1989, xxx; under Jaruzelski, 49 
political unrest {see also revolutions of 

1989), 22, 25, 43, 55, 95, 124; and 

changes of government, xxix-xx, 93; 

over education, 103; by farmers, 135; 

over food prices, 94; over housing, 87; 

over inflation, 129; repression of, 238; 

by workers, 44, 45, 126, 127, 128, 238, 

240 

Polity ka (Politics), 208 

Polska Partia Przyjaciol Piwa. See Polish 
Beer-Lovers' Party 

Polska Partia Robotnicza. See Polish Work- 
ers' Party 

Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza. 

See Polish United Workers' Party 
Polskie Linie Lotnicze. Polish Airlines 
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe. See Polish 

Peasant Party 
Pomerania, 60 

Pomerania Euroregion, xxxvi 

Pomeranian Bay, 60 

Pomeranian Military District, 260 

Poniatowski, Jozef. 23, 234 

Poniatowski, Stanistaw August, 17-19 

Popieluszko, Jerzy, 48, 94, 225, 242, 285 

population: age distribution in, 56, 66, 
67, 120; of Belarusians, 74-75; densi- 
ty, 62, 68; distribution of, 68; of Ger- 
mans, 72; of Gypsies, 75; of Jews, 71; 
in 1939, 65; in'l946, 65; in 1991, 66; 
in 2000, 66; percentage of, involved in 
agriculture. 78; percentage of Catho- 
lics in, 89; urban, 67, 120; of Ukraini- 
ans, 74 

population statistics: birth rate, 56, 67; 
death rate, 67; growth rate, xliv, 66-67; 
infant mortality rate, 62, 109; life ex- 
pectancy, 62, 66; mortality rate, 107, 
109; sex ratio, 66; structure of, 66-67 



346 



Index 



Porozumienie Centrum. See Center Al- 
liance 

Porozumienie Ludowe. See Peasant Al- 
liance 
ports, 156 

potop (deluge), 15-16 

Potsdam Conference (1945), 40 

poverty, 113 

Poznan: airport, 159; riots in, 43, 126, 
238 

Poznan University, 101 

PPPP. See Polish Beer-Lovers' Party 

Prague Spring, 44 

president {see also executive branch): un- 
der communist rule, xxxii; duties of, 
190; election of, 187, 189; eligibility re- 
quirements, 189; legislative preroga- 
tives of, 190-91; military under, 255; 
powers of, 179, 189; role of, xxxiii- 
xxxiv; under Round Table Agreement, 
175, 189; term of, 189; vacating office, 
189-90 

Presidium of the Sejm, 191 

press: freedom of expression in, 207-8; 
opposition, 207; role of, 173 

Preventive Units of the Citizens' Militia 
(Oddzialy Prewencji Milicji Obywatel- 
skiej— OPMO), 286 

prices: of coal, 143; deregulation of, 
xxxviii; for food, 45; increases in, 45, 
134; regulation of, 122-23, 128 

prime minister: military under, 255; 
naming of, 190 

prime minister, deputy, 183 

prisoners: number of, 289; political, 290; 
rate of imprisonment of, 289 

prisons: conditions in, 289, 291; popula- 
tion of, 291 

private sector: employment in, xxxix; 
farms, 152; growth of, xlviii; percent- 
age of work force in, xlviii; productivi- 
ty, xxxix 

privatization, xxx, xxxviii, xliv, 118, 
138-39, 149, 169; of agriculture, 43; of 
banking, 160; capital vouchers in, 139; 
of housing, 89; method of, xli-xlii; 
preparations for, 138; rate of, xli; of 
state enterprises, xli 

productivity, xxxix, 134 

professional classes, 82 

PRON. See Patriotic Movement for Na- 
tional Rebirth 

Pronit firm, 281 



Prosecution Office, Law on the (1990), 
257 

prosecutor general, 197 

Protestantism, 13; followers in popula- 
tion, 89; persecution of, 12 

Prussia, 19, 234 

PSL. See Polish Peasant Party 

Public Education, Committee for, 102 

publishing: books, 209; of Catholic 
Church, 94, 207, 208; under martial 
law, 207; underground, 207 

purges: of Jews, 44 

PZPR. See Polish United Workers' Party 



radio, 159, 209-10; church influence 
over, xxxv, xliii; freedom in, 173; sta- 
tions, private, 159; stations, state, 159 

Radio and Television, Committee for, 
208-9 

Radio Free Europe, 209 
railroads, 156 
Rakowski, Miczysiaw, 175 
recovery, economic, xliv-xlv 
Red Army, 234-35 

reform economic, xxxvii; accomplish- 
ments of, 169; attempts at, 44, 117, 
126; under Mazowiecki government, 
130-31; under Olszewski government, 
140, 181-82 

Reformation, 12-13 

Reformed (Calvinist) Church, 100 

refugees, 29, 288; crimes by, 288; to Ger- 
many, xxxvi; from former Soviet 
Union, xxxvi; from Yugoslavia, xxxvi 

religion (see also under individual sects), 
89-100; distribution of, in population, 
89; diversity of, 13; freedom of, 12-13; 
intolerance of, 16; military participa- 
tion in, 269; tolerance of, 12 

Rej, Mikoiaj, 13 

Renaissance, 13 

rents, 121 

Res Publica, 208 

revenue: sources of, xlviii 

revolutions of 1989: role of Poland in, xxx 

Riga, Treaty of (1921), 31, 246 

rivers: pollution in, 62-63 

roads, 156 

Rokossovskii, Konstantin, 238, 239 
Roman Catholic Church. See Catholic 
Church, Roman 



347 



Poland: A Country Study 



Romania, 214; in Little Entente, 235 
romanticism: impact of, 23-25 
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 40 
Round Table Agreement (1989), xxxii, 
103-4, 173, 175-76, 208; constitutional 
amendments under, 187; freedoms un- 
der, 175; government under, 198 
Round Table talks (1989), 173 
rural areas: agricultural workers in, 80; 
infrastructure of, 80; migration to, 81; 
nobility in, 10; population in, 67, 68; 
religion in, 97; women in, 66 
Rural Solidarity, 46, 202, 206 
Rurik, 14 

Russia {see also Soviet Union), 29, 245; 
domination by, xxix, 17, 19, 25, 30, 
231, 233-34; fear of, 244; invasion by, 
20; military conflict with, 15; policy 
toward, xxxv-xxxvi, xxxvii; relations 
with, xxxvii, 212-15, 249; revolt 
against, 25; trade with, 137-38, 144; 
treaty with, 252; withdrawal of troops 
by, 173-74, 213, 214 

Russian Revolution, 30 

Rzeczpospolita (Republic), 208 



salt mining, 119-20 
Samsonowicz, Henryk, 104 
Sandomierz Basin, 57 
SB. See Security Service 
scandals, 182, 285 

schools: college preparatory, 105-6; en- 
rollment in, 104, 105; kindergarten, 
105; primary, 105; private, 104; reli- 
gious, 103, 106; secondary, 105; voca- 
tional, 102, 105-6 

SdRP. See Social Democracy of the 
Republic of Poland 

Security Service (Sluzba Bezpieczenstwa — 
SB), 239, 284 

Sejm, 175, 191-92; accomplishments of, 
xxxiv; budget under, 192; coalition in, 
180; committees of, 191-92; elections 
for, 180; marshal of, 191; members of, 
xxxiv, 191, 198; military under, 255; 
operation of, 11; terms in, 191 

Senate, xxxii; elections for, 192; functions 
of, 192; members of, 192; revived, 175 

serfs: liberated, 26 

service sector: neglect of, 124; workers in, 
78 



SG. See Border Guard 

shipbuilding, xlii, 150-51; exports by, 
150; license agreements in, 150; re- 
structuring of, 151 

Sienkewicz, Henryk, 16 

Sigismund II Augustus, 14; death of, 15 

Sigismund III Vasa, 15 

Sikorski, Wladyslaw, 37 

Silesia: coal deposits in, 118; division of, 
31; ethnic tensions in, xlvii-xlviii; Ger- 
mans in, 72 

Silesia-Krakow Upthrust, 57 

Silesian Lowlands, 57 

Silesian Military District, 260 

Silesian University (Katowice), 106 

Siwicki, Florian, 242-43, 254 

Six- Year Plan, First (1950-55), 42, 126 

Skubiszewski, Krzysztof, xxxv, 179, 184, 
210, 212, 213, 215, 216, 219, 220 

slavery: under Nazis, 36 

Slavic tribes; migration of, 4 

SLD. See Alliance of the Democratic Left 

Slovakia: in Visegrad Group, xxxvii 

Slovak people, 4 

Slovenia, 220 

Slupsk airport, 159 

Sluzba Bezpieczenstwa. See Security 
Service 

Sobieski, Jan, 16, 233 

Social Cultural Association, 73 

Social Democracy of the Republic of 
Poland (Socjaldemokracja Rzeczy- 
pospolitej Polski— SdRP), 178, 180, 
181, 184; platform of, 205 

social policy: role of church in, xlii-xliii 

Social Relations and Education, Vice- 
ministry for, 256 

social relationships, 82-83 

social services, xxx; under Balcerowicz 
Plan, 107, 140; for peasants, 80-81 

Sofia Agreement (1949), 122 

Socjaldemokracja Rzeczypospolitej Pol- 
ski. See Social Democracy of the Repub- 
lic of Poland 

Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej . See Alli- 
ance of the Democratic Left 

Solidarity (Solidarnosc) {see also Interfac- 
tory Strike Committee), 49, 121, 198- 
99, 240; banned, 48, 174, 199-200; 
church support for, xxxi; communist 
resistance to, 46-47; in elections, 130, 
176; formed, 129; in government, 176; 
legalized, 174, 175; loss of power, 



348 



Index 



xxxiv, 47; members of, 46; negotiations 
of, with communists, 95, 174; origins 
of, 39, 45-47; political dissension by, 
xxx; social impact of, 83; support for, 
46, 77, 240-41; underground operation 
of, 48, 199-200 

Solidarnosc. See Solidarity 

Soviet Bloc: role in, xxix 

Soviet Union (see also Russia): attack by, 
31, 34; attempted coup d'etat in, 214, 
219-20, 252; end of, 137, 245; in- 
fluence of, 45, 185-86, 198, 236, 237; 
invasion of Hungary by, 239; liberation 
by, from Nazis, 38-39, 234; materiel 
acquired from, 279; military assistance 
from, 238, 239; Molotov-Ribbentrop 
pact, 34, 236; occupation by, 36, 68, 
231, 247; policy toward, xxxv; relations 
with, 212-15; trade balance with, 
164-66; trade with, 119, 123, 124, 137, 
138, 143, 164, 167, 213; treaty with, 
214, 215; withdrawal of troops by, 
173-74, 213, 214, 243-44, 246, 280 

Spychalski, Marian, 240 

stabilization, economic, 130-33 

Stalin, Joseph V., 34, 37, 117; Khru- 
shchev's attack on, 42 

Stalowa Wola Steel Works, 281, 282 

Stanislaw (saint), 5 

Stanislaw August (king), 19, 101 

Starachowice Truck Factory, 281 

state enterprises, 118; accounting system 
in, 136; financial structure of, xl; 
privatization of, xli, 138-39; reorgani- 
zation of, 127, 132, 137, 138; work 
force in, 120 

State Environmental Protection Inspec- 
torate, 64 

State Insurance Company, 160 

state of emergency, 191 

State Protection, Office of (Urzad Ochro- 
ny Panstwa— UOP), 285 

State Security, Committee for (Komitet 
gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti — KGB), 
238 

State Treasury, xli 

State Tribunal, 186, 188, 196-97 

Stelmaszuk, Zdzislaw, 252, 280 

Stomil Tire Plant, 281 

Straznik Graniczny. See Border Guard 

strikes, xl, 44, 46, 49, 82, 95, 199; armed 

forces used in, 269, 270 
student demonstrations, 103 



Student Solidarity, Committee for, 45 

subsidies, xlviii, 123; end of , xxxvii, 132; 
for mines, 142; for transportation, 156; 
for utility bills, 121, 141 

Suchocka, Hanna, 84, 202, 205, 220; sup- 
port for, xxxv, xlv, xlvi 

Suchocka government, xxx-xxxi, xxxiv- 
xxxv, 183-84, 257; expansion of spe- 
cial powers of, xxxiii 

Sudeten Mountains, 57 

sulfur, 119; mining, 124 

Support for Eastern European Democracy 
Act, 224 

Supreme Administrative Court, 196 
Supreme Control Chamber (Najwyzsza 

Izba Kontroli— NIK), 186, 192-93 
Supreme Court, 195-96; duties of, 195; 

justices of, 195, 196 
Suvorov, Aleksandr, 22 
Sweden: investment from, 168; military 

conflict with, 15; trade with, 119 
Swinoujscie: naval base, 263; port of, 156 
Switzerland: investment from, 168 
Szczecin, port of, 156 
szlachta. See nobility 



tactics, military, 250-51 
Targowica, Confederation of, 20 
Tatars, 233 
Tatra Range, 57 
taxes, xlviii 

Technical Military Academy, 277 
technology: imported, 127, 148 
telephones, 159 

television, 159, 209-10; church influence 
over, xxxv, xliii; freedom in, 173; sta- 
tions, private, 159, 210; stations, state, 
159 

Teutonic Knights, 6, 7; campaigns 
against, 8-10, 233; defeat of, 10 

Thatcher, Margaret, 225 

threat perception, 244-47 

topography, 57-60; elevation, 57; zones, 
57-60 

trade (see also exports; imports; balance of 
trade), 162-70; with Comecon, 117, 
123, 129, 130, 163; deficit, xlix; with 
European Community, xxxix-xl, 129; 
mechanisms, 163-64; policy, xlviii, 
117; by private sector, xxxix; reform of, 
164; with Soviet Union, 119, 123, 124, 



349 



Poland: A Country Study 



213; state monopoly on, 163; with 

West, 137 
transportation, 156-59; airports, 156-59; 

modernization of, 131; private-sector, 

139; railroads, 156; roads, 156; work 

force in, 120 
Treblinka concentration camp, 36 
Trybuna Ludu (People's Tribune), 208 
Turkey: military conflict with, 15, 233 
Tusk, Donald, 202 

Tygodnik Powszechny (Universal Weekly), 
207, 209 

Tygodnik Solidarnosc (Solidarity Weekly), 

207, 209 
Tyminski, Stanislaw, 178 

UD. See Democratic Union 

Ukraine, 231, 234, 245; divided, 31; mili- 
tary conflicts with, 246; nationalist 
movement in, 14; relations with, xxxv, 
xlix, 215, 218, 249; trade with, 137-38 

Ukrainian Resistance Army, 246 

Ukrainians, 71, 73-74, 238; number of, 
74; percentage of, in population, xxi, 74 

Ukrainian Social and Cultural Society, 74 

unemployment, xxxviii, xxxix, 77, 282; 
under Balcerowicz Plan, 118, 121, 136, 
138; benefits, 112-13; rate of, 134; of 
women, 85 

Unia Demokratyczna. See Democratic 
Union 

Uniate Church. See Greek Catholic 
Church 

Union of Military Youth, 275 
Union of Polish Patriots, 37 
Union of Ukrainians in Poland, 74 
United Nations: advice from, 148-49; 

membership in, 225; peacekeeping 

forces, 261 
United Nations Children's Emergency 

Fund, 225 
United Nations Conference on Trade and 

Development, 225 
United Nations Educational, Scientific, 

and Cultural Organization, 225 
United Nations Food and Agriculture Or- 
ganization, 225 
United Nations Industrial Development 

Organization, 225 
United Peasant Party (Zjednoczone Stron- 

nictwo Ludowe— ZSL), 175, 176, 186, 

198, 206 



United States: advice from, 148-49; aid 
from, 140, 224; economic sanctions by, 
222; investment from, 168, 224; rela- 
tions with, 212, 222-24; trade with, 212 

universities: brain drain from, 107; 
closed, 48; degrees from, 106; enroll- 
ment in, 106; entrance exams for, 106; 
military training in, 271 

University of Krakow, 6, 13, 27 

University of L'vov, 27 

UOP. See Office of State Protection 

urban areas: population in, 67, 120; 
professional class in, 28; working class 
in, 120 

urbanization, 10, 27, 68 

urban migration, 28, 81 

Urzad Ochrony Panstwa. See Office of 
State Protection 

Utrecht, Union of, 100 



Versailles, Treaty of (1919), 31 
Vienna, Congress of (1815), 23 
Vilnius: ghetto uprising in, 38 
Viritim officers' group, 270 
Visegrad Group, xlix; members of, xxxvii 
Visegrad Triangle, 252-53; defense 
cooperation in, 259; exports to, xxxix- 
xl; members of, xxxvii, 211; relations 
with, 218-20; summit, 219 
Vistula Basin, 60 

Vistula (Wisla) River, 57, 60; pollution 

in, 62 
Voice of America, 209 
Volvo, 149-50 



wages, xxxviii, 121, 124, 132, 134; 
declines in, 134, 135; increases in, 127, 
128 

Walesa, Lech, 72, 178, 219; awarded 
Nobel Peace Prize, 48; decline in sup- 
port for, xxxv, xlv, xlvi; jailed, 48; as 
president, xxxii, xxxiii-xxxiv, 176, 177, 
179, 189, 218, 243, 249, 257, 269, 270; 
relations of, with Democratic Union, 
201; secret police scandal, 285; as strike 
leader, 46, 199; visit to Moscow, 214, 
215; visit to Washington, 224 

Warsaw (Warszawa): airport, 159; ghet- 
to uprising in, 38; military district, 
254, 260-61; population density in, 68; 



350 



Index 



port of, 156 

Warsaw, Duchy of, 23 

Warsaw Pact, 241, 250; end of, 210, 231, 
244, 252; invasion of Czechoslovakia 
by, 44, 241, 243; obligations in, 243, 
244-45, 247, 250, 252, 263; restructur- 
ing of, 242, 245 

Warsaw Stock Exchange, xli, 161, 169 

Warsaw Technical School, 106 

Warsaw University, 84, 101, 106 

Warszawa, 264 

Warta River, 60 

waterways, 156 

welfare, 107, 111-13; assistance, demand 

for, 113; benefits, 112-13; cuts in, 111; 

pensions, 112, 140; restructuring of, 

111; structure of, 112 
Western European Union (WEU), 

212 

WEU. See Western European Union 
Wifama Textile Machinery Combine, 
281 

Wilno (Vilnius) University, 101 

Wilson, Woodrow, 30 

Wisla Shipyards, 281 

Wladyslaw II (see also Jagiello, Wlady- 
slaw), 8 

Woerner, Manfred, 252 

Wojska Obrony Wewnetrznej. See Inter- 
nal Defense Forces 

Wojska Ochrony Pogranicza. See Border 
Guard Troops 

Wojska Polskie. See armed forces 

women: discrimination against, 86; edu- 
cation of, 84; as farmers, 85-86; as 
mothers, 84; opportunities for, 84; as 
percentage of population, 66; in posi- 
tions of power, 84; professions of, 84; 
rights of, 86; roles of, 83-86; rural, 66; 
traditional roles of, 84, 86; unemploy- 
ment of, 85; work day of, 85; in work 
force, 83, 122 

women's liberation movement, 84-85 

WOP. See Border Guard Troops 

workers, xxxiv; education of, 76, 120; 
layoffs of, 138; opposition of, to com- 
munist rule, 45; protests by, 44, 45, 46, 
126, 127, 128, 238, 240 

Workers' Publication Cooperative Press- 
Book-Movement, 208 

work force, 120-21; percentage of, in pri- 
vate sector, xlviii; percentage of, unem- 
ployed, 134; size of, 120; women as 



percentage of, 83 
working class, 77-82; composition of, 77; 
origins of, 41; role of family in, 82; ur- 
ban, 120 

World Bank: advice from, 143, 147, 154; 

aid from, 140, 160, 168 
World Health Organization (WHO), 

109, 225 

World War I, 28-30, 234; casualties in, 
29, 234 

World War II, 34-39, 236-37; casualties 

in, 34; effects of, 55; origins of, 34 
WOW. See Internal Defense Forces 267 
Wojtyla, Karol (see also John Paul II 

(pope)), 45, 94 
Wprost (Straightforward), 208-9 
Wroclaw: military district, 254, 260; port 
of, 156 

Wyszynski, Stefan (cardinal), 45, 99; 
death of, 94; jailed, 42, 93; opposition 
to, 96 



Yalta Conference (1945), 40 
Yeltsin, Boris, 214 

Young People's Movement to Combat 
Drug Addiction (MONAR), 111 

Yugoslavia: in Central European Ini- 
tiative, xxxvii, 219; in Little Entente, 
235 



ZChN. See Christian National Union 
Zeszyty Historyczne (Historical Notebooks), 
207 

Zielona Gora: airport, 159; coal deposits 

in, 118 
zinc, 119 

Zjednoczenie Chrzescijansko-Narodowe. 

See Christian National Union 
Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe. See 

United Peasant Party 
Zmotoryzowane Oddzialy Milicji Oby- 

watelskiej. See Motorized Units of the 

Citizens' Militia 
Znak, 198, 199 

ZOMO. See Motorized Units of the Citi- 
zens' Militia 
ZSL. See United Peasant Party 



351 



Contributors 



Ronald D. Bachman is Area Specialist for Poland and Eastern 
Europe, European Division, Library of Congress, Washing- 
ton, D.C. 

Glenn E. Curtis is Senior Research Analyst in East European 
Affairs, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 
Washington, D.C. 

Zbigniew M. Fallenbuchl is Professor Emeritus of Economics, 
University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario, Canada. 

Neal Pease is Associate Professor of History, University of 
Wisconsin-Green Bay. 



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